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ON 16 JULY 2011, Trouw newspaper published an interview with Bishop 
Hans van den Hende, the newly appointed leader of the Diocese of 
Rotterdam. During the conversation, he had seized the opportunity to 
protest against the public image of the Dutch bishops being in constant 
disagreement, stating that “there is more that binds us together, than holds 
us apart”.1 Van den Hende also talked about his new position in an open 
and enthusiastic way. Addressing the basic features of the Diocese of 
Rotterdam, he noted that the area contained 520,000 Catholics. They 
made up only 14 percent of the entire population of the Province of South-
Holland, thus forming a minority group. When requested to reflect upon 
the future number of priests in the Diocese of Breda, the diocese he 
governed until May 2011 and still managed until a successor could be 
found, he replied that he had not studied the statistics enough to make any 
exact claims.  
This interview demonstrates at least two things. Firstly, that Van den 
Hende used quantitative data in order to sketch the basic socio-religious 
contours of one of the dioceses he led. Secondly, that the bishop was not 
able to precisely reproduce all the figures, yet suggested that statistics were a 
legitimate avenue to understanding ‘reality’ in an exact manner. In this 
cultural-historical study, I examine the developing bonds between 
sociological ‘expertise’ and episcopal decision making in the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War. Even though the Catholic Church and 
the application of sociology do not seem an obvious match, bishops and 
their vicars-general from 1945 onwards increasingly turned to sociologists of 
                                                          
1  ‘Geen verdeeldheid bisschoppen’, in: Trouw, 16-07-2011. 
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religion. These sociologists of religion calculated churchgoers, tabulated 
mixed marriages, determined where new churches had to be erected, polled 
thousands of Catholics, and served on advisory bodies, thereby shifting 
established boundaries of knowing, and influencing routines of episcopal 
decision making. Hence, the focus of this book is both an inner-ecclesiastical 
and actor-oriented one. Larger social developments are taken into account 
only in order to explain the historical backgrounds of episcopal policy.  
Sociology was also applied in the Protestant Churches in the 
Netherlands. 2  This application, however, will not be investigated in the 
following chapters. This study concentrates on the intellectual and 
performative roles of sociologists of religion in the decision making processes 
of the Dutch bishops in the post-war Netherlands. In the first section of this 
introduction, I shall clarify the central research question through a review of 
relevant themes in recent historiography. Attention will be paid to 
secularisation, Church renewal, and socio-religious engineering. In the 
second section, I shall discuss the most important types of primary sources 
used in this book, and briefly outline the way in which the book is 
structured.  
 
 
I. RESEARCH THEMES AND QUESTIONS 
 
Secularisation 
The questions of what religious transformations took place throughout 
Europe in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and why, form one of the 
most debated topics in recent historiography. The issue of continuity or 
discontinuity is also at the heart of debate. Historians, theologians, and 
sociologists have taken part in these debates during the last few decades. In 
fact, discussions often emerged from a sociologically informed research 
agenda. Prominent on this agenda stood the concept of ‘secularisation’, in 
its most basic form defined as a decreasing impact of religion on everyday 
lives.3  
On the international level, British historiography is a common frame 
of reference when it comes to an analysis of secularisation as a historical 
phenomenon. Anglican priest and self-made sociologist Edward Wickham 
set the tone in 1957 with his book Church and People in an Industrial City. 
Integrating plentiful statistics into his analysis of religious practices in the 
town of Sheffield after 1800, Wickham held that working class people 
gradually turned their back on the Church, and fell into disbelief.4 The 
clergy failed in anticipating the processes of industrialisation and 
urbanisation, especially by holding on to existing pastoral strategies and 
                                                          
2  Van den BOS, ‘De voorlichting der sociologie’. 
3  McLEOD, Secularisation in Western Europe, p. 13. See also: BROWN and SNAPE, 
Conceptualising Secularisation’, pp 3–5. 
4  WICKHAM, Church and People in an Industrial City, especially pp. 192–200. 
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vocabularies. In the decades to come, many scholars would support these 
claims.5 It was only in the 1980s that a revisionist movement originated. 
This revisionist movement, which examined popular belief rather than 
official ways of believing in the form of churchgoing, for instance, gained 
force in the 1990s and reached its height in 2001.  
In that year, historian Callum Brown published a monograph titled 
The Death of Christian Britain.6 Two lines of argument made this book an 
original contribution. First and foremost, Brown pointed at women as the 
primary instigators of change. He argued that they deliberately stopped 
adopting religious and moral codes of ‘feminine piety’, and, as a result, 
influenced entire families to become indifferent to religion. In addition, 
Brown contended that Great Britain was deeply religious until 1963, when 
Christianity ‘died’ over a short period of time. For the most part, he based 
his argument on written and oral testimonies. Brown questioned the value 
of ecclesiastical statistics for historical inquiry. Clergymen such as Wickham, 
who shaped the ‘myth of the unholy city’ in order to justify strategies of 
confessionalisation, gathered and displayed these statistics from 1750 
onwards. Lists of figures on religious practice gradually turned into key 
underpinnings of the secularisation thesis. Brown observed that “from the 
late eighteenth century to the present religion has been defined, measured, 
and ‘understood’ through ‘empirical’ evidence spawned by the supposed 
‘neutrality’ of social science”. 
In 2007, in a book titled The Religious Crisis of the 1960s, historian 
Hugh McLeod, who had already published numerous studies on 
secularisation in Great Britain at that time, focused on the Western World 
as a whole. He agreed with Brown as far as the relevance of the long 1960s 
(1958–1972) as a period of fundamental religious change was concerned: 
“In the religious history of the West, these years may come to be seen as 
marking a rupture as profound as that brought about by the Reformation”.7 
McLeod labelled this rupture as a ‘crisis’. What characterised the long 
1960s was a diminishing of the socialisation of individuals into membership 
of a Christian society, which started with a decline in their participation in 
rites of passage. In addition, the Church lost ground in social fields such as 
education and welfare, and became less dominant when it came to matters 
of law and morality. Both the rise of the welfare state in the post-war years 
and growing affluence had a significant impact on these developments. In 
contrast with Brown, McLeod’s periodisation was more refined, separating 
the ‘early 1960s’ (1958–1962) and its cautious openness to change from the 
‘mid 1960s’ (1963–1966) and its optimistic reformism, and from the ‘late 
1960s’ (1967–1974) and its apocalyptic atmosphere. With respect to the 
Dutch Catholic Church Province, McLeod noticed that the hopes for 
change were exceptionally high on all levels of Church hierarchy.  
                                                          
5  MORRIS, ‘The Strange Death of Christian Britain’, pp. 964–968. 
6  BROWN, The Death of Christian Britain, pp. 11 and 193–198. 
7  McLEOD, The Religious Crisis of the 1960s, pp. 1 and 257–265. 
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In 2012, historian James Kennedy departed from this particular 
analysis of the Dutch case.8 He argued that McLeod had focused too much 
on the Church as a site of ‘crisis’. According to Kennedy, religious 
transformations had significant consequences for the extensively networked 
Dutch subcultures as a whole. Taking into account ‘non-Church actors’, he 
underlined the ambivalence of these consequences. Whereas Dutch society 
lost its explicit Christian character from the second half of the 1960s 
onwards, the tight network of Christian organisations remained largely 
intact. 
Recently, a third strand of research was brought to prominence by 
historian Jeremy Morris, among others. What characterised this strand of 
research was not so much a quest for answers to the questions of when 
secularisation took place, what elements this process consisted of, and by 
what and whom it was influenced, but much more a historicisation of 
secularisation as a master narrative. According to Morris, it is vital to 
understand why so many came to believe in secularism as one of the most 
typical features of modern societies. In a review article, he expanded on the 
origins of the secularisation narrative in the late eighteenth century, when 
evangelical preachers such as John Wesley told stories of religious decay in 
urban areas. 9  Morris accentuated the narrative’s later sociological 
underpinnings. Under the influence of sociologists of religion who 
investigated churchgoing and scrutinised the social backgrounds of 
churchgoers, a portrait of religious decline with both soteriological and 
theological lines of reasoning became intertwined with authoritative 
sociological analyses, especially in the twentieth century: “The systematic 
collection of social data—a product largely of the scientific aspirations of 
social scientists in the nineteenth century—enabled the identification of 
inconvenient and undesirable trends, just as much as convenient and 
desirable ones. To measure churchgoing, to take the simplest example, was 
naturally also to enable the measurement of non-churchgoing”.  
The main contribution of Fact Factory to the debate on secularisation 
as a historical phenomenon is that it continues where Morris’s work left off. 
Even though Morris’s work did point at the relevance of the intellectual role 
played by sociologists of religion in the emergence and diffusion of the 
secularisation narrative, it did not analyse this role in detail. Such an 
analysis is relevant because, with secularisation, sociologists of religion 
produced a powerful analytical category which was adopted by 
contemporaries as well as by historians. Which sociologists coined and 
spread the secularisation narrative in the Dutch Church Province, when, 
how, and with what purpose? What cause-and-effect relationships, 
strengths, and weaknesses did this narrative identify? And what categories 
                                                          
8  KENNEDY, ‘Looking Beyond the Church’, especially pp. 476–480. 
9  MORRIS, ‘Secularization and Religious Experience’, pp. 205–218. This ‘third’ movement 
 in British historiography has already been identified as such: PAUL, Ziektegeschiedenissen,  
 pp. 12–15.  
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formed its discursive backbone? Such an attempt to highlight genealogical 
aspects of the secularisation narrative will be accompanied by a search for 
answers to questions on the process of Church reform. 
 
Church Renewal 
In Dutch historiography, ‘renewal’, rather than secularisation, has become 
the key category of analysis. The work of historian Peter van Rooden, who 
on the basis of a modest sample of interviews argued in 2004 that 
Christianity collapsed quite dramatically in the 1960s, and thus affirmed 
Brown’s thesis of a sudden death, is one of the few exceptions to this rule.10 
‘Renewal’ reflects an overarching theme of the Second Vatican Council 
(1962–1965).11 This theme was rooted in ‘aggiornamento’, the Italian word 
for ‘updating’ with which Pope John XXIII announced the council in 1959. 
Vatican II was effectuated in the Netherlands through the Pastoral Council 
(1966–1970). As many, particularly historians, have demonstrated, to seek a 
comprehension of reform policies is to anatomise Church politics. How 
have these Church politics been interpreted? Broadly speaking, two groups 
of scholars can be discerned. What sets these groups of scholars apart from 
one another is the fact that they have both given prominence to different 
elites who ‘renewed’ the Church. 
The first group has highlighted the way in which the ‘old elite’, or the 
Dutch bishops, embraced what they understood as a renewal of the Church 
in the long 1960s. Sociologist John Coleman SJ set the tone. In 1978, he 
published The Evolution of Dutch Catholicism. 12  After having received 
first-hand information from Jan van Kilsdonk SJ during his field work in the 
Netherlands, he divided the post-war years into three periods. Coleman 
argued that up to 1958, the leaders of the Dutch Church Province held on 
to existing structures of authority and were loyal to the Holy See. The 
Mandatory Letter of 1954, in which the bishops stated that Dutch 
Catholicism should maintain its internal unity, had to support this claim. 
Since 1958, and even more intensively from 1965 onwards, Archbishop 
Bernard Alfrink from the Archdiocese of Utrecht and newly appointed 
bishops such as Rinus Bekkers from the Diocese of Den Bosch, Gerard de 
Vet from the Diocese of Breda, and Jan van Dodewaard from the Diocese 
of Haarlem abandoned the unilateral strategy of their predecessors. Instead, 
they adopted a bilateral strategy centring around a dialogue with the laity. 
Coleman stated that in the late 1960s and early 1970s, they even acted as 
‘champions of renewal’ by openly advocating a liberalisation of priestly 
celibacy. 
In 1995, in a doctoral thesis titled Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw 
(Building New Babylon), Kennedy linked episcopal policy to general 
                                                          
10  Van ROODEN, ‘Oral history en het vreemde sterven van het Nederlandse  
christendom’, pp. 548–551.  
11  O’MALLEY, What happened at Vatican II, pp. 36–43. 
12  COLEMAN, The Evolution of Dutch Catholicism, especially pp. 88–261. 
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decision making in the Netherlands in the 1960s.13 He concluded that the 
bishops were far from unique. Similar to politicians and other authorities, 
these Church leaders promoted an ‘accommodation’ of their institute to the 
‘modern’ world in order to stand the test of time. Affected by a self-
conscious way of thinking which regarded traditional theology and older 
forms of organisation as outmoded, they became convinced that a religious 
‘crisis’ demanded ‘renewal’. On the basis of many contemporary articles, 
Kennedy directed much attention towards Bishop Bekkers. In an episode of 
the popular television show Brandpunt (Focal Point), broadcast by KRO 
(Katholieke Radio Omroep) on 21 March 1963, Bekkers stated that birth 
control was a matter of personal conscience, and thus moved away from the 
classical moral-theological notion of birth control as a sin.  
In a reaction to the emphasis placed on the bishops as agents of 
change, the second group of researchers has focused intensively on the 
impact of a ‘new elite’, or intellectuals, on episcopal decision making. 
Sociologist of religion Walter Goddijn OFM paved the way for this 
viewpoint with his 1973 book De beheerste kerk (The Deferred 
Revolution).14 Goddijn, who to a large degree, influenced the events he 
described, asserted that the global phenomenon of Church reform benefited 
from liberal bishops, critical intellectuals, and independent journalists. He 
put forward this argument after 1970 and 1972, years in which the Holy 
See intervened in what it deemed as a runaway Church Province through 
episcopal appointments.15  
Church historian Jan Bots SJ responded to both Goddijn and 
Coleman, albeit implicitly, in a 1981 study titled Zestig jaar katholicisme in 
Nederland (Sixty Years of Catholicism in the Netherlands). Bots’s argument 
rested on a dichotomy he envisaged between older, ‘internal’ religious 
values on the one hand, and new, in many ways ‘external’, values on the 
other. Rather than perceiving Church reform positively, Bots saw it in 
negative terms. Middle-class, liberal intellectuals—Bots hardly mentioned 
any names—continued to succeed in carrying through their ideas at the cost 
of the policy of the Holy See as the 1960s progressed. They fell back on 
powerful scientific institutions such as the Catholic University of Nijmegen 
and ecclesiastical ones such as PINK (Pastoraal Instituut van de 
Nederlandse Kerkprovincie), and forged alliances in the world of the media. 
In Bots’s opinion, the ‘ordinary faithful’ were the ultimate victims of the 
reform movement. Because the bishops implemented many of the ideas 
articulated by the intellectuals into their policy, the ‘average Catholic’ 
slowly but surely drifted away from the Catholic Church.  
Sociologist Ed Simons and theologian Lodewijk Winkeler elaborated 
on the interpretation of intellectuals as agents of change in their 1987 
                                                          
13  KENNEDY, Nieuw Babylon in aanbouw, especially pp. 82–116. 
14  GODDIJN, De beheerste kerk, especially pp. 149–166. This book was translated into English 
in 1975: GODDIJN, The Deferred Revolution. 
15  DOLS and ZIEMANN, ‘Progressive Participation and Transnational Activism in the Catholic 
Church after Vatican II’. 
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doctoral thesis Het verraad der clercken (The Treason of the Clerks).16 
Simons and Winkeler not only charted the networks of slightly more than 
200 historical actors, but also analysed articles published in periodicals on 
the one hand and episcopal statements on the other. The main conclusion 
was that the impact of intellectuals on episcopal decision making in the long 
1960s should not be underestimated. From 1958 onwards, priests holding 
an academic degree increasingly started to form all sorts of networks. 
Operating from editorial boards of magazines and study groups, they 
published extensively on the question of how the Dutch Church Province 
had to be ‘renewed’. Furthermore, they were requested by the bishops to 
draft episcopal statements and came to hold key advisory positions as 
members of PINK’s study committees. Simons and Winkeler underscored 
that the culmination of their influence was the Pastoral Council. Even 
though theologians remained the most dominant in an intellectual respect 
throughout the 1960s, psychologists and sociologists colonised the research 
areas of mental care and the priestly office.  
In the 1996 book Geestelijke Bevrijders (Mental Liberators), 
sociologist Hanneke Westhoff highlighted a specific group of intellectuals: 
that of the priest-psychologists who got closely involved in discussions on 
mental care.17 In great detail, she documented the emergence of a new field 
of social scientific expertise between 1920 and 1972. Including archival 
materials and interviews into her analysis, she showed how priests and 
laypeople collaborated in agenda setting, organised expert meetings, and 
how the field institutionalised from 1952 onwards, when KNBGG 
(Katholiek Nationaal Bureau voor Geestelijke Gezondheidszorg) was 
founded. In addition, she elucidated how opinions of leading priest-
psychologists such as Han Fortmann (not to be confused with theologian 
and President Herman Fortmann from the Rijsenburg Seminary of the 
Archdiocese of Utrecht) conflicted with traditional Catholic moral teaching. 
Nevertheless, ‘human experience’ turned into a key concept with which to 
rethink episcopal policy in the second half of the 1960s. In 1967, an official 
ecclesiastical institution offering psychological help to secular priests and 
religious—CAPER (Centraal Adviesbureau voor Priesters en 
Religieuzen)—came into being with the explicit agreement of the bishops. 
Westhoff was one of the first to point to the links between personal struggles 
and professional ambitions. Priest-psychologist Hein Ruygers became a 
leading figure in the Catholic movement for mental care, exactly because he 
was trained as a clergyman in an ultramontane way, with much emphasis 
on obedience and top-down power relations. Paradoxically, this training did 
not result in an eagerness to maintain the status quo, but instead led to 
anger and frustration, and fuelled Ruygers’s desire to untangle mental care 
and what he regarded as clericalism. 
                                                          
16  SIMONS and WINKELER, Het verraad der clercken, especially pp. 307–334. For a recent 
elaboration in English, see: WINKELER, ‘Opening Windows or Opening Doors?’. 
17  WESTHOFF, Geestelijke bevrijders, especially pp. 81–394. 
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Most recently, in a 2012 doctoral thesis titled Verlangen naar 
vernieuwing (Longing for Renewal), historian Maarten van den Bos 
revisited the historiography on Church renewal as a whole. Van den Bos 
particularly focused on continuities and discontinuities as far as overall 
intellectual domination in the episcopal circles between 1945 and 1972 was 
concerned. He combined a discourse analysis of periodicals with an 
exploration of primary sources such as the minutes of the monthly meetings 
of the bishops up to 1964, as well as with a close reading of ecclesiastical 
documents such as encyclicals, conciliar constitutions, and press 
communiqués.18 His findings confirmed the general insight that the bishops 
tolerated and even promoted the growing impact of intellectuals on their 
decision making in the long 1960s. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, this 
impact predominantly had a theological character. ‘Experts’ such as 
Edward Schillebeeckx OP were often followers of the Nouvelle Théologie, 
or New Theology. They successfully propagated a reconfiguration of 
Church policy on the basis of a return to sources such as the Gospel and the 
teachings of the Apostles. According to Van den Bos, and this is what makes 
his analysis stand out in the historiography, 1963 should be regarded as a 
turning point. In this year, the bishops appointed Goddijn as the director of 
PINK, a position that would have hitherto been confined to theologians 
who worked as seminary professors. After Goddijn also became the 
secretary-general of the Pastoral Council in 1965, he quickly grew into an 
ecclesiastical transition manager par excellence. Not only did he stage the 
Dutch council and press the case for Church ‘renewal’ almost incessantly, 
he also mobilised prominent sociologists of religion such as Osmund 
Schreuder OFM, thereby ensuring a maximum of sociological input. 
The main contribution of Fact Factory to the debate on Church 
renewal in the Netherlands is that it, particularly building on the works of 
Simons and Winkeler, Westhoff and Van den Bos, places sociologists of 
religion centre stage. As a result of the lack of an exclusive focus on them, 
their work has remained rather vague. The aforementioned studies suggest 
a substantial sociological impact on the Church reform of the long 1960s. 
Who were the main active figures behind the scenes of episcopal decision 
making along with Goddijn and Schreuder, and what were their intentions? 
What advice did they provide the bishops with? And to what extent did the 
influx of sociologically informed advice steer actual policy? Raising such 
questions demands a closer examination of the scholarly literature on the 
ascent of the ‘expert’ more broadly and socio-religious engineering in the 
Catholic Church more specifically. 
 
Socio-Religious Engineering 
During the last few decades, it has been demonstrated that a scientific 
degree alone did not automatically lead to expert status in the nineteenth 
                                                          
18  Van den BOS, Verlangen naar vernieuwing, especially pp. 221–231. 
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and twentieth centuries.19 Rather, the obtaining of this status was often the 
result of a complex and unpredictable interplay between two sides, the 
pronouncements of expertise by research commissioners and claims of 
expertise by researchers. The general prestige of ‘experts’ in society 
increased from the nineteenth century onwards.20 The ascent of statistical 
expertise can be perceived as illustrative for this growing prestige.21 After 
1800, numerous statistical repositories on a wide variety of subjects were 
built throughout Europe. Around these repositories gathered ambitious 
statisticians and social scientists, who shared a belief that ‘problems’ could 
be understood and solved with the help of internationally comparable 
numbers, along with all sorts of receptive and sometimes even desperate 
decision makers, who had to set out policy lines in times of profound social 
change.  
In 1996, historian Lutz Raphael launched the concept of the 
‘scientisation of the social’.22 This concept encompassed the transformation 
of social scientific knowledge into public categories, professional routines, 
and behavioural patterns. How this knowledge has informed activities in 
businesses and government administrations, and coloured common beliefs 
and convictions, Raphael claimed, has to be regarded as vital for an 
understanding of Western societies in the last 150 years.23 Embedding the 
social sciences concerned a sheer range of aspects, such as the establishment 
of statistical bureaux, psychological testing, and the application of opinion 
polls. The scientisation of the social was a creation of new infrastructures, 
both of a physical and mental nature. 
The significant potential of the concept of the scientisation of the 
social for an analysis of twentieth-century developments in the Catholic 
Church has been displayed by historian Benjamin Ziemann in his 2007 
book Katholische Kirche und Sozialwissenschaften (The Catholic Church 
and the Social Sciences).24 He explicitly interpreted his findings according 
to some of the parameters set by Raphael. Exploring the gradually rising 
influence of social scientific approaches—especially sociological ones—in 
the West-German Church Province, Ziemann concluded that profound 
religious transformation fuelled ‘target finding’ in the episcopal ranks. In 
order to understand what was happening at worst and to create a blueprint 
for policy lines at best, bishops and their vicars-general increasingly reached 
                                                          
19  See, for example, ALBERTS, ‘Hoe deskundigen wiskundigen werden’, especially pp. 131–141. 
20  ZIEMANN et alii, ‘Introduction: The Scientization of the Social in Comparative Perspective’, 
WAGNER, A History and Theory of the Social Sciences, pp. 54–87, and all contributions to 
Part IV of PORTER and ROSS, The Modern Social Sciences. 
21  RANDERAAD, Het onberekenbare Europa, especially pp. 251–254. 
22  RAPHAEL, ‘Die Verwissenschaftlichung des Sozialen als methodische und konzeptionelle 
Herausforderung für eine Sozialgeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts’, especially pp. 166–167. 
23  See also: ZIEMANN et alii, ‘Introduction: The Scientization of the Social in Comparative 
Perspective’, especially pp. 1–3.  
24  ZIEMANN, Katholische Kirche und Sozialwissenschaften, especially pp. 337–348. In June 
2014, an elaborated version of this book has become available in English under the title of 
Encounters with Modernity. 
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out to social scientists between 1945 and 1975. These scientists, who 
scrutinised socio-religious phenomena in an empirical fashion, provided 
statistically-underpinned interpretations that were absent in theological 
analyses, thereby shaping the scientific sub-discipline of the sociology of 
religion.  
Metaphorically speaking, Ziemann stressed, sociologists of religion 
threw open the windows of the Church in the 1950s. They drew the 
attention of Church authorities to the socio-religious consequences of 
phenomena such as migration. In the 1960s, sociologists of religion became 
successful in reforming the ecclesiastical apparatus according to principles 
derived from American organisational sociology. As a result of a continuous 
circulation of social scientific discourses, the ways in which bishops and 
vicars-general conceptualised the Church and defined their policy changed. 
They became much more future-oriented, and came to think in terms of 
sociological categories—in addition to, and sometimes even instead of, 
theological knowledge regimes, dogmas proclaimed by the Holy See, and 
the ‘truth of tradition’. According to Ziemann, the application of the social 
sciences in the ecclesiastical domain was characterised by ambivalence, as it 
led to both intended and unintended consequences. Polling contributed to 
the religiously explosive climate dominating the run-up to the Würzburg 
Synod (1971–1975), the West-German follow-up of Vatican II. Ziemann 
therefore reasoned that the scientisation of the social in the Church was 
akin to a journey through a ‘dangerous modernity’ (‘gefährliche 
Modernität’), in which bishops and vicars-general were repeatedly 
confronted with the unforeseeable side-effects of social scientific inquiry. 
Ziemann’s work will serve as the frame of reference when examining 
the development of sociology in the Dutch Church Province. Even though 
this development has caught some scholarly attention, it has not been 
analysed in-depth. The most detailed—and therefore influential—historical 
overview was presented by historian Gerard Dierick and sociologist Jozef 
Tettero in a 1976 brochure. This publication marked the third decennial of 
KASKI (Katholiek Sociaal-Kerkelijk Instituut), the Catholic sociological 
institute in the Netherlands. 25  Partly as a result of the commemorative 
purpose of the text, Dierick and Tettero avoided contention and 
controversial issues in KASKI’s history. They reasoned that the foundation 
of the institute by Catholic layman and sociologist George Zeegers, 
Montanus Versteeg OFM, Bertulf van Leeuwen OFM, and Manfred 
Staverman OFM in 1947 should be understood against the backdrop of 
                                                          
25  TETTERO and DIERICK, ‘Dertig jaar KASKI-onderzoek’, especially pp. 5–35. This 
publication served as an important source of information in a 1985 landmark study on the 
history of sociology in the Netherlands by sociologist Marja Gastelaars: GASTELAARS, Een 
geregeld leven, pp. 140–146. Also helpful but slightly less information-rich with regard to 
developments in the Catholic Church are: Van VUGT, ‘Godsdienstsociologie in Nederland na 
1945’, GODDIJN, ‘The Sociology of Religion and Socio-Religious Research in the 
Netherlands’, and LAEYENDECKER, ‘The Development of Sociology of Religion in the 
Netherlands since 1960’. 
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increased planning activities in Dutch society. KASKI took off quickly. 
Under Zeegers’s directorship, regional offices were opened within and 
beyond the Dutch borders. The number of research assignments granted by 
politicians, leaders of Catholic societies, and parish priests initially 
increased. Also, by request of bishops and vicars-general, KASKI 
employees inquired into the socio-religious consequences of phenomena 
such as urbanisation and criminality. After 1958, the stream of assignments 
nearly ran dry, which made the KASKI staff focus on what it perceived as 
its core business: the aggregation of ecclesiastical statistics and the guidance 
of spatial planning on the diocesan level.  
An analytically more refined attempt at understanding the 
development of sociology in the Dutch Church Province was offered by 
historian Joos van Vugt in a 1987 article. 26  Bolstered by a lengthy 
bibliography, he carried out a frequency analysis of publications on religion 
and Church in the Netherlands. He established how many studies appeared 
each year after 1945 and gave meaning to the figures by using historical 
analysis. According to Van Vugt, a boom of publications on religion and 
Church is discernible from the 1950s onwards, when Protestant Churches 
started to sociologically underpin confessionalisation policies. Concerning 
the Dutch Church Province, he concluded that a peak in the ‘conjuncture 
of publication’ occurred in 1968. In that year, much sociological research 
was conducted for the purpose of episcopal policy making. As of 1970, the 
optimism that research commissioners treasured with respect to the 
possibilities of sociology turned into pessimism. Even though socio-religious 
transformations could be surveyed and documented with the help of 
sociologists and their ambitious plans of reform, Van Vugt reasoned, it 
turned out to be hard to steer these transformations along a certain 
direction. 
Most recently, in 2010, theologian Winkeler published an article in 
which he highlighted the contribution of the Franciscan Order to the early 
development of Catholic sociology as a social scientific discipline.27 As early 
as in 1906, the Franciscans extended their curriculum with a so-called ‘fifth 
year’ consisting of courses in pastoral-theology and sociology. Catholic 
sociology still had a strong philosophical character at that point, building on 
encyclicals rather than on empirically yielded data. In the 1940s, the 
Franciscan Order started to send more and more of their priests to 
renowned universities such as that of Leuven, Belgium. Here, professor 
Nabor Devolder OFM taught sociology of religion. Claiming that facts and 
figures were indispensable for a comprehension of religion and society as a 
whole, he propagated empirical sociology as a means of countering 
‘delusions’ such as Communism. In the 1950s, Winkeler observed, the 
Franciscan impact on the establishment and evolution of KASKI had 
become evident. Not only did three Franciscan priests take the lead in co-
                                                          
26  Van VUGT, ‘Publicaties over godsdienst en kerk in Nederland’, especially pp. 165–169.  
27  WINKELER, ‘Sociografie en pastoraal beleid’, especially pp. 180–187. 
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founding this institute in 1946 and 1947. They also served on the institute’s 
board, wrote research reports and memoranda, and managed regional 
offices throughout the country. 
The main contribution of Fact Factory to the debate on socio-religious 
engineering is twofold. On the one hand, it will critically engage with 
Ziemann’s book on the application of the social sciences in the West-
German Church Province. Even though its conclusions are insightful and 
thought-provoking, at least one aspect of socio-religious engineering in the 
Catholic Church did not receive full attention, and can thus be further 
investigated in the Dutch context. Little is known about the asymmetric 
power relationships between priest-sociologists and sociologists with the lay 
state. What consequences did one’s state have for the position as an ‘expert’ 
in the ecclesiastical domain? After all, the Church was invariably governed 
as a hierarchical institute in a socio-religious order designed by God, 
meaning that power trickled downward from the Pope to bishops, priests, 
and, ultimately, to the laity.28 On the other hand, Fact Factory will refine 
the works of Dierick and Tettero, Van Vugt, and Winkeler, by finding 
answers to the question of how men such as Zeegers, Goddijn, and 
Schreuder became ‘experts’: professionals with recognised expertise in 
certain research areas and with the authority to claim a specific kind of 
knowledge. Additionally, the episcopal demand for sociology will be 
documented and analysed in more detail. 
 
This book is a national case study of what could be labelled as a 
‘sociologisation’ in the Dutch Church Province, seen in light of episcopal 
decision making between 1946 and 1972. The roles played by sociologists of 
religion in the realms of the Dutch bishops should be understood both in 
intellectual and performative terms. On the basis of empirical research, 
sociologists of religion coined and accentuated analytical categories, and 
arrived at conclusions regarding the relationship between Catholicism and 
society. On a performative level, sociologists of religion were involved in the 
development of research practices, and in the institutionalisation and 
implementation of their knowledge in the ecclesiastical domain. The 
intellectual and performative dimensions of the operation of sociologists will 
be studied in relation to one another. 
 
 
II. PRIMARY SOURCES 
In order to find an answer to the central research question, and focus on 
producers as well as on consumers of sociological knowledge, various types 
of primary sources will be examined. These primary sources mainly rest in 
the diocesan archives, as well as in the institutional archives of KASKI, 
PINK, the Franciscan Order, the Redemptorist Order, and the Pastoral 
                                                          
28  MONTEIRO, ‘Discretie en deskundigheid’, especially pp. 58–60. See also: WESTHOFF, 
Geestelijke bevrijders, pp. 103–111, 211, and 272–275. 
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Council, and the personal archives of Zeegers and Goddijn. As far as the 
archives of Goddijn, PINK, and the Pastoral Council are concerned, it is 
worth noting that he himself has selected and deposited these collections at 
KDC (Katholiek Documentatie Centrum). 29  Goddijn thus determined 
which documents would be stored and made available for (academic) 
research. Most of the primary sources analysed for the purpose of this book 
can be grouped together under one of the next five categories: memoranda, 
letters, opinion polls, newspaper articles, and interviews. In the following, I 
shall address each of these five groups and examine both possibilities and 
limitations for each. 
Memoranda from and to the Dutch bishops will serve as my starting 
point. Briefing notes, minutes of meetings, and ‘think pieces’ in the form of 
reports and papers will be studied as written communications primarily 
meant for internal usage.30 Since they conveyed analyses of socio-religious 
phenomena and processes, and were meant to give direction to bureaucratic 
structures, they will allow me to interpret episcopal decision making at a 
time when the value of democracy shaped a culture of deliberation in the 
ecclesiastical domain too.31 Memoranda not only provide information on 
the origins and pace of episcopal policies, but also identify the key players 
involved in policy formation. Two collections of memoranda should be 
mentioned in more detail. Firstly, I have consulted the—complete—series of 
the minutes of the joint meetings of the Dutch bishops between 1966 and 
1970, which took place once every month. These minutes became lengthier 
over the years, especially in 1968 and 1969, and enable a reconstruction of 
the way in which the bishops discussed matters they deemed important.32 
Secondly, in the analysis of the conciliar discussions, I have prioritised the 
verbatim transcripts of the fifth plenary session of the Pastoral Council over 
the published report co-edited by Goddijn.33 Just like the other volumes in 
PINK’s conciliar series, this report is filled with concise versions of the 
debates, and, in consequence, does not offer the best information for an 
examination of the debates of the council. Even contemporaries noticed this 
limitation. “With much interest”, Alfrink wrote to Goddijn on 13 
September 1968, “I have glanced through the report of the second plenary 
session”.34 The Cardinal went on by stating that his own intervention of 
                                                          
29  In the early 1990s, Goddijn told to KDC director Jan Roes that he would hand over the 
archives of PINK and the Pastoral Council, which the former still had at his home at that 
point, to Tilburg historian Jan Jacobs if KDC employees would not pick them up at short 
notice. Roes immediately sent a minibus to Goddijn. See: letters by Goddijn to Roes, 20-08-
1992 and 09-01-1993: KDC, KDC, 6566.  
30  READMAN, ‘Memoranda’, p. 121. 
31  Van HEIJST, DERKS, and MONTEIRO, Ex Caritate, especially pp. 596–598. 
32  These minutes have probably been authored by episcopal secretary Louis ter Steeg. Since I was 
not granted access to the minutes resting in the archives of the Archdiosese of Utrecht, I have 
consulted the versions resting in the archives of the Diocese of Roermond.  
33  GODDIJN et alii, Pastoraal Concilie van de Nederlandse Kerkprovincie, VI. 
34  Letter by Alfrink to Goddijn, 13-09-1968: KDC, PINK, 238. 
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around fifteen minutes long had been brought back to half a page: “Not 
bad, I think. But on the other hand, neither clear nor comprehensive”. 
By means of a social contextualisation of episcopal decision making, 
letters which circulated among bishops, among sociologists of religion, and 
between these two groups of historical actors will be analysed as written 
communications. Whereas some of these letters were private, others were 
(quasi)public. These letters particularly provide insights into networks, as 
they enable a survey of the circles of recipients and those omitted, and into 
the hierarchical relationships between the members of these networks. 
Moreover, they inform us about strategies with which sociologists of religion 
tried to obtain expert status in the ecclesiastical domain, as well as about 
images of the episcopal self. Yet, it almost goes without saying that, 
regardless of how exposing letters may sometimes seem, they will never 
allow the researcher to capture what individuals were actually thinking. 
Letters are dictated by writing conventions of many forms and the content 
of letters is often affected by the expected reactions of the reader.35 
In order to find out how sociologists of religion constructed the facts 
on the basis of which bishops built their decisions, opinion polls will be 
explored. This exploration will not defer from the premise that polls can 
effectively express the will of the people and contribute to democratic policy 
making, nor from the claim that public opinion does not exist at all. Instead, 
the constructed nature of public opinion will be presupposed. Effectively, 
this means that polls will be studied as a discursive form of social interaction 
which conveyed specific meanings to respondents. Opinion polling differs 
from an ordinary conversation: the questions and statements raised in a 
questionnaire cannot be negotiated and influence the outcomes of a project 
to a substantial degree. 36 Lists of questions and statements thus provide 
relevant information concerning the way in which sociologists wanted the 
socio-religious reality to be seen. 37  They demonstrate what answering 
possibilities were given, how polling items were worded, what allegiances 
and affinities they invoked, and which were suppressed. Two questionnaires 
have been selected for analysis: the 1966 ‘vocation questionnaire’ and the 
1968 ‘celibacy questionnaire’. These questionnaires resulted from two large-
scale polling projects on aspects related to the priestly office which were 
commissioned by the bishops through PINK and carried out by a 
sociological research institute. It should be mentioned that the vocation 
questionnaire is probably not the one used by the interviewers during their 
field work. Rather, it appears to be a nearly completed document, since it 
still contains some minor misspellings.  
Newspapers are closely related to journalists as historical actors. These 
sources will be integrated into the analysis as written records of historical 
                                                          
35  DOBSON, ‘Letters’, pp. 58–66. 
36  LIPARI, ‘Toward a Discourse Approach to Polling’, pp. 192–198. 
37  See also: KRUKE, ‘Opinion Polls’, p. 110. 
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events and opinions.38 On the one hand, they will be examined in order to 
gain information which cannot be derived from archival materials, such as 
factual data on an international sociological conference organised by 
KASKI and commentaries on episcopal policy by the bishops themselves. 
On the other hand, and to a much greater extent, they will be consulted in 
order to understand when and how the popularisation of sociological 
analyses took place. Here, I will focus on the ways in which journalists 
adopted or constructed an interpretative framework within which they 
placed factual information. Newspapers allow me to analytically link 
together authors, moments of writing, highlighted topics, presented 
conclusions, and visual contexts in terms of layout, graphics, and images. At 
a time when social upheaval spread throughout Europe, and the 
relationships between Church authorities and journalists changed, in that 
the latter turned from loyal allies into hostile opponents, newspapers did not 
just operate as purveyors of facts.39 Through these media, authorities were 
criticised and empirical forms of knowledge privileged, which could lead to 
an increase of the value of these forms of knowledge and its producers. 
Finally, in an attempt to understand the ‘company culture’ at institutes 
such as KASKI, including the personal dimensions of the application of 
sociology in the realms of the bishops, semi-structured interviews have been 
held with fifteen respondents. Among them were nine sociologists of religion 
and two emeritus bishops. Even though my list of questions obviously 
steered the content and course of the interviews, these also reflect the way in 
which the respondents remembered the past.40 What they conveyed is what 
they hold true. Their truth is not necessarily historically accurate. The 
fatherly tone frequently used to inform me which sociologists of religion I 
should focus on and what sociological books I should read is interesting. 
Interviewees realised that they influenced the way in which individuals 
would make their way into the history books.  
 
 
III. STRUCTURE  
This study consists of three parts, which each take the form of two chapters. 
The first part is dedicated to the ‘big picture’, the development and 
institutionalisation of sociological knowledge in the Dutch Church Province. 
I shall analyse how theologically underpinned civics, as practiced intensively 
by 1946, grew into an empirically informed and influential sociology of 
religion in the 1950s and 1960s. In accordance with what Raphael has 
recently advocated, I shall argue that the connections between ‘experts’, 
their institutes, discourses, techniques, and ‘clients’ are a vital analytical 
                                                          
38  VELLA, ‘Newspapers’, pp. 192–193 and 198–200. 
39  HANNIG and STÄDTER, ‘Die Kommunizierte Krise’, especially pp. 164–176, and 
HANNIG, Die Religion der Öffentlichkeit, pp. 387–397. Compare for the Netherlands: 
DERKS, ‘The Gospel of the Old’, especially pp. 150–152.  
40  LEYDESDORFF, De mensen en de woorden, especially pp. 9–22 and 43–79. See also: 
ROSEMAN, ‘Surviving Memory’ and THOMPSON, The Voice of the Past, pp. 118–172. 
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cipher to understanding this process.41 The obtainment of expertise runs as 
a common thread through both chapters. Widespread acknowledgement 
based on a perception of scientific quality was necessary for sociologists of 
religion in order to become accepted in the ecclesiastical domain and 
generate an episcopal demand for sociological analyses. Such 
acknowledgement did not emerge out of nothing, but instead had to be 
carefully cultivated. This cultivation revolved around the foundation of 
institutes and the acquisition of academic titles, but was also enhanced by 
positive media exposure and the establishment of the right alliances at the 
right time, both from the academic and ecclesiastical points of view. 
Competition will also come to the fore. Especially in the immediate post-
war years, there were some similarities between sociology and other social 
scientific disciplines—psychology and pedagogy in particular. In other 
words, sociology of religion was not yet a well-defined social scientific strand 
of research, which meant that its boundaries were (re)defined by the leading 
protagonists. I shall argue that a competition took place between the 
sociologists of religion themselves, too. 
The second part of this book addresses the relationships between 
sociological expertise and Church reform. My frame of analysis is indebted 
to the work of historian Sarah Igo. Building on the 1979 landmark study 
Laboratory Life, in which historians Bruno Latour and Steve Woolgar 
argued that an anthropological gaze on the execution of research is key to 
understanding the construction of scientific facts, Igo examined the ‘politics 
of surveying’. 42  In great detail, she documented how large-scale survey 
inquiries were designed and executed in twentieth century America. In this 
study, I shall focus on two large-scale polling projects related to the priestly 
office which were conducted in the 1960s for the purpose of episcopal 
decision making. Whereas one project dealt with religious vocation and will 
enable me to get a glimpse of the optimistic reformism of the mid 1960s, the 
other was related to priestly celibacy and will show various aspects of the 
apocalyptic atmosphere of the late 1960s. On a general level, I shall reveal 
how bishops and sociologists of religion gathered around these projects in a 
joint quest for Church reform, and how certain ways of raising questions 
and statements resulted in publicly circulating policy benchmarks. On a 
more specific level, I shall anatomise Goddijn’s role as the PINK director 
who embodied sociological expertise. This role was as diverse as it was 
influential. Not only did Goddijn prioritise subjects on the episcopal agenda 
of research and reform on the basis of the basic principles of the American 
structural-functionalism, stimulate a sociological gaze on the priestly office, 
and install supervisory committees. He also secured extra financial 
resources, formed the communicative link between the sociologists and the 
                                                          
41  RAPHAEL, ‘Embedding the Human and Social Sciences in Western Societies’, pp. 46–48. 
42  IGO, The Averaged American, especially pp. 281–299. See also: IGO, ‘“A Gold Mine and a 
Tool for Democracy”’, especially pp. 130–131. 
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bishops, and arranged press conferences. Since the bishops instilled much 
confidence in him, Goddijn could gradually turn into a key agent of change. 
The third part of this book is devoted to the treatment of the priestly 
office at the Pastoral Council and the absolute limits of Church reform that 
became apparent soon after. Drawing on recent studies on Vatican II, 
particularly the works of priest-historians Joseph Komonchak and John 
O’Malley SJ, I shall focus on the links between ‘the event’ and ‘the letter’.43 
That is, I shall situate the fifth plenary session of the Pastoral Council 
devoted to the priestly office in the context of conciliar preparations and 
consequences (event), and relate them to official conciliar statements (letter). 
The priestly office was discussed in almost every joint meeting of the bishops 
in 1969 and 1970. It worked as a litmus test in two directions. On the one 
hand, the bishops had to deal with the fact that laypeople and clergymen, 
convinced that a liberalisation of celibacy law was only a matter of time, 
demanded profound action from them. But the bishops also had to relate 
their policy to the vision of the Holy See, with Pope Paul VI holding on to 
the Second Vatican Council as the bandwidth of reform. As I shall 
underline, sociologists of religion had a considerable impact on this policy. 
In fact, they experienced their finest hour in the late 1960s. Having turned 
into the key protagonist of the sociology of religion in the episcopal circles, 
Goddijn, foremost in his capacity of conciliar secretary-general, was 
permitted by the bishops to have a finger in almost every pie. Furthermore, 
Schreuder left a significant imprint on the way in which the celibacy matter 
was discussed in the assembly hall in Noordwijkerhout. He chaired the 
conciliar expert committee on the priestly office. Most importantly, the 
intellectual underpinnings of episcopal policy on celibacy changed. Even 
though this policy was still based on theological notions, as partly taught by 
the Second Vatican Council, it came to rest on sociological analyses on an 
unprecedented scale.  
The figures and graphs which will be referred to in the following 
chapters are to be found in the final section of this book. This final section 
also holds four appendices with factual data: brief biographical overviews of 
the Catholic sociologists who play an important role in the analysis (I), a list 
of Dutch bishops (II), a list of publications commissioned at KASKI in 
service of episcopal decision making and appearing between 1950 and 1957 
(III), and a list of publications commissioned at KASKI and/or ITS in 
service of episcopal decision making and appearing between 1957 and 1972 
(IV). 
                                                          
43  KOMONCHAK, ‘Vatican II as an “Event”’ and O’MALLEY, What happened at Vatican II, 
especially pp. 43–52.  
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Part One  
 
OF DIAGNOSES AND PROGNOSES:  
THE DEVELOPMENT AND 
INSTITUTIONALISATION OF  
SOCIOLOGICAL KNOWLEDGE 
 
════════════════════════════ 
 
 
 
 
 
IN HIS BOOK on the application of sociology in the West-German Church 
Province, historian Ziemann placed emphasis on the importance of KISIF 
(Katholische Internationale Soziologische Institut für Flüchtlingsfragen) to 
the institutionalisation of sociological knowledge in the 1950s. 1  This 
institute, which was based in the city of Königstein, near Frankfurt, 
originated in 1951, when hundreds of thousands of Catholics were fleeing 
from Soviet satellite states into predominantly Protestant areas in West-
Germany in order to avoid persecution. KISIF documented this 
demographical development and its religious consequences in great detail. 
More so, its statistical and cartographical information soon became the 
analytical core of an apostolate plan. This plan envisaged a spatial 
reconfiguration of pastoral care as well as the erection of several monasteries 
as ‘points of support’ in a process of Christianisation. Encouraged by the 
Dutch Werenfried van Straaten O.Praem. in particular, and strengthened 
with KISIF’s data as ‘armoury’, regular priests populating these ‘castles of 
God’ embarked on motorised missions in Volkswagen Beetles and large 
trucks which had been transformed into ‘driving churches’—including an 
altar. 2  KISIF operated under the flag of KASKI, a Dutch Catholic 
sociological institute making its first steps abroad by the early 1950s. 
KASKI’s changing visual self-representation, as reflected by the institute’s 
                                                          
1  ZIEMANN, Katholische Kirche und Sozialwissenschaften, p. 102. 
2  ‘Konkurrenz hebt’s Geschäft’, in: Der Spiegel, 04-08-1954. The rhetoric of a religious battle or 
war illustrates a particular religious vigour. See also in this regard: ‘Met prof. Zeegers naar 
Oost-Afrika’, in: De Maasbode, 27-04-1955. In this article, KASKI’s cartogaphic section was 
compared to a ‘battlefield headquarters’.  
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logos (figures 1, 2, and 3), testify to this international expansion. The oldest 
logo pictures the symbol of the cross, set against the backdrop of the 
Netherlands and headed by the three Latin words ‘adveniat regnum tuum’ 
(‘thy kingdom come’). By using these very words, which form the third line 
of the Lord’s Prayer, KASKI’s governors suggested a continuum between 
the Gospels of Matthew and Luke on the one hand and the socio-religious 
situation in 1947 on the other. Not only is the suggestion of such a 
continuum absent in the 1947 logo. The globe also replaces the 
Netherlands.  
There was a larger story behind this Dutch network of Catholic 
research institutes: that of the development and institutionalisation of 
sociological knowledge in the Dutch Church Province in the decades after 
1945. 3  In order to examine this larger story, which encompassed links 
between ‘experts’, their institutes, discourses, techniques, and ‘clients’, I 
shall turn to the notions of ‘field’ and ‘capital’. Sociologist Pierre Bourdieu 
coined both of these notions. Recent historical research on the way in which 
the personnel management in three West-German multinationals became 
more and more professionalised and influenced by social scientists between 
1945 and 1955 has demonstrated their potential for an understanding of the 
evolution of new forms of expert knowledge.4 This evolution was dynamic. 
Groups of actors each raised their profile differently, and positioned 
themselves in the new field of human resources in a different way. A solid 
belief in this field’s right to exist united them. What set them apart was 
disagreement about suitable avenues to remaining relevant in an ever-
changing business environment. 
According to Bourdieu, social reality consists of ‘fields’: semi-
autonomous spheres of actions in which actors occupy positions.5 The basic 
structure of a field is formed by these positions as well as by the asymmetric 
power relations between the actors. Whereas newcomers often aim at 
undermining the status quo by means of subversive strategies, powerful 
agents normally fall back on conservative strategies in order to defend and 
maintain the status quo. Fields are both influential and malleable. That is, 
actors first have to gain access to a field by respecting its internal dynamics 
in terms of the written and unwritten rules before they can start to exert 
power over these internal dynamics themselves. Initiation rites, Bourdieu 
reasoned, are common expressions of acceptance. It is critical to note that 
Bourdieu has also labelled science in general and the social sciences in 
particular as fields.6 Despite the much heard claim of ‘objectivity’, there are 
power mechanisms at work in these fields. Bourdieu noted that scientific 
strategies are political strategies and that it is rewarding to study how and by 
                                                          
3  For a theoretical reflection upon the ‘scientisation of the social’, see: RAPHAEL, ‘Embedding 
the Human and Social Sciences in Western Societies’, pp. 46–48. 
4  ROSENBERGER, Experten für Humankapital, especially pp. 421–436. See also: 
WEISCHER, Das Undernehmen ‘Empirsche Sozialforschung’, pp. 1–17. 
5  BOURDIEU, ‘Enkele eigenschappen van velden’. 
6  BOURDIEU, ‘Het wetenschappelijk veld’. 
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whom social problems are placed on the research agenda. The social 
sciences are relatively young in comparison to other sciences such as 
astronomy, medicine, and theology. Consequently, social scientists often feel 
the urge to justify their field, and create the appearances of neutrality and 
respectability.  
The distribution of capital, then, influences the position of an actor in 
a field.7 Effectively, this position depends on the overall volume and the 
nature of capital. Bourdieu himself used the notion of capital in order to 
show that the societal game differs from a game of chance such as roulette: 
the more capital people acquire, the more dominant and sought after they 
can become. Besides referring to the economic form of capital in terms of 
money and assets, Bourdieu pointed at capital of a social nature, a network 
of relationships constituted by mutual recognition. These relationships are 
usually entered into with a growth of social capital in mind. People select 
powerful allies, after which they develop investment strategies revolving 
around the trade of, for instance, words and gifts. The total volume of social 
capital depends on the size and character of the network they can mobilise, 
and on the capital owned by each of its members. Large networks are not 
necessarily profitable. On the contrary, a membership of a small exclusive 
network can be highly prestigious. A third sort of capital discerned by 
Bourdieu is the cultural one, which comes in a threefold disguise. First of all, 
people can obtain cultural capital in an embodied condition. An example 
Bourdieu referred to in this context was that of knowledge gained through 
education. In contrast with economic capital, such cultural capital 
connected to one and the same person is rare and cannot be passed on 
easily. Cultural capital also exists in object form. The capitalisation of 
cultural objects often demands expertise. One can buy complex and 
powerful machinery, yet cannot operate it without the appropriate know-
how. Finally, cultural capital can be acquired in an institutionalised 
condition, of which a scientific degree is perhaps one of the most striking 
examples. Such an institutional imprimatur distinguishes its possessors from 
the self-taught-man, placing them in a scholarly hierarchy and providing 
them with academic rights. 
When applied to the development and institutionalisation of 
sociological knowledge in the Dutch Church Province in the following two 
chapters, this means that I shall analyse Catholic sociology as a field 
characterised by dynamics, and that the various forms of the capital of 
sociologists determined their position in this field. What made Catholic 
sociology Catholic was not only related to the selection of research subjects 
and the fact that sociological reports ought to serve ecclesiastical policy, but 
also to Catholics as being practitioners of a social scientific discipline. 
Catholic practitioners of sociology claimed the right to conduct sociological 
research in the ecclesiastical domain as well the right to say what, according 
to them, needed to be said in order to keep ‘their’ Church viable in times of 
                                                          
7  BOURDIEU, ‘Economisch kapitaal, cultureel kapitaal, sociaal kapitaal’.  
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religious transformation precisely because they adhered to Catholicism. In 
the first chapter, I shall focus on the years between 1946 and 1957, as seen 
through the lens of KASKI. 1946 serves as the starting point because 
Zeegers, who envisaged an empirical turn in both sociology and episcopal 
decision making, offered his services to Cardinal Jan de Jong in that year. 
More importantly, this is when the first Catholic efforts to institutionalise 
sociological knowledge became visible. At the end of 1957, a conflict at 
KASKI changed the internal dynamics of the field significantly. This 
conflict and its consequences will be addressed in the second chapter, in 
which Goddijn and PINK gradually replace Zeegers and KASKI as a main 
focal point in the analysis. 
 
 
 
════════════════════════════ 
 
Chapter One  
 
THE EMPIRICAL TURN 
 
════════════════════════════ 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION  
“THE SUPERNATURAL KINGDOM of God”, Zeegers wrote in 1957, “can 
only rest durably on the natural conditions inherent to the Creation”.1 He 
went on by arguing that, in order to reconstruct these conditions, and 
understand their variety over both time and space, a systematic knowledge 
of society was an “apostolic instrument with a high and even irreplaceable 
meaning”. These statements, which testify to a drive to push sociology into 
the spotlight in the Dutch Church Province, form the starting point when 
examining the questions of who Dutch bishops and vicars-general 
considered as having sociological expertise, what expertise, when, and in 
what historical context. At a time when the boundaries of social scientific 
disciplines were rather permeable, the answers to these questions were not 
self-evident and could vary over time.  
In the years under discussion, GITP (Gemeenschappelijk Instituut 
voor Toegepaste Psychologie) and the Hoogveld Institute joined KASKI in 
a competition for acknowledgement and research assignments. The first 
institute was founded in 1947 by two psychologists: Theo Rutten, who 
worked as a professor at the Catholic University of Nijmegen, and Jan de 
Quay, former professor of psychology in Tilburg and Queen’s 
Commissioner of the Province of Noord-Brabant. 2  GITP sought to 
contribute to a revitalisation and professionalisation of the Dutch labour 
market by examining psychological questions. It was directed by economist 
Jan Wever (until 1948) and psychologist Jan van Susante (from 1948 until 
1956). The second institute, which carried the name of priest-pedagogue 
Johan Hoogveld, who co-established the Nijmegen University in the early 
1920s, was founded in 1948 by Rutten, priest-psychologist Fortmann, and 
                                                          
1  ZEEGERS, ‘Voorrede’, p. ix.  
2  Van GINNEKEN, Een menselijk instituut, especially pp. 13–33. 
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psychologist Paul Ellerbeck SJ.3 It aimed at an exploration of pedagogical 
questions and stood under the directorship of pedagogue Nic Perquin SJ. 
In the first section of this chapter, I shall focus on the role played by 
Zeegers in the establishment and organisational development of KSKSK 
(Katholiek Sociaal-Kerkelijke Studiekring) and KASKI. In the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War, he started to collaborate with three 
Franciscan priests. This clerical alliance allowed Zeegers, a lay Catholic, to 
gain prominence in the ecclesiastical domain. In the second section, I shall 
examine the frames and metaphors brought into circulation by KASKI 
protagonists. The impact of these discursive elements on the way in which 
bishops perceived their own task and the position of the Church in society 
will also be explored. In the third section, I shall concentrate on the 
diffusion and detail of statistics and cartography. These techniques made 
complex socio-religious phenomena understandable to bishops and their 
vicars-general. Finally, in the fourth section, I shall investigate how an 
episcopal demand for sociology developed. Tens of KASKI publications 
were released by the direct or indirect request of bishops and vicars-general 
between 1950 and 1957. In the Diocese of Haarlem, Zeegers even 
participated in actual socio-religious engineering. Yet, not every Church 
authority made his way to KASKI. As it turns out, a fear of losing a grip on 
episcopal policy kept Auxiliary Bishop Toon Hanssen from ordering data at 
the institute, as well as from allowing its employees to become involved in 
spatial planning.  
 
 
1.1. THE EMPIRICISTS  
 
The Right Contacts 
“Sociology is the science of the facts of society as such; its forms, life, 
development, and decay”, wrote Sebald Steinmetz in 1943. 4  He was a 
professor of geography and ethnology at the University of Amsterdam 
between 1908 and 1933. In comparison to other forms of reasoning, the 
evolution of sociology as a scientific discipline in the Netherlands and the 
connected increase of its application in Dutch society cannot be traced back 
for centuries. In fact, it was Steinmetz who laid the intellectual foundations 
of the empirical approach that sociologists came to embrace. He presented 
the collection, description, and analysis of plain facts as essential for an 
understanding of social reality. Steinmetz’s student and successor Henri ter 
Veen, professor until 1948, was more concerned with practical applications 
of sociological expertise. Ter Veen placed several of his students in 
employment. He told them to act as ‘social engineers’, foremost by 
‘measuring the forces of society’ and building on the basis of that very 
                                                          
3  ‘Mgr. Dr. Hoogveld Instituut in het leven geroepen’, in: De Tijd, 02-02-1948. 
4  As quoted here: GASTELAARS, Een geregeld leven, p. 69. 
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knowledge. 5  Ter Veen himself practiced sociology in service of the 
impoldering projects in the Zuiderzee Area. A recent study by historian 
Liesbeth van de Grift has demonstrated that politicians perceived him as an 
absolute expert when it came to canvassing and interpreting social trends.6 
In collaboration with civil engineers, Ter Veen was tasked with drawing 
development plans. He also contributed to the effectuation of policies.  
The decades after 1945 gave further rise to technocratic governance. 
The Dutch landscape was being redesigned behind the desks of sociologists 
and technical engineers, blocks of flats replaced church buildings as the 
tallest buildings, and flyovers started to intersect the river-area right in the 
centre of the country.7 This increase of technocratic governance went hand 
in hand with an institutionalisation of sociological expertise. Within several 
years, every Dutch university created one or multiple relevant academic 
chairs.8 Furthermore, during the Second World War, the research institutes 
ISONEVO (Instituut voor Sociaal Onderzoek van het Nederlandse Volk) 
and RNP (Rijksdienst voor het Nationale Plan) had been founded. The 
establishment of SINHK (Sociologisch Instituut van de Nederlandse 
Hervormde Kerk), the sociological institute of the Dutch Reformed Church, 
followed in 1945. 
As will be explained, the Catholic Church was not able to rely on its 
own sociological institute until late 1947. In the immediate post-war years, 
Catholic sociology still rested on deductive methodology, designed to 
explain the theologically informed social teaching of the Church.9 Priest 
Willem Koenraadt was one of the most prominent Catholic sociologists. 
After he studied political and social sciences at the Catholic University of 
Leuven and defended his doctoral thesis there in 1928, he started to teach at 
the Bovendonk Seminary of the Diocese of Breda. 10  While Koenraadt 
introduced a new generation of priests to the essentials of sociology, he co-
authored the book Handboek der Maatschappijleer (Textbook on 
Sociology). 11  This publication, which was launched onto the market in 
1938, did not take empirically yielded data as a point of departure, but 
instead the encyclicals Rerum Novarum (Revolutionary Change; 1891) and 
Quadragesimo Anno (Forty Years; 1931). According to Koenraadt and co-
author Max van Poll, the rise of Communism, Fascism, and National 
Socialism had caused a great deal of confusion throughout society, and 
demanded an immediate answer in terms of a reconstruction of the social 
order based on Christian principles.  
                                                          
5  HAGOORT, ‘Sociale wetenschappen op het kruispunt van binnenweg en heirbaan’, p. 38. 
6  Van de GRIFT, ‘On New Land a New Society’, especially pp. 616–618. 
7  SCHUYT and TAVERNE, 1950, especially pp. 40–105, 135–157, 177–234, and 269–306. 
8  GASTELAARS, Een geregeld leven, p 123. 
9  LUYKX, Andere katholieken, pp. 55–56 and WINKELER, ‘Sociografie en pastoraal beleid’, 
pp. 178–180. 
10  OUDEJANS, ‘Koenraadt, Wilhelmus Matthias Johannes’, on-line accessible via: 
 http://www.historici.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/BWN/. Visited on 16-01-2013.  
11  KOENRAADT and Van POLL, Handboek der Maatschappijleer. For other key publications 
written by Koenraadt, see Appendix 1. 
 CHAPTER ONE: THE EMPIRICAL TURN  
 
[26] 
To search for the origins of a Catholic strand of sociological research 
that rested to a much greater extent on empiricism is to focus in more detail 
on Zeegers, a layman born in Rotterdam in 1911, and raised in this 
religiously mixed harbour town in the following decades.12 He was part of a 
family full of entrepreneurial activities. Zeegers’s father witnessed some 
modest successes in the chemistry business. He passed on to his sons a drive 
to look beyond established borders. 13  As the result of a rather devout 
Catholic and upper middle-class upbringing, Zeegers junior came to believe 
in the necessity of Catholicism in society. 14  In contrast to many of his 
relatives, Zeegers did not chase a career in the business world. He first 
acquired a degree from the Rotterdam School of Economics in 1936. 
Willem Boerman, who is generally regarded as a pioneer in the field of 
spatial planning, trained Zeegers and subsequently requested him to 
become his scientific assistant.15 Then, in 1941, Zeegers left the School of 
Economics and accepted a position as head of the research department of 
the just founded RNP. This was the first nationally operating institution for 
spatial planning in the Netherlands. Against the backdrop of ongoing 
growth in the population and a threatened shortage of farmlands, it sought 
to develop the Dutch landscape in its entirety. The first ideas to establish a 
governmental institute to this end circulated in political circles as early as 
before the Second World War. The actual establishment took place in 
1941, after the Nazi Regime, as represented in the Netherlands by 
Reichskommissar Arthur Seyss-Inquart, promoted it. 16  Whereas the 
secretary-general of the Ministry of the Interior, Karel Frederiks, became 
RNP’s president, civil engineer Frits Bakker Schut was appointed as the 
institute’s first director. 
In light of the development and institutionalisation of sociological 
knowledge in the Dutch Church Province, 1 May 1946 should be regarded 
as an important moment. On that date, Zeegers sent a letter to Cardinal De 
Jong in which he focused on the socio-religious question of ‘non-
denomination’ (‘onkerkelijkheid’). 17  He explained to De Jong that the 
problem of decreasing piety had drawn his attention for many years 
already.18 Claiming that this matter was in need of sociological attention, he 
assured the Cardinal that he could always call upon his know-how and 
                                                          
12  Letter by Zeegers to De Jong, 01-05-1946: KDC, ZEEG, 33.  
13  Interview by Dols with Paul Zeegers (Zeegers junior), 14-08-2013.  
14  ‘Een bezeten ridder’, in: De Katholieke Illustratie, 16-04-1966 and ‘Het charitatief imperium 
van drs. G.H.L. Zeegers’, in: Vrij Nederland, 12-02-1977. Zeegers’s diary provides the best 
examples of his religiosity: diary by Zeegers, 1964–1965: ZEEGERS. 
15  Relevant biographical information can be found here: curriculum vitae Zeegers: KDC, ZEEG, 
35; documents with regard to the School of Economics in Rotterdam, 1936–1941: KDC, 
ZEEG, 12; documents concerning RNP, 1941–1944 and 1946–1951: KDC, ZEEG, 16. For 
information on Boerman, see: ‘Prof. W.E. Boerman: oprecht en strijdbaar’, in: NRC, 22-02-
1965. 
16  Van DAM and VUIJSJE, Plannenmakers in oorlogstijd, pp. 17–30. 
17  Letter by Zeegers to De Jong, 01-05-1946: KDC, ZEEG, 33.  
18  As early as in 1933, Protestant sociologist Jacob Pieter Kruijt placed this phenomenon in the 
spotlight: KRUIJT, De onkerkelijkheid in Nederland. 
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years of experience. Zeegers contacted De Jong because he sensed that the 
bishops were interested in an inductive approach to non-denomination. He 
underlined that he could contribute his understandings of studies conducted 
in France to episcopal decision making. 
Here, priest-sociologists Gabriel Lebras, Fernard Boulard, and Jacques 
Petit were shaping a sociological research tradition revolving around the 
notion of ‘Christianisation’. While prompting fellow clergymen to integrate 
factual data into pastoral strategies, they literally mapped religious trends in 
rural regions and brought forth lists of statistics on churchgoing on 
Sunday.19 They regarded a violation of this Catholic duty as an important, 
if not one of the most important, indicators of religious transformation.20 
The research endeavours of Lebras, especially, coincided with the 
publication of Henri Godin’s and Yvan Daniel’s 1943 bestseller. These two 
clerics, who based their argument on sociological analyses, stated that the 
levels of churchgoing had dropped so heavily that it was justified to speak of 
France as a missionary country. 21 
Zeegers was keen to apply such knowledge of a French programme for 
an ‘internal mission’ (‘mission intérieure’), which aimed at Christianisation 
and rested on empirical data, to the Dutch pastorate. The letter he 
addressed to De Jong may perhaps appear as an offer of help with no  
strings attached. Far more likely, however, is that the text was meant as a 
first attempt to forge clerical alliances. Being a lay person, he found himself 
at the very bottom of the pyramidal system of authority that prevailed in the 
Church and in an intellectual culture dominated by clerics.22 In order to 
legitimise his future presence and work in the ecclesiastical domain, he 
needed an ally with clerical status. If De Jong could be won for the promise 
of a sociological gaze on religious matters, the potential for success would 
increase substantially. As will be argued throughout this chapter, Zeegers 
anticipated a common self-understanding of Church authorities by adopting 
a missionary rhetoric. He structured research questions, analytical 
categories, and the collection and presentation of data, such that bishops 
and vicars-general might become convinced of a sociological angle to 
coming to terms with what they perceived as the dangers of ‘modernity’. 
The mark ‘unanswered’ suggests that, for reasons unknown, the 
Cardinal never responded to Zeegers’s letter.23 It is likely that De Jong 
perceived other matters as more urgent in the immediate wake of the 
Second World War. Zeegers soon found another, albeit less eminent, ally in 
Versteeg (figure 4). He met this Franciscan priest in the summer of 1946 in 
Maastricht. Zeegers was exploring possibilities to practice spatial planning, 
whereas Versteeg was organising parish missions. An aspiration to enhance 
                                                          
19  CHENU, ‘Les equêteurs du dimanche’, especially pp. 178–182. 
20  ZIEMANN, Katholische Kirche und Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 80–81. 
21  ZIEMANN and DOLS, ‘Catholic Church Reform and Organizations Research in the 
Netherlands and Germany’, pp. 301–302. 
22  SIMONS and WINKELER, Het verraad der clercken, p. 95.  
23  Letter by Zeegers to De Jong, 01-05-1946: UA, BAU, 607.  
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the Catholic faith and a sense of urgency brought them together.24 They 
soon started to collect quantitative data on Dutch Catholicism. Zeegers 
repeatedly presented himself as the one with the most expertise. Concerning 
‘de-Christianisation’ (‘ontkerstening’) and Christianisation, he told Versteeg 
that it was much wiser to invest time and effort in the conversion of groups 
than in converting individuals.25 After becoming detached from the Church, 
dissenters often entered into secular groups such the Communists. 
According to Zeegers, these former Catholics had to be convinced to break 
with their new milieu and return to the community that they had 
abandoned. Special attention should be given to influential persons. If they 
could be convinced to embrace Catholicism again, Zeegers stressed, their 
flock would usually follow. In this specific context of a ‘missiology in our 
own country’, it was essential to acquire an ‘arsenal’ of pastoral techniques 
and carefully test them in everyday situations. 
Together with theologian Leo Buys CssR, Zeegers and Versteeg 
therefore established a small-scale study group named KSKSK. Zeegers 
had been the main initiator of this study group—rather than Versteeg, as 
theologian Winkeler has argued.26 On 5 July 1946, Zeegers proposed to 
establish a centre for inquiry on non-denomination akin to SINHK.27 The 
first official meeting of KSKSK members took place on 19 May 1947.28 
Franciscan theologians Staverman and Van Leeuwen attended this meeting 
along with Zeegers and Versteeg. In accordance with the French research 
programme for missionary pastoral care, they discussed the compilation of 
already existing data and the manufacturing of cartograms, diagrams in the 
form of a map which presented numeric data. Just as Zeegers was able to 
profit from the clerical status, religious vigour, and the free labour force of 
the Franciscans, these regular priests could benefit from their collaboration 
with Zeegers in order to gain new insights into the socio-religious issues that 
they encountered. The Franciscan Order was not only the largest Order 
active in the Dutch Church Province. It also controlled the most parishes.29 
A growth of Franciscan parishes was particularly visible after 1945.  
KSKSK emerged out of mutual interests. According to a preliminary 
working scheme, approximately two years of work were needed to build a 
comprehensive repository.30 First, the KSKSK members planned to gather 
statistical information from parish administrators, and calculate the 
Catholic population density per deanery and parish. Following on, they 
aimed at: relating this density to political preferences as expressed during 
the last national elections, manufacturing cartograms holding data on the 
                                                          
24  Correspondence between Zeegers and Versteeg, 1946: KDC, ZEEG, 33. 
25  Letter by Zeegers to Versteeg, 25-07-1946: KDC, ZEEG, 33. 
26  WINKELER, ‘Sociografie en pastoraal beleid’, pp. 184–186. 
27  Letter by Zeegers to Versteeg, 05-07-1946: KDC, ZEEG, 33.  
28  Minutes of the KSKSK meeting on 17-05-1947: KDC, KASKI, 3644. Biographical 
information on Versteeg, Staverman, and Van Leeuwen can be found in Appendix 1.  
29  JANSEN, De pater op de pastorie, pp. 72–76. For general historical backgrounds, see:  
De KOK, Acht eeuwen Minderbroeders in Nederland, pp. 338–363. 
30  Preliminary scheme of work KSKSK, 1947: KDC, ZEEG, 32. 
 CHAPTER ONE: THE EMPIRICAL TURN  
 
[29] 
religious state of the Church Province with church attendance, the number 
of Holy Communions, and the number of mixed marriages as key 
parameters of religiosity, working all parish borders and the exact location 
of all parish churches into cartograms and finding out more about the 
participation of Catholics on the job market. In this way, KSKSK members 
hoped to contribute to new insights into non-denomination and ‘seasonal 
conformity’ (‘randkerkelijkheid’), the act of attending Mass occasionally. 
The constitutive KSKSK meeting in the spring of 1947 should be 
defined as a key moment of institutionalisation. Buys did not attend this 
meeting, nor the following ones. He was appointed Father General in the 
General Chapter of the Redemptorists on 30 April 1947. As such, he did 
not witness how Zeegers turned an informal practice of gathering and 
analysing data into an institution that united four Catholic protagonists of 
sociology, their activities, and contacts under one flag. The next step 
Zeegers and the Franciscans took in the summer of 1947 was to get in touch 
with Catholic scholars. Since expert knowledge exists by the grace of faith in 
its foundations, ties with leading academics were of paramount 
importance. 31  These academics represented a place where objectivity 
triumphed and fundamental research stood high on the agenda. Historian 
Louis Rogier was the first to receive a letter.32 He was impressed by the 
study group’s first activities. He argued that a systematic collection, 
description, and analysis of empirical data had been disregarded by 
Catholics for much too long. This line of reasoning becomes 
understandable when one realises that Rogier drew intensively on 
cartographic interpretations of the Dutch Church Province in his series of 
books on the development of Catholicism in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
century which appeared between 1945 and 1947.33 Franciscan professor 
Devolder was also contacted.34 He perceived the new initiative as intriguing. 
The endorsement from Willem Heere, another of Steinmetz’s students, who 
worked as professor of sociology in Tilburg, was also ensured.  
However, not everyone approached by the KSKSK members believed 
in the research they advocated so fervently. Psychologist Fortmann received 
an invitation to become the study group’s chairman. After graduating in 
1943 and completing a doctoral project on prayer in 1945, he became 
widely known as a specialist in the fields of pedagogy and mental care.35 
Strategically, Fortmann was also interesting for Zeegers, Versteeg, 
Staverman, and Van Leeuwen because he worked as a priest in the most 
prominent Dutch diocese: the Archdiocese of Utrecht. He was able to 
                                                          
31  For a more theoretical reflection, see: BOURDIEU, ‘Het wetenschappelijk veld’, especially  
 pp. 179–184. 
32  Minutes of the KSKSK meetings in 1947 and letter by Rogier to KSKSK, 13-06-1947:  
 KDC, KASKI, 3644. 
33  ROGIER, Geschiedenis van het katholicisme in Noord-Nederland in de 16e en 17e eeuw. 
34  Minutes of the KSKSK meeting on 30-07-1947: KDC, KASKI, 3644. 
35  Van SCHAIK, ‘Fortmann, Herman Joannes Henricus Maria’, on-line accessible via: 
www.historici.nl/onderzoek/projecten/BWN. Visited on 02-01-2013. 
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stretch KSKSK’s clerical connections beyond the Franciscan Order. 
Furthermore, he was involved in the priestly training at the Rijsenburg 
Seminary, and could thus bring a sociological approach into the classrooms. 
Unexpectedly, it turned out in October 1947 that Fortmann had no high 
expectations about sociological inquiry.36 He was willing to give KSKSK his 
support, but rejected the offer to become its chairman. Possibly, Fortmann 
was already involved in establishing the Hoogveld Institute at that time. 
Despite this rejection, Zeegers, Versteeg, Staverman, and Van 
Leeuwen carried on. They transformed their study group into an institute 
on 17 November 1947: KASKI. Giving KSKSK corporate status, they 
minimised personal responsibility for possible future debts, and discerned 
between personal belongings and institutional ones. The articles of 
association show that it was the main aim of KASKI to promote the study 
of the socio-religious life of Catholics in the Netherlands. This aim was 
mainly pursued by collecting data, conducting research, and establishing a 
headquarters with a library and an archive.37 
 
The First Steps  
Zeegers became the first director of KASKI, where he would not earn any 
money until 1950 besides a one-off gratification of 100 Dutch Guilders. In 
order to test the institute’s viability and at the same time secure the financial 
future of his wife and a total of four children, he continued to work full-time 
at RNP.38 Zeegers’s directing activities for KASKI usually took place after 
he returned to his home in the early evening. KASKI’s management also 
consisted of a board, of which Versteeg became the chairman and Zeegers 
the secretary.39 As both the director and secretary of the board, the latter 
had much influence. In effect, he was the one setting out the institute’s 
agenda.  
This agenda had to be determined at a time when theology was the 
dominant science in the ecclesiastical domain. 40  Zeegers and Versteeg 
agreed that Church authorities had to be convinced of the advantages of 
sociology for their decision making in a gradual way.41 However, this was 
impossible without money. Paper had to be bought, letters sent, and 
cartograms produced. Because the institute was built on nothing but 
humble beginnings, Zeegers faced a total lack of funds. Versteeg’s 
connections provided a solution in terms of credit. Apollinaris van Leeuwen, 
the Father Superior of the Franciscans, lent KASKI 1,500 Guilders in 
                                                          
36  Minutes of the KSKSK meetings on 29-10-1947 and 30-10-1947: KDC, KASKI, 3644. 
37  Memorandum omtrent ontstaan, doel en werkwijze van het Katholiek Sociaal-Kerkelijk 
Instituut, p. 8. 
38  Six more children would be born during the years to come: interview by Dols with Zeegers 
junior, 14-08-2013. 
39  Minutes of the KASKI Board meetings, 1947–1960: KDC, KASKI, 3644–3657. 
40  WINKELER, ‘Sociografie en pastoraal beleid’, pp. 178–184. 
41  See the introduction of De kerkelijke registratie en statistiek als basis voor de kerkelijke 
sociografie ten dienste van de zielzorg.  
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1947. 42  This loan, contracted shortly after KSKSK was turned into an 
institute, formed KASKI’s starting capital. 
Yet, the Dutch Church Province was not only organised in a 
hierarchical but also a territorial way, meaning that Zeegers had to work in 
each diocese separately. Until 1956, the Church Province consisted of five 
dioceses (figures 5 & 6). The territory of the two most southern ones, Den 
Bosch and Roermond, overlapped with the religiously homogeneous 
Catholic Provinces of Noord-Brabant (89.4 percent of the population was 
Catholic in 1947 according to the census) and Limburg (94.5 percent of 
Catholics).43 The other dioceses, encompassing the provinces of Gelderland 
(38.1 percent of Catholics), Utrecht (31.5 percent of Catholics), North-
Holland (29.3 percent of Catholics), Overijssel (30 percent of Catholics), 
Zeeland (25.7 of Catholics), South-Holland (24.5 percent of Catholics), 
Friesland (7.3 percent of Catholics), Drenthe (7 percent of Catholics), and 
Groningen (6 percent of Catholics), were religiously mixed. The 
Archdiocese of Utrecht and the Diocese of Haarlem were the largest by far. 
As historian Mathieu Spiertz has shown while examining the origins of 
the 1954 Mandatory Letter, regional diversity is also visible with respect to 
Church politics. 44 The leaders of the dioceses of Roermond and Breda, 
Auxiliary Bishop Hanssen and Bishop Joseph Baeten in particular, 
advocated an ‘ecclesiology of authority’ (figure 7). They were convinced that 
a unity of the Church should express itself through an almost unconditional 
loyalty of the bishops to the Pope, of the clergy to their bishops, and of the 
laity to the clergy. In accordance with theological lines of reasoning set out 
in the encyclical Mystici Corporis (The Mystical Body; 1943), which was 
issued by Pope Pius XII, they developed a basic understanding of Church as 
a hierarchical and mystical body designed by God. Each of the individual 
elements of this body had to fulfil a given and fixed role. The other bishops, 
especially Alfrink (who became Archbishop-coadjutor in 1951 and 
succeeded De Jong in 1955) and Jan Huibers from the Diocese of Haarlem 
also stood under the influence of the socio-religious diversity of their 
dioceses. Consequently, they believed much more in a Church responsive to 
its embedment in terms of time and space. This implied a greater 
susceptibility towards alternative avenues to maintaining the position of the 
Church in a rapidly changing society. 
In order to do justice to such regional differences, Zeegers strived for 
the establishment of regional offices. As he had little financial resource, he 
had no other choice besides falling back on the already existing 
infrastructure of his main allies: the Franciscans.45 In 1948, ‘offices’ were 
located in their monasteries in Alverna, where Van Leeuwen lived and 
                                                          
42  Accountants’ reports KASKI, 1947–1958: KDC, KASKI, 3703 and documents with regard to 
financial affairs at KASKI, 1947–1957: KDC, KASKI, 2841 and 2912.  
43  KNIPPENBERG, De religieuze kaart van Nederland, pp. 174–184. 
44  SPIERTZ, ‘De aartsbisschop-coadjutor B.J. Alfrink voor een dilemma’, pp. 272–274. 
45  Compare the archives of the regional KASKI offices: KDC, KASKI, 2558 (Alverna,  
 1948–1949) and 2559–2566 (Amsterdam, 1948–1957).  
 CHAPTER ONE: THE EMPIRICAL TURN  
 
[32] 
worked, and Amsterdam, where sociologist Linus Grond OFM (figure 8) 
introduced KASKI to the clergy.46 Zeegers supervised the establishment 
and development of these offices at the institute’s headquarters, which was 
to be found in two family houses in the Paul Gabriëlstraat (numbers 32–34) 
in The Hague. He chose this town in the Diocese of Haarlem not only 
because the headquarters of RNP and other secular institutes such as CBS 
(Centraal Bureau voor de Statistiek) were located there. He also preferred 
the city to Nijmegen and Tilburg, which respectively hosted a university 
and a school of economics, because it was the home of influential Catholic 
institutions such as the political party KVP (Katholieke Volkspartij) and the 
Apostolic Internunciature, and because it allowed KASKI employees to be 
at the heart of religious ‘problems’ such as non-attendance at the Sunday 
Masses. Ecclesiastical statistics demonstrated that the three large towns in 
the Diocese of Haarlem—The Hague, Amsterdam, and Rotterdam—posed 
a threat to the future of the Dutch Church Province.47  
In Maastricht, a homogeneous Catholic town in the Diocese of 
Roermond, the establishment of a regional office failed despite serious 
efforts and good contacts with Queen’s Commissioner François Houben. 
The main reason for this failure was the way in which Dean Johan 
Ingendael undermined Zeegers’s plans. 48  Bernardus ‘s-Gravendijk OFM, 
who represented KASKI in Maastricht, reported that Ingendael was 
terrified of statistics because they could reveal declining levels of 
churchgoing. Allegedly, Ingendael wanted the outside world to believe that 
he still had the situation in his deanery under control. ‘s-Gravendijk also 
claimed that the longstanding rivalry between regular and secular priests 
worked to KASKI’s disadvantage, as the dean suffered a ‘phobia’ for 
regulars and believed that a ‘brown friar’ was concerning himself with 
parish affairs that were simply not ‘his business’. Zeegers knew the 
difficulties he was up against in this respect. In October 1946, several 
months before KSKSK was founded, he predicted that he and Versteeg 
would have to fight like a ‘fox terrier’ while promoting sociology in the 
Church, where various kinds of interests could conflict with each other.49  
Thanks to the loan and despite a sometimes fierce opposition, KASKI 
managed to release 11 publications between 1947 and 1949.50 At least six 
studies were published on the institute’s own initiative. In Zeegers’s opinion, 
a demand for KASKI’s facts and figures would develop in the ecclesiastical 
realm once the printing press was running, and priests could see the 
advantages for their everyday work with their own eyes.51 As a result of a 
lack of relevant primary sources, it has proved impossible to find out more 
                                                          
46  Biographical information on Grond can be found in Appendix 1. 
47  Memorandum omtrent ontstaan, doel en werkwijze van het Katholiek Sociaal-Kerkelijk 
Instituut, pp. 13–14. 
48  DOLS, ‘Een Limburgs wespennest’, especially pp. 203–207. 
49  Letter by Zeegers to Versteeg, 22-10-1946: KDC, ZEEG, 33.  
50  MAES, ‘Bibliografie van KASKI’, pp. 42–114. 
51  See also: ZEEGERS, ‘Het Katholiek Sociaal-Kerkelijk Instituut’. 
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about the average amount of time needed to prepare and complete a report 
or memorandum. Concerning the aspect of staffing, it should be noted that 
the number of KASKI employees grew from four in 1948 to nine in 1949 
(figure 9).52 A dearth of personnel files in the institute’s archives has made a 
reconstruction of the exact number of full-time and part-time positions 
impossible. 
 
Episcopal Recognition 
Crucial for the acceptation of KASKI as a sociological research centre in 
the Dutch Church Province, and thus its sustainability, was its assessment 
by the so-called Koenraadt Committee. Cardinal De Jong installed this 
advisory committee on 17 November 1947. Convinced of the necessity of a 
re-evaluation of pastoral care in times of profound transition, he instructed 
its members to write a report on the study and treatment of sociological, 
socio-pedagogical, and socio-psychological ‘problems’. Besides Rutten, these 
members were priest Mart Cobbenhagen, professor of economy at the 
Tilburg School of Economics, and Frans Tellegen, the theologian who 
acted as the chairman of the Catholic Action—an organisation attempting 
to mobilise the laity and nurture the Catholic influence in society.53 They 
stood under the leadership of Koenraadt. In 1946, he became involved in 
episcopal decision making as the vicar-general of the Diocese of Breda.  
While the committee’s activities intensified in February 1948, Tellegen 
contacted attorney Cor van Haren.54 Van Haren was the editor in chief of 
Katholiek Archief (Catholic Archive), Catholic Action’s magazine. As 
KASKI’s treasurer, he assisted Zeegers, one of his friends, in developing the 
institute organisationally. Tellegen informed Van Haren that the Koenraadt 
Committee was about to call a meeting with representatives of Catholic 
research institutes. KASKI employees would be invited to this meeting as 
well.  
On 28 April 1948, KASKI employees Versteeg, Zeegers, and Van 
Leeuwen, advisor Heere, and Van Haren made their way to the Oranje 
Hotel in Den Bosch. On behalf of the Hoogveld Institute, which had only 
been initiated several weeks prior to the gathering, Perquin, professor of 
Latin Literature and Linguistics Harry Janssen, and psychologist Lène 
Coenders attended the meeting. Minutes of the discussion reveal that the 
KASKI representatives were astute, realising that an impressive 
presentation would be a vital step in the direction of episcopal recognition. 
Not only did they come up with a memorandum in which their institute’s 
goal and procedures were presented sharply and eloquently. They also 
adopted a far more constructive stance than Janssen, Perquin, and 
                                                          
52  Memorandum on the goal, organisation, and operating procedures of KASKI, 1956:  
 UA, BAU, 607.  
53  For more information on this organisation in the 1940s and 1950s, see: De HAAN, Van 
volgzame elitestrijder tot kritische gelovige, pp. 111–181. 
54  Letter by Tellegen to Van Haren, 19-02-1948: KDC, KASKI, 2812.  
 CHAPTER ONE: THE EMPIRICAL TURN  
 
[34] 
Coenders did. 55  Furthermore, Zeegers, who according to his former 
employees could be very charismatic, expanded on a success story.56 He 
stated that the Amsterdam dean Gerard van der Burg had ordered KASKI 
employees to localise ‘key positions of non-denomination’. After the 
preliminary outcomes of statistical and cartographical inquiry were 
established, Van der Burg would discuss these results and their value for the 
city pastorate together with every parish priest, so that a maximum of 
collaboration with the clergy would be guaranteed. When asked by Rutten 
about what to do when the most important work was done, Zeegers quick-
wittedly replied that this danger was almost non-existent: “The field is 
inexhaustible, and new days and ages bring about new problems”. It is 
probable that a recent meeting between Zeegers and Pope Pius XII was also 
mentioned. During an audience in Rome on 25 March 1948, the Pope 
wished KASKI a successful development.57 
A letter sent by Zeegers to Redemptorist Father General Buys on 19 
July 1948, makes clear that the KASKI director was rather satisfied with the 
latest developments: “Up to this point, God’s blessing has clearly shined 
upon our work”. Zeegers held out hope that the bishops would now label 
his institute as the official institution for sociological inquiry in the Dutch 
ecclesiastical domain, and that this would imply financial support.58 Such 
support would enable him to hire professionally trained sociologists. As 
Zeegers wrote to Buys, he was intent on preventing the image of KASKI as 
being ‘a Franciscan business’ from circulating, which was why he had tried 
to get theologian Henri Boelaars CssR involved in the institute’s activities. 
These efforts remained unsuccessful, however, since Boelaars already had 
too many other responsibilities. 
On 18 September 1948, Koenraadt sent the report he and the other 
committee members drafted to the bishops.59 The Koenraadt Committee 
argued that intense socio-religious change legitimised a reflection upon the 
question of whether the existing methods of pastoral care were still efficient 
enough. “We do see ourselves confronted with a reality of immense 
problems”, its members noted while pointing at a growing non-
denomination and the impact of Communism. KASKI was stated by them 
to be the quintessential institute able to contribute to such a reflection. Its 
staff was able to offer ‘important services’ to the clergy. Scrutinising modern 
problems in an ‘excellent’ way, this staff identified ‘sources of infection’ and 
discovered ‘correlations’ between various socio-religious phenomena. 
Against the backdrop of the financial difficulties that KASKI was facing, the 
                                                          
55  Minutes of the committee meeting on 28-04-1948: KDC, KASKI, 2812. See also: 
Memorandum omtrent ontstaan, doel en werkwijze van het Katholiek Sociaal-Kerkelijk 
Instituut.  
56  See, for instance: interview by Dols with Matthijssen, 30-11-2010. 
57  Circular letter KASKI I, 03-05-1947: KDC, KASKI, 2826 and letter by Montini to Versteeg, 
03-11-1948: KDC, ZEEG, 33. 
58  Letter by Zeegers to Buys, 15-07-1949: ENK, CSSR, 7509. Emphasis in original document. 
59  Letter by Koenraadt to Versteeg, 29-03-1949, including report: KDC, KASKI, 2812. 
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Koenraadt Committee prompted the bishops to consider the option of 
supporting this institute financially. Its members held on to a rule of thumb 
mentioned by Heere during the meeting in Den Bosch: one cent per 
Catholic, meaning 30,000 Guilders in total. 
The bishops discussed the Koenraadt Report and its financial 
consequences twice, at the end of September 1948 and in March 1949.60 As 
Vicar-general Johan Geerdinck wrote on their behalf to the KASKI board 
on 21 April 1949, who effectively governed the Archdiocese of Utrecht since 
1947 as a result of De Jong’s worsening health, they had much appreciation 
for the institute’s goal, the commitment of the employees, and the scientific 
character of the conducted research.61 Nonetheless, the bishops were unable 
to help laying the financial foundations of KASKI. Their own resources did 
not allow for any assistance, nor did a contribution from the local church 
governments. KASKI had to make it on its own. This was not to say, 
however, that its director could not submit any reasonable research 
proposals. According to Geerdinck, such proposals would be met by the 
Episcopacy with sympathy. 
 
Expansion  
Zeegers and Versteeg were ambivalent about this episcopal decision.62 On 
the one hand, their institute had gained the kind of recognition they were 
desperate for. On the other hand, they had not succeeded in convincing the 
bishops to give KASKI a substantial donation. Problems, in other words, 
seemed there to stay. Whereas there were not many priests left who could 
become involved in KASKI, professionals could not be hired without 
funding. And without these professionals, it was difficult to acquire research 
assignments and earn money.  
This problem was alleviated by a loan of 5,000 Guilders from Bishop-
coadjutor Baeten from the Diocese of Breda as well as a gift of 10,000 
Guilders from the Brenninkmeijer family. This wealthy Catholic family of 
entrepreneurs, who founded and owned the successful clothing company 
C&A, regularly supported Catholic initiatives financially.63 What must also 
have encouraged Zeegers to continue was the fact that Koenraadt became 
KASKI’s new chairman in 1950.64 Koenraadt more and more presented 
himself as a proponent of the institute in episcopal circles, and used his close 
contact with Baeten in order to maximise the outcomes of the episcopal 
deliberations and provide Zeegers with a loan.65 As both a sociologist and a 
vicar-general, Koenraadt seemed to be the perfect ally for Zeegers, even 
                                                          
60  Letter by De Jong to Hanssen, 16-04-1949: UA, BAU, 607. 
61  Letter by Geerdinck to the KASKI Board, 21-04-1949: KDC, KASKI, 2812. 
62  Letter by Versteeg and Zeegers to De Jong, 27-05-1949: KDC, KASKI, 2812. 
63  The Brenninkmeijer family established a foundation to this end: the  
 Benevoltentia Foundation. For financial injections into the Catholic world of media in the 
1920s, see: DIBBETS, Sprekende films, p. 280. 
64  Minutes of the KASKI Board meetings, 1950–1951: KDC, KASKI, 3647–3648.  
65  Letter by Koenraadt to Versteeg, 16-03-1949: KDC, KASKI, 2812. 
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though, or perhaps precisely because of, the fact that Koenraadt embodied 
a more deductive research paradigm (figure 10). Versteeg, who did not want 
to become too organisationally involved in KASKI’s development and 
began to organise parish missions in a working class neighbourhood in 
Amsterdam, did not leave the institute entirely. He would remain as a 
member of the board until 1965. On the personal level, Versteeg became 
very close with Zeegers. Not only did he baptise almost all of Zeegers’s 
children. He was also present during his twelve-and-a-half-year marriage 
anniversary in July 1956 and dressed up as Saint Nicholas during a family 
gathering several months later.66 
Also in 1950, Zeegers left RNP and started to work full-time at 
KASKI. He could make this move due to accepting a part-time position at 
the newly founded political and social sciences department of the Catholic 
University of Nijmegen.67 Sociologist Antoine Oldendorff, yet another of 
Steinmetz’s students, drafted the organisational blueprint of this 
department. He chaired a committee advising the board of the Faculty of 
Arts and Philosophy on the candidate for the new chair of spatial planning. 
Together with Heere, Janssen, and priest-philosopher Johan van Boxtel, the 
other committee members, Oldendorff argued that the establishment of this 
chair was instrumental to meeting a mounting demand on the labour 
market, where ‘sociologist’ was becoming a well-respected profession. 68 
Many Nijmegen students would ultimately end up as a social engineer. 
They had to be prepared for the job, as they would be analysing the 
complex problem of the spread of the rapidly increasing Dutch population 
over cities and villages and looking to help create a socioeconomic balance 
The chair was seen to serve a distinctive Catholic interest too: the university 
needed to ‘catch up’ with that of Amsterdam and Utrecht when it came to 
the education of professional spatial planners. 
Zeegers knew Heere rather well as a result of their joint quest for 
KASKI’s ascent. More importantly, however, was Zeegers’s connection to 
Oldendorff. These two sociologists collaborated with each other at 
ISONEVO in 1945 and 1946, where Oldendorff worked as co-director at 
that time, and never lost contact.69 In fact, as Oldendorff wrote to Zeegers 
on 10 October 1949, he had the impression that he could push the entire 
nomination committee into Zeegers’s direction. 70  Oldendorff underlined 
that he would do everything that he could to get him appointed to the 
position. Oldendorff’s confidence did not prove unfounded. Even though 
Zeegers’s lack of a doctoral degree gave rise to serious reservation, the 
committee presented Zeegers as the top candidate.71 The rumour that he 
                                                          
66  Diary by Zeegers, 1964–1965 (pp. 30–32): ZEEGERS. 
67  SCHREUDER, Argonauten aan de Waal, pp. 37–38.  
68  An undated document in which the establishment of the chair is discussed and Zeegers is 
recommended can be found here: KDC, ZEEG, 21.  
69  Documents with regard to ISONEVO, 1945–1946: KDC, ZEEG, 18. 
70  Letter by Oldendorff to Zeegers, 10-10-1949: KDC, ZEEG, 21. 
71  SCHREUDER, Argonauten aan de Waal, pp. 37–38.  
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was in the running for a professorship in Amsterdam contributed to this 
decision. 
The faculty board and university trustees agreed on the establishment 
of the proposed chair. Zeegers was asked to accept an extraordinary 
professorship.72 His acceptance should be seen, if not as a highlight of his 
career, then in light of its advantages for KASKI. Between 1950 and 1957, 
Zeegers supervised the doctoral projects of four of his employees.73 KASKI 
facilitated these projects including the publication of the research results in 
book form. Media coverage on the project of priest-sociologist Jan 
Dellepoort (figure 11) suggests that the institute’s direct link to academia 
enforced its trustworthiness in the public sphere. When Dellepoort defended 
his thesis on priestly vocation in 1955, KRO broadcasting company and 
other media followed the ceremony closely. The editors of De Katholieke 
Illustratie (The Catholic Illustration) magazine even devoted an entire six-
page editorial in their July Issue to the priest’s findings.74 They integrated a 
graph and two cartograms into this article, thereby popularising KASKI’s 
visual representations of socio-religious behaviour. They also printed a large 
chart depicting a declining number of ordinations on the front cover (figure 
12). Journalist Willy Kint alias J.W. Hofwijk introduced Dellepoort to the 
Catholic audience as a representative of a new form of expertise—a hero 
who collected ‘down-to-earth figures’ and ‘hard statistics’.  
From 1950 onwards, Zeegers exchanged the strategy of gradual 
growth that he pursued during KASKI’s first years for a strategy of 
expansion, often at the cost of his lecturing commitment at the university. 
Armed with the title of ‘director general’, he established new offices in 
Rotterdam (1951), Leeuwarden (1952), Nijmegen (1952), Breda (1955), and 
Den Bosch (1956).75 He attempted to profit from existing networks as much 
as possible. In Rotterdam, Zeegers teamed up with Lodewijk Rogier, one of 
historian Rogier’s sons who was the director of a Catholic administrative 
institution called KKBR (Katholiek Kerkelijk Bureau Rotterdam). The 
preparations of the Leeuwarden office took place in Drachten, where the 
Franciscans, united in AMF (Apostolaat Minderbroeders Friesland), were 
systematically bringing Christianisation into practice. 76  In Nijmegen, 
Zeegers succeeded in establishing a joint venture with Oldendorff: the 
Sociological Research Centre. This institution was an official academic 
training centre for sociology students as well as a KASKI affiliation. And in 
                                                          
72  GODEFROY, De toekomst van de academisch gegradueerden opnieuw beschouwd, 
DELLEPOORT, De priesterroepingen in Nederland, GODDIJN, Katholieke minderheid en 
protestantse dominant, and MATTHIJSSEN, De intellectuele emancipatie der katholieken. 
73  Documentation on Zeegers’s appointment, 1949–1951: RU, CVB, HGL0045A. 
74  ‘De dalende lijn’, in: De Katholieke Illustratie, 09-07-1955. See also: ‘Priesterroepingen in 
Nederland’, in: De Tijd, 05-07-1955.  
75  Compare the archives of the regional KASKI offices: KDC, KASKI, 2674–2683 (Rotterdam, 
1950–1957), 2567–2573 (Breda, 1955–1957), 2574–2584 (Den Bosch, 1958–1957), 2586–2600 
(Leeuwarden, 1948–1957), and 2659–2666 (Nijmegen, 1951–1957). 
76  For more information on the Franciscan activities in the Drachten area, see: HOTTINGA, 
Het franciscaanse avontuur van Drachten, especially pp. 25–56. 
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Den Bosch, the KASKI director convinced Queen’s Commissioner De 
Quay of the indispensability of sociology for regional politics and forged an 
alliance with PPD (Provinciale Planologische Dienst). These regional offices, 
which were squeezed into tiny and sometimes even dilapidated rooms, and 
hardly stood in contact with each other, were staffed by a few people only: a 
manager, one or several assistants, and a typist (figure 13).77 Zeegers also 
established affiliations in Austria, Belgium, France, Italy, Luxemburg, 
Spain, West-Germany, Brazil, Columbia, Indonesia, and Surinam. The 
director even founded the international umbrella organisation ICARES 
(Institut International Catholique de Recherches Socio-Ecclèsiales) in 1955, 
with Archbishop of Vienna Franz Jachym as its chairman. The total 
number of KASKI employees grew from 16 in 1950 to more than 80 in 
1956.78  
Supervising these employees at the institute’s headquarters in The 
Hague, Zeegers came to show a true Janus face. Driving himself hard, he 
turned out to be not only the expected charismatic sociologist, but also a 
hands-on boss who could lose his temper and did not tolerate any 
opposition. His employees had to write lengthy reports about their progress 
on a weekly basis, invariably had to follow his commands, always had to 
pick up the telephone when he rang, and were not allowed to leave the 
office without informing him.79 According to Zeegers, that was the only way 
in which KASKI, this expanding institute with affiliations within and far 
beyond the Dutch borders, could be properly governed. Control became 
everything to him. 
Zeegers’s new strategy was rooted in a strong desire to pave the way 
for the victory of Catholicism across the globe.80 In his mind, Europe should 
adopt the role of trailblazer (figure 14). Zeegers believed that this part of the 
world, lying at ‘the heart of Christianity’, was historically chosen to fulfil its 
global vocation, namely to lead other cultures and nations to the Church 
that was ‘the Mother of all Nations’. Europe could of course neglect this 
vocation. But in that case, it would throw a centuries-old tradition away and 
evolve into a mere material superstructure. Meaningful in this regard is the 
jacket of a brochure published at the occasion of KASKI’s decennial in 
1956 (figure 15). This jacket not only showed the symbol of the cross, set 
against the background of a globe, but conveyed images of a young family 
going to church and Saint George killing a dragon with a spear. This 
dragon stood for heathenism. 
                                                          
77  ZIEMANN and DOLS, ‘Catholic Church Reform and Organizations Research in the 
Netherlands and Germany’, p. 295. 
78  Memorandum on the goal, organisation, and operating procedures of KASKI, 1956:  
UA, BAU, 607. 
79  See the following KASKI files: KDC, KASKI, 2559–2560, 2566, 2571, 2574, 2586–2587, 
2591–2600, 2659, 2661–2662, 2666–2667, 2669, 2673–2675, 2683–2684, 2686, 2689, and 
2693–2694. See also: ZIEMANN, ‘Die Institutionalisierung des Tatsachenblicks’, pp. 103–105.  
80  ZEEGERS, De roeping van het Westen, De verantwoordelijkheid van het christelijke Westen 
voor de onderontwikkelde gebieden, and De kerk en Europa.  
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Part and parcel of Zeegers’s strategy of expansion, too, was Sociaal 
Kompas (Social Compass). First published in Dutch in 1953, this journal 
soon became multilingual and won critical acclaim at an international level 
(figure 16).81 Priest Frans op de Coul, who was a friend of KASKI, was its 
editor in chief. This director of CBKO (Centraal Bureau voor het Katoliek 
Onderwijs) linked KASKI to the world of Catholic education. Minutes of 
meetings of the editorial board demonstrate that Op de Coul, Zeegers, and 
Koenraadt expected their journal to serve as a vehicle of scientific exchange 
and at the same time legitimate the existence of the social sciences in the 
Church. “Social Compass is a proof of the fact that the Church is able to 
take a position in the contemporary world without losing its soul, and that it 
succeeds in making use of the modern apparatus of science”, Op de Coul 
noted on 15 September 1953.82 In terms of appearance, much attention was 
given to tables, cartograms, and graphs. Through these visuals, Social 
Compass emphasised empiricism—something that set the social sciences 
apart from normative ones. 
Correspondence from and to Koenraadt show that Zeegers’s towering 
ambitions gave rise to internal friction. As early as in 1952, Koenraadt 
wrote to Zeegers that a longing for expansion was risky for KASKI’s future: 
“For all sake, Professor, do consider the large significance of wise and early 
self-restraint. An institute that gradually grows and always works towards a 
consolidation of what such a growth brings forth in terms of profit; such an 
institute will eventually become strong, internally and externally. But an 
institute that is invariably overstretching is unstable and runs the risk of 
imploding”.83 And in 1955, Koenraadt dared to challenge Zeegers’s plan to 
open a KASKI affiliation in the town of Breda.84 Nonetheless, this affiliation 
opened its doors and was consecrated by Bishop Baeten in February 1957. 
The KASKI director thus expanded the institute, regardless of the opinions 
and desires of his chairman.  
Zeegers also defended KASKI’s position in the field. He did so by 
disqualifying competing institutes. In early 1952, Catholic psychologist 
Frederik Buytendijk wrote a paper in which he based moral disqualifications 
of the people living in the Province of Limburg on criminality figures. This 
paper led to considerable turmoil in both public and Catholic circles. In one 
of the June 1952 issues of Credo, the weekly of the Diocese of Roermond, it 
was argued that the province was stigmatised, possibly on false grounds, and 
that it was important to get to the bottom of the matter.85 After Zeegers 
heard that Vicar-general Frans Feron was about to grant a research project 
                                                          
81  MEJIDO, ‘On the Genesis and Transformations of Social Compass’, pp. 23–30 and  
 ZIEMANN, Katholische Kirche und Sozialwissenschaften, p. 24.  
82 Speech by Op De Coul, 15-09-1953. See also: minutes of the Editorial Board meetings on  
 15-09-1953 and 19-11-1953. All documents: UA, BAU, 607. 
83  Letter by Koenraadt to Zeegers, 27-04-1952: KDC, KASKI, 4281. 
84  Letter by Koenraadt to Zeegers, 17-02-1955. See also: letter by Zeegers to Koenraadt,  
 14-02-1955. Both letters: KDC, KASKI, 2567. 
85  ‘Uit de doeken’, in: Credo 4 (1952), issue 26, p. 2. 
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to the Hoogveld Institute to this end, the KASKI director immediately sent 
Op de Coul to him, contending that this institute was not sufficiently 
equipped for the job and lacked specific expertise.86 If its director was to 
acquire the assignment in question, a ‘blurring of duties’ would take place 
which threatened to ‘damage’ the entire research sector.  
Here, Zeegers created a distinct hierarchy, claimed expertise, and 
attempted to damage the Hoogveld Institute’s reputation.87 It is not unlikely 
that new signs of support by the Holy See nurtured the self-confidence 
Zeegers showed in his efforts to expand and defend KASKI. In 1951, Pope 
Pius XII bestowed upon him the honour to become Knight of the Pontifical 
Equestrian Order of Saint Gregory the Great.88 Three years later, the Pope 
sent his Apostolic Blessing to the employees responsible for Social Compass. 
According to Giovanni Montini, the later Pope Paul VI and then Pro-
Secretary of State, the goal they had set for themselves was very 
praiseworthy.89 Zeegers and his ‘skilful’ employees were therefore urged to 
practice their ‘important’ work in an energetic way. In 1955, Zeegers met 
the Pope for the second time (figure 17). And in 1957, Apostolic Internuncio 
Paolo Giobbe familiarised Zeegers with the news that he was moving up to 
become Knight Commander of the Saint Gregory Order—one of the 
highest ecclesiastical decorations one could receive as a lay Catholic.90  
Did Zeegers’s strategy of expansion lead to an increase of research 
assignments? As detailed in Table 1, KASKI published 230 
reports/memoranda between 1950 and 1957.91 A demand for the institute’s 
facts and figures was successfully generated. Letters and reports indicate that 
employees stationed at the regional offices had to work hard to keep up with 
all the deadlines. In 1954, Rogier junior bitterly complained that he often 
worked during the night.92 One year later, he noted that he had filled up the 
stock of aspirin for the umpteenth time: “By turns, we all take aspirin. 
Today, I almost poisoned myself. I was ruined by sleepiness and headache. 
But we’ve got no choice. There’s so much work to do, and we’re making not 
enough headway”. 93  Strikingly, a recurring anecdote in recollections of 
former employees is that of a proud Zeegers standing in his office at 
                                                          
86  Letter by Zeegers to Op de Coul, 22-07-1952 and letter by Op de Coul to Feron, 23-07-1952. 
Both letters: BARD, 312.1, 49. 
87  Priest Hendrik Litjens pioneered sociological inquiry on the phenemenon of  
‘maladjusted bevahiour’ in a 1953 doctoral thesis, with criminality as a category of  
analysis. See: LITJENS, Ontmaatschappelijke gezinnen and Onmaatschappelijkheid. KASKI 
published a key study on the matter in 1957: LITJENS, Onderzoek naar de 
onmaatschappelijkheid in de gemeenten Helmond, Mierlo, Stiphout, Aarle-Rixtel, Lieshout, 
Beek en Donk, Gemert, Bakel, Deurne, Asten, en Someren. For the larger historical picture, 
see: DERKSEN and VERPLANKE, Geschiedenis van de onmaatschappelijkheidsbestrijding 
in Nederland. 
88  ‘Prof. Zeegers ridder in Orde van St. Gregorius’, in: De Tijd, 05-07-1951. 
89  Letter by Montini to Zeegers, 24-03-1954: KDC, ZEEG, 33. 
90  GODDIJN, De moed niet verliezen, p. 49. 
91  MAES, ‘Bibliografie van KASKI’, pp. 42–114. 
92  Report by Rogier, 03-11-1954: KDC, KASKI, 2681. 
93  Report by Rogier, 07-02-1955: KDC, KASKI, 2681. 
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KASKI’s headquarters around midnight, his staff exhausted, and the floor 
covered with cartograms.94 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Table 1. Number of publications released by KASKI, 1947–1957.  
(Source: Maes 1977) 
 
 
The combination of a lack of financial resources and Zeegers’s 
towering, even global, ambitions meant that money paid for the activities 
undertaken by Rogier junior and the other members of the KASKI staff 
formed a first essential income flow. This first income flow consisted of at 
least three sub-flows. Firstly, as the Dutch subsidiary landscape was divided 
along ideological and confessional lines, KASKI received money from 
Catholic commissioning institutes and organisations. These could be 
religious ones such as the Franciscan Order, social ones such as the 
National Social-Caritative Centre, and political ones such as KVP. 95 
Secondly, the American Marshall Plan, which sought to contribute to a 
recovery of Europe and provided a financial injection of up to one million 
Dutch Guilders into social scientific research in the Netherlands, 
contributed to KASKI’s expansion. In 1953, a large-scale project costed at 
414,000 Guilders was allocated to GITP.96 This project focused on methods 
                                                          
94  GODDIJN, De moed niet verliezen, p. 263 and interview by Dols with Keverkamp,  
15-01-2013, for instance.  
95  For a bibliographical overview, see: MAES, ‘Bibliografie van KASKI’, pp. 42–114. 
96  Van GINNEKEN, De uitvinding van het publiek, pp. 97–135. For the American influence  
Year Number of Reports Number of 
Memoranda 
Total Number of 
Reports/Memoranda 
1947 1 1 2 
1948 4 1 5 
1949 4 - 4 
1950 15 - 15 
1951 22 - 22 
1952 27 - 27 
1953 26 - 26 
1954 23 5 28 
1955 24 15 39 
1956 16 19 35 
1957 14 24 38 
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of selection and education of foremen. In addition, KNBGG acquired a 
335,000 Guilders project on the nature, extent, and remedy of neuroses in 
companies. GITP assisted KNBGG in gathering and analysing data. Via 
Van Susante’s institute, employees of the Nijmegen Sociological Research 
Centre got involved in both projects. 97  Thirdly, KASKI benefited from 
public money. In 1952, for instance, the institute published the results of a 
study on the position of technicians on the labour market.98 Rutten, who in 
1948 became the new Minister of Education, Arts, and Sciences, 
commissioned this study. And in 1957, on a more local level, members of 
the KASKI staff completed an inquiry on the Smallingerland Area in the 
Province of Friesland by request of the Mayor of Smallingerland and the 
other political authorities governing the municipality.99 
Monetary assistance in the form of gifts by representatives of the 
Church formed a second essential incoming flow of funds. In the early 
1950s, Zeegers received substantial funding from sisters. 100  Versteeg’s 
ecclesiastical connections again proved to be valuable. He successfully 
embarked on propaganda tours in convents, using his rhetorical talent in 
order to turn the benevolence of the Sisters Franciscans, in particular, to 
KASKI’s benefit. In 1965, he recalled: “In the early days of KASKI, I used 
to give many speeches for sisters. Before the break, I already did my very 
best. As a result, the Mother Superior said during the break: ‘You can count 
on 2,500 Guilders’. But then I thought: ‘After the break, I’ll walk all over 
you’. In the second part of my speech, I couldn’t be stopped any more. By 
the end of the day, I often went home with 5,000 Guilders”.101 As KASKI 
gained more influence over the course of the 1950s, the sums of money 
increased.102 Whereas the Apostolic Internunciature made a gift of 5,000 
Guilders in 1953, priest Herman van Hussen, the director of the National 
Office for the Papal Mission Action, provided the institute with a grant of 
19,000 Guilders in 1956. In that same year, Alfrink donated 45,000 
Guilders gathered through the yearly Saint Willibrord Collection. Should 
this donation be interpreted as a financial boost in the year of KASKI’s 
decennial? 
Sociologist Tettero and historian Dierick have rightfully reasoned that 
this decennial formed Zeegers’s personal zenith (figure 18). 103  On 30 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
on the academic world in the Netherlands in general, see: RUPP, Van oude en nieuwe 
universiteiten, especially pp. 201–265. 
97  Reports on the research activities in Nijmegen, 1952–1955: KDC, KASKI, 2661.  
98  Rapport betreffende de omvang van het academische en middelbare technische kader in  
 1947 en zijn ontwikkeling tot 1960.  
99  Smallingerland in Overgang, III. 
100  List of grants KASKI, 1951–1952: KDC, KASKI, 2912. 
101 ‘Montanus Versteeg, de franciscaan met de grandioze ideeën’, in: De Tijd, 13-03-1965. For a 
speech delivered by Versteeg in Maastricht in 1949, see: Toespraak, gehouden door pater 
Montanus Versteeg OFM, voorzitter van het Katholiek Sociaal-Kerkelijk Instituut, bij de 
installatie van de Raad van Bijstand van het Bureau Maastricht op zaterdag 26 februari 1949. 
102  Accountants’ reports KASKI, 1947–1958: KDC, KASKI, 3703 and documents with regard to 
financial affairs at KASKI: KDC, KASKI, 2841 and 2912. 
103  TETTERO and DIERICK, ‘Dertig jaar KASKI-onderzoek’, p. 14.  
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September 1956, the institutional milestone was celebrated with much 
ecclesiastical splendour. A Pontifical High Mass took place in the Saint 
Jacob’s Church in The Hague during which Alfrink delivered a special 
sermon.104 Apostolic Internuncio Giobbe and members of the parliament 
graced the event with their presence. It is precisely against this backdrop of 
euphoria that Zeegers’s supposed masterstroke has to be set. On 14 
November 1956, Zeegers asked Alfrink to become KASKI’s honorary 
chairman.105 As Zeegers noted in a letter, Alfrink’s authority was needed in 
order to win the battle over the involvement of the laity in the improvement 
of foreign development territories, in which malnutrition and child 
mortality were the order of the day.  
This request followed on a public dispute that arose during and in the 
wake of the yearly meeting of the rather elitist Saint Adelbert Society. At the 
heart of the debate was the question of what role Catholics should play with 
regard to development aid. Catholic politician Geert Ruygers, who was a 
member of the Dutch Labour Party, argued in favour of a reliance on 
already existing—and often religiously neutral—organisations such as 
SUNFED (Special United Nations Fund for Economic Development).106 In 
his opinion, economic and technical help should not be linked to 
programmes of Christianisation. A solution to the social issue was in itself a 
contribution to Christianisation, as this solution “brings us closer to that 
justice, charity, and respect for every human being presented to us in the 
Gospel on a daily basis”. Ruygers was an exponent of a movement of young 
intellectuals who in the immediate aftermath of the Second World War 
started to aim at breaking through a larger societal constellation which was 
ideologically and confessionally segregated.107 This movement prompted the 
bishops to publish their 1954 Mandatory Letter, in which they advocated 
such a segregation.108 In marked contrast with Ruygers, Zeegers argued that 
organisations with a distinctive Catholic character were needed and had 
their own responsibility when it came to development aid. 109  For him, 
Alfrink accepting the title of honorary chairman meant to having the 
Archbishop at his side for the long term. Alfrink refused the offer, however. 
He explained to Zeegers that he could simply not afford losing his neutrality 
as an Archbishop. 110  To become KASKI’s honorary chairman was to 
choose sides. Alfrink perceived this as unwise. 
Whereas Archbishop Alfrink drew a firm line between Church 
governance and sociological inquiry in light of ecclesiastical independence, 
sociologist Jacques van Doorn did broadly the same, yet with scientific 
                                                          
104  This sermon will be discussed in the following paragraph.  
105  Letter by Zeegers to Alfrink, 14-11-1956: UA, BAU, 607. 
106  RUYGERS, ‘Een sociaal vraagstuk zo groot als de wereld’. 
107  For more information on this movement and its perception in the Dutch Church Province,  
see: Van den BOS, Verlangen naar vernieuwing, pp. 64–66. 
108  SPIERTZ, ‘De aartsbisschop-coadjutor B.J. Alfrink voor een dilemma’. 
109  ZEEGERS, ‘De kerk bij de ontwikkeling der volkeren’.  
110  Letter by Alfrink to Zeegers, 03-12-1956: UA, BAU, 607. 
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independence and objectivity in mind. In his doctoral thesis, Van Doorn 
stated that the existence of confessional sociological institutes in the 
Netherlands enlarged the scientific pitfalls of biased preconceptions and 
subjectivity.111 Zeegers, who saw KASKI’s right to exist violated and his 
own position in the field challenged, reacted immediately in Social 
Compass.112 He argued that the role of the Catholic and Protestant research 
institutes testified to a religiously inspired responsibility to contribute to the 
solution of national issues from a confessional viewpoint. He also held that 
this role met a demand to solve socio-religious problems in the ecclesiastical 
domains. Catholic and Protestant sociologists were able to understand the 
inner life of the communities under investigation much better than 
‘outsiders’. Besides, Zeegers noted, Catholic and Protestant research 
commissioners were better off with advice articulated by fellows who spoke 
‘the same language’. 
This dispute demonstrates that Van Doorn, a spokesman of a new 
generation of sociologists who provocatively called themselves the ‘modern 
sociologists’ and gathered around their journal Sociologische Gids 
(Sociological Guide), attempted to upset the general scientific status quo.113 
He charged confessional colleagues with a likely lack of objectivity. More 
importantly, the debate shows how Zeegers attempted to neutralise this 
attempt: by pointing at external and internal sources of legitimation, and 
sharply defining the boundaries of the field. As he had to admit within a 
period of two years, rather unexpectedly, the most serious threat to his 
position would not come from Van Doorn’s side, but instead from within 
the very walls of KASKI. 
 
 
1.2. THE DISCOURSE OF ENGINEERING CHRISTIANISATION 
 
Framing Christianisation  
What characterised the directorate of Zeegers was that he believed that he 
could influence the mindsets of the bishops down to the smallest detail. 
Reports ‘sounding like clockwork’ should stimulate a sociological overturn 
of their theological modes of thought, as he wrote on 7 August 1952.114 In 
the second half of the 1940s, two such documents were delivered to the 
bishops. In 1947, Zeegers sent the Episcopacy KASKI’s first report: De 
kerkelijke registratie en statistiek als basis voor de kerkelijke sociografie ten 
dienste van de zielzorg (The Ecclesiastical Registration and Statistics as a 
Basis of the Ecclesiastical Sociography in Service of Pastoral Care).115 In this 
text, luxuriously bound for the occasion, the necessity of reliable and 
                                                          
111  Van DOORN, Een sociologische benadering van het organisatieverschijnsel, statement II. 
112  ZEEGERS, ‘De sociale research als politiek instrument’, especially pp. 147–150.  
113  See also: GASTELAARS, Een geregeld leven, pp. 185–232. 
114  Letter by Zeegers to Goddijn, 07-08-1952: KDC, KASKI, 2568. 
115  De kerkelijke registratie en statistiek als basis voor de kerkelijke sociografie ten dienste van de 
zielzorg.  
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uniform ecclesiastical statistics for Church governance was underlined. As 
noted above, KASKI released a memorandum in 1948 for the purpose of its 
assessment by the Koenraadt Committee. 116  The bishops received this 
document, Memorandum omtrent ontstaan, doel en werkwijze van het 
Katholiek Sociaal-Kerkelijk Instituut (Memorandum on the Origins, Goal, 
and Procedures of the Catholic Socio-Ecclesiastical Institute), in addition to 
the Koenraadt Report. Both texts will be studied in this section in more 
detail. Since Zeegers prevented the authorship of KASKI documents from 
becoming publicly known, their authors could not be identified. 
Nevertheless, they have been included in the analysis because it can be 
stated with certainty that they have been used by KASKI employees in 
order to influence the bishops towards their field of expertise, and that they 
have actually been read by the intended readers.117  
The notion of framing is relevant from an analytical perspective. This 
notion has been developed in the 1980s and has been applied in numerous 
studies on social movements ever since. As sociologists Robert Benford and 
David Snow have reasoned, actors involved in these movements intensively 
engaged in the production of meaning.118 They brought into circulation 
frames, or interpretative schemes, which encouraged other individuals to 
analyse occurrences within their life space and the world at large in terms of 
those frames. Frames condensed and thus simplified reality. They were 
meant to negotiate a certain understanding of an issue and urge others to 
act in order to accomplish change. What provided a series of frames with 
their novelty was often the way in which elements were aligned, such that a 
new angle of vision, vantage point, or interpretation came into being. 
Benford and Snow distinguished three basic types of frames. Through 
‘diagnostic frames’, frame articulators illuminate what they perceive as a 
problem, and focus on causality and responsibilities. ‘Prognostic frames’ 
encompass the articulation of a solution to the problematic situation as well 
as of tactical lines of acting for carrying out a plan. And ‘motivational 
frames’ indicate a rationale for engaging in action, including appropriate 
vocabularies of motive such as severity, urgency, and efficacy. 
A similarity between the two sources under investigation is that they 
deal with the missionary notion of Christianisation. Already during the 
Second World War, Pope Pius XII incited Catholic leaders across Western 
Europe to strengthen and defend the Kingdom of God, and stimulate a 
return of Christ in the consciousness of the people and their homes.119 In 
1947, KASKI’s co-founder Buys lectured that pastoral care was not only 
about protecting the souls of those Catholics who continued to participate in 
                                                          
116  Memorandum omtrent ontstaan, doel en werkwijze van het Katholiek Sociaal-Kerkelijk 
Instituut. 
117  The impact of the 1947 report in episcopal circles will be analysed in the following section. 
118  BENFORD and SNOW, ‘Framing Processes and Social Movements’.  
119  As quoted in: paper by Tellegen, May 1947: KDC, KASKI, 2812. 
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the religious rites, but also about Christianisation.120 KASKI protagonists 
thus interfered in an already existing debate. How, then, did they frame this 
debate in order to make the Episcopacy sensitive to a sociological angle to 
their decision making? In the following, I shall analyse the applied frames 
and metaphors. I shall do so, first by highlighting their central message, 
then by reflecting upon the meaning of these discursive elements within the 
larger context of the discourse on Christianisation, and addressing their 
possible impact on episcopal self-understanding. 
Conveying a diagnostic frame, the two documents told that strategies 
of Christianisation should rest much more on ‘knowledge of reality’.121 It 
was reasoned that nobody in the Dutch Church Province could actually tell 
with certainty what percentage of the Catholics disregarding their religious 
duties were male, female, young, and old. The same applied to the 
correlations between social circumstances such as intellectual development 
and the phenomenon of not attending Mass on Sunday. For this reason, it 
was asserted, the bishops should structurally analyse the place of the Church 
in society using factual insights. Do the location and size of the existing 
parishes and church buildings still correspond with profound 
transformations in the geographical spread of Catholics? And what 
consequences do developments such as migration and urbanisation have for 
their religious behaviour? The answers to such questions had to be pursued. 
Facts and sociological analyses provided these answers. 
Transmitting a prognostic frame, the two documents taught that 
KASKI delivered facts and sociological analyses. 122  Church authorities 
could therefore not ignore the help offered by its employees and at the same 
time establish a break in negative trends. This was especially the case in the 
decades to come, in which the demographical developments would 
influence religious behaviour even more. What set KASKI employees apart 
from the amateur was that they worked with Hollerith machines, deployed 
modern techniques, and operated according to scientific principles of 
objectivity. They did not aim at practicing pastoral care themselves, nor at 
disqualifying priests by listing declining figures of, for instance, church 
attendance. Instead, they strived for conclusions which could be used by the 
clergy in everyday situations, which was why the name of ‘Catholic Socio-
Ecclesiastical Institute’ had been favoured over that of ‘Catholic Institute for 
Religious Sociology’. By means of a demonstration of KASKI’s 
respectability, it was emphasised that ecclesiastical authorities such as Pope 
Pius XII and Franciscan Father Superior Van Leeuwen, scientific 
                                                          
120  De kerkelijke registratie en statistiek als basis voor de kerkelijke sociografie ten dienste van de 
zielzorg, p. 11 (appendix). 
121  Ibidem, p. 13 and Memorandum omtrent ontstaan, doel en werkwijze van het Katholiek 
Sociaal-Kerkelijk Instituut, pp. 1–4. 
122  De kerkelijke registratie en statistiek als basis voor de kerkelijke sociografie ten dienste van de 
zielzorg, pp. 9–15 and Memorandum omtrent ontstaan, doel en werkwijze van het Katholiek 
Sociaal-Kerkelijk Instituut, pp. 4–12.  
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authorities such as Rogier and Heere, and political authorities such as 
Houben and De Quay supported the institute.  
Bringing a motivational frame into circulation, the two documents 
claimed that the bishops needed to turn to sociology because otherwise, they 
would run the risk of backwardness. 123  The secular government spent 
millions of Guilders on reliable statistics in order to make the right decisions. 
Additionally, every self-respecting business man acquainted himself with 
market analysis: he surveyed the taste of his public, the composition of the 
population, and the degree of saturation. Enemy forces such as the 
Protestants and the Communists had not stayed behind either. Reigning 
over more than three million Catholics, the bishops, too, had to embrace 
sociology and analyse their market. A plan-de-campagne should be 
developed so that the product—‘the Message of Our Lord Jesus Christ’—
could be sold on a mass scale. 
Together, these diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames 
formed a discourse which could be typified as a discourse of ‘engineering 
Christianisation’. What this discourse also consisted of, albeit only in the 
1947 report, were the medical metaphors of diagnosis and disease. 124 
Diagnosis stood for an in-depth examination of the socio-religious situation 
in the Church Province, whereas disease referred to de-Christianisation. 
These metaphors were embedded in a narrative structure of religious rise 
and fall, a structure which is discernible in the 1948 report as well.125 In 
both texts, the central line of reasoning rests on the claim of a causal 
relationship between rapid social transformations on the one hand and ‘key 
problems’ such as mixed marriage, unbaptised children, and non-
denomination on the other. These problems were understood in dramatic 
terms of religious decay. Such a decay was stated to originate in the 
‘modernity’ of the second half of the nineteenth century and have affected 
the Dutch Reformed Church first, upon which it had started to erode the 
Catholic community from the 1930s onwards. For the bishops, the ‘time to 
act’ had come. 
 
‘Special Knowledge’  
How did these frames and metaphors function when analysed in relation to 
the debate on Christianisation? While the two KASKI documents drew the 
                                                          
123  De kerkelijke registratie en statistiek als basis voor de kerkelijke sociografie ten dienste van de 
zielzorg, pp. 12–13 and Memorandum omtrent ontstaan, doel en werkwijze van het Katholiek 
Sociaal-Kerkelijk Instituut, p. 12. 
124  De kerkelijke registratie en statistiek als basis voor de kerkelijke sociografie ten dienste van de 
zielzorg, pp. 9 and 8 (appendix). At that point, medical metaphors were already used in circles 
of the Catholic Action in a narrative context of religious rise and decline: paper by Tellegen, 
May 1947: KDC, KASKI, 2812. See also: De HAAN, Van volgzame elitestrijder tot kritsche 
gelovige, pp. 129–130. In 1949, in Nederlandse Katholieke Stemmen (Catholic Voices), a 
magazine for the Dutch clergy, Zeegers envisaged KASKI as a ‘laboratory’ for research on 
‘religious cancer’. See: ZEEGERS, ‘Het Katholiek Sociaal-Kerkelijk Instituut’, p. 293. 
125  Memorandum omtrent ontstaan, doel en werkwijze van het Katholiek Sociaal-Kerkelijk 
Instituut, especially pp. 1–3. 
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attention of the bishops to a supposed shortage of facts in ecclesiastical 
planning, presented KASKI and its employees as bearers of a new form of 
expertise, and made the Episcopacy aware of its backwardness, associative 
frameworks related to medical research were stimulated in order to open up 
a more rational and instrumental perspective to decision making. KASKI 
employees brought the discourse of engineering Christianisation in 
circulation, not only as an explanation of religious transformation, but also 
and especially in order to encourage the bishops to reach out to their 
institute. Seen in this way, the discourse had both a referential and 
performative character.126 It encouraged the bishops to perceive the Dutch 
Catholic Church Province as an acutely ill patient and KASKI employees 
as social doctors—specialists with a specific form of expertise that was 
needed. “Narratives of secularisation are medical histories which exercise 
power by telling the patient and doctor what is going on and what to do”, 
historian Herman Paul recently wrote.127 
Statements made by the bishops suggest that the discourse of 
engineering Christianisation, as conveyed by the two KASKI documents, 
had a serious impact on their self-understanding. On 21 April 1949, when 
the bishops officially acknowledged KASKI as an expert centre, Vicar-
general Geerdinck noted that they believed that this institute was able to 
offer very important services to them.128 Its research projects were ‘perfectly 
suitable’ in order to unveil the backgrounds of the many problems of 
modern pastoral care, such as non-attendance of Mass on Sunday, the 
influence of Communists, and the impact of industrialisation. During the 
third international conference on the sociology of religion, which was 
organised by KASKI in the city of Breda on 29, 30, and 31 March 1951, 
Bishop Baeten from the Diocese of Breda held that the work of KASKI was 
‘indispensable’ for pastoral care.129 It was actually a ‘gift of God’ that had 
arrived ‘just on time’. On 3 April 1952, Alfrink travelled to Leeuwarden in 
order to consecrate a KASKI office (figures 19 & 20). “If numerous 
questions in profane society are seen from a rational point of view”, he told 
the attendees, “then the same needs to happen in pastoral care”.130 The 
Church could in fact not practice pastoral care without a ‘scientific basis’. 
Alfrink was convinced that the Lord approved the application of sociology 
in the ecclesiastical domain: “He did not only give us his means of grace, 
but also a common sense, and he gladly sees us using this”. Nineteen days 
later, the bishops wrote to the members of the KASKI board that the socio-
religious inquiries conducted by their institute should be regarded as a vital 
contribution to a ‘rational’ and ‘fruitful’ national apostolate. 131  And as 
previously mentioned, Alfrink delivered a sermon during the Pontifical High 
                                                          
126  PAUL, Ziektegeschiedenissen, especially pp. 6–10. 
127  Ibidem, p. 17.  
128  Letter by Geerdinck to the KASKI Board, 21-04-1949: KDC, KASKI, 2812. 
129  ‘Wetenschappelijk onderzoek onmisbaar voor verantwoorde zielzorg’, in: De Tijd, 07-04-1951.  
130  Report on the opening of KASKI Leeuwarden on 03-04-1952, undated: KDC, KASKI, 4287. 
131  Letter by the Episcopacy to the KASKI Board, 22-04-1952: SAB, BAB, I.118, 143. 
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Mass organised at the occasion of KASKI’s decennial on 30 September 
1956 (figure 21). The ‘world of today’, he said, was characterised by a 
universal and profound change in its social structures.132 The consequences 
of these transformations were of a drastic nature. According to Alfrink, large 
parts of Western society were involved in a process of de-Christianisation 
unprecedented in terms of size and intensity. More than ever before, the 
Church was in need of ‘understanding the structures of the modern world’, 
so that it was able to practice its work of salvation as efficiently as possible. 
In this context, Alfrink declared to what large extent he and the other 
bishops were willing to learn more about the ‘special knowledge’ of the 
Catholic practitioners of sociology. 
Under the influence of the frames and metaphors analysed above, the 
bishops implicitly came to agree from 1949 onwards that pastoral care 
lacked an empirical basis and needed to be planned more rationally. They 
explicitly acknowledged that society was changing profoundly in terms of 
de-Christianisation and that KASKI employees should be called upon to 
the end of rational planning. This impact of the discourse of engineering 
Christianisation can be explained in three ways. Foremost, sociological 
knowledge did not necessarily collide with theological modes of thought. 
Dogmas and data on religious behaviour could be neatly integrated into the 
same pastoral plan. In addition, the discourse provided the bishops with an 
authoritative narrative template with which they could monitor and 
understand the world that surrounded them. 133  It clearly showed what 
socio-religious trends were ‘problematic’ and had to be ‘treated’, provided 
plausible explanations for these trends, and envisaged a coherent ‘therapy’. 
Finally, the technical and apparent incontestable appearance that the 
KASKI documents sported contributed to their discursive power.134 Not 
only had dozens of statistics been brought together in tables. The frames 
and metaphors were also bolstered by tens of cartograms. In the following 
section, it will be explored what it was that made statistics and cartography 
attractive for episcopal decision making. 
 
 
1.3. STATISTICS AND CARTOGRAPHY 
 
Faith in Numbers 
In the previous sections, the role of Zeegers in KASKI’s organisational 
development has been examined, as well as the ways in which the debate on 
Christianisation was successfully framed. It is now time to turn to the two 
techniques that Zeegers used in order to gain territory in episcopal circles: 
statistics and cartography. Since KASKI’s inquiries did not always stand out 
theoretically, it is easy to underestimate the relevance of these techniques.  
                                                          
132  Feestpredikatie door Z.H. Exc. Mgr. Dr. B.J. Alfrink, pp. 3–7. 
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 CHAPTER ONE: THE EMPIRICAL TURN  
 
[50] 
The technique of statistics was most frequently applied at KASKI. 
Belgian astronomer and statistician Adolphe Quetelet pioneered this 
technique in the early nineteenth century. He became one of the first to 
systematically apply statistics to solving social issues such as criminality and 
what is typified nowadays as obesity. To measure is to know, he unshakingly 
believed while launching the so-called ‘Quetelet Index’, or ‘Body Mass 
Index’.135 As historian Jacques van Maarseveen has demonstrated, it was 
only as a result of the economic depression of the 1880s and a shift in the 
political landscape that statistics were accepted in Dutch political circles.136 
Up to that point, the various ministries had an own responsibility for the 
collection of legally required information. Conservative politicians 
undermined the establishment of a national office for the processing and 
publication of statistics. They argued that this establishment demanded a 
too large financial investment. Moreover, they held that a new, centrally 
operating institution undermined the independence of the ministries, and 
were afraid of a boom of social reform blueprints. After rather liberal 
politicians took office in the last decade of the century, a Central 
Commission for Statistics originated in 1892. This committee was changed 
into CBS in 1899, something which ought to have enhanced the unity, 
comparability, and continuity of statistical databases. According to Van 
Maarseveen, the importance of CBS in the political landscape from 1900 
onwards is particularly evidenced by a growing number of research 
assignments on a wide variety of subjects.137 On a scale unprecedented, 
statistics became the common frame of reference for politicians. 
When looking at the linkage between statistics and Church 
governance after 1945, a similar process of centralisation becomes visible. 
Bishops and their vicars-general had already drawn on quantitative data for 
centuries, especially in the contexts of moral teaching and the judgment of 
religiosity in parishes.138 Hand in hand with a disciplination of Catholicism 
in the sixteenth century onwards went a growing interest in a registration of 
aspects related to the notion of orthopraxy: the belief that correct religious 
behaviour is as important as the act of believing itself.139 Indicators such as 
Mass attendance on Sunday and a fulfilment of the religious duties at 
Easter, one of the most important events on the ecclesiastical calendar 
because of its celebration of the afterlife, were seen as mirrors of what 
Catholics actually believed in. Parish priests relied heavily on ecclesiastical 
population registers. What still did not exist in the Dutch Church Province 
by 1947 in comparison to the West-German Church Province, where a 
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national ecclesiastical office for statistics originated in 1915, was one 
centrally operating Catholic institution specialised in the collection of 
statistical materials upon which Church authorities could call—a Catholic 
equivalent of CBS.  
KASKI protagonists claimed this role of a ‘Catholic CBS’ for 
themselves by sending the institute’s first report to the Episcopacy in 
December 1947. Not only did this document boast that the statistical mind 
of the Dutch Church Province was weakly developed. It also pinpointed 
three major causes of this weakness.140 Foremost, it was argued that the 
ecclesiastical statistics were unreliable, since many clergymen did not 
understand the importance of statistical data for pastoral care or had to deal 
with such an immense workload that they did not even try to collect exact 
figures. Furthermore, the ecclesiastical statistics were stated to be 
incomparable. Despite the Holy See seeming in need of an overall review of 
the situation in the Dutch Church Province, and thus of comparable 
statistics, it was reasoned, the forms used in the various dioceses lacked 
uniformity. Whereas the templates circulating in that of Utrecht and 
Haarlem were ‘superfluous’, the ones applied in that of Den Bosch and 
Breda asked for a few data only. Finally, the wrong classifications were used. 
For example, the differentiation between an ‘ecclesiastical’ (that is to say, 
contracted within the Church) and a ‘non-ecclesiastical’ marriage should 
replace the existing categories of ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’. 
This report, in which a reference to the Holy See was used in order to 
increase the pressure on the bishops, functioned as a wake-up call. Soon 
after Zeegers sent the document throughout the country, the statistical 
forms employed in the dioceses of Roermond, Breda, and Den Bosch were 
altered. KASKI was not involved in these endeavours, however, which was 
why Zeegers contacted the Episcopacy on 5 January 1953. 141  Zeegers 
explained that, even though De Jong and the other bishops welcomed 
research proposals in 1949, the institute had had no other choice besides 
letting the matter of ecclesiastical statistics rest for a couple of years as a 
result of insufficient funds. Now that KASKI had acquired enough 
manpower, and the leaders of the three southern Dutch dioceses had 
changed their templates, this matter could be returned to. Zeegers stressed 
that parish priests would benefit greatly from uniform statistics: uniformity 
would enable them to gain a better insight into the socio-religious situation 
in their territorial unit. Bishops, in turn, would profit from a well-founded 
overview of the situation in their own diocese and the Church Province as a 
whole. At the end of his letter, the director asked the Episcopacy whether it 
was still susceptible for KASKI’s suggestions. 
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In order to arrive at a joint decision, Archbishop Alfrink brought into 
circulation a letter which made its way from one diocese to the other.142 
The bishops unanimously agreed on the necessity of uniform ecclesiastical 
statistics. In the opinion of Bishop Guillaume Lemmens from the Diocese of 
Roermond, a standardisation was an excellent opportunity to convince the 
parish priests of the pastoral value of facts and figures. “Unfortunately”, 
Lemmens noted, “most of them just write down some random numbers”. 
At his insistence and that of Bishop Willem Mutsaerts from the Diocese of 
Den Bosch, it was decided that every bishop had to approve a new template 
before this template would be completed. The bishops sought to maintain 
their autonomous decision making position.  
Zeegers instructed his employees, Van Leeuwen, Dellepoort, and 
Rogier junior in particular, to elaborate on a proposal with this outcome in 
mind. Similar to the already existing documents used in the Dutch dioceses, 
the concept form they came up with several months later was supposed to 
measure the religious state of the Dutch parishes by privileging a rationalist 
approach which assigned importance to formal religion. However, a major 
difference with older forms was that the proposed form singled out two 
types of information: ‘dynamic’ and ‘static’ information. 143  Dynamic 
information encompassed short-term developments and must be gathered 
on a yearly basis. The categories concerned the number of: parishioners (I), 
baptised children (II), converts (III), former dissenters (IV), confirmations 
(V), communions (VI), vocations (VII), marriages (VIII), separations from 
bed and board (IX), dissenters (X) and youngsters who engaged in 
catechism (XI). These categories would be complemented with 
demographical data derived from the governmental population register. 
Static information, which dealt with long term developments and should be 
collected once every five years, was devoted to: the religiosity of men and 
women with a family (I), the Easter duties of unmarried Catholics without a 
family (II), the religiosity of children (III), divorce (IV), churchgoing (V), 
membership of religious associations and religious lay organisations such as 
a Third Order (VI), the number of Catholic societies (VII), membership of 
mission organisations such as the Holy Childhood Association (VIII) and 
convents (IX). According to the proposal, the advantage of this dual mode 
of surveying was that the yearly statistics could be simplified, became more 
homogenous, and demanded less time and effort from the priests.  
On 6 April 1954, five KASKI employees, an equal number of 
episcopal secretaries, and one external advisor from CBS discussed this 
proposal in Den Bosch.144 Probably much to Zeegers’s disappointment, the 
secretaries rejected the binary opposition between dynamic and static 
information, contending that these two sorts of data should not be separated 
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in a rigid way. As a result of this rejection, the attendees abandoned the 
quinquennial form. They integrated the categories on religious societies, 
Catholic societies, and mission organisations into the annual one. 
Furthermore, the attendees deliberated about the remaining classifications. 
They sometimes accepted a definition without further discussion: Catholics 
were collectively perceived as persons baptised in a Catholic fashion or 
converted to the Catholic Church, irrespective of whether they still 
regarded themselves as a Catholic, and irrespective of how old they were. It 
also occurred that definitions changed, as happened with an ‘ecclesiastical’ 
and a ‘non-ecclesiastical’ marriage. These categories were deemed as 
ambiguous, and altered back into ‘valid’ and ‘invalid’. The attendees 
removed entire classifications three times: the one on former dissenters 
because it was too vague, the one on separations from bed and board 
because parish priests were not able to acquire this specific kind of 
information and because the secretaries already had documentation on this 
issue at their disposal, and the one on additional demographical data 
because it complicated the gathering process too much. Only one new 
category was inserted, the one on the number of secular priests active in the 
parishes. This enabled bishops and vicars-general to establish priest-to-laity 
ratios, and, thereby, statistically underpin the spatial distribution of people. 
Zeegers ensured the secretaries that they would have ample opportunity to 
comment on a new draft once his employees had completed the document. 
This was indeed the case. On 2 July 1954, for instance, Secretary 
Peter Coolen from the Diocese of Den Bosch underlined that the category 
on the priests should be extended with data on brothers and sisters.145 It was 
vital, Coolen noted, that the bishops could also extract the ‘religious 
population density’ of their diocese from a statistical overview. After such 
criticism had been worked into yet another version, Zeegers sent a final 
proposal to the Episcopacy on 11 November 1954. He requested that the 
bishops study this proposal, and, if necessary, raise questions or make 
remarks. 146  Satisfied with the new statistical form that the KASKI 
employees and their own secretaries developed, they only wanted minor 
details to be changed, meaning that Zeegers and his staff succeeded in 
standardising one of the most important ecclesiastical systems of self-
observation. 147  As of 1955, the episcopal secretaries sent booklets 
throughout the dioceses.148 Parish priests had to fill out two booklets, then 
deposit one in their own archive, and finally send the other to the dean. 
This dean worked the data into overviews covering his deanery. The 
episcopal secretaries brought the overviews of the deaneries together in a 
diocesan list and dispatched this list to KASKI. 
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The Dutch Episcopacy, incited by Zeegers, deemed uniform 
ecclesiastical statistics as vital to Church governance and tasked KASKI 
with a standardisation. This investment in terms of time, effort, and money 
should be linked to the numerical nature of statistical evidence. Statistics 
reduced the complexity of various interrelated socio-religious phenomena to 
plain numerical lists. 149  For bishops and vicars-general, who were 
theologically trained, is was not always easy to come to terms with 
understanding socio-religious transformation. An apparent lack of the 
ambiguity of words meant that figures had the appearance of objectivity 
and exactness. This appearance was attractive when far-reaching decisions 
on spatial planning had to be made, and the probability of risks assessed.150  
 
The Visual Power of Cartograms 
For much of the nineteenth century, cartograms and other visualisations 
such as graphs were regarded in academia as inferior in comparison to the 
table. It was believed that these visualisations fell short in obtaining the level 
of accuracy and completeness of numbers.151 But the last quarter of the 
century saw decisive change. A 1885 issue of the journal of the Statistical 
Society of London explicitly stated that graphical techniques could be of 
great importance for statistical inquiry. Particularly as a result of the work of 
French statistician Emile Levasseur, who produced one of the first area 
cartograms in 1870, scholars came to believe that visualisations added 
something to figures in terms of form and shape. Consequently, the 
technique of cartography made its way into many research institutes. In the 
Netherlands, CBS used graphs on a mass scale in the first half of the 
twentieth century, and cartograms circulated widely within RNP as a 
legitimate and powerful mean of socioeconomic planning.  
Bolstered by the studies of the aforementioned French priest-
sociologists, Zeegers did not wait long to transfer cartography from the 
latter institute into KASKI. Through cartography, Zeegers wanted to 
translate what he described as ‘religious landscapes’ from reality into paper. 
152 As early as in the very first report, no less than 30 cartograms were 
included. Zeegers could not afford to manufacture all these maps in a 
professional way. Franciscan Sisters therefore assisted in producing hand-
coloured ones.153 Probably because of their amateurish appearance, Zeegers 
produced cartograms in a professional manner as soon as he was able to.154 
Former KASKI staff member Mathieu Matthijssen recalled that the 
production process took place on the headquarters’ ground floor in The 
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Hague.155 A special team became responsible for the hundreds of maps 
crafted over the years. Figures 22 and 23 indicate that Zeegers copied the 
visual style of the RNP cartograms one on one.  
Figure 24 represents one of the institute’s most intensively used 
cartograms. Employees published this tricoloured map in numerous reports 
and exhibited it during lectures that they delivered across the country.156 Its 
central message? Catholic minorities inhabited large parts of the Dutch 
Church Province in 1947. KASKI employees distinguished these so-called 
‘diaspora areas’, in which Catholics had already formed a confessional 
minority for centuries, from other ‘religious emergency zones’ (‘geestelijke 
noodgebieden’) in which the position of the Church had recently 
weakened.157 Figure 25 is more sophisticated. In detail, it indicated where 
the borders of the dioceses and deaneries were to be found around 1946. In 
addition, it provided an answer to the question of how many Catholics 
above seven years old lived in these deaneries, and, simultaneously, 
highlighted the phenomenon of ‘non-paschantie’: Catholics disregarding 
their religious duties at Easter. The lesson to be learnt was obvious. The 
larger and darker the circle, the more urgent the ‘problem’.  
KASKI cartograms not only mirrored social ‘reality’, but also and 
especially reshaped it on the basis of empirical data and cultural values 
centring around orthopraxis. They visually created a world of Catholics and 
non-Catholics, and of churchgoers and non-churchgoers. Seen in this way, 
cartography did not always serve scientific goals, but also the aim of 
Christianisation. Moreover, as Zeegers wrote in 1952, he applied 
cartography in order to ‘seduce’ possible customers. 158  These possible 
customers were often unfamiliar with the whereabouts of sociology. In 
1949, Cardinal De Jong wrote to Auxiliary Bishop Hanssen: “Positive 
sociology or (and?) sociography is a new metier, that’s for sure, and that’s 
pretty much all We know about it”.159 Zeegers took advantage of this lack of 
familiarity. Matthijssen remembered that he even went so far as to 
deliberately manipulate a map depicting Africa.160 If such a manipulation 
has indeed happened, then this is when the scientific ideal of objectivity 
faded into the background. 
Cartograms established the reputation of KASKI abroad. Lebras 
referred to the institute’s maps when reflecting upon the achievements of a 
similar institute based in France.161 He reasoned that KASKI was far ahead 
in the application of cartography in socio-religious research. In the 
Netherlands, too, Zeegers’s use of cartography had some desired effect. In 
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1949, Cardinal De Jong wrote to Zeegers that KASKI’s cartographic 
documentation was instrumental to the governance of his diocese.162 Three 
years later, Vicar-general Jan Groot from the Diocese of Haarlem noted 
that cartograms were not only useful but even indispensable for episcopal 
decision making.163 It was the visual nature of the KASKI cartograms that 
has made them attractive at worst and persuasive at best in episcopal circles. 
Maps presented territorial overviews, highlighted religious abnormalities, 
showed where parish borders were located, and demonstrated what 
consequences a certain sociological intervention had. Hereby, they enabled 
bishops and vicars-general to immediately form a mental picture of a 
specific area. Precisely this effect urged Goddijn to retrospectively ascribe a 
certain ‘magic’ to KASKI maps, and compare them to x-rays.164  
 
 
1.4. THE EMERGENCE OF AN EPISCOPAL DEMAND FOR 
SOCIOLOGY 
“The problems with which Our Diocese struggles will certainly not decrease 
in the future”, Bishop Huibers from the Diocese of Haarlem let his faithful 
know on 8 September 1951.165 He in fact expected the cities of The Hague, 
Amsterdam, and Rotterdam to offer housing and working facilities to an 
increasing population.166 Contrary to the past, the bishop emphasised, he 
and his staff had to try to ‘keep up’ with the demographical developments. 
One year later, on 5 October 1952, the Episcopacy published a pastoral 
letter in which it portrayed Saint Willibrord, who Christianised Dutch 
regions in the early Middle Ages, as the ‘Apostle of the Netherlands’.167 
They reasoned that many baptised people could hardly be called Catholic 
anymore and that the name of Jesus Christ had become nearly unknown. 
“If we want our offspring to still know Jesus”, they concluded, “then the 
time has come to do the best we can to counter non-belief and non-
denomination”. 
What these words testify to is an episcopal concern about the future of 
the Dutch Church Province. National data on socio-religious behaviour 
systematically gathered and released by KASKI indicate various 
measurable aspects of the changes that the bishops struggled with.168 The 
                                                          
162  Letter by De Jong to Zeegers, 19-11-1949, including circular letter: UA, BAU, 607. 
163  Letter by Groot to the KASKI Board, 08-05-1952: NHA, BAHA, 1539. 
164  GODDIJN, De moed niet verliezen, p. 266. 
165  Letter by Huibers to the clergy and the faithful in the Diocese of Haarlem, 08-09-1951: 
Herderlijke Brieven, Diocese of Haarlem, Huibers, 1936–1960. 
166  According to the 1947 census, the percentage of Catholics living in the Province of North-
Holland grew from 27.5 in 1899 to 29.3 in 1947. In the Province of South-Holland, the 
percentage increased from 24.2 in 1899 to 24.5 in 1947. KNIPPENBERG, De religieuze kaart 
van Nederland, p. 174.  
167  Letter by the bishops to the clergy and the faithful in the Netherlands, 05-10-1952: Herderlijke 
Brieven, Dutch Church Province, De Jong, 1935–1953. 
168  SCHEPENS, SPRUIT, and KREGTING, De Rooms-Katholieke Kerk in Nederland, 
especially pp 9–22. Compare the figures provided by Hans Knippenberg, who also focused on 
the years prior to 1955: KNIPPENBERG, De religieuze kaart van Nederland, p. 170.  
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figure of Catholics grew from 4.31 million in 1955 (39.9 percent of the 
Dutch population) to 5.02 million in 1965 (40.5 percent of the Dutch 
population). The dioceses of Haarlem and Rotterdam witnessed the smallest 
growth, that of Utrecht and Den Bosch the largest. Paradoxically, the 
religious participation in terms of engagement in the first rite of life 
dropped: 104,102 baptisms took place in 1955 (45.4 percent of all Catholic 
births) and 104,672 in 1965 (42.7 percent of the births).  
Historians are well advised not to make sweeping statements on 
religiosity only on the basis of KASKI statistics. As we have seen, these 
statistical data mainly address ritual behaviour and do not cover personal 
acts of faith such as prayer at home.169 Besides, there is no reason to believe 
that the ‘manipulation’ of figures by priests which Bishop Lemmens 
signalled suddenly stopped in 1955. 170 Standardised forms did not quite 
guarantee flawless registration. Telling on this score is a statement made by 
KASKI employee Goddijn during the formative meeting of the Episcopal 
Committee for Ecclesiastical Registration and Statistics on 21 April 1959. 
Expanding on the recent standardisation of ecclesiastical statistics, he noted 
that the parish priest regularly tended “to make his territorial unit appear 
larger or smaller than it actually is”.171 
Did bishops and their vicars-general not only applaud the existence of 
sociology as a scientific discipline and the operation of KASKI in light of 
socio-religious change, but also commission studies at this institute? On the 
basis of a 1977 bibliographical overview compiled by KDC employee 
André Maes, studies have been listed and digitally stored in a Microsoft 
Access Database. 172  This database consists of the following eight 
parameters: title of the study, year of publication, relationship between 
research commissioner(s) and researcher(s), research commissioner(s), 
diocese(s) from out of which the study was allocated, executive research and 
planning institution(s), research subject and research scope. A frequency 
analysis of these parameters has been carried out using Microsoft Excel.  
Graph 1 demonstrates that bishops and vicars-general became 
KASKI customers. It should be noted that the episcopal demand for 
sociology varied greatly over both time and space, however. In total, 46 
KASKI studies were prepared by request of bishops and vicars-general 
between 1947 and 1958. The basic features of these studies, of which the 
titles can be found in Appendix 3, are the following. Eleven publications 
were allocated directly, by bishops (nine) and vicars-general (two), and 35 
indirectly, by (inter)diocesan institutions. Vicars-general could be part of 
these institutions, though, as was the case with the Diocesan Location 
Committee in the Diocese of Haarlem, the organisation discussed below. 
                                                          
169  For criticism on such a sociological approach in the ecclesiastical context, see: BROWN, The 
Death of Christian Britain, p. 11.  
170  See also: ZIEMANN, ‘Zur Entwicklung christlicher Religiosität in Deutschland und 
Westeuropa’, pp. 101–107. 
171  Minutes of the committee meeting on 21-04-1959: KDC, KASKI, 3116. 
172  MAES, ‘Bibliografie KASKI’, pp. 42–114. 
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Graph 2 suggests that the first studies were released in 1950. 31 publications 
contained cartograms.  
When the issues examined by KASKI employees are taken into 
account (graph 3), the domination of the studies on the pastorate—the 
ecclesiastical infrastructures of pastoral care—is striking (89 percent). This 
domination suggests that KASKI was successful in Zeegers’s field of 
expertise, namely the distribution of people, buildings, and activities in 
spaces of various scales. As examined above, publications on ecclesiastical 
registration contained statistical analyses of, for instance, the number of 
Catholics and territorial units. Inquiries into socio-religious conditions built 
on a much more complex body of sources, including historical accounts and 
interviews, and tried to analytically link religious phenomena such as non-
churchgoing to social circumstances such as housing. Graph 4 illustrates 
that the spaces under investigation were rather of a local (34 studies or 74 
percent) than of a regional (eight studies or seventeen percent) and national 
(four studies or nine percent) scale. A research subject one perhaps misses is 
that of the priests, both regulars and seculars, brothers, and sisters. Possibly, 
no assignments related to this matter were granted to KASKI because 
Dellepoort was investigating priestly vocations in detail on his own and 
ecclesiastical statistics already provided relevant data. 
By far the most studies were commissioned in the Diocese of Haarlem, 
where, in addition to the aforementioned general socio-religious 
developments, church buildings were damaged during the Second World 
War and the erection of the Atlantikwall by German forces led to a 
depopulation of parishes. 173  Substantial financial support by the Dutch 
government meant that the material damage could be repaired. From May 
1949 onwards, the government paid 75 percent of the costs involved in the 
re-erection and reconstruction of affected churches. 174  In the cases of 
ecclesiastical buildings and monasteries, the numbers respectively were 65 
percent and 55 percent. In order to arrive at well-founded advice on spatial 
planning throughout the bishopric, Bishop Huibers, who invested much 
time in pastoral care as a dean in the 1920s and early 1930s, installed the 
Diocesan Location Committee in 1949. Historian Hugo Landheer has 
demonstrated that KASKI gained much influence through this 
institution.175 Zeegers became one of its few members. In this capacity, he 
deliberated about planning blueprints with Vicar-general Nico Ammerlaan 
and several technical engineers. Besides, KASKI carried out 32 studies in 
service of the committee’s plans, and, thereby, provided the very 
information on the basis of which decisions were reached. The 1955 
                                                          
173  ‘De situatie van de kerkenbouw in Nederland na de oorlog’, in: Katholiek Archief 7 (1952),  
pp. 1017–1019. 
174  LANDHEER, Kerkbouw op krediet, pp. 415–430. 
175  Ibidem, especially pp. 373-385 and 410-415. In-depth case studies on the construction of new 
churches and KASKI’s involvement can be found on pp. 437-447. For a personal recollection, 
see: interview by Dols with Poeisz, 28-01-2010.  
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‘structuurplan’ (‘structural plan’) should be mentioned in particular.176 In 
this document, KASKI employees estimated that 56 new churches had to 
be built before 1970, one church rebuilt, and seven churches enlarged. 
These adaptations would allow approximately 51,000 more Catholics to 
take part in church services. The plan also encompassed a redivision of 
parish borders and a reshuffling of labour as far as the clergy was 
concerned. According to Landheer, the KASKI report did not disappear 
into a drawer, but instead was often used in blueprinting Church policy.  
On the interdiocesan level, a 1954 study on the redivision of diocesan 
boundaries became influential.177 This study was rooted in a desire of the 
Holy See to enlarge the control on the Dutch Church Province. According 
to members of the Roman Curia, the religious vitality of the Church in the 
Netherlands had to be safeguarded. 178  In September 1953, after being 
instructed to explore a possible redefinition of diocesan boundaries, 
Apostolic Internuncio Giobbe proposed to Alfrink to erect a new diocese at 
the cost of a large part of the Diocese of Haarlem (figure 5). Furthermore, 
Giobbe pointed at the necessity of establishing another new diocese in the 
northeast of the country by separating the provinces of Friesland, 
Groningen, Drenthe, and Overijssel from the Archdiocese. It is probable 
that the reports sent by Zeegers and his staff to the Holy See fuelled this 
Roman initiative. As early as on 3 November 1948, when KASKI could not 
yet celebrate its first year of existence, Secretary of State Montini explained 
to Versteeg that KASKI data were thoroughly investigated in Rome and 
forwarded to the Consistorial Congregation, the Vatican department 
responsible for the establishment and development of dioceses. 179  The 
confidential KASKI report L’Église catholique aux Pays-Bas (The Catholic 
Church in the Netherlands; 1950) highlighted an alarming degree of de-
Christianisation in the three large cities in the west, the communities in the 
north, and the need for a radical intervention.180 Strikingly, it was exactly 
these regions Giobbe suggested to restructure. In a reaction to the proposed 
intervention, Alfrink and Huibers, who were not keen on a radical 
redivision of the diocesan landscape, requested Zeegers to cast a sociological 
light on the Roman proposals. Of course, the KASKI director embraced 
this request—an outstanding opportunity to show the Episcopacy what his 
institute was worth. After elaborating on the legitimacy of a sociological 
angle to what primarily seemed to be a question of canon law, as well as on 
a typology of the diocese in Western society, Zeegers arrived at the heart of 
the matter.181 He reasoned that is was not advisable to split the Diocese of 
Haarlem into two. This would actually be an ‘illusory solution’ to the 
                                                          
176  Een structuurplan voor de kerkenbouw in het Bisdom Haarlem, especially pp. 19–25.  
177  [ZEEGERS], Het vraagstuk van de diocesane indeling der Nederlandse Kerkprovincie.  
178  BARY, ‘De oprichting van het bisdom Groningen’, p. 68. 
179  Letter by Montini to Zeegers, 03-11-1948: KDC, ZEEG, 33.  
180  L’Église catholique aux Pays-Bas, especially p. 33. 
181  [ZEEGERS], Het vraagstuk van de diocesane indeling der Nederlandse kerkprovincie,  
pp. 28–71. 
 CHAPTER ONE: THE EMPIRICAL TURN  
 
[60] 
‘problem’ of de-Christianisation, since the socio-religious homogeneity of 
the area was expected to increase rather than to decline. Zeegers was more 
optimistic about the integration of the four northern provinces into a new 
diocese: these regions formed a unity in socio-religious respect. Alfrink and 
Huibers worked the information and arguments offered by Zeegers into an 
appeal.182 These appeals were submitted in Rome in the spring of 1954, 
after which a year of radio silence followed. Then, in July 1955, the Holy 
See unexpectedly announced the foundation of two new Dutch dioceses: 
Rotterdam and Groningen (figure 6). Whereas Dean Mart Jansen became 
the Bishop of Rotterdam, Dean Pieter Nierman was appointed as the 
Bishop of Groningen. 
How should the total lack of research assignments in the dioceses of 
Groningen, Den Bosch, and Roermond be explained? The situation in the 
Diocese of Groningen has just become understandable, as this diocese was 
only erected in 1956. As relevant primary sources have not been found in 
the episcopal archive in Den Bosch, the lack of assignments here could not 
be examined. However, useful sources could be consulted in the episcopal 
archive in Roermond.  
In the episcopal realm of Roermond, an unpublished KASKI report 
in which the benefits of sociological inquiry for the pastorate and a research 
agenda were presented encountered reservation in the summer of 1952.183 
“Sociological work is necessary”, Auxiliary Bishop Hanssen claimed, “also 
in Limburg”.184 Hanssen was fascinated by analyses of decline. Yet, what 
bothered him was that KASKI seemed to disqualify amateurs in its field of 
expertise, and go as far as to usurp episcopal governance. Especially the 
involvement of the regular clergy based outside his diocese urged caution, 
Hanssen stressed. In addition, he condemned the fact that the research for 
the greater part was conducted by people who were not active in pastoral 
care: “If our practitioners of pastoral care arrive at a certain conclusion 
themselves, albeit through their own less professional endeavours, they will 
feel the need more intensively and work harder than if a procedure is 
offered to them by external parties”. Secretary Willem Delhoofen typified 
the KASKI document as ‘non-scientific’ because of its boasting tone, and 
warned for an I-told-you-so-attitude.185 Referring to the medical metaphors 
conveyed by the discourse of engineering Christianisation, he reasoned that 
the ‘cure’ might be worse than the ‘disease’: the link between religion and 
politics in Limburg was already established and should not be endangered 
by taking investigative duties away from civil authorities. Secretary Peter 
                                                          
182  BARY, ‘De oprichting van het bisdom Groningen’, pp. 78–79. 
183  This report, only known as ‘KASKI Report Number 65’, has not been found in KASKI’s 
archive, nor in the diocesan archive. 
184  Contribution by Hanssen to internal circular note, undated: BARD, 312.1, 48. For more 
biographical information on Hanssen, see: Van NISPEN tot PANNERDEN, ‘Hanssen, Jan 
Michiel Joseph Antoon’, on-line accessible via: 
http://www.historici.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/BWN/. Visited on 16-01-2013. 
185  Contribution by Delhoofen to internal circular note, 15-06-1952: BARD, 312.1, 48. 
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van Odijk argued that the report was somewhat intrusive and 
tendentious. 186  Nonetheless, it opened up perspectives on an 
‘accommodation’ of pastoral care to socio-religious change. According to 
Van Odijk, new methods had to be developed. Besides, the despotic air of 
many clergymen had to be countered. “The time has changed”, Van Odijk 
stated, “and the beacons must be repositioned”. KASKI could play an 
important role in this process, as it pinpointed ‘actual solutions’ to ‘actual 
problems’. In order to prevent ‘contra-governance’ from happening, the 
bishops should always remain the ultimate decision making authorities. 
Finally, Vicar-general Feron held that it was extremely important that 
KASKI would be involved in research and planning activities. 187  He 
explained that practitioners of pastoral care were not able anymore to do 
their job properly without the institute’s ‘modern instruments’. Therefore, 
objections against KASKI needed to be neutralised as much as possible.  
This internal consideration demonstrates that Van Odijk and Feron 
adopted the less skeptical stance, whereas Hanssen reacted in the most 
critical way and Delhoofen found himself in a position of compromise. 
Despite the fact that they were all convinced of the existence of socio-
religious transformations, as well as of the value of sociology for determining 
the position of the Church in society, they felt that Zeegers was crossing 
lines of demarcation between advice and governance too much. Several 
letters confirm that a fear for Zeegers’s hegemony was the main reason for 
Hanssen not to reach out to KASKI.188  
Telling on this score is Hanssen’s response to yet another of Zeegers’s 
attempts to gain more influence on episcopal decision making. Since the 
sixteenth century, bishops were obliged to regularly visit the tombs of the 
Apostles Peter and Paul, and meet the Pope to inform him about the state of 
their diocese. From 1911 onwards, they also ought to submit a report once 
every five years. While referring to the example of the Federal Republic of 
Germany, where sociological overviews of the various dioceses were ‘highly 
valued’, Zeegers wrote to the bishops in 1957 that they should travel with 
more sophisticated ad limina reports to the Pope.189 If they thought that it 
was not a good idea to allow KASKI employees to co-author these reports, 
then they could always integrate the institute’s data into their accounts. This 
effort to steer the writing process of ad limina reports is exactly where 
Hanssen drew the line between Zeegers as an expert and the bishops as 
ecclesiastical governors. In a reaction to Zeegers’s argumentation, Hanssen 
emphasised that the preparation of ad limina reports was one of the main 
                                                          
186  Contribution by Van Odijk to internal circular note, 27-06-1952: BARD, 312.1, 48. 
187  Contribution by Feron to internal circular note, 04-08-1952: BARD, 312.1, 48. 
188  In addition to the following example, see: letter by Hanssen to Van Voorst tot Voorst,  
29-02-1956: BARD, 312.1, 50 and letter by Hanssen to Zeegers, 13-02-1958:  
KDC, KASKI, 4326. 
189  Letter by Zeegers to the bishops, 12-01-1957: BARD, 312.1, BV. For an earlier attempt of 
Zeegers to enlarge the influence of KASKI on the ad limina reports and the reaction from the 
secretary of the bishop of Roermond, see: minutes of the committee meeting on 17-01-1955: 
KDC, KKBR, 202.  
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tasks of the bishops. 190  KASKI could never replace these ‘divinely 
appointed shepherds’, Hanssen noted, nor could it replace their vision by a 
sociological analysis.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Driven by a visionary sense of entrepreneurship, a solid belief in God, and a 
professional desire for influence in society, the papally decorated Zeegers 
became successful in developing and institutionalising sociological 
knowledge in the Dutch ecclesiastical domain. He knew how to convince 
people of the promise of sociology and often forged the right alliances at the 
right time. The alliance with the Franciscan Order in general, and Versteeg 
in particular, was crucial for a transformation of the internal dynamics of 
the field of Catholic sociology. At a time when expertise alone did not 
guarantee acceptance as an expert in the Church, clerical involvement and 
support were of great importance. KASKI united key players active in the 
field from 1947 onwards. In addition, it formed a direct link to the Catholic 
University of Nijmegen, and published a multilingual journal. This was ‘big 
science’ in the making, centring around large numbers of researchers and 
large budgets.191 An inductive approach characterised this science. Zeegers 
and his staff did not study what Catholics should believe in, but scrutinised 
their actual behaviour. This approach, which also rested on developments 
in France, followed on years in which Catholic sociology had been heavily 
influenced by theological modes of thought. But even though Zeegers 
managed to occupy a leading position in the field, he only proved to be 
partly successful in generating an episcopal demand for sociology. Under 
the influence of a powerful discourse with narrative, numerical elements, 
and visual elements, the bishops came to believe in the possibilities of 
sociology for their decision making in a rapidly changing society. A rather 
zealous temperament and a lack of an inner brake on his ambitions meant 
that Zeegers overplayed his hand, however. 35 out of the 46 KASKI reports 
drafted for the purpose of episcopal decision making were ordered in the 
Diocese of Haarlem. In the other dioceses, Church authorities hardly made 
their way to KASKI. In the Diocese of Roermond, especially, Zeegers 
appeared to be the pioneer whose second nature pushed him further and 
further across the established lines of ecclesiastical decision making, and 
who wanted an institutional house of cards to touch the sky. In the following 
chapter, I shall analyse what far-reaching consequences this image had for 
his position in the field. 
                                                          
190  Note by Hanssen, 17-01-1957: BARD, 312.1, BV. 
191  For more information on the emergence of ‘big science’ throughout the world in the twentieth 
century, see: GALISON and HEVLY, Big Science, part II on sponsored research and external 
interests in particular.  
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INTRODUCTION 
THE FIRST PAGES of the first 1969 issue of De Kloosterling (The Monastic) 
magazine—a magazine particularly written by and for the religious—held 
an interview with PINK director and conciliar secretary-general Goddijn.1 
Readers came to know him as a Franciscan priest-sociologist who promoted 
a thorough reform of ecclesiastical structures, at the same time stressing that 
this reform would take considerable time. He partly lived in solidarity with 
priests who could no longer cope with what they perceived as an inertia of 
Church authorities and by implication left the office. “On the other hand”, 
he noted, “one has to realise that if we all start to act like that, we will never 
come any further”. According to Goddijn, the only way in which the 
Church could be ‘renewed’ was ‘from within’, not in the least because 
history proved that sects had no influence at all on ecclesiastical structures. 
Pastoral projects uniting secular and regular priests, as well as brothers, 
sisters, and laypeople, formed a suitable avenue to arriving at such a reform 
from within. “You can’t just breed charisma, or organise it”, Goddijn 
concluded. What he did envisage, however, was the shaping of the ‘right 
preconditions’. 
From this interview we start our exploration of the evolution of the 
field of Catholic sociology between 1958 and 1972, focusing again on 
sociologists and their ‘expert’ role, their institutes, discourses, and 
techniques, and bishops and vicars-general as their ‘clients’. Emphasis will 
be placed on Goddijn and his positions as PINK director and conciliar 
secretary-general. The years under investigation could be typified as the 
‘finest hour’ of sociology.2 Sociologists acquired an enormous prestige in 
                                                          
1  ‘Voorwaarden scheppen voor het charisma’, in: De Kloosterling 37 (1969), I, p. 9. For more 
information on De Kloosterling magazine, see: ACKERMANS, ‘Repertoires en strategieën 
van geestelijke leiding in De Kloosterling’. 
2  GASTELAARS, Een geregeld leven, pp. 161–232. See also: interviews by Dols with Scholten 
(05-11-2008) and Laeyendecker (15-11-2012). 
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Dutch society. Almost as a matter of course, they drafted voluminous 
organisational blueprints, and got involved in decision making processes. 
Universities attracted an ever-increasing population of students. Van 
Doorn, professor of sociology at the Leiden University from 1958 onwards, 
and his successor Cor Lammers, professor since 1964, became the two most 
prominent scholars of the new generation of sociologists to which Goddijn, 
also, belonged. Inspired by American empirical-analytical sociology, this 
new generation invested much effort in a specialisation of sociological 
expertise.3 Emigration, organisation, and religion—sociologists active in 
these and other areas of inquiry created their own networks. Specialists in 
methodologies and techniques even populated newly established 
departments: the so-called ‘M&T Departments’. The transfer of the 
computer into these departments had a large impact on day-to-day research 
practices. Even though research projects remained strongly policy-oriented, 
theorisation often went hand in hand with specialisation. Notions derived 
from American organisational sociology were applied in order to establish 
whether specific ‘elements’ had negative effects on the efficiency of 
institutions and individuals.  
ITS (Instituut voor Toegepaste Sociologie) rose from these 
developments. Renowned Leuven sociologist Ward Leemans, who started 
to lecture at the Catholic University of Nijmegen in 1957 and became a 
professor there one year later, founded this ideologically and religiously 
neutral research institute in December 1964.4 His right-hand man, Catholic 
layman Jos van Kemenade (figure 26), became the institute’s director. Van 
Kemenade studied sociology at the Nijmegen University between 1955 and 
1960, upon which he specialised in educational policy.5 In 2010, former 
employee J. Hutjes typified him as a coming man in the field, someone with 
flair and supervisory qualities.6 The goal of ITS was to study social 
‘problems’, and, thereby, assist in solving these ‘problems’ and ameliorating 
the university’s sociology courses.7 The institute witnessed some success 
under Van Kemenade’s leadership. Within several years, the number of 
research assignments increased substantially, and levels of staff grew larger: 
from six employees in 1964 to 65 employees in 1975. 
Effectively, Leemans succeeded Oldendorff as a professor of sociology 
in Nijmegen, whose troubled relationship with Zeegers led him to 
professorships at the Catholic School of Economics in Tilburg and the 
School of Engineering in Eindhoven in 1956.8 Under the supervision of 
                                                          
3  To be sure, Dutch sociologists already embarked on research trips to the United States of 
America in the 1950s in order to become familiar with the latest developments in their field of 
expertise. Highly interesting in this regard are Oldendorff’s letter of travel to Zeegers in the 
early 1950s: KDC, KASKI, 2781.  
4  For more biographical information on Leemans, see: LAMMERTYN and VERHOEVEN, 
Tussen sociologie en beleid. 
5 More biographical information on Van Kemenade can be found in Appendix 1. 
6 Interview by Dols with Hutjes, 20-01-2010.  
7 10 Jaar ITS, especially pp. 7–52. 
8 ADRIAANSENS, ‘Prof. dr. Antoine Oldendorff’, p. 6. 
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Oldendorff, Catholic layman Ruud de Moor (figure 27) defended a doctoral 
thesis on conflict theory in 1961, after graduating in Tilburg in 1952 and 
accepting a position as the director of IAV (Instituut voor 
Arbeidsvraagstukken) shortly thereafter. This research institute focused on 
the development of the post-war Dutch labour market. De Moor was 
appointed as a professor in Tilburg himself in 1962. In the years to come, 
he turned into one of the most influential Catholic sociologists in the 
Netherlands as a result of the many advisory and administrative positions he 
occupied.9 Franciscan priest-sociologist Schreuder (figure 28) was another 
Catholic sociologist marching to prominence. Similar to Goddijn, and also 
De Moor, Schreuder belonged to the new generation of sociologists who 
branded both a specialisation and theorisation of empirically yielded 
knowledge as their core businesses. After Schreuder studied sociology at the 
Nijmegen University and defended his doctoral thesis Kirche im Vorort 
(The Church in a Suburb) on parish sociology there, he in 1963 accepted a 
lectureship in Nijmegen.10 Four years later, he became a professor at his 
alma mater.  
In the first section of this second chapter, I shall begin with analysing 
Goddijn’s ascent in the decision making of the bishops. After contributing to 
the resignation of Zeegers at KASKI, Goddijn remained as a KASKI 
manager and launched pastoral experiments in the Diocese of Rotterdam. 
Being a promising priest-sociologist with a deep understanding of pastoral 
matters and practical ideas concerning policy formation in the Dutch 
Church Province, he became the top candidate for the directorate of PINK 
and the position of secretary-general of the Pastoral Council. In the second 
section, I shall concentrate on the frames and metaphors Goddijn brought 
into circulation in order to keep the bishops reaching out to sociological 
inquiry. He did not enter into the discussion on Christianisation that 
Zeegers and the other KASKI protagonists framed, but instead set out to 
steer the debate on Church renewal. He interpreted this ‘renewal’ as an 
‘adaptation’ of ecclesiastical structures to worldly structures and values. In 
the third section, I shall examine the diffusion and detail of opinion polling. 
The bishops not only perceived the poll as a fact-finding instrument, but 
also understood polling as technique which enabled a ‘dialogue’ with their 
priests and the laity. Finally, in the fourth section, I shall explore whether 
bishops and vicars-general still ordered sociological publications at KASKI, 
and whether ITS was successful in acquiring research assignments in 
episcopal circles. In contrast with what happened in the years up to 1958, 
sociological research was commissioned in every diocese in the long 1960s. 
KASKI remained the leading institutional player in an ever-differentiating 
field.  
                                                          
9 Van de KAA, ‘Levensbericht R.A. de Moor’. More biographical information on De Moor can 
be found in Appendix 1. 
10 SCHREUDER, Kirche im Vorort and De professionalisering van het ambt. More 
biographical information on Schreuder can be found in Appendix 1. 
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2.1. GODDIJN’S ASCENT  
 
The Fall of Zeegers 
Not long after KASKI celebrated its decennial in 1956, derailed 
relationships amongst the institute’s management and workers were 
instrumental in the emergence of a deadlock. As we have seen, Zeegers did 
not quite change course after Koenraadt insisted on institutional 
consolidation instead of expansion.11 On the contrary, he sidelined 
Koenraadt while attempting to establish a global Catholic research 
enterprise. In order to prevent KASKI from being condemned to implode, 
in January 1957 Koenraadt launched the idea of reforming the board by 
replacing the—in his opinion—benevolent yet powerless clerics with 
competent and authoritative laypeople.12 Zeegers grasped that such a 
replacement would make his own comfortable position crumble. He 
therefore asked Dellepoort and the other priests working at KASKI to 
reflect upon Koenraadt’s idea. Perhaps not surprisingly, they came up with 
a memorandum in which they called for a substantial organisational input 
of the clergy.13 Hence, the director and chairman of KASKI came to find 
themselves on opposing sides in early 1957. Several months later, in May 
1957, their battle for power was elevated to an even higher level of intensity 
by Koenraadt, who intervened in a labour dispute between Zeegers and 
KASKI employee Jan Godefroy. This intervention became a source of 
bitterness for Koenraadt and Zeegers, who started to disqualify each other’s 
competencies. Zeegers even claimed not to tolerate Koenraadt’s presidency 
any longer.14 Koenraadt refused to bow to Zeegers once again. He got in 
touch with Archbishop Alfrink and familiarised him with the way in which 
Zeegers often disregarded the majority of KASKI’s board.15  
Goddijn, who we have hardly come across as a historical actor up to 
this point, also campaigned against Zeegers at that point. In the summer of 
1951, Zeegers and Staverman managed to get him involved in the 
establishment of a regional KASKI office in Leeuwarden. Goddijn ran this 
office from 1952 onwards. It was in this institutional context that Goddijn 
wrote a letter to Father Superior Castulus van den Eijnden, who succeeded 
Apollinaris van Leeuwen in 1952, on 24 October 1957.16 Allegedly, Zeegers 
tried to turn Goddijn into an ‘administrative servant’ by forcing him to 
work at KASKI’s headquarters in The Hague, which was not why he had 
become a priest-sociologist. Furthermore, the KASKI director was told to 
                                                          
11 See paragraph 1.1. for more details, especially the passage on KASKI’s expansion. 
12 Minutes of the KASKI Board meeting on 05-02-1957: KDC, KASKI, 3654. 
13 Memorandum on the cooperation between laity and clergy at KASKI, undated: KDC, 
KASKI, 3654. 
14 Letter by Zeegers to Koenraadt, 11-05-1957: UA, BAU, 609. 
15 Letter by Alfrink to the other bishops, 22-11-1957: BARD, 312.1, 50. 
16 Letter by Goddijn to Van den Eynden, 24-10-1957: UA, OFM, 229. In his autobiography, 
Goddijn noted that he no longer wanted to be ‘lent’ by the Franciscans to an institute at which 
Zeegers ‘terrorised’ his employees and turned the finances into a ‘mess’: GODDIJN, De moed 
niet verliezen, pp. 51–52. 
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disapprove of Goddijn’s recent appointment by Alfrink as head of the 
mental care section in the so-called camps of ‘maladjusted families’ in the 
Province of Drenthe, arguing that Goddijn was too selfish and defended the 
interests of his Order too much. Goddijn did not take these accusations 
lightly. He in fact questioned whether Zeegers’s ‘lack of tact, self-control, 
honesty, and reliability’ did KASKI any good, and pressed for the departure 
of his employer in strong terms: “In the long run, the only solution is that Z. 
resigns or operates on the international level only”. Goddijn mentioned the 
name of Alfrink as a possible trouble-shooter. 
The manner in which both Koenraadt and Goddijn acted is relevant. 
These clergymen, respectively a vicar-general and a Franciscan priest, 
represented vital parts of the infrastructure on which KASKI rested 
organisationally as well as financially. They believed that Zeegers infringed 
their priestly authority and tasks, and turned to an influential person in their 
clerical network. It seems reasonable to assume a joint action. Koenraadt 
and Goddijn knew that Zeegers had little authority in the ecclesiastical 
domain because he was a lay Catholic. So too, must have Zeegers himself. 
Already in the letter sent to Redemptorist Father General Buys in July 
1948, he noted that his lay status might form a legitimate reason for 
rejecting KASKI’s full-time directorship in the near future: “I do not know 
if a layperson is always the right man in the right place when opposed to 
clergymen; rather delicate problems can arise”.17 The moment on which 
Goddijn intervened, October 1957, is meaningful. This was only several 
months after he defended his doctoral thesis Katholieke minderheid en 
protestantse dominant (Catholic Minority and Protestant Dominant), in 
which he focused on the minority of Catholics in the Province of Friesland, 
under the supervision of Zeegers (figures 29 & 30). There is evidence 
suggesting that Goddijn also tried to damage Zeegers’s credibility in a 
conversation with Vicar-general Feron from the Diocese of Roermond. 18 
Bishop-coadjutor Hanssen hoped that Zeegers would be able to hold his 
position, despite his tendency to cross the traditional lines of Church 
authority now and then.19 It was crucial, Hanssen noted, to prevent KASKI 
from becoming an institute governed by regular clerics. 
Feeling betrayed, and realising that the odds were against him, 
Zeegers made the outside world believe that he could just carry on. As he 
wrote to Van den Eijnden, his institute had enough devoted employees to 
continue its job.20 The fact that KASKI formally operated as an 
independent institution, without any influence of the Episcopacy on its 
management, had probably nurtured this approach.21 However, it seems 
                                                          
17 Letter by Zeegers to Buys, 25-07-1948: ENK, CSSR, 7509. 
18 Contribution by Feron to internal circular note, 27-11-1957: BARD, 3.121, BV. 
19 Contribution by Hanssen to internal circular note, 25-11-1957: BARD, 3.121, BV. 
20 Letter by Zeegers to Van den Eijnden, 02-11-1957 and letter by Zeegers to Van den Eijnden, 
03-12-1957. Both letters: KDC, KASKI, 4236. 
21 In a letter to Archbishop Jachym, Alfrink admitted that, according to KASKI’s statutes, the 
Dutch Episcopacy officially had no sovereignty over KASKI: letter by Alfrink to Jachym,  
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that Zeegers underestimated the ecclesiastical dynamics. Reasoning that 
KASKI was an institute that had great significance for the Dutch Church 
Province, Alfrink set up an official investigation on 22 November 1957.22 
Former prime minister Louis Beel led this investigation. The report he 
drafted, the Beel Report, was so highly classified that even Zeegers was not 
permitted to read it.23  
The document contained a condemnatory judgement of the 
management of KASKI. Beel noted that, on paper, a director, a general 
board, an executive committee, and a board of governors determined the 
institute’s organisational course. But in reality, the two latter bodies did not 
exist, and only Zeegers could be held primarily responsible for this course. 
In his capacities of director and secretary of the board, he was reported to 
neglect the opinions and desires of other board members, structurally brush 
aside the criticism of his employees, and stretch the development of the 
institute far beyond its statutory specifications. He was also claimed to have 
deliberately engaged in financial mismanagement. It was stated that funding 
meant for KASKI was used for different purposes such as Zeegers’s side 
project KAROSI (Kardinaal Van Rossum Instituut), an internationally 
operating Catholic institute for development work.24 According to Beel, a 
‘crusader’ was driven, even obsessed, by the idea that the Church needed 
sociology. Zeegers’s ‘largest shortcoming’ was that he did not know his own 
limitations. At the expense of almost everything, Beel purported, he chased 
his own dream of Christianisation. Beel’s conclusions read that Zeegers 
needed to leave KASKI, and that the institute must be reorganised.  
Sensing that his tenure rapidly edged towards an end, Zeegers decided 
to accept the unacceptable, and resign from what in many respects was his 
institute. He stepped down before Beel had finished his report, on the 
condition that he would receive a financial settlement.25 As of 1 January 
1958, Zeegers was no longer the director of KASKI, nor did he serve on its 
board. He accepted a financial compensation of 20,000 Guilders per year in 
1958 and 1959, minus the earnings gained through his professorship at the 
Nijmegen University. De Tijd newspaper anticipated a press statement 
released on 1 January 1958. It reported as follows: “Prof. G.H.L Zeegers, 
director-general of the Catholic Institute for Socio-Ecclesiastical Research, 
has informed the Most Reverend prof. dr. B.J. Alfrink that he, after having 
led this institute for 12 years, wishes to step down from his position 
immediately. The Archbishop regrets his leave yet respects the motives 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 01-02-1958: UA, BAU, 609. 
22 Letter by Alfrink to his fellow bishops, 22-11-1957: BARD, 312.1, 50. 
23 Letter by Beel to Alfrink, 30-12-1957, including report: UA, BAU, 609. This report was based 
on an investigation of relevant archival materials, as well as on interviews with Zeegers; Op de 
Coul, Van Deursen, Koenraadt, Nolet, and Versteeg (members of the KASKI board); 
Franciscans Goddijn, Grond, and Van Leeuwen; and Kock, Kusters, Matthijssen, and Thoen 
(employees working at KASKI’s headquarters). 
24 For a contextualisation of this institute, see: Van HEIJST, Gedreven helpers, especially  
 pp. 243, 293, and 317–329.  
25 Beel Report, especially p. 9: UA, BAU, 609. 
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which have prompted prof. Zeegers to make this decision. (…) The 
resignation of Zeegers seems to be related to problems between the board of 
KASKI and the inexhaustible director”.26 
Everyone involved in this resignation must have known that Zeegers’s 
departure would give rise to a power vacuum. Whereas he oversaw 
everything that went on within KASKI’s walls down to the smallest detail, 
his domination had suddenly collapsed. On Beel’s initiative, a special 
committee consisting of Vicar-general Groot, politician Herman van Voorst 
tot Voorst, and attorney Laurent Nouwen dealt with this situation until a 
new director took office.27 Hub Damoiseaux, the director of the Amsterdam 
Sociaal-Charitatief Centrum, a branch of a national centre which ought to 
coordinate Catholic societal work in the Dutch Church Province as a whole, 
became Zeegers’s successor from September 1958 onwards. Under his 
leadership, the centrally operating umbrella organisation ICARES became 
a federation named FERES (Fédération Internationale des Instituts de 
Recherches Socio-Religieuses).28 Additionally, the system of regional 
representation was reshuffled in that several offices were dissolved and 
various new ones opened their doors. Furthermore, representatives of the 
new generation of sociologists were hired as scientific advisors—Goddijn’s 
younger brother Hans and Van Kemenade, to name a few—and Leemans 
entered the institute’s board.29 In short, Koenraadt’s and Goddijn’s 
intervention gave rise to a repositioning of KASKI in the field.  
In the longer run, a dissolution of all regional offices and a refinement 
of ecclesiastical statistics became part and parcel of this repositioning. 
KASKI employee Jos Poeisz (figure 31) grew into the institute’s specialist in 
statistics.30 He witnessed that some deans and parish priests articulated 
complaints in the wake of the 1955 standardisation.31 These complaints 
were particularly related to the large amount of paperwork. As a result of 
the chosen procedure, statistical data were repeatedly processed before they 
made their way to KASKI. Besides, the bishops came to believe by the mid 
1960s that a systematical survey of Mass attendance during the weekend 
was ‘indispensable’ for their decision making.32 This all led to a 
reconfiguration of the existing documents and protocols in 1965. A first 
significant shift encompassed the documents to be filled out. Well-organised 
forms replaced the somewhat complex booklets.33 Whereas some of the 
                                                          
26 ‘Prof. G. Zeegers verlaat Kaski’, in: De Tijd, 02-01-1958. 
27 Final report of the Committee of Three, October 1958: KDC, KASKI, 3055.  
28 TETTERO and DIERICK, ‘Dertig jaar KASKI-onderzoek’, pp. 15–24. 
29 More biographical information on Hans Goddijn can be found in Appendix 1. 
30 More biographical information on Poeisz can be found in Appendix 1. For a more general 
description of this refinement, see: TETTERO and DIERICK, ‘Dertig jaar KASKI 
onderzoek’, pp. 26–28. 
31 Paper on the reorganisation of ecclesiastical statistics, February 1964: KDC, KASKI, 3121.  
32 Letters by the bishops to the parish priests, rectors, and Mothers Superior, 15-12-1965: KDC, 
KASKI, 3150. KASKI started to count the number of Catholics attenting Mass on Sunday 
occasionally in the second half of the 1940s: DOLS, ‘Een Limburgs wespennest’, pp. 191–192. 
33 Statistical form 1965, including instruction: KDC, KASKI, 3150.  
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statistical categories disappeared, such as that of the membership of 
religious associations and youngsters engaging in catechism, the most 
important additions concerned the categories on changing parish borders 
and churchgoing during the weekend. According to the instruction sheet, 
parish priests ought to make sure that the number of Catholics attending 
Mass on two given Sundays was documented. Assistants had to divide the 
church building into different sections, start the counting operation around 
the Gospel, when ‘the most Catholics were present’, and not forget the choir 
and the altar boys. One person instructed these assistants and gathered the 
outcomes. On the basis of these outcomes, each year, KASKI established 
average numbers of Mass attendance during the weekend. The dispatch of 
the data to KASKI formed a second significant shift. Parish priests sent the 
statistical forms directly to the episcopal secretaries, rather than to the dean 
first. 
What few people involved in the repositioning of KASKI and the 
reshuffling of ecclesiastical statistics knew about, and seemed to care about, 
was that Zeegers suffered from severe depression. A series of diary entries 
written in 1964 and 1965 indicates that his resignation in early 1958 
undermined his self-respect and haunted him for years.34 He understood 
this resignation in terms of an ‘unimaginable treason’ of the Franciscans and 
a ‘great cowardice’ of Alfrink. Zeegers was angry at the Archbishop because 
he had not provided him with a fair opportunity to defend himself. So 
disillusioned and shocked was Zeegers that he advised his ten children not 
to do any business with priests: “As I believe in the Catholic faith, still, so 
too I believe that many authorities in the Catholic Church, and many 
priests in particular, do their utmost in their quest for power, and will lead 
both Christianity and the Church towards the brink of collapse”.  
 
Goddijn: from KASKI Manager to PINK Director  
At the time when Zeegers wrote these thoughts down, the Second Vatican 
Council reached its final stage. The so-called ‘Fourth Period’ commenced 
on 14 September 1965 and ended on 8 December of that year. Vatican II 
should be perceived as one of the most influential ecclesiastical events since 
the fall of the Papal State in 1870.35 Pope John XXIII initiated the council 
in 1959. Reacting to the unrest noticeable in various pastoral sectors, he 
particularly sought to teach the core message of the Church in an altered, 
more attractive fashion. Between 1962 and 1965, hundreds of bishops from 
all over the world made their way to Rome. So, too, did the Dutch bishops 
(figure 32). Among them, Alfrink, who worked as a professor of theology at 
the Catholic University of Nijmegen between 1945 and 1951, and became a 
                                                          
34 Diary by Zeegers, 1964 and 1965, especially pp. 104–109 (07-02-1965) and 110–112  
 (16-02-1965): ZEEGERS.  
35 Recent publications on Vatican II include: LAMB and LEVERING, Vatican II, 
HOONDERT, JACOBS, and PLOUM, Visioenen van het Tweede Vaticaans Concilie,  
 and ALBERIGO, The History of Vatican II. 
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Cardinal in 1960, was prominent.36 He served on the Board of Presidency 
which Pope John XXIII tasked with directing and coordinating the work of 
the council. During and in the aftermath of Vatican II, Alfrink developed 
and advocated a vision on Church governance that revolved around a 
servitude towards the faithful as well as around the notion of ‘collegiality’. 
According to Alfrink, the Pope and bishops together formed a governmental 
body: the collegium episcoparum. This body, which the Roman Curia had 
to support, and in which the Bishop of Rome held a special position and 
embodied a maximum of authority, was the successor of the ancient 
collegium apostolorum, as formed by the Apostles. Or, as Alfrink himself 
stated: “The sequence in the Church of Christ should thus not be: first the 
Holy Father, then the Curia, and finally the bishops. If there is such a thing 
as the collegiality of the bishops according to a divine right, the order must 
be: the Holy Father (of whom we are all keen to believe that he, and he 
alone, is the most important person in the Church) who forms the body of 
bishops together with the other bishops, and then the Curia, which 
functions as the executive institution of this body of bishops (even though it 
also serves the Holy Father as such)”. Vatican II effectuated the notion of 
collegiality in the Decree on the Pastoral Office of Bishops Christus 
Dominus (Christ the Lord; 1965) by prompting bishops all over the world to 
formally establish national episcopal conferences in which the principle of 
shared responsibility for decision making prevailed: “An episcopal 
conference is, as it were, a council in which the bishops of a given nation or 
territory jointly exercise their pastoral office to promote the greater good 
which the Church offers mankind, especially through the forms and 
methods of the apostolate fittingly adapted to the circumstances of the 
age”.37  
It is against this very backdrop of collegiality that Goddijn could grow 
from a KASKI manager into the director of PINK. On 13 March 1962, in 
a memorandum on recent developments at KASKI he wrote at 
Koenraadt’s request, he promoted the establishment of a National Pastoral 
Centre in the Dutch Church Province and explicitly referred to Vatican 
II.38 Goddijn stated that KASKI employees still had to work under high 
pressure and ‘juggle’ with lots of source materials, which negatively affected 
the quality of the research. In addition, he noted that KASKI was still not 
always regarded with sympathy by ecclesiastical decision makers, especially 
due to a commercial attitude maintained by Damoiseaux. 39 Finally, and 
                                                          
36 Van SCHAIK, Alfrink, pp. 296–323 and 342–344. Quote on p. 343. See also: Leven in de 
kerk, especially pp. 77–120. 
37 Constituties en decreten van het Tweede Vaticaans Oecumenisch Concilie, pp. 183–185. I 
have used the English translation, as it can be found on the Vatican’s website: 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents.  
 Visited on 07-11-2012. 
38 Memorandum by Goddijn, 13-03-1962: KDC, PINK, 631. 
39 Note that the Redemptorists established their own internal Planological Service in 1958, 
instead of turning to KASKI. This department, in which sociologist Chris Stuart CssR played  
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most strongly, Goddijn claimed that KASKI’s knowledge and techniques 
did not enable bishops and fathers superior to draw policy lines after 
Vatican II. Priestly activities demanded a ‘more effective application’, he 
argued, as did the tasks of brothers and sisters. Goddijn therefore urged the 
bishops and fathers superior to bring about their own research and planning 
department in terms of a professional advisory institution that would focus 
on research on the one hand and the implementation of inquiry results into 
decision making on the other. At the end of his memorandum, he predicted 
that the need for such an internal institution would be ‘unmistakably large’ 
in the wake of the Second Vatican Council, when the broadly formulated 
decisions of this council had to be ‘translated’ to national policies. 
Goddijn tried to stimulate the establishment of a well-funded and 
authoritative institute—an advisory body which was independent of the 
vagaries of the research market, stood under the (financial) protection of the 
bishops and fathers superior, and was directly involved in their decision 
making—without imposing himself as a candidate for director. In May 
1962, Koenraadt brought him in contact with De Vet, the recently 
appointed Bishop of Breda who had a great interest in sociology and dealt 
with pastoral issues on behalf of the Episcopacy.40 De Vet soon came to 
believe that Goddijn’s plea for a new institutional framework made sense.41 
It did take substantially longer, until November 1963, for him, his fellow 
bishops, and the fathers superior to found the institute Goddijn propagated. 
In August 1962, while this process was fully underway, De Vet prompted 
Goddijn to turn down the offer of West-German sociologist Nobert 
Greinacher to succeed him as the director of the Pastoral Institute of the 
Diocese of Essen and accept a job as seminary professor. According to 
historian Ziemann, the number of suitable candidates in the West-German 
ecclesiastical domain was so low that Greinacher saw himself forced to seek 
for successors abroad.42 Soon after Goddijn had followed the advice, De Vet 
asked him to assist in grounding what in the end became PINK. The 
bishops unanimously appointed Goddijn as the institute’s director in 
September 1963. A committee installed by De Vet several months earlier 
guided this appointment.43 Its members were KVP politician Piet 
Steenkamp, Vicar-general Lambert Rooyackers from the Diocese of Den 
Bosch, and Franciscan Father Superior Van den Eijnden on behalf of 
SNPR (Stichting Samenwerking Nederlandse Priester Religieuzen), the 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 a key role, aimed at providing Redemptorists working in the field of pastoral care with 
empirically yielded insights. It published around 23 reports between 1958 and 1974. See:  
 ENK, CSSR, 1990. 
40 Chronicle by Goddijn, October 1962: KDC, PINK, 631. For more biographical information 
on De Vet, see: LEPPER, ‘Vet, Gerardus Henricus de’, on-line accessible via: 
 http://www.historici.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/BWN/. Visited on 16-01-2013. 
41 Correspondence between De Vet and Goddijn, 1962–1964: KDC, PINK, 631. 
42 ZIEMANN, Katholische Kirche und Sozialwissenschaften, p. 107. 
43 De HAAN, Van volgzame elitestrijder tot kritische gelovige, p. 267. 
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federation which united all the Dutch priests-religious from 1955 onwards 
and was meant to operate on the same level as the Episcopacy.44 
It would be incorrect to present PINK as a totally new institutional 
project, however, since it was the organisational follow-up of NPI 
(Nederlands Pastoraal Instituut). The bishops established this institute in 
1958, after years of fierce discussion on pastoral care in a variety of 
magazines. The debate took off when a small group of laymen and 
clergymen, led by Redemptorist priest Boelaars, published a book titled 
Onrust in de zielzorg (Unrest in Pastoral Care) in 1950.45 They highlighted 
what they deemed as an emergency situation. Many priests argued that they 
were loaded with organisational work and had turned into mere managers 
so that they did not have any time left to carry out their core duty: 
practicing pastoral care. Another complaint articulated by the authors was 
that, generally speaking, priests had not succeeded in keeping up with the 
changing society. In a follow-up series of essays, published in 1954, 
KASKI’s co-founder and Franciscan priest Van Leeuwen linked this 
changing society to structural aspects of the pastorate.46 Van Leeuwen fell 
back on one of Protestant sociologist Jakob Pieter Kruijt’s analyses. In 1951, 
Kruijt used German sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies’s categories of 
‘community’ (‘Gemeinschaft’) and ‘society’ (‘Gesellschaft’) to contend that 
Churches were losing their grip on large groups of faithful. According to 
Van Leeuwen, the disintegration of Catholic communities was visible in the 
large cities in the Netherlands. Declining levels of churchgoing and a 
mounting number of mixed marriages expressed this process. 
The foundation of NPI accelerated after theologian Herman Borgert 
CssR from 1953 onwards worked towards a plan to erect a National 
Pastoral Study Centre.47 He believed that the increasing non-denomination 
should be countered through an approximation of the City of God (‘civitas 
dei’) and the Earthly City (‘civitas hujus mundi’). Even though the means of 
mercy provided to mankind by God could not be replaced by others, 
Borgert wrote, it was necessary to thoroughly study and eventually 
modernise these means under the intellectual domination of theology—with 
Christianisation as the ultimate goal. In order to elucidate his lines of 
argument, Borgert quoted the French Cardinal Jules Saliège from the 
Archdiocese of Toulouse: “The formula of the mission should be renewed; 
it does no longer correspond with the socio-cultural climate”. The pastoral 
institute Borgert envisaged ought to stand under the authority of SNPR. 
The board of this body of regular priests acknowledged that a serious 
                                                          
44 JACOBS, Werken in een dwarsverband, especially pp. 23–84.  
45 Van den BOS, Verlangen naar vernieuwing, p. 67. 
46 Van LEEUWEN, ‘De structuur van de zielzorg sociologisch gezien’, especially pp. 111–112.  
47 BORGERT, ‘Moderne missiemethode in Frankrijk’ and VERHAGEN, ‘Maar, wat doen wij in 
Nederland?’, 42. See also: paper ‘Pastoraal Studie-Centrum’ by Borgert, undated: ENK, 
CSSR, 1984. Quote on p. 6. 
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pastoral need existed, and embraced the idea of calling a new organisation 
into existence.48 In the end, however, the bishops seized the initiative.49 
Redemptorist priest Boelaars, priest and the then industrial chaplain 
De Vet, Tellegen, Seminary President Hubert van Deursen, priest-
philosopher Albert Ariëns, and SNPR secretary Theo Keulemans O.Carm. 
entered NPI’s board. Priest-theologian Jos Vermeulen and Catholic layman 
Ludo Baas became the directors of NPI. The first worked as a seminary 
professor in Driebergen, acted as the co-director of the regional branch of 
the Catholic Action in the Archdiocese of Utrecht until 1945, and 
contributed to the just mentioned 1950 publication. Baas studied law and 
succeeded Tellegen as chairman of the Catholic Action in 1958. Their 
primary tasks were to examine issues related to pastoral care and the 
apostolate of the laity, and provide the bishops, especially, with advice on 
these issues.50 As it turned out, NPI left these Church authorities as well as 
the members of its board with much to be desired.51 They wanted 
Vermeulen and Baas to concentrate on the aspect of advice, but these 
protagonists spent almost all their time conducting research. Besides this, 
the only significant results they accomplished between 1958 and 1962 were 
a modest series of publications and the organisation of several discussion 
days on preaching, dialogue, and business apostolate.52 Advised to do so by 
the NPI board, Bishop Bekkers from the Diocese of Den Bosch, and later 
De Vet, investigated the possibility of a reorganisation of the institute.53 
PINK emanated from this reorganisation. 
PINK’s tasks formed one of the largest differences between NPI and 
PINK. Goddijn and his staff were not expected to conduct inquiries 
themselves. Rather, as the articles of association indicate, they had to carry 
out a threefold duty: prepare ecclesiastical policy by initiating and 
coordinating research as well as by giving advice (both on request and 
unsolicitedly) to bishops and fathers superior, stimulate the communication 
between the various levels of the Church when pastoral care, apostolate, 
ecumenism, and mission were concerned, and take care of a systematic 
pastoral documentation (figure 33).54 This threefold duty echoes a working 
plan which Goddijn drafted in December 1962 at De Vet’s request. 
Goddijn noted that PINK should become an institute akin to the Centre de 
Recherches d’Information et de Coordination de Toute la Pastorale (Centre 
For Inquiry into and the Coordination of the Entire Pastorate), which was 
founded by the French bishops in the autumn of 1961.55 In effect, he 
                                                          
48 Letter by Keulemans to Vermeulen, 09-03-1957: ENK, CSSR, 1984.  
49 JACOBS, Werken in een dwarsverband, pp. 81–82. 
50 The Articles of Association of NPI (22-05-1959) can be found here: KDC, PINK, 631. 
51  De HAAN, Van volgzame elitestrijder tot kritische gelovige, pp. 257–261. 
52  Letter by Van Deursen and Boelaars to Bekkers, 12-05-1961: ENK, CSSR, 1984. 
53  Minutes of the NPI Board meeting on 19-06-1961 and letter by Bekkers to the Episcopacy, 
December 1961: ENK, CSSR, 1984. See also: chronicle by Goddijn, October 1962:  
 KDC, PINK, 631. 
54  SNABEL, ‘Documentair verslag van 5 jaar PINK’, pp. 25–29.  
55 Untitled paper by Goddijn (especially pp. 3–7), 8-12-1962: KDC, PINK, 631. 
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observed, this implied that PINK must stimulate bottom-up 
communication, and arrive at both well-founded and long-term pastoral 
advices which were flexible enough to be implemented in the Dutch Church 
Province as a whole without violating the diocesan particularities.  
A considerable number of advisory committees had to provide the 
intellectual building blocks of the advice which Goddijn often worked into 
memoranda. On the one hand, there were ‘ad-hoc committees’ consisting of 
several members only.56 These members addressed fundamental questions 
raised by either the Episcopacy or SNPR, or both. On the other hand, 
larger ‘work committees’ focused on specific issues such as that of the 
deanery as a pastoral unit and the position of the priest. All kinds of 
intellectuals populated the two types of committees: from theologians and 
philosophers to psychologists and sociologists. Some of them were a priest, 
brother, or sister, others had the lay status. Most of the committee members 
held an academic degree. 
In financial terms, PINK put the bishops and fathers superior under 
pressure, as it demanded a colossal investment of approximately 1,3 million 
Guilders between 1963 and 1971.57 Various recurring entries are 
discernible when overlooking the accountants’ reports. Expectedly, a 
substantial amount of money flowed in the direction of the PINK 
employees, 717,000 Guilders to be precise. From 1964 onwards, PINK’s 
headquarters was located in a rather luxurious building in the ‘s 
Gravendijkwal street (number 61) in Rotterdam. In total, the housing costs 
amounted to 126,000 Guilders. According to the reports, 1/8 share of the 
fixed costs was paid by SNPR, and 7/8 share by the bishops.  
 
Three Keys to Goddijn’s Success  
At the beginning of 1966, the bishops delegated the organisation of the 
Pastoral Council to PINK, implying that Goddijn became conciliar 
secretary-general as well (figures 34 & 35).58 “Of course”, Rogier senior 
noted in 1974, “PINK took this assignment seriously: the institute started 
immediately, and, in accordance with a general Dutch desire for 
perfectionism, built a complex conciliar apparatus, mainly consisting of 
fourteen expert committees which brought forth rather lengthy reports or 
so-called ‘papers’ (…)”.59 What, then, were Goddijn’s two appointments 
based upon?  
First and foremost, Goddijn was a key player in the field of Catholic 
sociology. He studied political and social sciences at the Catholic University 
of Leuven between 1948 and 1951 (figure 36). As lecture notes demonstrate, 
focal points of academic attention were religious leadership, the pitfalls of 
religious formalism, and tensions between a dynamic religious community 
                                                          
56 SNABEL, ‘Documentair verslag van 5 jaar PINK’, pp. 36–74.  
57 Accountants’ reports PINK, 1963–1971: KDC, PINK, 320–328. 
58 ZIEMANN and DOLS, ‘Catholic Church Reform and Organizations Research in the 
Netherlands and Germany’, p. 300.  
59 ROGIER, Vandaag en morgen, p. 24.  
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and a static religious institution.60 After obtaining his master’s degree, 
Goddijn pursued a doctorate. For a while, it looked as if he would write a 
doctoral thesis on religious propaganda under the supervision of Franciscan 
professor Devolder. Both the research subject and supervisor changed, 
however, after Zeegers and Staverman convinced him to join the KASKI 
staff. During his KASKI years, Goddijn extended his social network with 
Church authorities such as Archbishop Alfrink and Bishop Nierman from 
the Diocese of Groningen. He also worked his way up to become the editor 
in chief of Social Compass and followed a course at the Westphalian 
Wilhelm’s-University in Münster, West-Germany. Walter Hagemann 
introduced him into the essentials of Publizistik, or journalism studies. 
Furthermore, Goddijn’s publication list came to hold a co-authored 1960 
handbook on the sociology of religion (figure 37), which was 
straightforwardly titled Godsdienstsociologie (The Sociology of Religion), as 
well as tens of other publications.61  
Similar to Van Doorn and Lammers, Goddijn fell for the promises of 
structural-functionalism. American sociologists Talcott Parsons and Robert 
Merton developed this research paradigm in the 1940s and 1950s. 
According to structural-functionalism, order and dynamic stability is 
favourable over disorder and instability.62 The structure of every ‘social 
system’ consists of the interrelationships between its elements. An element 
has a ‘function’ if it contributes to the fulfilment of the social needs of a 
social system, and a ‘dysfunction’ if it obstructs this fulfilment. In order to 
maintain balance, decision makers in every social system have to deal with 
the issue of ‘adaptation’, here interpreted as an accommodation to the 
system’s social and non-social environment. In addition, they must engage 
in ‘tension management’: disturbances must be reduced in order to carry on 
efficiently. When applied to the Catholic Church, Goddijn stated that this 
was a social system too, albeit with its own structure.63 Like any other 
organisation, it had a ‘staff’, needed to be administratively ‘managed’, and 
was intertwined with social dynamics. Consequently, analysing the position 
of the Church in society meant determining its ‘degree of adaptation’. In 
Goddijn’s opinion, the primary duty of a sociologist operating in the 
ecclesiastical domain was to restore the institutional balance by bringing to 
light dysfunctional elements, that is to say, elements eroding the core task of 
                                                          
60 Lecture notes by Goddijn, 1951: KDC, GODD, 19. For more information on the Leuven 
sociology department, see: GERARD, Sociale wetenschappen aan de Katholieke Universiteit 
Leuven, pp. 52–82 and GERARD and WILS, ‘Catholics and Sociology in Leuven’, especially 
p. 49. 
61 In 1956, Zeegers kept Goddijn from writing this handbook under the KASKI flag, thereby 
nurturing feelings of frustration: letter by Zeegers to Goddijn, 13-02-1956: KDC, KASKI, 
4299. An overview of publications up until 1985 can be found here: MOMMERS, ‘Bibliografie 
van prof. dr. W. Goddijn, 1944-1985’.  
62 JOHNSON, Sociology, pp. 48–79. Goddijn himself referred to this work: paper ‘Der 
Beteutung der Theorie in einer soziologischen Untersuchung’ by Goddijn (p. 4), May 1962: 
KDC, GODD, 127.  
63 Paper ‘Der Bedeutung der Theorie in einer soziologischen Untersuchung’ by Goddijn (p. 4), 
May 1962: KDC, GODD, 127. 
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the Church: to proclaim the message of salvation. More specifically, 
Goddijn stressed that sociologists should focus on unrecognisable and 
unintended—also known as ‘latent’—dysfunctions. In this way, they 
contributed to ‘synchronising’ the ecclesiastical apparatus with socio-
religious change.  
Exactly this secular gaze on an institute which had often been 
interpreted in divine terms set Goddijn apart from Zeegers and even older 
Catholic sociologists such as Koenraadt. Goddijn was far from unique in 
this respect. As historian Paul Luykx has argued, a considerable number of 
younger Catholic sociologists reached out to structural-functional principles 
in the 1960s, rather than to the concepts of conflict sociology.64 Adherents 
of this other popular sociological paradigm evaluated disorder and 
instability positively instead of negatively. They believed that this disorder 
and instability, which was rooted in an unequal distribution of power, 
contributed to the change of a social system and a continuation of society at 
large. Both the age of the Church and a connected longing for continuity 
explain why conflict sociology never gained widespread support in the 
ecclesiastical domain. Bishops and their priests were willing to embrace 
transformation, but always stayed or were forced to stay within the 
established institutional framework. This guaranteed a fixed configuration 
of power relations and thus a great deal of order. 
A second reason why the Episcopacy and SNPR allowed Goddijn to 
occupy the positions of PINK director and conciliar secretary-general was 
that he launched practical proposals on how pastoral care and Church 
governance had to be reformed. In Rotterdam, where he became the 
manager of the regional KASKI office in 1959 (because the number of 
research assignments in Leeuwarden decreased and Damoiseaux wanted 
him to work closer to the institute’s headquarters), he laid the foundations of 
a ‘Pastoral Meeting Point’.65 Here, every priest could relax and participate 
in face-to-face discussions about the future of the Church. Goddijn also 
stimulated the installation of a Central Pastoral Council, a permanent local 
advisory body consisting of priests which contributed to policy making. 
Dean Ben Henning’s ambition to revitalise the entire city pastorate meant 
that these two institutions could be established. At the conceptual heart of a 
pastoral plan co-authored by Goddijn to this end of revitalisation was the 
French notion of the ‘pastoral d’ensemble’, or ‘unitary pastorate’. Historian 
Lieve Gevers has demonstrated that followers of this notion, often but not 
exclusively sociologists, embraced new forms of collaboration between 
priests and lay Catholics.66 In more general terms, one could say that they 
promoted a rationalisation of pastoral activities and aimed at 
                                                          
64 LUYKX, Andere katholieken, especially pp. 51–54 and 57–58. In 1963, Goddijn’s younger 
brother Hans defended a doctoral thesis on the structural-functional paradigm: GODDIJN, 
Het funktionalisme in de sociologie. This was one of the first companions in Dutch. The book 
was re-issued in 1968. 
65 GODDIJN, ‘Trefcentrum Dekenaat Rotterdam’. 
66 GEVERS, ‘Priesterproblematiek in een stroomversnelling’, pp. 167–169. 
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democratisation.67 Telling on this score is that the Rotterdam Pastoral Plan 
highlighted the necessity of teamwork.68 The document stated that, as many 
parochial problems were urban problems, the parochial autonomy needed 
to be subdued. On the horizontal level, this meant that clergy and laity had 
to join forces in a quest for solving these problems. And on the vertical level, 
the parish priest, the dean, and the bishop should deliberate more 
intensively with each other. ‘Own initiative’ and ‘self-development’ were 
presented as other vital notions. According to the pastoral plan, it was no 
longer possible to sustain every hierarchical structure of the Church at a 
time when democracy had become a key asset in the lives of many.  
Thirdly, as a Franciscan priest and thus a man, Goddijn was familiar 
with the written and unwritten rules that prevailed in the ecclesiastical 
domain, and neatly blended in to the male-dominated decision making 
scene. Aged six, he became one of the many thousands of Dutch altar 
boys.69 He increasingly found himself drawn to the ecclesiastical atmosphere 
during the following years. Goddijn’s mother, his priest-uncle, and a parish 
priest in Leiden, the religiously mixed town where Goddijn was born in 
1921 and grew up as part of an upper middle-class family, encouraged this 
growing engagement with the priestly office. He joined the Franciscan 
Order in 1940, at a time when the number of Franciscan novices had 
already started to drop.70 That he selected precisely this Order should not 
come as a surprise when one realises that he visited the Bonaventura School 
in Leiden and the Grammar School in Venray between 1934 and 1940, 
which were both led by Franciscans.71 The sober training programme of the 
Franciscans reflected the Franciscan themes of poverty and humility. 
Dressed in a brown habit and provided with a new name (Jan became 
Walter), Goddijn was confronted with his own shortcomings, especially 
those related to pride. At times, he went through a hard time: “Quite often, 
I think I stand, but as soon as the thought hits me, I succumb to the pressure 
of a depression again; an utter dryness is what settles in next, something 
which achromatises everything and makes everything purposeless, but I 
know than I can trust on God, and that I should not surrender to rebellion, 
as if I had the right to receive mental consolation”.72 A 2013 interview with 
former KASKI and PINK secretary Leny Keverkamp, who knew Goddijn 
better than most because she also lived with him from the mid 1960s until 
                                                          
67 ZIEMANN, Katholische Kirche und Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 203–205. See also: 
SCHREUDER, Gedaanteverandering van de kerk, pp. 48–49 and Revolution in der Kirche?, 
pp. 75–81. 
68 Pastoraal Plan Rotterdam, especially pp. 4–6. See also: GODDIJN, ‘Het dekenaat’, 
[GODDIJN], De feitelijke en gewenste struktuur van het dekenaat and [GODDIJN], Pastoraal 
Plan.  
69 GODDIJN, De moed niet verliezen, pp. 19–22. 
70 BAAN, De Nederlandse minderbroedersprovincie sinds 1983, p. 107. 
71 Documents concerning Goddijn’s primary school years, 1934–1940: KDC, GODD, 12, 56, 
59–60, and 75. In Venray, one offered students the possibility of participating in a state 
examination, a possibility Goddijn’s father insisted on. 
72 Red diary by Goddijn, 31-10-1940: KDC, GODD, 62. 
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the 1980s, suggests that the obligation to respect the vow of chastity formed 
his most grave problem. Goddijn told his superiors no less than three times 
that he wanted to leave the programme because he did not succeed in 
handling this problem.73 Every time, however, they convinced him to stay. 
Goddijn was ordained in the spring of 1947. He subsequently followed a so-
called ‘fifth year’ with courses in pastoral-theology and sociology. “A whole 
new atmosphere; almost standing on my own legs; great preparation of my 
upcoming years in academia”, he wrote on 5 October 1947.74  
 
Goddijn’s Agency 
In a somewhat mechanical fashion, one can identify all of the three 
previously mentioned aspects—sociological expertise, practical thinking, 
and the priestly state—when taking into account Goddijn’s agency. As will 
be elucidated later in this chapter, the PINK director granted a 
considerable amount of research assignments to KASKI in his role of 
sociologist.75 He believed that decision making had to start, not so much 
with approaching religious issues theologically, as it had often been done, 
but instead with gathering and analysing empirically-yielded data.76 
Statistics should first reveal how many priests, brothers, and sisters there 
were, and what activities they were carrying out, upon which a more 
thorough inquiry had to show what growth or decline was to be expected in 
the foreseeable future. “Only then”, Goddijn said in an interview in 1964, 
“can we determine: what do we concentrate on, what do we abolish, and 
how can we handle the matter as efficiently as possible”. Concerning the 
activities of Goddijn behind the scenes of the Pastoral Council, marxist 
student in theology Leo Dullaert rightfully claimed in 1970 that the 
secretary-general, according to the structural-functionalist principle of 
stability, attempted to keep its fairly liberal course steady.77 Goddijn 
incorporated escalation into this course as much as possible and minimised 
the overall tension. As early as in 1967, moreover, when the first 
preparations of the Pastoral Council took place, Goddijn secured a 
permanent social scientific contribution to this council by calling into 
                                                          
73 Interview by Dols with Keverkamp, 15-01-2013. Allegedly, Goddijn in the mid 1960s said to 
her that if the option of marrying would ever become reality in the Church, then he would 
grasp it with both hands. See also: ‘Walter Goddijn: Ik werd de man achter Alfrink genoemd’, 
in: Trouw, 18-02-1991. In this interview article, Goddijn did mention the fact that he had 
repeatedly wanted to quit the Franciscan training, yet he did not touch on his personal trouble 
with living up to the vow of chastity. In 2010, his brother Hans explicitly did not link the desire 
to quit to such trouble: interview by Dols with Goddijn, 25-01-2010. 
74 Purple diary ‘Verboden lectuur voor iedereen’ by Goddijn, 05-10-1947: KDC, GODD, 62. 
75 See paragraph 2.4.  
76 ‘Walter Goddijn wil meer lijn brengen in Nederlandse zielzorg’, in: Brabants Dagblad,  
 08-02-1964.  
77 DULLAERT, ‘Hoelang nog, meneer Goddijn?’. 
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existence a special advisory committee consisting exclusively of social 
scientists.78  
As a practically thinking Catholic, the PINK director carried out an 
expansion of the Rotterdam Pastoral Plan. That is, he shaped a national 
pastoral programme in which the power of the parish was reduced and all 
sorts of (lay) experts contributed to episcopal decision making. KASKI and 
NPI already elaborated on plans to modernise pastoral care, Goddijn stated 
in the previously mentioned 1964 interview.79 But the ‘pieces’ still did not 
‘fit’, since nobody had an overview of the entire pastoral scene. As Goddijn 
reasoned four years later, he wanted to put an end to this situation by acting 
as Alfrink’s vicar-general when it came to national affairs, and, as such, 
‘operationalising’ Church reform coherently.80 Goddijn typified his own 
institute as a ‘customhouse’ coordinating everything related to Church 
reform. In everyday situations, he tried to prevent other—in his opinion 
competing—institutions from carrying out activities which he thought 
belonged to PINK’s competencies.81 The European Symposium of Bishops 
was one of the platforms Goddijn created as PINK director.82 Between 10 
and 13 July 1967, seventy bishops gathered at the De Leeuwenhorst 
Prepatory Seminary in Noordwijkerhout. In the aftermath of Vatican II, it 
had not occurred that so many Church authorities discussed matters such as 
authority with each other. Yet, as conciliar secretary-general, Goddijn 
particularly perceived and treated the Pastoral Council as a ‘method of 
change’: a suitable avenue to arriving at the formation of public opinion 
and the integration of this opinion into policy.83  
And as a Franciscan priest, Goddijn defended priestly interests. In 
interviews, he held that priests made up one of the most neglected groups in 
the Church.84 During the plenary sessions of Vatican II, they were forced to 
adopt a ‘pseudo-stance on the margins’. Goddijn therefore ensured that 
priests became members of the various PINK committees and could have 
their say at the Pastoral Council.85 Moreover, he reasoned that the idea of 
priests or religious maintaining an unmarried life was antiquated and no 
                                                          
78 Minutes of the committee meetings on 09-01-1967, 22-03-1967, and 13-06-1967: KDC, 
PCNK, 559. Van Kemenade, Kusters, Laeyendecker, De Moor, Poeisz, Ponsioen, Scheuder, 
and Gerrit Toussaint joined the committee in question.  
79 ‘Walter Goddijn wil meer lijn brengen in Nederlandse zielzorg’, in: Brabants Dagblad,  
 08-02-1964. 
80 ‘Ik dacht dat de doorsnee-gelovige de vernieuwingen aan kan’, in: De Gelderlander,  
 02-11-1968. 
81 De HAAN, Van volgzame elitestrijder tot kritische gelovige, 270–271 and JACOBS, Werken  
 in een dwarsverband, pp. 119–120. See also: [ZEEGERS], God in Nederland, p. 20. 
82 SNABEL, ‘Documentair verslag van 5 jaar PINK’, p. 105. 
83 Paper ‘Das holländische Nationalkonzil’ by Goddijn, January and February 1968: KDC, 
GODD, 127. 
84 ‘Nieuw Pastoraal Instituut voor Nederland’, in: De Tijd, 31-10-1963 and ‘dr. Walter Goddijn: 
het zout ligt naast de pap’, in: Kruispunt 5 (1969), issue 11, especially p. 6. 
85 JACOBS, ‘Experiment in kerkelijk leiderschap’, especially pp. 31–32. 
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longer corresponded with values prevailing in contemporary society.86 
Goddijn even went so far as to publicly oppose the encyclical Sacerdotalis 
Caelibatus (The Celibacy of the Priest; 1967), in which Pope Paul VI held 
on to the sacral character of the priestly office and typified celibacy as a 
‘jewel’ in the crown of the Latin Church.87 In De Tijd newspaper, Goddijn 
contended that many priests would not appreciate the ‘one-dimensional’ 
content of the encyclical, the timing of publication, and the ‘top-down 
procedure’ that followed.88 Numerous facts and statements against the 
obliged character of celibacy had made their way to the Holy See, he 
underscored, and research projects were being carried out in many 
countries. In the midst of dialogue and discussion, Goddijn typified the 
Pope’s decision as ‘ostrich policy’: “Why consultation on liturgy, catechism, 
and ecumenism, and not on celibacy?”. And when at last, Goddijn asked 
himself, would a ‘courageous post-conciliar policy’ be designed concerning 
the ‘most vulnerable group’ of Catholics who were linked to the Church 
with their entire being?  
 
 
2.2. THE DISCOURSE OF ENGINEERING CHURCH RENEWAL 
 
Framing Church Renewal 
One of the distinguishing features of the Church reform of the long 1960s 
was that it rested to a large extent on the theological foundation of the 
Nouvelle Théologie.89 This theological paradigm originated in France in the 
immediate aftermath of the Second World War. Its followers challenged the 
present state of the Church, looked to early Christianity for norms to be 
used in shaping the future, and adopted a critical stance towards the 
Catholic theology of Neo-Scholasticism. Neo-Thomism, as Neo-
Scholasticism was also known, became common currency in Europe in the 
second half of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries. It 
had a strong introverted and defensive character towards non-Catholic 
faiths, and rejected almost every ‘external’ influence, most notably from 
industrialising societies. 
Just like many other (Franciscan) priests born in the 1920s, Goddijn 
found himself attracted to New Theology.90 Already in 1954, in a lecture for 
students from the Leiden University, he referred to KASKI’s co-founder 
and Franciscan theologian Van Leeuwen as well as to theologians Marie-
                                                          
86 Petition signed by Goddijn on 18-10-1966: KDC, PINK, 213 and ‘Voorwaarde scheppen voor 
het charisma’, in: De Kloosterling 37 (1969), I, p. 14. 
87 Quotes taken from the official text, as it can be found on the Vatican’s website: 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals. Visited on 07-11-2012. 
88 Enkele stemmen uit de wereldkerk reageren op de encycliek over het celibaat van de priester, 
pp. 3–4. In July 1968, Goddijn also publicly objected against the encyclical Humanae Vitae: 
‘Discussie blijft volkomen open’, in: Twentsche Courant, 29-07-1968. 
89 O’MALLEY, What happened at Vatican II, p. 36. 
90 De KOK, Acht eeuwen Minderbroeders in Nederland, pp. 364–441 and MONTEIRO,  
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Dominique Chenu OP and Yves Congar OP when pointing at the necessity 
of Church reform and disapproving of Franz Diekamp’s 1933 definition of 
theology.91 This German theologian described theology as the ‘examination 
of God and the divinely matters emerging from the revealed truths’.92 
Goddijn asserted that this was a rather narrow description which cut off 
theology from ‘reality’, as visible in the daily praxis of the faithful, presented 
the Church as a Godly and static institution, and despised the fact that the 
message of the Gospel needed to be adapted to the ever-changing society. 
What he advocated instead was a broader, ‘newer’ definition of theology. 
This definition departed from the insight that God revealed himself through 
his people. It also linked the divine character of the Church to the 
sociologically informed interpretation of this institute as a man-made 
bureaucratic structure with malleable elements. In the years to come, 
Goddijn used this broader definition of theology as a starting point when 
framing the debate on Church renewal.93  
How did Goddijn try to steer this debate into the direction of 
sociology? This is the question to be answered in the following. Similar to 
the discourse analysis employed in the previous chapter, I shall first 
paraphrase the central message of the frames and metaphors. Then, in the 
next paragraph, I shall explore their meaning within the larger context of 
the discourse, and study their possible impact on episcopal self-
understanding. Two primary sources authored by Goddijn have been 
selected for closer examination because they can be seen as rather 
representative for his way of reasoning throughout the 1960s about the 
interactions between Church and society.94 They were channels through 
which Goddijn communicated a pastoral programme, underscoring 
leverage points that he thought were interesting for Church authorities and 
the kind of knowledge that he presented as inevitable.  
The first primary source is a paper dated 8 September 1960. In this 
paper, Goddijn expanded on a line of argument he unfolded in a 
contribution to De Tijd newspaper in March 1952.95 He focused on the 
mutual relationships between theology and sociology. Significant parts of 
this 1960 text seem to have been inserted into a memorandum he wrote 
several years later together with his brother Hans. This memorandum was 
offered to the PINK board in 1964, on which Bishop De Vet served as 
chairman, and published in article form in De Maand (The Month) 
                                                          
91 Paper ‘Theologie en sociologie’ by Goddijn, 14-03-1954: KDC, GODD, 126. 
92 DIEKAMP, Theologiae dogmaticae manuale, I, p. 2. 
93 See, for instance, Goddijn’s reference to Dominican theologian Schillebeeckx in the 1960 
paper which will be analysed below: paper ‘Enkele aantekeningen voor een gesprek over de 
verhouding tussen theologie en sociologie’ by Goddijn (p. 13), 08-09-1960: KDC, GODD, 127. 
94 Compare the two papers in question with the other papers resting in Goddijn’s personal 
archive: KDC, GODD, 127. 
95 Paper ‘Enkele aantekeningen voor een gesprek over de verhouding tussen theologie en 
sociologie’ by Goddijn, 08-09-1960: KDC, GODD, 127 and ‘Kerk, theologie en sociologie’,  
 in: De Tijd, 11-03-1952. 
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magazine in that same year.96 The second primary source is a paper dated 
24 June 1963, in which Goddijn elaborated on what he deemed as the 
central problem of the Church: its institutional adaptation to a rapidly 
changing society. He also launched a concise programme of reform.97 Its 
introduction suggests an audience of practitioners of pastoral care in a large 
city such as Rotterdam. Various passages are likely to have been used, too, 
in a KASKI report released in 1963.98 Besides, it appears that Goddijn 
worked several passages into the introduction of the 1966 volume De kerk 
van morgen (Tomorrow’s Church), which he co-edited together with his 
brother.99 
Bringing into circulation a diagnostic frame, Goddijn claimed that one 
of the largest shortcomings of Church renewal was that theologians were 
involved in it too closely.100 Even though renewal was all about embracing 
the contemporary world, both ‘old’ and ‘new’ theologians hardly 
contemplated beyond deductive schemes of thought. Effectively, they 
discussed the interpretation of the Gospel at length, as well as the 
translation of the divine truth into dogmas. But they did not cast light on the 
question of to what extent the faithful supported and actually lived up to 
these dogmas. Nor did they provide clues to bringing Vatican II notions 
into practice. The danger of a near-exclusive theological angle to 
ecclesiastical decision making was that the ‘worldly realities’ (‘aardse 
realiteiten’) and ‘historical movability’ (‘historische beweeglijkheid’) of the 
Church would be disregarded. As a result, elements, structures, norms, and 
values which were actually relative and could form a serious hindrance for 
renewal would be absolutised. Goddijn therefore underlined the necessity of 
an intense collaboration between theologians and sociologists. 
Conveying a prognostic frame, Goddijn stated that sociological 
knowledge was inevitable to find a dynamic balance between a destruction 
of ‘the old’ and a construction of ‘the new’.101 Sociologists thought 
inductively, and possessed the techniques needed to effectuate Vatican II. 
This meant that they uncovered ‘reality’, arriving at in-depth analyses of the 
distance between what was learned, preached, spoken, and intended on the 
one hand, and what was accepted, heard, practiced, and desired on the 
other. In addition, they drafted policy blueprints on the basis of insights into 
long-term socio-religious trends. The critical analyses of sociologists 
                                                          
96 Paper ‘Voor een dialoog tussen theoloog en socioloog’ by Goddijn, 06-04-1964: KDC, GODD, 
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98 [GODDIJN], Pastoraal Plan. 
99 GODDIJN and GODDIJN, ‘De tweede emancipatie’.  
100 Paper ‘Enkele aantekeningen voor een gesprek over de verhouding tussen theologie en 
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101 Paper ‘Enkele aantekeningen voor een gesprek over de verhouding tussen theologie en 
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protected Church authorities against overconfidence and societal blindness. 
Goddijn singled out three stages of Church renewal. In the ‘pre-creative 
stage’, Church authorities had to confront themselves with research reports. 
It was important for them not to let themselves be demoralised by empirical 
data, and learn to think towards the future. Then, in the ‘creative stage’, 
they should engineer this future using new authority and communication 
structures. The absolute value of the past must be put into perspective. The 
last stage was that of the ‘pastoral experiment’. Goddijn argued that only 
through experiments, could the repercussions of renewing policy lines be 
assessed. 
Transmitting a motivational frame, Goddijn held that the situation in 
the Church had become so problematic that it was justified to speak of a 
‘crisis’ instead of a series of ‘problems’.102 Many Catholics turned their back 
on this institute. An increasing number of priests left the office. And the 
number of priestly vocations dropped. In sum, the casual presence of the 
Church in society was disappearing quickly. The ultimate cause of this 
emergency situation was a socio-religious lag: a yawning gap between ‘the 
Church’ and ‘the world’. Whereas a new era had emerged in the years after 
1945, Church authorities still lived in a bygone era. Clinging to a centuries-
old world view gave them a feeling of safety. Examples of what Goddijn 
perceived as semi-feudal phenomena were the kissing of rings, titles, the 
genuflection, extravagant ritual clothing, the privileges of Curia members, 
and the principle of seniority when it came to appointments. The more 
these phenomena added up to the image of a Church not corresponding 
with real life, the worse it seemed. 
Together, these diagnostic, prognostic, and motivational frames 
formed a discourse which could be typified as a discourse of ‘engineering 
Church renewal’. This discourse, too, consisted of the medical metaphors of 
diagnosis and disease.103 ‘Disease’ stood for the degree of non-adaptation of 
the Church, ‘diagnosis’ for sociological analysis, ‘therapy’ for Church 
renewal, and ‘recovery’ for authentic and up-to-date ecclesiastical 
structures. In his 1960 paper, moreover, Goddijn elaborated on a metaphor 
conveyed by the title of KASKI’s magazine Social Compass: that of 
sociological data and analyses as a ‘guidebook’. He argued that it was 
irresponsible to send a convoy of aid teams into the desert without well-
informed knowledge on the route to be followed, upon which he noted: 
“The sociologist does not tell what means of mercy the Church should offer 
                                                          
102 Paper ‘Enkele aantekeningen voor een gesprek over de verhouding tussen theologie en 
sociologie’ by Goddijn, 08-09-1960 (pp. 16–20) and paper ‘De kansen in de kerk van nu en 
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to the people, but does function as a guide in complicated situations in 
which expertise has become a necessity”.104  
 
‘Route Indicators’ and ‘Warning Signs’ 
Perhaps not surprisingly, one can identify traces of Goddijn’s work 
experience at KASKI in his discourse of engineering Church renewal. 
Before presenting sociology as an essential precondition of reform, he 
transferred and further developed the diagnostic frame which KASKI 
protagonists integrated into the Christianisation debate. Using 
backwardness as a rationale in his plea for an application of sociology no 
longer made sense, since bishops and vicars-general had been 
commissioning studies at KASKI since 1951. Goddijn therefore highlighted 
urgency. The combination of the word ‘crisis’ and the medical metaphors 
are relevant in this respect. This combination had a highly dramatising 
effect. As historian Reinhart Koselleck and philosopher Machiel Karskens 
have argued, the word ‘crisis’ often had medical connotations in the past.105 
It referred to a decisive phase which could lead to either a fatal outcome or 
a complete recovery. By implication, then, sociologists were again presented 
as social doctors whose interventions could lead to a recovery of ‘the 
patient’. Without these experts and their discipline, it was implied, the 
bishops’ modernisation efforts were doomed to fail. 
Because the two papers authored by Goddijn cannot be directly linked 
to the Episcopacy as a whole, positing straightforward lines of causality 
between his discourse of engineering Church renewal and episcopal self-
understanding is an inaccurate interpretation. One could reasonably state, 
however, that it is highly probable that these Church authorities were 
familiar with this discourse, and that they joined Goddijn in a coalition 
around the motivational and prognostic frames in particular. When one 
takes a closer look at a Lent letter drafted by Bishop Piet Moors from the 
Diocese of Roermond and psychologist Fortmann, which was titled 
Vernieuwing en Verwarring (Renewal and Confusion) and published in 
May 1968, the similarities to Goddijn’s lines of argument are striking.106 
The bishops admitted that they had no other choice than the one between 
‘renewal’ and ‘fossilisation’, as the Church reacted much too slowly on 
essential social developments such as the rise of independent science, the 
desires of the Eastern Churches, the Reformation, democratisation, and the 
spread of prosperity. Its reaction to these developments was full of mistrust. 
Too often, the bishops claimed, the Church embraced a fear of the world 
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instead of relying on a trust in the power of God. Even though the process 
of rebuilding the Church would go hand in hand with feelings of 
uncertainty and confusion, this was the way that it had to happen. “A child 
undertakes a voyage of discovery and expands the terrain it explores”, the 
bishops wrote. It learned to know the pleasant as well as the unpleasant 
aspects of certain matters, for instance “if something that is red-hot turns 
out to be hot, if something that shines temptingly cuts painfully”. In this 
way, maturity was reached. And in this way, Church renewal should take 
place. The bishops emphasised that this renewal would never be completed: 
“When current problems have been solved, other ones will ask for our 
attention”. 
These arguments were repeated several months later in a pastoral 
letter titled Kerk worden in dienst van een veranderende wereld (Becoming 
A Church in Service of a Changing World).107 For a long time, the bishops, 
stated, “we perceived ourselves as the bearers and the guardians of the 
European order and closed our eyes for future developments”. A ‘crisis’ 
followed. According to the bishops, Church renewal needed to be 
encouraged in order to counter this crisis—“now or never”. This time, the 
bishops fell back upon two different metaphors which had to elucidate the 
uncertainty and confusion that were part of such a process of renewal: that 
of a young couple and a cloverleaf junction. When two young, just-married 
people moved into a flat in a large town, they had no longer a circle of 
acquaintances. Many things that were fixed until then, now began to move. 
In the opinion of the Episcopacy, this example of the young man and his 
wife who had to rebuild their lives in a modern city stood for the central 
problem of the entire day and age. Everyone was part of the ‘birth of a new 
world’. Nobody, however, had a grip on this world in the making, since a 
comprehensive view of the near future was absent. These feelings of 
uncertainty and confusion could also be compared to driving on the large 
cloverleaf near to the German city of Frankfurt: “We all find ourselves 
underway on the same cloverleaf and it is not possible anymore to oversee 
the entire situation. We have to improve the manner in which we look at 
the signs and warnings that come our way from out of a distance. Without 
overseeing the entire situation, we also have to learn to react more strongly 
and decidedly on every sign and warning—having faith in a certain route, 
or, even better, experiencing that there will be such a thing as a certain 
route”. ‘Hard numbers’ were something to get hold of, the bishops stressed. 
These numbers functioned as both a ‘route indicator’ and ‘warning sign’. 
In that same year, 1968, Cardinal Alfrink wrote that sociological 
inquiry mattered despite its limitations, of which the lack of a reflection 
upon the question of how Catholicism should be experienced stood out.108 
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“Some structures and institutions evidently respond to the modern human 
being, but socio-religious data reveal that others clearly do not”, he claimed. 
Alfrink held that sociologists shed light on questions that bishops and 
theologians had to take into account if they truly wanted the Church to 
continue to play an important role in society. And in June 1971, he 
contended that effective ecclesiastical decision making was impossible 
without “knowledge of the factual situation, as presented by statistics”. 
These statistics served as a ‘reliable guide’.109 
Given the similarities between the discourse of engineering Church 
renewal and episcopal self-understanding, and Goddijn’s privileged 
position, it is hard to believe that the Dutch bishops did not explain the 
current state of their Church Province in terms of a ‘crisis’ under the 
influence of this discourse in the late 1960s. More importantly, they 
developed a different basic interpretation of the Church in light of facts and 
figures. Whereas the bishops in the immediate past often conceptualised this 
Church as a divinely constituted ‘mystical body’ in a secular society, they 
came to believe much more in an understanding of the Church as an 
changeable institute of which its viability also depended on an almost 
permanent interaction with this secular society. In that very discursive 
context, they collectively labelled sociology as indispensable for Church 
governance.  
 
 
2.3. OPINION POLLING 
In sharp contrast with Zeegers, who reasoned that polls represented ‘reality’ 
in a false way because they directed the outcomes too much, and argued 
that many socio-religious questions were too delicate to be investigated 
through polls, Goddijn was keen to apply this technique in addition to 
statistics and cartography.110 The PINK director followed an international 
and national trend. 
The application of the poll throughout the Western World intensified 
after American market researcher George Gallup refined sampling methods 
in the 1930s and the American government trumpeted polling as a 
democratic research technique after 1945.111 The first large-scale project 
conducted in the Netherlands in the aftermath of the Second World War 
reflects this linkage between science and politics. It was tellingly titled Vrije 
meeningen in een vrij land (Freely Expressed Opinions in a Free 
Country).112 How did people think about a certain matter? According to 
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researchers of NSS (Nederlandse Stichting voor Statistiek), the best way to 
answering this question was simply to ask them. Whereas polling was more 
and more accepted as a legitimate research technique during the 1950s, the 
1960s became a true polling era. Hundreds of Dutch pollsters discerned 
between various ‘publics’, and canvassed the intensity of all sorts of 
convictions. “From a tabula rasa”, psychologist Jaap van Ginneken wrote in 
1993, “the psyche of the masses suddenly turned into a dense text: 
presented in reports filled with jargon, and tables full of scores, which 
indicated the ‘climate of opinion’ in detail”.113 
Since Goddijn had the power necessary to launch actual projects, 
several polling inquiries were carried out in service of episcopal policy on his 
initiative. Between July 1966 and September 1967, every Catholic could 
send in his or her desires regarding the Pastoral Council to one of the eight 
mailboxes stationed across the country (figure 38). Goddijn welcomed 
remarks on every possible subject: from authority and ecumenism to 
sexuality and prayer.114 At his request, sociologists examined 2,000 
submitted letters and released a research report.115 Goddijn orchestrated the 
polling studies on religious vocation and priestly celibacy as well. In 1966 
and 1968, thousands of Catholics and clergymen expressed their views on 
the attractiveness of the priestly office, the priestly obligation not to marry, 
and Sacerdotalis Caelibatus.116 
Both the minutes of a meeting of the PINK board on 7 February 1966 
and a 1968 letter addressed by Goddijn to all the priests, deacons, and 
subdeacons in the Netherlands demonstrate that his fondness for polling 
should be particularly explained on the basis of his enthusiasm for the 
unitary pastorate concept. Goddijn promoted opinion polling with an 
emancipation of priests and laypeople in mind.117 By consulting these 
Catholics—whether through the Council Mailboxes or a questionnaire—
Goddijn was intent on getting them ‘involved’ in episcopal decision making. 
Their voices, too, had to be taken seriously, and not only that of the Roman 
elite who proclaimed dogmas and regulations. Their participation was not 
solely a stage in the reform that Goddijn coordinated so enthusiastically, but 
also a goal in itself. Goddijn thus envisaged opinion polling as a constitutive 
practice through which ecclesiastical participation could be practically 
realised. This is certainly not to say, however, that he always endorsed the 
opinions articulated by the faithful. In 1964, he wrote that it would not be 
right if ‘doctors’ exclusively based their diagnosis and therapy on the 
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complaints of their ‘patients’.118 If Catholics could not handle Church 
reform, they had to ‘guided’ by the clergy.119 
The bishops approved Goddijn’s polling proposals and paid for most 
of the costs involved.120 What was it that could have made polling attractive 
at least and indispensable at most from the decision making perspective? 
The bishops believed that this technique enabled them to yield a “true 
image of the factual life and experience in the Church”.121 After the 
Dogmatic Constitution on the Church Lumen Gentium (Light of the Peope; 
1964) of Vatican II theologically conceptualised the Church as the ‘People 
of God’, which emphasised collegial responsibility for creating the Kingdom 
of God on earth and rejected the image of the laity as passive recipients of 
‘the truth’, Alfrink and his fellow bishops were increasingly willing to 
incorporate such images into their policy.122 In 1968, Alfrink argued that 
ecclesiastical decision makers could not disregard what numerous Catholics 
believed in without facing ‘dramatic consequences’.123 Two years later, 
Bishop Huub Ernst from the Diocese of Breda, who succeeded De Vet in 
1967, took this argument one step further by noting that the opinions of a 
70 percent majority of ‘progressively moderate Catholics’ formed an 
excellent benchmark for setting out policy lines.124 
This episcopal appreciation for the opinion of ordinary Catholics was 
something unheard of until 1958, when the bishops did not have a frequent 
access to the opinions and desires of the faithful because most of them were 
not quite interested in visions of the laity. Viewing themselves as divinely 
chosen representatives of God on earth, they cultivated a top-down, I-say-
unto-you style of governing. Characteristic of this style is not only the 
Mandatory Letter of 1954, especially Part III on unchristian currents, but 
also the so-called ‘Huissen Controversy’. This controversy revolved around 
the chapel of the Dominican Order in the little town of Huissen, territory 
belonging to the Archdiocese of Utrecht.125 Despite the objections of the 
Dominicans, who saw themselves as excluded from practicing pastoral care, 
Alfrink closed this chapel for the local Catholic community on 2 January 
1952. Three days later, members of this local community publicly protested 
against the decision of the Archbishop-coadjutor by lifting the chapel doors 
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off its hinges. They also informed the Holy See. Whereas Father Superior 
Laurentius Teewen OP was prepared to acknowledge their right to fight for 
their Church and call upon highly placed officials in Rome, Alfrink stuck to 
his opinion and was defended by the Holy See in this respect. According to 
the Consistorial Congregation, the Dominicans could legitimately allow 
visitors into their chapel during prayer, yet the Archbishop of Utrecht was 
ultimately responsible for the planning of pastoral care is his diocese.  
 
 
2.4. THE EVOLUTION OF AN EPISCOPAL DEMAND FOR 
SOCIOLOGY 
As we have seen throughout this chapter, bishops and their vicars-generals 
had to arrive at decision making in a situation which differed from that of 
the immediate post-war years. The Second Vatican Council re-evaluated 
Catholic tradition and opened up new perspectives of the future, which had 
repercussions for policy formation. Even though sociologists hardly acted as 
advisors in the assembly hall in Rome, the Council Fathers did not close 
their eyes to the general rise of sociology. In fact, they explicitly encouraged 
an application of sociology on every level of the Church. In Christus 
Dominus, they wrote that, in order to be able to look more closely at the 
welfare of the faithful, and adapt the various forms of the apostolate, every 
bishop should become acquainted with their needs in the social, 
demographical, and economical circumstances in which they lived.126 The 
decree taught that “religious and social research, through offices of pastoral 
sociology, contributes much to the efficacious and fruitful attainment of that 
goal, and it is highly recommended”. It is unknown whether the Dutch 
bishops influenced this conciliar outcome, and if they interpreted the 
recommendation as a sign of approval for their active promotion of 
sociology in their Church Province from 1949 onwards. 
As far as the socio-religious developments in this Church Province are 
concerned, KASKI figures, which again need to be ‘read’ with great 
caution, confirm Goddijn’s claim of an acceleration of an internally 
contradictory trend over the course of the 1960s. Whereas the number of 
Catholics grew—from 5.02 million in 1965 (40.5 percent of the Dutch 
population) to 5.49 million in 1975 (39.8 percent of the Dutch 
population)—their religious participation in terms of engagement in the 
rites of life dropped.127 104,672 baptisms took place in 1965 (42.7 percent of 
the births) and 60,252 in 1975 (33.9 percent of the births). The number of 
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First Holy Communions decreased from 98,019 in 1960 to 86,860 in 1977. 
Furthermore, national data on churchgoing systematically gathered from 
1965 onwards suggest that the average figure of Catholics attending Mass 
during the weekend fell from 2.7 million in 1965 to 2.1 million in 1970, and 
to 1.5 million in 1975. The Diocese of Haarlem saw the largest decline, and 
that of Roermond the smallest. The priestly population, too, became subject 
to significant shifts. The number of ordinations dropped from 411 seculars 
and 981 regulars between 1961 and 1965, to 213 seculars and 507 regulars 
in the period 1966–1970, and to 49 seculars and 120 regulars between 1971 
and 1975. 108 priests, both seculars and regulars, left the office in the period 
1961–1965. This figure increased to 918 between 1966 and 1970, and to 
769 in the period 1971–1975. 
How, then, did the episcopal demand for sociology develop against the 
double backdrop of Vatican II and national socio-religious trends? On the 
basis of the 1977 bibliographical overview of KASKI publications and a 
1975 bibliographical overview of ITS publications, the project database has 
been completed.128 Again, a frequency analysis has been carried out using 
Microsoft Excel. This frequency analysis suggests that the episcopal demand 
for sociology, as it had taken shape between 1950 and 1957, did not 
evaporate after Alfrink intervened in KASKI’s management. As graph 5 
exemplifies, bishops and vicars-general commissioned 102 publications at 
KASKI and ITS between 1958 and 1972. The basic features of these 
publications, of which the titles can be found in Appendix 4, are the 
following. 41 inquiries were ordered directly, of which at least 27 by bishops 
and at least nine by vicars-general, and 61 indirectly. Here, the substantial 
impact of the role of PINK and thus of Goddijn becomes visible. This 
institute commissioned 23 publications. Graph 6 indicates that KASKI 
carried out an overwhelming majority of the slightly over 100 projects (96 
percent or 98 studies). This was partly the result of a gentlemen’s agreement 
between sociologist Wim Kusters, a specialist in migration who succeeded 
Damoiseaux as the director of KASKI in 1962, and Van Kemenade.129 In 
total, 34 KASKI publications contained cartograms. The visual style that 
Zeegers had copied from the RNP maps stayed intact. 
Bishops and vicars-general, on average, commissioned 5.75 KASKI 
studies on yearly basis between 1950 and 1957. Between the resignation of 
Zeegers and the official appointment of Goddijn in 1963, this number 
almost doubled (10 publications). This growth and the peak in 1959, as 
visible in graph 7, can be explained by the erection of the dioceses of 
Rotterdam and Groningen in 1956. Out of the 22 inquiries published in 
1959, eight were commissioned in the former diocese and three in the latter. 
In Rotterdam, KASKI was involved immediately and intensively in spatial 
planning: church attendance in the town of Delft on Sundays was 
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scrutinised, a structural plan designed for the Leiden agglomeration, the size 
of a church in the town of Vlaardingen calculated, and the relocation of 
parish borders prepared.130 Bishop Nierman from the Diocese of 
Groningen, in turn, ordered reports on Catholic associations, sister 
communities, education, and parish structures.131 Nierman also asked for a 
pastoral-sociological sketch of his entire diocese.132 When he was still a 
dean, he had already granted research assignments to KASKI employees 
based in Leeuwarden and subscribed to Social Compass.133 In other words, 
Nierman’s reliance upon KASKI as a bishop did not emerge out of nothing. 
One might perhaps expect the average number of sociological studies 
to have grown even further after Goddijn had become the director of 
PINK. But that has obviously not been the case. 42 studies were released 
between 1964 and 1972, with an average of 4.7 studies per year. KASKI 
employees stayed structurally involved in discussions on the geographical 
spread of Catholics, ecclesiastical buildings, and pastoral activities in the 
Dioceses of Haarlem and Rotterdam. That of Breda followed in 1963, 
Utrecht in 1964, and Den Bosch in 1967.134 Even though KASKI still did 
not experience much success in the Diocese of Roermond, Church 
authorities did make their way to this institute in a very limited number of 
cases. KASKI employees released two publications on spatial planning by 
their request. 135 The peak in 1968, as visible in graph 7, can be linked to 
the Pastoral Council. The studies granted in the conciliar context did not 
only include the three mentioned opinion polling projects but also inquiries 
on sexuality and diaspora communities.136 The number of publications does 
not tell the entire story, though, since it does not include the various 
sociologically oriented internal PINK papers which appeared over the 
years.137 Furthermore, as graph 8 indicates, the number of studies may have 
dropped, yet the scope of research became substantially larger. No less than 
41 inquiries addressed national phenomena. Graph 9 shows that the 
diversity of the research subjects changed, too. The category of the 
pastorate is still the largest one (65 percent), but the number of projects 
priests, brothers, and sisters increased significantly (eight percent). This 
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135 Enige beschouwingen over de kerkelijke planologie in het diocees Roermond and KUSTERS 
and ENGBERSEN, Kerkenbouw in het bisdom Roermond. 
136 Van der ZEE, Diaspora in beweging and HUTJES, Interviewen over sexualiteit. 
137 SNABEL, ‘Documentair verslag van 5 jaar PINK’, pp. 122–125. 
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increase testifies to a growing episcopal concern over the immediate future 
of the Church as well as of an episcopal desire to get to the bottom of 
decreasing figures of Catholics willing to pursue a religious or priestly life. In 
the second half of the 1960s, such indicators of an increasing domination of 
sociologists in the decision making realms of the bishops made some 
prominent theologians voice their concern about a relative lack of 
theological underpinnings of pastoral policy.138 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
Significant shifts structured along the lines of generation and 
institutionalisation characterised the field of Catholic sociology after 1957. 
Just as representatives of a second generation of Catholic sociologists 
occupied most of the key positions in their field of expertise in the 
immediate years after 1945, and succeeded in moving Catholic sociology 
away from its theological underpinnings, a third generation which respected 
the scientific status quo gained access to the field in the 1950s. Following on, 
in the 1960s, more and more members of this third generation rose to 
prominence. Many of the early protagonists, most notably Zeegers, left or 
were forced to leave their posts. Whereas De Moor and Schreuder came to 
hold important positions in academia, and Van Kemenade acted as the first 
director ITS, Goddijn became PINK director and secretary-general of the 
Pastoral Council. Goddijn’s ascent in the decision making circles of the 
bishops was not preordained. In a sense, the priest-sociologist found himself 
lucky that NPI left them as well as fathers superior with something to be 
desired, and that the 1960s saw a high tide of Church reform as a result of 
the Second Vatican Council. This is not to say, however, that Goddijn did 
not play the game successfully. Not only did he promote the establishment 
of a new institute, and turn vital social contacts to his own benefit. He also 
sociologically framed the discourse of Church renewal, clung to the 
principles of American structural-functionalism, and stimulated the 
application of opinion polling. In this way, Goddijn contributed to an 
alteration of internal field dynamics. The episcopal demand for sociology, as 
it had taken shape in the years up to 1958, showed continuity in the years 
under discussion. To begin with, this demand continued to exist. Moreover, 
KASKI still conducted by far the most inquiries, many studies still had a 
distinctive statistical character and were related to the pastorate, and 
KASKI employees strengthened their participation in the diocesan 
committees of location. Claims in favour of discontinuity are valid too, 
however. Sociological projects were often carried out within, and in service 
of, the Church political context of ‘renewal’. In addition, research 
assignments were also granted to ITS. PINK came to serve as the most 
important intermediary party between the researchers on the one hand and 
                                                          
138 SCHILLEBEECKX, ‘Pastoraal Concilie: óók theologisch beluisteren van de Nederlandse 
situatie’ and interview by Dols with Willems, 01-06-2010. 
 CHAPTER TWO: HEY DAYS  
 
[94] 
the bishops on the other. Equally significant shifts encompassed an increase 
of both the scope of the research agenda and the attention for priests, 
brothers, and sisters. How and to what extent Goddijn, De Moor, Van 
Kemenade, and Schreuder influenced these two latter shifts in day-to-day 
situations, will be analysed in the following part of this book.  
════════════════════════════ 
 
Part Two  
 
RESEARCH AND REFORM:  
TWO CASE STUDIES 
 
════════════════════════════ 
 
 
 
 
 
IS IT BOTH desirable and legitimate to redefine the priestly office on the 
basis of worldly expectations and values? In the Dutch Church Province, 
this question was increasingly answered in affirmative terms over the course 
of the 1960s. In the Diocese of Breda, for instance, approximately 160 
priests convened in the summer of 1965. 1  They arrived at eleven 
conclusions, some of which were more far-reaching than others. Whereas 
the priests argued in favour of more teamwork, a specialisation of labour, 
one day off each week, and a reduction of administrative tasks, they also 
pleaded for an abolition of ‘obstacles’ on the road of a proper contact with 
the faithful, such as celibacy and special clothing. In addition, they 
promoted the idea of the priest as someone who worked part-time in the 
ministry and had ‘another job’ as well. 
These conclusions reflect the ascent of a sociologically informed 
interpretative framework in which, under the influence of American 
organisational sociology, the priestly office was envisaged as a profession at 
worst and a life style that represented a specific class in a society in which 
almost all other classes had diminished at best. Tellingly, the priests referred 
to the work of priest-sociologist Schreuder. Their conclusions 
simultaneously testify to an erosion of the theological interpretation of the 
priest as an omnipresent and sacred mediator between Heaven and Earth. 
This interpretation for the greater part took root in the Council of Trent 
(1545–1963), which condemned the principles of Protestantism and 
portrayed the Catholic priest in a threefold way: first as an ‘another Christ’ 
(‘alter Christus’) who stood in for Christ, then as a ‘man of God’ (‘homo 
Dei’) who invariably departed from the Gospel, and finally as a ‘good 
                                                          
1  NOOREN, Over de beleving van het priesterambt, especially pp. 8–10.  
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shepherd’ (‘pastor bonus’) who watched his flock. 2  From the sixteenth 
century onwards, priests throughout Europe increasingly understood and 
presented themselves as such. Fortifying the souls of the faithful with the 
sacraments became their key duty. They rejected a worldly influence on 
their day-to-day life as much as possible. The priestly collar, the unmarried 
status, and a series of gestures accentuated their privileged position in 
society and set them apart from laypeople.  
By 1965, the future of the priestly office was not only discussed at the 
lower levels of Church authority in various countries, but also at the Second 
Vatican Council in Rome. The Decree on Ministry and the Life of Priests 
Presbyterorum Ordinis (The Priestly Office; 1965) taught the outcomes of 
the conciliar deliberations. The document singled out three priestly duties.3 
Foremost, the Council Fathers stated that the office holder had to step into 
the wide world and preach the Gospel to everyone (Mark 16:15). In order to 
uphold the Gospel effectively in the contemporary day and age, they urged 
priests to connect its lasting truth to specific social circumstances, and 
refrain from proclaiming this truth in an abstract manner. But the priest was 
also an ‘educator in the faith’ who performed sacred functions, meaning 
that he had to instruct his faithful to participate in the celebration of the 
liturgy, make them confess their sins, incite them to engage in genuine 
prayer, and persuade them to sing hymns and spiritual songs. Finally, the 
Council Fathers noted that priests should gather the family of God together, 
not as a mere collection of individuals, but instead as a brotherhood 
enlivened by one spirit. Special attention had to be given to the poor and 
weak, as well as to the sick and dying.  
As historian Gevers has argued, this three-step sequence of duties is 
meaningful. 4  The Council Fathers primarily envisaged the priest as 
someone open towards the world and having a missionary duty, rather than 
someone entitled to celebrate the sacraments. Even though the decree on 
the priestly office did not disregard the theological legitimation of the 
hierarchical relationship between clergy and laity, moreover, it subdued this 
relationship by encouraging priests to interpret their office in terms of 
service instead of power. With regard to the daily life of the priest, the 
Council Fathers continued to propagate the idea that he was made in the 
likeness of Christ, and, therefore, bound to acquire perfection. 5  Here, 
Matthew 4:48 served as a source of inspiration: “So then, be perfect, as your 
Heavenly Father is perfect”. According to the Council Fathers, priestly 
celibacy must be embraced and valued as a gift. The unmarried status 
allowed priests to adhere to the Lord more easily with an undivided heart. 
                                                          
2  MONTEIRO, ‘Mannen Gods’, pp. 12–16.  
3  Constituties en decreten van het Tweede Vaticaans Oecumenisch Concilie, pp. 362–369. I 
have used the English translation, as it can be found on the Vatican’s website: 
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist_councils/ii_vatican_council/documents. Visited on  
 07-11-2012. 
4  GEVERS, ‘Priesterproblematiek in een stroomversnelling’, p. 175. 
5  Constituties en decreten van het Tweede Vaticaans Oecumenisch Concilie, pp. 375–389. 
 PART TWO: RESEARCH AND REFORM  
 
[97] 
Priestly celibacy was also heralded as a stimulus for pastoral charity and a 
special source of spiritual fecundity in society. By means of conclusion, the 
Council Fathers acknowledged that priests were experiencing difficulties in 
the contemporary world. As a result of dramatic socioeconomic change, it 
could indeed occur that they felt like “strangers anxiously looking for the 
ways and words with which to communicate with their surroundings”. Yet, 
the priest always had to remember that he was never alone, and that the 
world entrusted to him was the same which God loved. 
In the second part of Fact Factory, I shall demonstrate that the 
discussions on the future of the priestly office which took place in the Dutch 
Church Province in the second half of the 1960s rested on a complex 
interplay between these conciliar determinations and nationally circulating 
interpretative frameworks—particularly that of the priestly office as a 
profession. Two opinion polling projects were instrumental to the 
development and increasing prominence of this interpretative framework. 
One project, which will be analysed in the third chapter, dealt with religious 
calling. The other, which will be examined in the fourth chapter, focused on 
priestly celibacy. What united these projects is the fact that they were 
related to role theory. Adherents of this sociological theory, which gained 
territory in the sociology of religion in the 1960s, advocated the notion of 
the priest as someone who had a job and performed a variety of professional 
roles. “It should not come as a surprise”, Hans and Walter Goddijn wrote in 
1966, “that the pastoral profession is in a state of crisis at a time when 
numerous professions are changing and searching for a new status or 
professionalisation”.6 In the context of role theory, the difficulties of and 
with the clergy were usually explained as emerging from a short circuit 
between the centuries-old norm of an ‘another Christ’ on the one hand and 
transformed expectations of the laity on the other.7 Sociologists labelled 
these difficulties as a ‘role conflict’. Solving this conflict, then, was all about 
restoring the ‘breakdown in communication’ between ‘the Church’ and ‘the 
world’. 
In terms of methodology, Part Two of this study builds on the work of 
historian Igo. Focusing on the rise of opinion polling in American society, 
she uncovered the aims of sponsors of early research projects such as the 
Middletown studies conducted by Robert and Helen Lynd. 8  She 
demonstrated how pollsters such as Gallup and Elmo Roper claimed to 
provide what people were actually thinking, yet were constrained in their 
ambitions by the institutional and financial frameworks of the polling 
                                                          
6  GODDIJN and GODDIJN, Sociologie van kerk en godsdienst, p. 200. My emphasis. See  
 also: paper by W. Goddijn, ‘Die Rolle des Priesters in Kirche und Gesellschaft’, 01-09-1964:  
 KDC, GODD, 127. 
7  ZIEMANN, Katholische Kirche und Sozialwissenschaften, pp. 206–225 and ZIEMANN and 
DOLS, ‘Catholic Church Reform and Organizations Research in the Netherlands and 
Germany’, p. 302. 
8  IGO, The Averaged American, especially pp. 281–299 and IGO, ‘“A Gold Mine and a Tool 
for Democracy”’, especially pp. 130–131. 
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industry. She revealed how ‘facts’, as yielded by Alfred Kinsey through 
interviews, appeared in newspapers and television shows. And, perhaps 
most importantly, she showed that surveys increasingly changed the very 
public they had to represent. As a result of publicly circulating data—often 
presented as the ‘average opinion’ or the ‘majority’s verdict’—people 
started to understand themselves differently. Public opinion allowed them to 
recognise their own experiences within the percentages displayed in tables 
and graphs. This is not to say, however, that they always evaluated 
changing self-understandings in a positive fashion. They often wrote critical 
letters to the pollsters. Criticism was also articulated in academic circles, 
where scholars questioned the scientific underpinnings of surveys. When 
applied to the following two chapters, this means that I shall analyse four 
areas of concern in close relation to each other: encounters between 
research commissioners and researchers, day-to-day research practices, 
criticism related to polling as a technique and to research results, and the 
popularisation and impact of polling outcomes in society. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
════════════════════════════ 
 
Chapter Three  
 
THE DISEASE OF AN ENTIRE CHURCH? 
 
════════════════════════════ 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
IN EARLY 1964, not long after his official appointment as PINK director, 
Goddijn was interviewed by Alfred de Weijer OFMCap.. Just like Goddijn, 
De Weijer studied political and social sciences at the Catholic University of 
Leuven in the second half of the 1940s. Under the supervision of Devolder, 
he subsequently prepared and defended a doctoral thesis. This thesis, which 
appeared in KASKI’s series of monographs in 1955, centred around 
twentieth-century religious practices in the industrial town of Tilburg. 1 
Between 1956 and 1962, De Weijer strived for the establishment of 
discussion groups on a variety of subjects in the dioceses of Haarlem and 
Rotterdam. Following on, in his capacity of star reporter on religious and 
ecclesiastical matters for the Catholic newspapers united in the Dutch Press 
Union, he wrote on Vatican II and the Pastoral Council. Seen in this way, 
the meeting between Goddijn and De Weijer formed a reunion of two 
priest-sociologists who had been academically trained at the same university 
at the same time, and had not met each other since. They talked extensively 
about the development of a pastoral plan for the entire Church Province.2 
Goddijn expanded on the position of the priest. “In our country”, he stated, 
“the priestly office has not only started to lag behind economically, but also 
and especially socially”. Goddijn therefore argued in favour of an 
emancipation of the priest, who had to regain his position in society and 
gain self-confidence and respect. 
We have seen that Goddijn initiated a large-scale opinion polling 
project on religious calling for the purpose of episcopal decision making.3 In 
this third chapter, I shall demonstrate why and how he did so. The vocation 
                                                          
1  De WEIJER, De religieuze practijk in een Brabantse industriestad. 
2  ‘Walter Goddijn wil meer lijn brengen in Nederlandse zielzorg’, in: Brabants Dagblad,  
 08-02-1964. 
3  See paragraph 2.3. for more details. 
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poll did not emerge out of the blue. Rather, it was part and parcel of a 
broader research tradition. In 1960, theologian Humbert Leers OFM 
estimated that nearly 300 studies on religious calling and education 
appeared throughout Western Europe between 1945 and 1959.4 KASKI 
conducted a number of these studies. Questions related to the ‘utterly 
important problem’ of vocation, Koenraadt and Oldendorff wrote to the 
Episcopacy on 29 February 1952, were far more complex than they at first 
glance appeared. 5  They stressed that in-depth sociological inquiry was 
therefore needed. In August of that year, the bishops agreed that this was 
necessary and urged all parties involved—such as the fathers and mothers 
superior—to provide the information KASKI employees required as 
accurately as possible.6 The bishops also requested that these parties not 
carry out any research before consulting with the management of KASKI, 
since such research could form an impediment to ‘professional inquiry’. 
At KASKI, Dellepoort worked his way up to become an expert on 
priestly vocation and education. He entered the priestly training 
programme of the Bovendonk Seminary in 1929. Here, Koenraadt 
propagated sociology as an apostolic instrument. Dellepoort was so inspired 
by him that he decided to choose psychology as a minor course when he 
was ordered to study English Language and Literature at the Catholic 
University of Nijmegen, where sociology was not yet taught. 7 A modest 
polling inquiry on priestly vocation became his graduation project, which 
eventually led to the 1955 doctoral thesis De priesterroepingen in 
Nederland (Priestly Vocations in the Netherlands). Similar to many of the 
other studies conducted in the formative years of the field of Catholic 
sociology, this thesis had a strong descriptive character, with an emphasis on 
the historical contexts and socio-religious backgrounds of statistical data. 
According to Dellepoort, a priestly calling should be theologically defined, 
as a special mercy of selection for the priestly dignity offered by God to 
some.8 He explicitly distanced himself from a tendency he noticed to equate 
the priestly office with a profession, as this would imply a de-sacralisation of 
what essentially was a divine matter. Drawing on an abundance of tables, 
graphs, and cartograms, Dellepoort demonstrated that there was little room 
for optimism in the Dutch Church Province. On the one hand, the number 
of ordinations was already dropping from the late 1930s onwards and the 
efficiency of education was showing significant deficiencies. On the other 
hand, 5,200 secular priests would be needed in the pastorate by 1981—
approximately 1,600 more than in 1951. Dellepoort also directed attention 
to these matters on an international level. Apart from co-organising an 
international conference in 1958, he and West-German sociologists 
                                                          
4  LEERS, Literatuur over roeping, priesterroeping, priesteropleiding en kloosterroeping. 
5  Letter by Koenraadt and Oldendorff to the Episcopacy, 29-02-1982: SAB, BAB, I.118, 143. 
Oldendorff briefly stood in for Zeegers as KASKI director at that time. 
6  DELLEPOORT, De priesterroepingen in Nederland, p. 290.  
7  GRIBLING, Jan Dellepoort, pp. 3–78. 
8  DELLEPOORT, De priesterroepingen in Nederland, pp. 5–13. 
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Greinacher and Walter Menge published what would quickly turn into an 
often-cited monograph: Die deutsche Priesterfrage (The Question of the 
Priesthood in Germany).9 In 1960, Dellepoort became the director of the 
Maastricht Instituut voor Europese Priesterhulp (Institute for Help to the 
European Priest). He left KASKI.  
Dellepoort’s work as a KASKI employee forms our point of departure 
when examining the emergence and impact of the vocation poll.10 In the 
first section, I shall argue that Goddijn initiated this poll in order to counter 
what he perceived as a ‘crisis of vocations’. Cardinal Alfrink paved the way 
for this approach. In the second section, I shall analyse the preparations of 
the inquiry. Goddijn excluded at least one sociologist from the project who 
he perceived as a representative of a bygone research era: Dellepoort. In 
this way, the PINK director made sure that his more theoretical, structural-
functional approach would triumph. The third section encompasses a 
discourse analysis of the polling text and an exploration of the 
accompanying instruction sheet. Even though these documents were 
designed in order to get to the bottom of religious vocation, they 
substantially simplified the public perception of a calling Finally, in the 
fourth section, I shall study how the field work was carried out, what the 
main outcomes looked like, and what happened with these outcomes. On 
the basis of the completed questionnaires, ITS employee Johan Sterk 
highlighted unpopular aspects of becoming a priest, brother, or sister. He 
also pleaded for a thorough reform in terms of both a religious ‘renewal’ 
and a professionalisation. Journalists such as Van de Weijer expanded on 
these results in their newspaper articles, thereby increasing the pressure on 
the bishops to act decisively.  
 
 
3.1. RELIGIOUS VOCATION ON THE AGENDA OF RESEARCH 
AND REFORM  
 
Goddijn Takes Over 
It is more than likely that a growing body of facts and figures, as presented 
by Dellepoort, influenced the bishops in adopting a more pro-active stance 
when it came to redefining recruitment policies. “Yet still, beloved faithful, 
there are reasons for concern”, they wrote to all the Dutch priests, religious, 
and laypeople on 15 February 1957.11 Rather exceptionally, these Church 
authorities admitted in the public sphere that less and less priests were 
                                                          
9  ZIEMANN and DOLS, ‘Catholic Church Reform and Organizations Research in the 
Netherlands and Germany’, p. 302. 
10  Note that KASKI also focused on the vocation question in relation to the female religious in 
the 1950s. The investigations, however, were not as thorough as Dellepoort’s work on priestly 
calling. See, for example: DEKKERS, Het verloop van de roepingen bij de vrouwelijke 
religieuzen in Nederland en enkele overwegingen betreffende voortgezet sociologisch 
onderzoek. 
11  Letter by the bishops to the clergy and the faithful, 15-02-1957: Herderlijke Brieven, Dutch 
Church Province, Alfrink, 1953–1975.  
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ordained each year in comparison to the immediate past, and that the 
monastic life had lost a considerable force of attraction. The overall 
decrease in the number of vocations could be interpreted as an “indicator of 
a demise of the religious life”. The bishops held that this demise was all the 
more fatal for the Dutch Church Province because the religious needs of 
contemporary society asked for an expansion of Catholicism. At the end of 
their letter, they called on every Catholic to pray for more ‘workers’ in the 
vineyard of the Lord. 
Three years later, the bishops underscored that a coordination of 
shattered initiatives and of the latest insights into religious calling had 
become necessary. For this reason, they installed an advisory committee 
chaired by philosopher and Nijmegen dean Sjef Martin.12 Dellepoort, too, 
became a committee member. Partly as a result of Dellepoort’s efforts, the 
Martin Committee investigated the possibilities of opening a National 
Centre for Vocations akin to the French Centre National des Vocations 
(National Centre for Vocation). It took several years before the plans had 
been fully worked out. In 1964, the bishops and religious superiors 
approved the establishment of LRR (Landelijke Raad voor de Roeping tot 
het Priesterschap en het Religieuze Leven).13 Its primary aim was to become 
a service point for everyone who wished to learn more about the 
phenomenon of religious vocation. This aim was pursued by gathering field 
experience and archiving relevant documentation. Bishop Van Dodewaard 
became the chairman of LRR, which consisted mainly of clerics.14 He was 
open to New Theology and new forms of knowledge such as sociology. 
At that point of institutionalisation, spring 1964, Alfrink already asked 
Father Superior Lucas Hoogveld OSA to get in touch with Martin and 
reflect upon a national policy that would lead to an increase of vocations. 
Hoogveld contacted Goddijn as well as Louis van Rijen MSC with this 
request in mind.15 Van Rijen was a specialist in moral theology. He worked 
as a professor at the educational centre of the Missionaries of the Sacred 
Heart in Stein since 1950, acted as a ‘peritus’, or conciliar advisor, in 
Rome, and would become a lector at the Tilburg Theological Faculty in 
1967. 16  The particular novelty of the report Goddijn and Van Rijen 
contributed to in August 1963 was Goddijn’s appeal for ongoing 
sociological research. As the circulating statistical overviews spoke a ‘clear 
language’, Goddijn noted, bishops and religious superiors faced no other 
choice besides gaining more detailed knowledge about the factual 
                                                          
12  GRIBLING, Jan Dellepoort, especially pp. 68–71. 
13  ‘Episcopaat richt roepingenraad op’, in: De Tijd, 14-04-1964, ‘Strijd om de roepingen’, in: de 
Volkskrant, 25-03-1965, and ‘Roeping trekt meer aandacht dan ooit’, in: Het Binnenhof,  
 14-03-1965. 
14  For more biographical information on Van Dodewaard, see: VOETS, ‘Dodewaard, Johannes 
Antonius Eduardus’, on-line accessible via: 
http://www.historici.nl/Onderzoek/Projecten/BWN/. Visited on 16-01-2013. 
15  Letter by Hoogveld to Goddijn and Van Rijen, 26-06-1963: KDC, PINK, 222. 
16  SIMONS and WINKELER, Het verraad der clercken, p. 423.  
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situation.17 Goddijn envisaged an ambitious national research project which 
would be conducted by the KASKI staff in collaboration with sociologists 
working at the Catholic University of Nijmegen. 
In 1964, Goddijn and former KASKI colleague Poeisz couched these 
lines of reasoning in a socio-medical discourse, arguing that ‘therapy’ 
naturally followed from ‘diagnosis’ and connected the question of vocations 
to Church reform in interdependent terms. 18 Since previous sociological 
projects analysed this question in isolation and never revealed the actual 
problem, they claimed, a study had to be carried out in which the processes 
of recruitment and education were linked to a ‘social system’, that is to say, 
the functioning of a Church, a Church Province, or an Order as a whole. 
The time to act was running out, as a ‘crisis of vocations’ was hitting Dutch 
Catholicism. Goddijn and Poeisz underlined that the decrease in the 
number of callings implied that the stability of the entire Dutch Church 
Province was in serious danger. According to the two sociologists, 
ecclesiastical ‘renewal’ was needed in order to stabilise the Church 
Province. This renewal could only be successful if the Church, “truly 
embracing an existential attitude, is courageous enough to establish a 
dialogue with the changing world, and dare to test the viability of this 
dialogue over and over again”. 
Goddijn took over.19 Claiming expertise as the spokesman of a new 
generation of Catholic sociologists, and using the structural-functional 
notions of a ‘social system’ and ‘dynamic stability’, he charged the projects 
that until then had been carried out at KASKI with a lack of analytical 
depth. These projects certainly yielded valuable conclusions, yet Goddijn 
believed that sociologists never reached the core of the ‘problem’. For this 
reason, he observed, it was likely that the solution to the vocation question 
had never been comprehensive enough.  
Goddijn’s recently acquired and prominent position as PINK director 
allowed him to further explore research possibilities and task a sociologist 
with documenting some initial thoughts. He sidetracked Dellepoort by 
appointing Poeisz to the job. This exclusion must have influenced 
Dellepoort’s recollection that PINK tried to annex all the pastoral 
movements in the Church in an authoritarian manner.20 Poeisz formulated 
two hypotheses which could serve as a starting point in a polling project on 
religious vocation.21 The first linked this matter to the religious nature of a 
                                                          
17  Report ‘Een landelijk beleid inzake de bevordering van roepingen tot het priesterschap en het 
kloosterleven’, holding various contributions, August 1963: KDC, PINK, 221. 
18  GODDIJN and POEISZ, ‘Proeve van een sociologische probleemstelling voor Nederland’,  
especially pp. 105–107. More biographical information on Poeisz can be found in Appendix 1. 
19  See also: Sociologie van de roepingen and GODDIJN, ‘Enkele sociografische en sociologische 
opmerkingen over het roepingenvraagstuk’, in: Verslagen franciscaanse studiegroep  
 (KDC, KASKI, 2276), pp. 87–107. 
20  GRIBLING, Jan Dellepoort, p. 70.  
21  Paper, 21-04-1964: KDC, KASKI, 3038. The author of this paper is unknown, yet it can 
almost be stated with absolute certainty that Poeisz wrote the document: interview by Dols  
 with Poeisz, 28-01-2010. 
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local Catholic community. Firm group cohesion, combined with a 
dominant orientation towards the Church as an institute, was argued by 
Poeisz to have positive effects on the number of callings to the priestly office 
and monasticism. Minor group cohesion, on the other hand, combined with 
an increasing distance towards the Church as an institute, was expected to 
have negative effects. The second hypothesis was related to the emerging 
conceptualisation of the priestly office as a profession. This profession, 
Poeisz hypothesised, had much appeal to Catholics who found themselves 
in social circumstances in which other jobs with the same status were less 
accessible. In the case of brothers, the same could be hypothesised, whereas 
the social position of sisters should be compared to that of women who 
worked in the worldly domain. Poeisz wanted families both with and 
without a history of vocation to participate in interview sessions. 
 
 
3.2. THE VOCATION POLL IN THE MAKING 
 
The Preparations Take Off  
The actual preparations of the polling project started on 13 May 1964, 
when Goddijn, who perceived PINK as the commissioning institute, 
addressed a letter to KASKI director Kusters. 22  Goddijn informed him 
about the forthcoming project. LRR would be requested to install a 
supervisory committee which guaranteed that the study corresponded with 
questions raised in the field. LRR was chosen instead of the PINK’s 
Preparatory Seminaries (Kleinseminaries) and Priestly Experience of the 
Faith (Geloofsbeleving van de priester) committees because Goddijn wanted 
to foster cooperation with this young institution. KASKI and the sociology 
department of the Nijmegen University would be asked to form a 
committee of experts. They should become responsible for the build-up and 
execution of the inquiry.  
Two committees were formed. LRR appointed its secretary Jos Peters 
SCJ, priest-theologian and President Willem de Graaff from the Warmond 
Seminary of the Diocese of Haarlem, and journalist Carel Enkelaar. 
Franciscan priest-sociologist Schreuder came to play a crucial role in the 
expert committee. His membership was proposed by Leemans, with whom 
Kusters had discussed Goddijn’s letter in early June. Sociologist Van 
Kemenade joined Schreuder in the committee along with KASKI 
employees Poeisz and Kees Thoen. At that point, ITS had not yet been 
established. 
Since PINK was soon planning to make vital decisions regarding the 
following budgetary year, Schreuder quickly sprang into action. He 
collected literature, gathered data, and wrote a seven-page paper in which 
he anticipated the provisional blueprint of the project by proposing a 
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paradigm shift. 23  In contrast with research conducted by Dellepoort, 
Schreuder put the social status of the priestly office in the contemporary 
Catholic community at centre stage and linked this status to the larger, 
secular context of job market. How did Catholics assess the priestly office in 
comparison to other jobs? What criteria meant that they valued the priestly 
office positively or negatively? And did a possible devaluation mean that 
future scenarios had to be regarded as troubling, or could changes in the 
current structure of the priestly ‘profession’ perhaps lead to a revaluation of 
the priestly office? Schreuder legitimised such a new perspective by pointing 
at the emerging ‘society of achievement and prestige’, in which people 
increasingly judged each other on the basis of ‘what one does’ rather than of 
‘what one is’ and people were more and more ascribed a societal position 
depending on their achievements. The greater these achievements, the 
higher one could climb on the societal ladder. One’s profession particularly 
formed a vehicle of achievement, Schreuder added to this. As a result, jobs 
were much more often rated according to their value for personal status and 
societal mobility than in the past. Professional jobs such as that of a medical 
doctor or attorney were generally regarded as prestigious. In Schreuder’s 
opinion, it was important to investigate how the priestly office related to 
these prestigious jobs. He hypothesised that its relative social status was very 
low, not in the least because it hardly corresponded with the prevailing 
professional standards. In order to test this hypothesis, and put together a 
differentiated research population, Schreuder suggested interviewing the 
parents of sixth grade pupils attending Catholic primary school, and 
compare these findings with those yielded through separate interviews with 
the parents of boys in their first year of the preparatory seminary. 
During a meeting on 3 July 1964, members of the LRR Committee 
had the opportunity to comment on this document. 24  According to De 
Graaff, the research problem was approached in a ‘too worldly manner’. He 
regretted the fact that Schreuder suppressed the theologically underpinned 
notion of a calling as a divine call to God’s service, and placed too much 
weight on the principles of achievement, specialisation, and 
professionalisation. De Graaff also believed that instead of examining the 
causes of certain developments in the past, more attention should be given 
to the future. Peters, who represented the religious in LRR, believed that 
Schreuder concentrated too heavily on priestly vocations and consequently 
overlooked the brothers and sisters. Enkelaar, in turn, wished for an 
emphasis on elements that could be used to improve the image that 
Catholic youths had of the priest. Schreuder was requested to revise his 
paper keeping these comments in mind. 
The LRR Committee not only held on to the theological 
interpretation of a calling as a sign from God, but also insisted on a 
broadening of the inquiry. Several months later, in November 1964, 
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Schreuder completed the lengthy KASKI memorandum Het beeld van en 
de waarderingen voor het geestelijk beroep (The Image and Assessment of 
the Religious Profession). 25  Despite the comments made by Peters, the 
document shed light on priestly vocations exclusively. Schreuder reasoned 
that it was near impossible to integrate both priestly vocations and callings 
of brothers and sisters into the one study. His primary research aim was to 
determine the extent to which specific groups of Catholics were ready to 
become a priest and what factors influenced this readiness. Again, 
Schreuder rationalised the phenomenon of vocation by defining it as a 
‘more or less conscious evaluation of all options possible’.  
 
A Deadlock 
Perhaps somewhat predictably, Schreuder’s refined proposal did not receive 
a warm welcome in the LRR Committee. Psychologist Huub Penders, who 
was closely involved in LRR and also read the document, probably at 
Peters’s request, drafted a lengthy critique. 26  Penders pinpointed four 
objections. The bottom line of his critique was that the inquiry could not 
start earlier than 1 January 1965, the date proposed by Schreuder. Several 
matters needed to be settled first, to begin with the commissioning 
institution. PINK was mentioned as such in the introduction of the KASKI 
memorandum. But was this actually the case? What was the exact wording 
of the research assignment? And why were KASKI employees and 
Nijmegen-based academics hired as researchers? Penders noted that by 
PINK granting the inquiry exclusively to sociologists they had prescribed 
the entire project in a distinctive, namely sociological, way. Secondly, he 
raised objections against what he perceived as the ambiguity of the 
procedure followed by PINK, especially if it turned out that Goddijn 
labelled the decrease in the number of vocations as a ‘crisis’ before the 
project had even taken off. Thirdly, Penders argued that the decision 
making context of the study was blurred. Was it true that the bishops were 
willing to spend many thousands of Guilders on just one aspect of what, in 
essence, was an immensely complex problem? And what expectations did 
they have about this study? Finally, Penders underscored that the research 
plan was incomplete: it was not clear what kind of interviews would be used, 
what the questionnaire looked like, and what stages the project was divided 
into.  
Here, Penders questioned the way in which Goddijn set the research 
stage as well as the research design which took shape in a short period of 
time. The situation worsened when Peters, unwilling to take any 
responsibility for the vocation project in its current form, sent a letter 
directly to Alfrink on behalf of the LRR Committee.27 The fact that Peters 
                                                          
25  [SCHREUDER], Het beeld van en de waarderingen voor het geestelijk beroep and PINK 
estimate, 1964: KDC, PINK, 770. 
26  Letter by Penders to Peters, 30-11-1964: KDC, KASKI, 3038. 
27  Letter by Peters to the bishops, 18-12-1964: KDC, KASKI, 3038. 
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bypassed Goddijn—who, after all, suggested an alliance including LRR—
indicates that he no longer saw the PINK director as of great importance. 
Alfrink was told that LRR had perceived itself as the commissioning 
institution from the very beginning of the project since its chairman, Bishop 
Van Dodewaard, was an episcopal delegate. Furthermore, Peters noted that 
the LRR representatives never received the research assignment PINK had 
formulated and consequently, were not able to get to the heart of the 
matter. Peters also mentioned the KASKI memorandum. Even though he 
typified this document as a ‘rich source of experience’ and a ‘good point of 
departure for further deliberation’, he believed that it should be improved, 
as it had an exclusive sociological character and narrowed down the 
research problem to priestly callings. Peters stressed that such an approach 
could not be corrected by a follow-up study. He therefore advised Alfrink 
and his fellow bishops not to approve the start of the project at that stage.  
Kusters soon discovered the intervention of the LRR Committee. He 
promptly responded, also on behalf of Schreuder and Van Kemenade, who 
had just become the director of ITS. Referring to a commissioning letter 
sent by Goddijn, he wrote to Van Dodewaard and the committee members 
that they were surprised that LRR suddenly presented itself as research 
commissioner.28 According to the KASKI director, moreover, the dominant 
sociological point of view certainly did not exclude psychological and 
theological notions. Concerning the exclusion of brothers and sisters from 
the inquiry, Kusters held that financial aspects played a decisive role, and 
noted that a follow-up study was proposed. The reason why both the 
questionnaire and the research design could not yet be completed was that 
the limited budget did not allow such. Kusters increased the pressure on 
LRR by emphasising that KASKI as well as ITS already made significant 
budgetary alterations. He implied that these alterations could not be 
undone easily.  
Peters, De Graaff, and Enkelaar discussed this reply with other 
members of LRR on 8 January 1965. 29  After reading Goddijn’s 
commissioning letter, they decided that the expert committee acted 
correctly. They could not give the green light, however, since they believed 
that the preparations of the project were moving much too quickly, and that 
the content of the KASKI report left crucial things to be desired. All the 
members of the LRR Committee had to agree on a new draft before the 
study could commence. In addition, they would not meet any commitments 
so long as the bishops had not elucidated what institution acted as research 
commissioner. 
Goddijn tried his best to tweak this commissioning issue to his own 
benefit. Advised to do so by Bishop De Vet, he contacted Alfrink in late 
                                                          
28  Letter by Kusters to the chairman and members of LRR, 05-01-1965: KDC, KASKI, 3038. 
Goddijn’s letter, which according to Kusters must have been dated on 15-05-1964, has not 
been found. It is not unlikely that Goddijn’s letter dated on 13-05-1964 was meant here.  
29  Letter by Peters to Kusters, undated, but a copy was sent to Van Kemenade on 19-01-1965: 
KDC, KASKI, 3038. 
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December 1964 and early January 1965. 30 The fact that Hoogveld had 
recently left LRR could have been one of the main reasons for the deadlock. 
Goddijn explained: as a result of this leave, Peters and the other LRR 
representatives might not have known the exact whereabouts of PINK, 
officially allocating the project to specific parties. According to Goddijn, the 
future of PINK had to be safeguarded by making that very message clear to 
the LRR Committee. All forms of ‘vagueness’ would ‘obstruct’ PINK’s 
development as a national centre which coordinated pastoral research and 
advice. If LRR were allowed to claim the title of commissioning institute, 
Goddijn purported, other institutes could start doing the same on the basis 
of a precedent, leading to a ‘conflict of interests’.  
After having deliberated about Goddijn’s letters, the Episcopacy 
determined that Bishop Van Dodewaard and Goddijn would resolve the 
conflict.31 This happened during a joint meeting of the LRR Committee (as 
represented by Penders, J. Segers, and Olav Albers OSA, also) and the 
committee of experts (as represented by sociologist and ITS employee Jan 
van Westerlaak) on 10 March 1965. This meeting saw Peters once again 
clarifying that he and the other committee members had difficulties with 
what they perceived as a too sociologically informed research proposal and 
a too great emphasis on priestly callings. 32  Schreuder, Kusters, Van 
Kemenade, and Van Westerlaak replied that they could not integrate a 
perspective other than the sociological one into the study. They regarded 
this perspective as acceptable and even advisable: a sociological report could 
form a solid foundation on which future inquiry could rest. Regarding 
laying emphasis on priestly vocations, they repeated that financial 
circumstances set clear limits for the research scope. Peters, Penders, Segers, 
and Albers accepted the first explanation and endorsed the priority given to 
a sociological approach. They stuck to their opinion on the 
underrepresentation of the religious in the KASKI memorandum, though, 
meaning that they wanted this underrepresentation to be dealt with. In 
more general terms, the attendees concluded that Van Kemenade would 
refine the research proposal without losing sight of the report. In effect, 
ITS—rather than KASKI—came to play a leading role in executing the 
research. The bishops had not yet made up their mind concerning the 
commissioning issue. However, this would not take long to happen. 
 
The Preparations Continue  
In early April 1965, Van Kemenade completed a significantly reduced 
research proposal.33 The entire project kept revolving around a rationalised 
approach. To what extent was the ‘religious office’ (‘geestelijk ambt’) 
                                                          
30  Letter by Goddijn to Alfrink, 22-12-1964 and letter by Goddijn to Alfrink, 06-01-1965.  
 Both letters: KDC, PINK, 231. 
31  Letter by Goddijn to Van Dodewaard: 18-01-1965: KDC, PINK, 234.  
32  Minutes of the joint committee meeting on 10-03-1965: KDC, KASKI, 3038. 
33  Letter by Van Kemenade to the chairman and members of LRR, 06-04-1965, including 
proposal: KDC, KASKI, 3038. 
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perceived as an attractive job opportunity? 34 And what social determinants 
played a stimulating or discouraging role during the process of choice? The 
inquiry would not lead to precise prognoses on the expected number of 
vocations, nor would it provide universal answers to the question of why 
some callings resulted in someone entering the office whereas others did 
not. Van Kemenade proposed to interview 800 parents of sixth grade pupils 
of Catholic primary schools, and by means of comparison, carry out a 
random sample survey among 600 parents whose boys started their religious 
career at a preparatory seminary (priests) or juvenate (brothers), or whose 
girls had recently joined a Congregation or Order (sisters). This mode of 
surveying made that the study would not fully represent the Dutch Church 
Province. The older and younger generations of parents would be 
underrepresented, for instance, and parents of Catholic youths attending 
non-Catholic schools would be excluded. The inquiry would cost 90,000 
Guilders. Van Kemenade presented a follow-up study demanding an 
investment of another 85,000 Guilders as desirable. 
The LRR representatives deliberated about Van Kemenade’s revised 
research design on 13 April 1965. Even though no minutes of this meeting 
remain, their opinions can be gleaned from a slightly altered document that 
Van Kemenade brought into circulation one month later, in which both the 
agreements on supervision and the time schedule had been refined.35 It was 
decided to dissolve the two existing committees and form one new 
supervisory committee including LRR representatives. From September 
1965 until January 1966, the fieldwork would be prepared. This fieldwork 
would be carried out by ITS employees in February and March 1966. 
Then, from March until June 1966, the data would be coded and punched 
at ITS. The analysis would take place from June until September 1966, 
after which the writing process would start. Van Kemenade believed that it 
would be possible to send a final research report to PINK in March 1967. 
As Peters wrote to the other members of the LRR Committee on 30 April 
1965, such specifications ensured that none of the parties involved could 
make any move if they disagreed.36 
The PINK board also reflected upon the new draft. Serious doubts 
came to the surface during a meeting on 26 May 1965.37 On the one hand, 
Vicar-general from the Diocese of Den Bosch and secretary Rooyackers 
argued in favour of an approval of the proposal. He reasoned that PINK 
should provide the bishops with advice on the urgent matter of vocation as 
soon as possible. Moreover, the preparations of the study had already been 
paid for. Rooyackers implied that it would almost be a crime to cancel the 
project at this point. On the other hand, Father Superior of the Brothers of 
Maastricht Avellinus Janssens stated that even Kusters was not quite sure of 
                                                          
34  Van Kemenade, and Sterk later on, articulated this somewhat unusual term because there  
 was not a generic term including priests, brothers, and sisters. 
35  Letter by Van Kemenade to Goddijn, 14-05-1965, including blueprint: KDC, PINK, 222. 
36  Letter by Peters to the De Moor Committee, 30-04-1965: KDC, PINK, 222. 
37  Minutes of the PINK Board meeting on 26-05-1965: KDC, PINK, 815. 
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usable research results, E.M. Grond-Grollenberg wished for an emphasis on 
the future image of the priest, and Father Superior G. Bakker SCJ said, on 
behalf of the SNPR, that the project would not suffer greatly from a more 
modest set-up. A lengthy consideration followed. The conclusion of this 
consideration was that approval would be given despite the objections.  
In order to guarantee that no major problems would beset the project 
again, the bishops requested a special meeting with Goddijn, the expert 
committee, and the LRR Committee. This meeting on 30 July 1965 was, 
among others, attended by Bishop De Vet and Bishop Van Dodewaard, 
Goddijn, Peters, Rooyackers, and Gerard de Gier MSC on behalf of SNPR. 
SNPR was only officially informed by Peters and Albers about the take-off 
of the project in early June 1965 and was about to join the bishops in 
carrying the financial burden. 38  The gathering started with Goddijn 
detailing the history of the inquiry. He noted that the main reason why 
PINK commissioned the inquiry was that former attempts to improve 
recruitment had not been adequately well-founded. Attention then shifted 
towards the research design. Goddijn and Peters had appreciation for Van 
Kemenade’s proposal, realising that alternative research suggestions would 
be viable as well. But further discussion could result in a delay and even a 
cancellation of the project. The attendees therefore decided that the final 
preparations should start immediately.  
This was the moment when the bishops expressed four desires. 
Foremost, they wanted the researchers to set the matter of vocation against 
the background of the ‘entire Church situation’, meaning that a one-
dimensional focus needed to be prevented, and that the research outcomes 
should give insight into a variety of pastoral issues.39 The second thing the 
bishops wanted to see happen was that the one committee which would 
supervise the subsequent stages of the project would have a differentiated 
character. Their third wish was that the expenses of the study—90,000 
Guilders—would be spread out over PINK’s budgetary years of 1965, 1966, 
and 1967. They finally stated that Goddijn’s institute would act as the sole 
commissioning institution. As such, PINK would mediate between the 
Episcopacy and SNPR on the one hand and the researchers on the other, 
and form the supervisory committee. 
 
The Final Steps 
On 6 September 1965, De Vet informed Goddijn that both the bishops and 
SNPR had authorised the final polling blueprint, and thus officially 
approved the start of the inquiry.40 The SNPR board did regret the fact, 
though, that priestly vocations still far overshadowed the callings of brothers 
and sisters. It also reasoned that the proposal lacked the question of how 
Catholic youths were thinking about the priestly office and monasticism. De 
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39  Ibidem. 
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Vet asked Goddijn to ensure that the supervisory committee, which still had 
to be formed, would take these remarks into account. From the SNPR 
perspective, this was an absolute condition for participation in the project. 
Goddijn established the supervisory committee once he had 
successfully requested sociologist De Moor to act as its chairman.41 LRR 
representatives De Graaff, Peters, Penders, and Segers (secretary) became 
the other committee members. From November 1965 until February 1966, 
the De Moor Committee fine-tuned the research design in collaboration 
with Van Kemenade, Poeisz, Schreuder as an external advisor, and ITS 
employee Sterk. 42  One of the first things they did was to discuss the 
sampling and interviewing procedures.43 How exactly should the research 
population be determined? In an ideal situation, ITS employees argued, 
both fathers and mothers would be part of the research population. The 
ITS employees deemed this as practically unworkable, however, since it 
would take up too much time and cross the budgetary limits. Consequently, 
there were three options left: targeting one part of the questionnaire to men 
and the other part to women, presenting men and women with the same 
questionnaire, or interviewing either men or women. The ITS employees 
perceived the first option as problematic and the second one as equally 
unattractive. Even though they realised that the third option resulted in 
one-dimensional information, they successfully suggested interviewing men 
accompanied by women. These men would act as the primary interviewees. 
This variation on the third option was expected to give rise to the least 
unwelcome complications. The ITS employees preferred men to women 
because they presumed that fathers had more influence on their child’s 
choice of school and profession than mothers. They also took for granted 
that fathers assessed becoming a priest, brother, or sister more critically 
than mothers did. 
On 12 January 1966, another important issue dominated the 
discussion: that of the questionnaire, as drafted by Sterk. 44  De Moor 
reasoned that this questionnaire focused too much on sociological 
perspectives and that it lacked spiritual aspects. The importance attached to 
this opinion is evidenced by the fact that it was mentioned again at the end 
of the meeting. In a collection of essays published in 1965, De Moor 
criticised Schreuder’s 1964 inaugural lecture De professionalisering van het 
ambt (The Professionalisation of the Office), which bears a remarkable 
resemblance to the KASKI memorandum written for the purpose of the 
vocation project.45 De Moor particularly objected to the conceptualisation 
of a priestly calling as part of a rational choice of a profession, in which 
                                                          
41  Letter by Goddijn to De Moor, 08-10-1965: KDC, PINK, 222. More biographical information 
on De Moor can be found in Appendix 1. 
42  More biographical information on Sterk can be found in Appendix 1. 
43  Minutes of the committee meetings on 10-11-1965 and 09-12-1965 and letter by Sterk to the 
De Moor Committee, 01-12-1965, including a paper. All documents: KDC, KASKI, 3038.  
44  Minutes of the committee meeting on 12-01-1966, including alterations: KDC, PINK, 225.  
45  De MOOR, ‘Kerkelijke roepingen in onze tijd’, especially pp. 167–171.  
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costs, benefits, and social status were evaluated at length. Referring to a 
psychological study conducted in Vienna, De Moor believed that a priestly 
vocation had to be seen instead as a kind of Paulinistic conversion: it was a 
gift one received from God, something one simply could not escape from. 46 
For this reason, De Moor rejected Schreuder’s plan of restructuring the 
entire office on the basis of the argument of professionalisation. Such a 
restructuring would imply that the Church was an institution that belonged 
to the world rather than an institution that was part of this world.47  
De Moor, a prominent Catholic sociologist, adopted a rather 
traditional theological stance when criticising Schreuder’s sociologically-
informed reform plan. De Moor applauded a reform of the priestly office, 
but this reform should have its limits. Since the bishops insisted on a multi-
faceted, pastoral approach, and De Moor chaired the supervisory 
committee, one would perhaps be inclined to say that ITS employees had to 
alter the questionnaire substantially. However, only a relatively small 
number of questions and statements were added or reformulated. Item 11b 
was rephrased from ‘What are, in your opinion, the attractive aspects of 
being a priest in this day and age?’ to ‘What are, in your opinion, the 
attractive and valuable aspects of being a priest in this day and age?’.48 In a 
similar vein, the question of ‘What are, in your opinion, the less attractive 
aspects of being a priest in this day and age?’ was modified to ‘What are, in 
your opinion, the less attractive and problematic aspects of being a priest in 
this day and age?’ (item 11c).49 The respondents now also had to indicate 
whether their difficulties with being a priest, brother, or sister were 
counterbalanced by the fact that one was able as a priest, brother, and sister 
to devote oneself totally to God (item 12). Item 13 was inserted as well, 
which prompted the respondents to express whether their objections against 
being a priest, brother, or sister should still be borne in mind if their own 
child received a calling. Or did they believe that these objections did not 
matter in the end, as a vocation was by all means a religious phenomenon? 
Finally, the questionnaire was extended with the items 29, 30, and 31. The 
respondents were asked to express what was the most important task of a 
priest in the contemporary world, urged to rank five priestly activities on the 
basis of importance, and reflect upon the question of whether priests could 
fulfil their priestly task properly while working in a factory. Whereas all the 
LRR representatives agreed on these adjustments, one more detail was 
changed at De Moor’s request.  
After the questionnaire was finished, Van Kemenade started to gather 
the addresses of the respondents via Catholic educational institutions. In 
                                                          
46  De Moor referred to: LINDNER, LENTNER, and HOLL, Priesterbild und 
Berufswahlmotive. 
47  Emphasis in original document. 
48  Minutes of the committee meeting on 12-01-1966, including alterations: KDC, PINK, 225  
 and letter by Van Kemenade to the De Moor Committee, 01-12-1965: KDC, KASKI, 3038. 
My emphasis. 
49  My emphasis. 
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addition, ITS employees tested the questionnaire on 20 people, and 
instructed the 72 interviewers hired to complete the fieldwork.50 Most of 
these interviewers were advanced students in sociology and psychology at 
the Nijmegen University. In late January and early February 1966, they 
were divided into two groups and informed about the goal of the study, its 
scope, and the research design. In order to standardise the study as much as 
possible and remove possible misconceptions, they were also taken through 
the entire questionnaire and the accompanying instruction sheet. 
 
 
3.3. HOW TO CAPTURE A VOCATION CRISIS 
 
An Analysis of the Questionnaire and the Instruction Sheet 
The first interviewers travelled to the corners of the Netherlands in 
February 1966. They were issued with an extensive list of no less than 83 
items, mostly addressed to men.51 The interviewers were instructed to fill 
out the questionnaire and return the document to ITS. Some items were 
only used in the encounters with parents of pupils attending primary school, 
whereas others were left out in the conversations with parents of children 
who pursued a life as priest, brother, or sister. Every item channelled and 
influenced the answers of the interviewees.52 Often, the respondents could 
not bring up issues that were important to them, and were bound to the 
answers scripted at ITS. The only act of resistance they could employ was to 
refuse to cooperate. The following analysis of the polling language, as 
conveyed by the questionnaire and clarified in the instruction sheet, 
confirms what the above analysis of the preparations of the project has 
already hinted at: the respondent regularly had to bring back the immense 
complexity of the research problem to general terms and binary 
oppositions, was repeatedly encouraged to assess becoming a priest, brother, 
or sister negatively, and could hardly expand on the positive sides of 
stepping into the office. These positive sides did not correspond with the 
image of a crisis. 
The first of the five polling sections, consisting of nine items, was 
intended to yield basic socio-religious data on the families which the 
respondents were part of.53 They were asked to express how many children 
they had, if these children were male or female, if these children had a job, 
and how these children were or had been educated. They also had to give 
insight into the family’s experience with vocation. Were any children a 
priest, or had any of them made their vows as brother or sister? Were any of 
their children preparing or willing to become a priest, brother, or sister? 
And did the family contain children who had left the religious training 
                                                          
50  Letter by Van Kemenade to the De Moor Committee, 02-03-1966: KDC, KASKI, 3038. 
51  Questionnaire: KDC, KASKI, 3031. 
52  LIPARI, ‘Toward a Discourse Approach to Polling’, especially pp. 194–196. 
53  Questionnaire, pp. 1–3: KDC, KASKI, 3031. 
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programme? Subsequently, the respondents were expected to reveal 
whether they followed this programme themselves, how old they were, what 
profession they had, at what company they worked, how much they earned, 
what kind of education they had received, what their place of birth was, and 
what type of priests were active in their parish (regulars, seculars, or both). 
The second polling section, the key section, was related to the 
‘religious office’ and the ‘religious way of living’.54 It spanned from item 10 
through until item 43. Item 10 asked both fathers and mothers what they 
would think if their son wanted to become a priest or brother, or if their 
daughter wanted to become a sister. After the father answered this question 
in his own words, he and his partner had to choose among the following 
possible answers: ‘Would you be very happy about that?’, ‘Would you be 
rather pleased with that?’, ‘Would you be displeased about that?’, ‘Would 
you be opposed to that?’. The interviewers were urged not to mention the ‘it 
depends’ and ‘no opinion-cannot say’ options, and only select them if 
necessary. Item 11 requested that the respondents indicate whether or not 
they liked the idea of being a priest, brother, or sister, or whether they had 
no opinion. Even though they could freely explicate the ‘attractive’ and 
‘valuable’ aspects of being a priest, brother, and sister, the instruction sheet 
suggested that the ‘less attractive’ and ‘troublesome’ features were more 
important: “If the respondent answers the questions 11a, d and g negatively, 
first ask for the less attractive and troublesome sides, then address the 
attractive and valuable ones”.55 Items 12 and 13, the ones inserted after De 
Moor insisted on this, belonged to the few items focusing on the more 
positive aspects of the office. Item 15 prompted the respondents to elaborate 
on the causes of a declining number of vocations. The items 16, 17, and 18 
reflected a search for the essence of the ‘religious office’. More specifically, 
they asked the respondents about duties and tasks which had to be partly or 
completely scrapped or maintained if the pressure on the proper daily 
activities of a priest, brother, or sister became too large. In the case of priests 
(item 16), missionary activities, preaching, teaching subjects such as history, 
French, and algebra, reciting one’s breviary, leading religious discussion 
groups, moderating societies, house visiting, taking care of spiritual retreats, 
engaging pupils in catechism, living a contemplative monastic life, 
managing institutions for child protection and the mentally handicapped, 
and taking care for the publication of missionary magazines were listed. 
Here, the respondents were also given the option of ticking the ‘do not 
know’ box. Item 19 urged fathers as well as mothers to reflect upon the 
statement saying that the religious way of living should be valued higher 
than being married. Did they agree with this statement, value them as 
equally high, or believe that a marriage should prevail over the religious 
way of living in terms of value?  
                                                          
54  Ibidem, pp. 3–9. 
55  Instruction sheet, p. 2: KDC, KASKI, 3031. Emphasis in original document. 
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It was attempted by means of the items 21, 22, and 23 to compare the 
perception of the religious ‘position’, or ‘profession’, to secular ones.56 Item 
21 asked the respondents to rank five positions (secondary school teacher, 
medical doctor, director of a large company, priest, and social worker) on 
the basis of social status, importance, welfare, freedom and independence, 
and general attractiveness. The items 22 (primary school teacher, technical 
draftsman, social worker, brother, and delegate) and 23 (nurse, secretary, 
nursery school teacher, sister, and secondary school teacher) were arranged 
in a similar vein. This meant that categories in which the religious 
‘profession’ could be expected to score relatively highly in comparison with 
secular ones—such as living for a religious ideal, receiving trust from a 
community of faithful, and convincing people to adopt a certain way of 
living—were completely absent. 57  Item 24 prompted the respondents to 
think in general terms about the functioning of priests, brothers, and sisters. 
Again, they were asked to further clarify their answer only if they responded 
negatively. Whereas item 25 gave them the opportunity to expand in their 
own words on the question of whether it was more difficult or more easy to 
be a priest than it used to be in the past, the following two items, which 
dealt with brothers and sisters, offered them only four fixed answering 
options. Item 28 consisted of a list of statements, such as ‘The priest should 
by all means be a devout and holy man’ and ‘The most important task of 
the priest is to give advice on the problems occurring in life’, which were 
mixed. Respondents had to agree on these statements, disagree, or fairly 
(dis)agree, or indicate that they did not know the answer. The last items of 
the section incited them to think generally about complicated matters such 
as the extent to which priests were suited for their task, their influence on 
the faithful, the usefulness or disadvantages of celibacy, their 
conservativeness and progressiveness, understanding of what was going on 
in the world, and approach of the faithful. 
The third polling section, running from item 44 until item 60, directed 
the attention of the respondents towards the choice of both school and 
profession.58 Whereas the items from 44 until 50 were related to the sixth 
grade pupils, the items 51 from until 60 addressed the students who wanted 
to become a priest or religious. The respondents had to nominate what 
school their children would attend (item 44) and what kind of professional 
position these children wanted to hold in their future lives (item 45). They 
must also indicate if they deemed their children eligible for becoming a 
priest or brother (item 47), or sister (item 48). Once again, they were only 
requested to elaborate on their answer if they answered negatively. It is in 
this third section in which a sociologically informed conceptualisation of 
vocation—not as a divine call from God, but as something part and parcel 
                                                          
56  Questionnaire, pp. 9–14: KDC, KASKI, 3031. 
57  Such positive dimensions were highlighted in the Vienna inquiry: LINDNER, LENTNER,  
 and HOLL, Priesterbild und Berusfwahlmotive, pp. 24–27. 
58  Questionnaire, pp. 15–20: KDC, KASKI, 3031. 
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of a rational career choice—echoed most strongly. “Could you tell me”, the 
interviewers asked at item 51, “what made your son or daughter choose the 
religious way of living”?59 And did this son or daughter perhaps consider 
any other ‘professions’? 60  Before providing extra information on their 
children in the brief fourth polling section, such as data on their 
achievements at school and the type of this school, the respondents should 
indicate in general terms what social background the boys and girls they 
thought would be eager to become a priest, brother, or sister, should have, 
and what kind of boys and girls would be inclined to strive for a religious 
life.  
In the fifth and final polling section, which was titled ‘religious-
ecclesiastical backgrounds’ and consisted of nineteen items, it was attempted 
to determine what sort of Catholic the respondents were.61 Were they, to 
quote the six options discerned in the research design: ‘very ecclesiastical-
traditional’, ‘ecclesiastical-traditional’, ‘ecclesiastical-liberal’, ‘fairly 
ecclesiastical-traditional’, ‘fairly ecclesiastical-liberal’, or ‘weakly 
ecclesiastical-liberal’? In order to measure to what extent the respondents 
belonged to one of these categories, a series of items based on participation 
in Catholic ties and networks was developed. Item 65 asked the respondents 
whether they deemed the existence of Catholic organisations or institutions, 
such as sports clubs, political parties, unions, schools, and brass bands, as 
desirable or superfluous. They could also tick the boxes of ‘no opinion’ and 
‘do not know’. Before item 67 urged them to answer the question of 
whether they had sometimes voted for non-Catholic parties at the Second 
Chamber Elections, they had to agree, disagree, or fairly (dis)agree on three 
statements: ‘As a Catholic, you should preferably search for friends and 
acquaintances in Catholic circles’, ‘Catholics should buy as much as possible 
at Catholic suppliers’, and ‘Catholic employers should hire as many 
Catholic staff members as possible’. By means of the items from 68 until 73, 
it was attempted to discover how many respondents were subscribed to 
KRO’s magazine, participated in Catholic societies, and were a KVP 
member. The last items of the poll, from item 74 onwards, were related to 
religious practices. The respondents ought to declare: how often they were 
in contact with priests apart from during church service (item 74), if they 
had any priests, brothers, or sisters among their relatives (item 75), whether 
or not they were in favour of liturgical changes, the abolition of the 
veneration of the Virgin Mary in many churches, and the rapprochement 
with ‘dissenters’ such as the Protestants (item 76), if they attended Mass last 
Sunday (item 78), and how often they received the Communion on Sundays 
(item 79). Item 82 requested them to report whether they prayed before and 
after dinner, engaged in novenas, prayed the rosary with the entire family, 
wore a religious medallion, had a statue of Mary at their home, had a 
                                                          
59  My emphasis.  
60  Idem.  
61  Questionnaire, pp. 21–27: KDC, KASKI, 3031. 
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rosary, and lighted a candle in a church. At the end of the poll (item 83), the 
respondents were incited to explain how much being a Catholic meant to 
them: ‘everything’, ‘very much’, ‘quite a lot’, ‘not so much’, ‘a little’, 
‘nothing’, or ‘cannot say’.  
 
 
3.4. A PLEA FOR FUNDAMENTAL TRANSFORMATION 
 
The Main Outcomes 
Out of the 1,745 households approached by the interviewers, 234 refused to 
cooperate, partly as a result of suspicion against what Sterk rather vaguely 
typified as ‘the inquiry’s intentions’.62 Another 169 households did not take 
part or were not included in the study for different reasons, for example 
because the interview was regarded as invalid for scientific analysis. The 
analysis of the 1,342 usable questionnaires took place between March 1966 
and November 1967. After ITS employees drafted a code set, they 
extracted data from these questionnaires. 63  The scale on which these 
activities were carried out becomes evident when one realises that around 
350,000 pieces of data were turned into 5,368 punched cards and 2,100 
tables. The Nijmegen University Computer Centre and the Amsterdam-
based firm General Electric produced these tables. ITS employees 
subsequently connected information of various kinds to each other—such as 
data on ecclesiastical bonds and data on the judgement of priestly duties—
in order to investigate whether there were any causal links. Finally, Sterk 
compiled the research report. The members of the De Moor Committee 
were involved in all of these activities. At PINK, Goddijn was desperately 
trying to generate extra funding in the circles of the brothers and sisters.64 
His attempts proved to be successful: the brothers granted 1,800 Guilders, 
whereas the sisters contributed more, namely 8,000 Guilders.  
On 22 November 1967, De Moor informed Goddijn that the project 
was completed, meeting the scholarly demands.65 “We have to deliberate”, 
the PINK director already wrote to Van Kemenade at that point, “about 
how the vocation study, which is practically ready now, has to be presented 
to the public, the bishops, and elsewhere (television et cetera)”.66 Goddijn 
underlined that it was absurd to throw a 200 odd page scientific account on 
the table, as ordinary people were unfamiliar with the genre of the research 
report. A well-written, accessible piece about the main outcomes and their 
value for decision making was what he needed. Without such a document, 
Goddijn noted, he could not legitimise the necessity of expensive 
                                                          
62  STERK, De leek over het ambt, appendices I and II.    
63  Ibidem.    
64  Letter by Goddijn to the SNVR Board, 27-06-1966 and letter by Goddijn to the Board of 
Stichting Broedercongregaties, 27-06-1966. Both letters: KDC, PINK, 222. 
65  Relevant documents (letters, notes, and drafts) can be found here: KDC, KASKI, 3038 and 
KDC, PINK, 222.  
66  Letter by Goddijn to Van Kemenade, 12-09-1967: KDC, PINK, 675. 
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sociological inquiry. Priest-theologian Jan Dekkers would therefore identify 
the main insights of the study. According to Goddijn, Dekkers had writing 
talent and was able to express complex matters in a lucid manner.  
What overall conclusions had the poll yielded? A first general 
conclusion was that a strong causal linkage existed between ecclesiastical 
bonds and the attractiveness of the ‘religious office’: as the personal 
relationship with the Church became less ecclesiastical-traditional and more 
ecclesiastical-liberal, the attractiveness of the office declined. 67  A second 
general conclusion read that several aspects—most notably that of an 
unmarried life, permanent availability, a life in exclusive communities of 
men and women, dependence on superiors, lack of personal freedom, social 
isolation, and low welfare—had a negative effect on the general interest in 
the office. Sterk believed that a rapidly changing society caused such ‘costs’ 
outweighing the ‘benefits’: opinions on sexuality, authority, and the 
importance of leisure activities transformed significantly, leading to a loss of 
status of the ‘religious profession’ as well as to a different frame of reference 
when it came to rival job alternatives. A third general conclusion held that a 
widespread confusion prevailed with regard to priestly roles. Some forty 
percent of the respondents believed in the priest as a ‘traditional practitioner 
of pastoral care’: someone who stood higher in terms of Church authority, 
and, even though undertaking many different activities, focused on 
fortifying Catholics with the sacraments. Another forty percent perceived 
the priest as a ‘social-service-worker’: a man able to meet real-life personal 
needs and desires, and offer practical solutions and spiritual help in times of 
trouble. And a minority of approximately twenty percent held up the image 
of the priest as a ‘religious inspirer’: someone who placed his authentic 
abilities to move and inspire in service of a change of both religious and 
secular mentalities. 
The key recommendation Sterk provided to the research 
commissioners, in this specific case the Episcopacy and SNPR through 
PINK, was that of a thorough reform.68 On the one hand, the ‘religious 
office’ had to be religiously renewed in that it had to be connected to a more 
anthropocentrical mentality, an understandable and appealing cult, 
democratic power relationships, a truly religious inspiration, and a new 
synthesis between the Church and the world. On the other hand, the office 
should be professionalised in terms of an adaptation to the key values of the 
job market. Aspects that had to be taken into account were that of a 
broadening of the working conditions on entering the office, holiday, a 
professional and socially flexible working mentality, welfare, a 
transformation of education, specialisation, changes in the appointment 
policy, autonomy, social facilities, promotion policy, and privacy. Sterk paid 
special attention to priestly celibacy. He expected a liberalisation of celibacy 
law and its immediate consequences (family life, a home, an improvement 
                                                          
67  STERK, De leek over het ambt, pp. 163–174. 
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in income, more awareness a career prospects, and a stricter demarcation 
between work and private life) to lead to an increase of the attractiveness of 
becoming a priest. 
 
A Glimpse Behind the Institutional Scenes  
Goddijn sent the research report titled De leek over het ambt (The Laity on 
the Office) to the bishops on 11 December 1967. 69  SNPR received the 
document shortly hereafter. In order to discuss its value for decision making 
as well as its popularisation, Goddijn organised a meeting in the village of 
Doorn on 26 February 1968. This meeting was attended by the PINK 
director himself, Dekkers, Van Kemenade, Poeisz, Schreuder, Sterk, and 
several student pastors affiliated with theological institutions.70 It appears 
that neither the Episcopacy nor SNPR received an invitation. 
At Goddijn’s request, Dekkers prepared a paper which served as a 
starting point for the gathering. 71  Four matters received his attention. 
Firstly, Dekkers was not sure if the polling study was suitable for 
publication, since it could be perceived negatively, even disastrously, and 
function as ‘a slap in the face’ in the milieus that until then brought forth so 
many candidates so piously. Secondly, concerning the overall conclusions, 
Dekkers noted that a clear understanding was discernible: the ‘religious 
office’ was still perceived as attractive in those Catholic milieus in which the 
personal relationship with the Church as an institute was strong. It was in 
these milieus that the laity had the most appreciation for the clergy and 
gave attention to the satisfying aspects of the office rather than to the 
troublesome ones. According to Dekkers, these conclusions begged the 
question of whether new radical roads could be taken now that these milieus 
were becoming smaller year after year. Thirdly, three priestly roles could be 
singled out: that of the ‘ecclesiastical service provider’, the ‘social service 
provider’, and the ‘religious motivator’. Dekkers asked himself whether it 
was necessary to make clear choices, and perhaps favour one role over the 
others. Finally, Dekkers addressed the recommendations of the report. He 
believed that these recommendations reflected the opinions of a growing 
minority of liberal Catholics in the Dutch Church Province. Should 
sociologists, then, promote a policy based on the expectation that this 
minority became the majority in the foreseeable future? 
Schreuder led the two plenary sessions and a discussion group 
examining the issue of training.72 This group determined that the desires of 
young priestly candidates should serve as an important benchmark for a re-
evaluation of the existing selection procedures. As many of them knew little 
about society, the educational balance between theology and the social 
sciences also had to become equal. Sterk chaired a second group focusing 
                                                          
69  Letter by Goddijn to Van Kemenade, 20-12-1967: KDC, PINK, 222. 
70  SNABEL, ‘Documentair verslag van 5 jaar PINK’, 126. 
71   Paper by Dekkers, undated: KDC, PINK, 222. 
72  Minutes of the Doorn meeting on 26-02-1968: KDC, PINK, 227. 
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on recruitment. This group argued that the priestly office should be 
presented in a more attractive way, that a differentiation of this office had to 
be stimulated, and that better secondary labour standards must be pursued. 
Furthermore, ecclesiastical structures needed ‘renewal’ in order to minimise 
an adverse impact on the number of callings. The outcomes of the meeting 
as a whole were the following. Even though the attendees were inclined to 
target future decision making towards the more liberal group of Catholics, 
they agreed that policy on vocation and education must always rest on ‘the 
facts’, meaning that the multiform demands of ‘the market’ should be taken 
into account. For this reason, they believed that it was important to publish 
a brochure, as suggested by Goddijn. This brochure should hold the main 
understandings of the ITS-KASKI report, a pastoral-theological reflection 
upon the quantitative data, and clues for pastoral planning. The suggested 
types of authors were a theologian, a psychologist, and a sociologist. Hence, 
sociologists were the experts who yielded empirical data, whereas 
psychologists and theologians were regarded as the experts who gave 
meaning to this data. 
The conclusions of the Doorn meeting were to be worked into the 
suggested brochure, which had to appear in PINK’s De kerk van morgen 
(Tomorrow’s Church) series. In the end, however, this brochure was never 
published. The manuscript still was not finished by 15 January 1969, and by 
October of that year, it was no longer being discussed by the members of 
the editorial board.73 A 2012 interview with priest-theologian and former 
PINK employee Ruud Huysmans suggests that the bishops forbade its 
publication.74 Based on this line of thought, one might perhaps argue that 
the bishops rejected what they perceived as the report’s de-sacralisation of 
the priestly office. On 24 December 1966, while the project was fully 
underway, Alfrink touched on the priestly office in an interview with 
journalist Ton Oostveen. The Cardinal noted that being a priest could not 
be compared to working from nine to five as a medical doctor or teacher.75 
The priestly office was not a profession, but instead a ‘way of living’ which 
was always there and which should invariably be lived up to. And in 
January 1967, Alfrink and the other bishops vetoed the publication of the 
report of PINK’s Priestly Experience of the Faith Committee precisely 
because it denied this notion of the priestly office as a way of living.76 But an 
examination of the minutes of the monthly meetings of the bishops points in 
another direction.77 On 12 March 1968, they discussed Goddijn’s idea to 
present the polling outcomes to the public by means of a brochure. They 
                                                          
73  Letter by Goddijn to Braun, Van Hooijdonk, and Van Kemenade, 07-03-1968: KDC, PINK, 
227 and minutes of the Editorial Board meetings on 12-06-1968, 09-10-1968, 15-01-1969,  
 and 30-10-1969: KDC, PINK, 174.  
74  Interview by Dols with Huysmans, 24-11-2012.  
75  ‘Kardinaal Alfrink: celibaatscrisis is vaak geloofscrisis’, in: Brabants Dagblad, 24-12-1966.  
76  Minutes of the Episcopacy meeting on 10-01-1967: BARD, 312.1, BV. See also: letter by De 
Vet to Goddijn, 12-01-1967: KDC, PINK, 241.  
77  Minutes of Episcopacy meeting on 12-03-1968: BARD, 312.1, BV.  
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wanted to assess this brochure before its release, in principle endorsing its 
publication. Seen in this way, it is likely that the results of recent and partly 
overlapping sociological studies came to receive greater priority as the 
vocation manuscript stayed behind. The outcomes of the celibacy poll 
among the Dutch priests, deacons, and subdeacons (1969), an inquiry into 
the opinions of laypeople on priestly celibacy (1969), an analysis of priestly 
functions (1969), and the development of a model of pastoral care in the city 
of Eindhoven (1970) did appear in brochure form.78 In its original form, 
Goddijn offered the research report to a newly established expert committee 
which was expected to examine the matter of the priestly office in service of 
the Pastoral Council, too.79  
 
A Media-Led Crisis  
According to historians Nicolai Hannig and Benjamin Städter, who 
examined post-war relationships between media on the one hand and the 
Catholic and Protestant Churches in West-Germany on the other, 
journalists in the long 1960s turned their back on the uncritical reports on 
Church authorities which characterised the years up to 1958. 80 Instead, 
these journalists cultivated the image of Churches being in a state of crisis. 
This was particularly the case in the second half of the 1960s, when they 
paid much attention to internal controversies in the Catholic Church over 
the implementation of the determinations of the Second Vatican Council. 
Polling results were often used as ammunition in a quest for a pluralisation 
of religion, so to speak, religious praxis outside the Church.  
Did the outcomes of the vocation poll make their way into the public 
sphere through the media, and did journalists place these outcomes within 
the interpretative framework of a ‘crisis’? As both a sociologist open to 
journalism and the director of PINK, Goddijn was a welcome ally for 
Catholic journalists who critically analysed the position of the Church in 
society and underlined the necessity of profound reform. Not only did he 
possess a clear voice. He also embodied a thorough knowledge of the 
workings of the Dutch Church Province and the Holy See. Goddijn 
searched for journalists as much as they searched for him, however. He was 
well aware of the impact that the media could have on episcopal policy. 
Minutes of a joint episcopal meeting on 11 April 1967 suggest that Goddijn 
deliberately passed on confidential information to journalists without the 
Episcopacy knowing it in order to gain support for his pastoral programme 
of ‘renewal’.81 
                                                          
78  Priestercelibaat, een probleem van de kerk, Hoe denken de gelovigen over de celibaatswet?, 
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Several weeks after the Doorn meeting, Goddijn received a letter from 
theologian Ignaas Brekelmans MSC. 82  Brekelmans managed the 
Oriëntatiecentrum voor Kerkelijke Roeping (Orientation Centre for 
Ecclesiastical Calling), an institute operating in the Dioceses of Den Bosch 
and Breda. As he noted on 9 April 1968, he wanted to make clear to the 
public why it was important to work towards a ‘renewed’ vision on religious 
calling by linking the latest statistics and the main results of the vocation poll 
to the yearly ‘Callings’ Sunday’ (‘roepingenzondag’). Goddijn was 
supportive of the idea and decided to cooperate.83 A press conference took 
place on 23 April 1968.84 ITS director Van Kemenade presented the more 
qualitative results of the polling study, whereas KASKI employee Poeisz 
addressed the more quantitative aspects of the ‘manpower problem’ by 
drawing on statistics. Brekelmans, in turn, cast light on the activities 
undertaken at his institute.  
Priest-sociologist and journalist De Weijer became the most important 
messenger of sociologically underpinned narratives of a crisis of the 
‘religious office’. On 24 April 1968, he wrote in de Volkskrant newspaper 
that the figures produced at KASKI and ITS proved that the priestly office 
as well as the monastic life went through an absolute ‘crisis’.85 One day 
later, he argued in De Nieuwe Limburger that the numbers ‘did not lie’.86 
As nothing seemed to indicate a break in trend, Church authorities and 
religious superiors had to prepare themselves for a ‘totally new socio-
religious reality’. Adopting a defensive stance would be ‘irresponsible’ in this 
respect. To wait until things collapsed was in fact the worst possible attitude, 
De Weijer claimed. And in an interview by De Weijer with Thoen 
published in De Stem newspaper on 3 May 1968, the first asked the latter to 
look beyond the KASKI figures, which prompted Thoen to expand on the 
‘mental crisis’ which he claimed was hitting almost all the orders and 
congregations in the Netherlands.87 Thoen noted that whereas a younger 
generation strived for a radical reform of forms of living, an older 
generation perceived the ‘crisis’ as a tragic and existential development and 
wondered whether their future still made any sense. 
Other newspapers also depicted the image of the stream of vocations 
running dry and focused on the unattractiveness of the ‘religious office’: 
‘Religious Office Unattractive’ (Tijd- en Maasbode), ‘Image of Priestly and 
Monastic Life Confused’ (Brabants Dagblad), and ‘Staggering Figures in 
KASKI Report’ (Dagblad van Coevorden).88 Sterk himself contributed to a 
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widespread circulation of the sociological data and the concomitant 
interpretation of a ‘crisis’. In De Bazuin (The Trumpet), the magazine of 
the Dominicans, he published an article under the alarming title of ‘De 
kwaal van gans een kerk’ (‘The Disease of an Entire Church’). 89  This 
contribution stood on the very first pages and attracted the attention of 
readers immediately. Repeating the main recommendation discussed above, 
Sterk stated that only a fundamental transformation of the office could 
provide a solution to the decreasing number of ordinations. Mere 
emergency measures—such as a modernisation of clothing, an 
improvement of income, a democratisation of authority, a more efficient 
personnel management, and even an abolishment of priestly celibacy—did 
not suffice so long as Catholics did not perceive the ‘religious office’ as an 
“evident expression of the Catholic faith and their own opinions on the 
Church”. One photograph, which was placed at the top of the first page, as 
if it was a header, pictured a family consisting of a mother, a father, and 
three children. Instead of attending Mass, they held each other’s hand while 
walking through the park. The photograph in question probably stood for a 
trend noticed in the ITS-KASKI study: a decrease in the number of 
‘ecclesiastical-traditional’ Catholics. Another photograph showed two boys 
standing in front of a liturgical supplier, possibly in Czechoslovakia, and 
gazing at clerical clothing. By means of this visualisation, it was implied that 
such images belonged to the past in the Dutch Church Province. 
Part of the entrance into the media of the latest sociological findings 
on callings, was a high-profile article in De Katholieke Illustratie magazine 
in June 1968. In this article, the same Hofwijk who wrote on Dellepoort’s 
thesis in 1955 raised the following question: ‘What is happening to our 
priests?’. 90  Using the sociological data established at KASKI and ITS, 
Hofwijk answered this question by contending that a ‘vocation crisis’ could 
not be neglected. Not only did statistics suggest that the number of priests, 
brothers, and sisters would quickly drop in the decades to come. The polling 
inquiry also demonstrated that the image of the priest was distorted. 
“People experience much more doubts about entering the priestly office in 
comparison to the past”, De Graaff, a member of the supervisory committee 
commented, upon which he told: “Yes, the self-evidence is largely gone, the 
prestige of becoming a priest; one now sees it in terms of a somewhat 
difficult task”. Photographs of foreign priestly students picnicking in a park 
and lining up accentuated the severity of the situation in the Dutch Church 
Province. 
In short, a vocation crisis shaped behind the walls of KASKI and ITS 
became a widely reported crisis as a result of much media exposure on and 
after 24 April 1968. In the wake of the publication of Dellepoort’s doctoral 
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thesis in 1955, the public attention for the matter of vocation was hardly so 
intense, both in quantitative and qualitative terms. 91  The fact that the 
respondents did not fully represent the Dutch Church Province was 
completely ignored. For the Episcopacy and SNPR, one of the most far-
reaching repercussions of the media exposure was that the Catholic 
community became aware of one of the most urgent internal issues faced by 
the members of these bodies in an extremely detailed manner. This 
repercussion meant that profound reform became almost inevitable. The 
question of how this reform should be staged replaced that of whether and 
when. Or, as Cardinal Alfrink himself put it in December 1969: “Even 
though everyone agrees on the diagnosis of a crisis, different opinions about 
the ways in which the priestly office has to be renewed can be singled out”.92 
 
Expert Criticism 
In sharp contrast with the planned character of most of the media spin-off 
stood a public debate which arose unexpectedly after Walter de Bont OP 
attacked the vocation inquiry on 4 May 1968 in De Tijd newspaper. De 
Bont was not just a low profile scientist, but an acknowledged priest-expert 
on religious calling who had studied psychology at the University of 
Montreal and obtained a doctoral degree there in 1960.93 The scope of this 
chapter does not cover the accuracy of De Bont’s criticism. Instead, the 
argument and its reactions will be explored. This exploration demonstrates 
that it was not sociological inquiry as such that was being disputed, but 
rather the way in which the research was commissioned and executed. It 
also sheds light on how and by whom the scientific trustworthiness of the 
project was defended.  
In his review, De Bont identified what he perceived as three major 
scientific flaws, the first of which was that the poll lacked a well-composed 
research design. 94  A ‘loose series’ of questions was addressed to the 
respondent. According to De Bont, this did not allow the researchers to find 
any causal patterns. Secondly, De Bont questioned the statistical validity 
and significance of the results. He claimed that the researchers did not fully 
address significance. They only compared ‘raw figures’, which damaged the 
accuracy of the analysis to a considerable degree. In addition, De Bont 
believed that they used the wrong statistical tool. The so-called ‘percentage 
test’ revolved around an ‘improper use’ of a statistical formula designed for 
other scientific purposes. Thirdly, De Bont wrote that the conclusions were 
much too one-sided, since the researchers rejected Church reform in a 
traditional fashion and presented a solution to the decrease of callings 
primarily in liberal terms. De Bont concluded that the project was a 
                                                          
91  Compare KDC’s collection of newspaper articles on religious calling to the digital collection of 
articles, as accessible via: http://kranten.kb.nl/. Visited on 15-05-2013. 
92  Minutes of the Second National Assembly of Priests on 24-11-1969 and 25-11-1969 (pp. 1–2): 
KDC, PCNK, 563. 
93  MONTEIRO, Gods Predikers, pp. 711–712. 
94  ‘De leek over het ambt zeer dubieus rapport’, in: De Tijd, 04-05-1968. 
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‘scientific miscarriage’. In-depth investigations on the phenomenon of 
vocation were important, yet flawed research was ‘worse than no research 
at all’. In De Bont’s opinion, the researchers deluded themselves and the 
entire Church Province with sociological certainties which were actually 
‘unverified spinnings of the imagination’. He stated that this Church 
Province would benefit from an impartial association scrutinising the 
scientific integrity of sociological research and planning institutes. The 
bishops and religious superiors would then be able to arrive at more 
openness as well as at well-informed decisions, prevent themselves from 
buying ‘another expensive pig in a poke’, and prevent Goddijn from 
underhandedly granting assignments to ‘institutional lightweights’. 
In a lengthy answer, also published in De Tijd newspaper, De Moor, 
Schreuder, Van Kemenade, and Kusters applauded a critical review of 
social scientific research. 95  Even though they characterised De Bont’s 
challenges as so ‘unsympathetic’ and ‘exaggerated’ that a reply could hardly 
lead to a reconsideration, they wanted to react in the public sphere in order 
to enable the public to hear the other side of the story. Regarding the 
technical criticism, they charged the priest-psychologist with 
misunderstanding, overlooking, and neglecting various key aspects. De 
Moor, Schreuder, Van Kemenade, and Kusters also criticised him of 
having little knowledge about the pace of social transformations, little 
understanding for the limited financial possibilities of research 
commissioners, a lack of expertise concerning sociological research, and a 
shortage of caution. In a reaction to De Bont’s theory of a Church political 
tunnel vision, they wrote that the history of both sociology and social 
transformations ‘proved’ the impossibility of a fundamental, enduring 
attachment of mankind to an institute if this ran against the social forces 
prevailing in society. De Moor, Schreuder, Van Kemenade, and Kusters 
did not return to the commissioning issue. Did they perhaps realise that De 
Bont was quite right when pointing at room for improvement? 
As Goddijn noted in a letter to like-minded priest-theologian Frans 
Haarsma, a specialist in dogmatic theology who worked as a professor at the 
Catholic University of Nijmegen and was susceptible to sociological modes 
of thinking, this public dispute did not do the vocation project any good.96 
The project was in fact ‘discredited’ on a mass scale. Possibly, such discredit 
has been the reason for no follow-up projects being carried out. More likely, 
however, is that there was no more funding available for expensive studies 
on religious vocation. Both Van Kemenade and Goddijn tried to find 
parties willing to invest in further research, yet without any success.97 These 
attempts were made at a time when ITS employees embarked on one of the 
largest sociological inquiries ever conducted in the Dutch Church Province: 
                                                          
95  ‘Wederwoord op dubieuze kritiek’, in: De Tijd, 08-05-1968 and 09-05-1968. 
96  Letter by Goddijn to Haarsma, 06-05-1968: KDC, PINK, 227.  
97  Correspondence between Goddijn and Van Kemenade, 1966: KDC, PINK, 222 and letters by 
Van Kemenade to Brekelmans (undated) and Vermeulen (29-10-1968): KDC, PINK, 218.  
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the celibacy poll. In an interview with a journalist from Het Limburgs 
Dagblad newspaper, published on 10 May 1968, De Bont stated that he was 
eagerly anticipating the research report.98 Let us now, then, take a closer 
look at this other project, its preparations, the polling text, the outcomes, 
and the reactions. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
In the first half of the 1960s, a desire of Church leaders and religious 
superiors to ‘optimise’ recruitment strategies increasingly went hand in 
hand with a demand for sociological inquiry. By 1964, two newly founded 
institutions competed for the status of research commissioner of an 
ambitious polling inquiry into the matter of religious vocation: PINK and 
LRR. Bishop De Vet chaired the first institution, which the Episcopacy and 
SNPR established. PINK aimed at integrating the vocation issue into a 
coherent national pastoral plan. Bishop Van Dodewaard chaired the latter 
institution, which the Episcopacy and religious superiors called into 
existence. LRR was expected to turn into a service centre for everyone 
interested in religious calling. In July 1965, the Episcopacy allowed PINK, 
and thus Goddijn, to act as research commissioner. Goddijn was the one 
who in the early 1960s argued in favour of a transformation concerning 
future sociological studies on religious calling. This transformation had to 
depart from the structural-functional notions of a ‘social system’ and 
‘dynamic stability’. Goddijn’s plea followed on years in which priest-
sociologist and KASKI employee Dellepoort conducted pioneering 
research. Dellepoort was the first to systematically investigate a recent drop 
in the number of priestly vocations. Drawing on a dense collection of 
statistical data and cartograms, he focused on the influence of internal 
backgrounds—for instance that of seminary life—on this drop. In contrast 
with Dellepoort’s inquiries, the polling study which took shape between 
1964 and 1968 included brothers and sisters into the research question. In 
addition, it put external causes at centre stage. That is, it conceptualised a 
religious calling as something part and parcel of a rational career choice, 
rather than as a divine call from God, and linked the ‘religious profession’ to 
secular ones such as that of the medical doctor and secondary school 
teacher. Criticism articulated by LRR representatives, who came to serve 
on the supervisory committee, as well as by De Moor, who presided this 
committee, did not have much effect on such a particular structural-
functional approach. The first preparations of the project took place within 
the walls of KASKI. Van Kemenade, the director of ITS, which was 
established several months after these preparations started, got the eventual 
initiative. The study only became a co-production between the Episcopacy 
and SNPR in July 1965, after the latter body came on board by carrying a 
financial burden. The bishops and members of the SNRP board did not 
                                                          
98  ‘ITS-rapport bekritiseerd en later weer verdedigd’, in: Het Limburgs Dagblad, 10-05-1968.  
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exert any influence on the wording of the questionnaire, which enabled the 
ITS staff to paint a ‘crisis’ in many colours. Nevertheless, they left an 
imprint on the general procedures. What they ended up with in the spring 
of 1968 was a sociological research report. This sociological research report 
nurtured a media-led crisis of vocation.  
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Chapter Four  
 
A RISKY CHURCH?  
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INTRODUCTION 
IN THE SPRING of 1963, a booklet titled Celibaatscrisis (Celibacy Crisis) was 
published anonymously. 1 In fact, it was published by Jan Brouwers, a priest 
of the Diocese of Roermond. Due to high demand, it had to be reprinted 
soon after. Prominent Catholic journalist Michel van der Plas also read it. 
He commented as follows: “The problem [of obliged celibacy] is like a 
wound in the body of the Church. One has to know the wound in order to 
heal it. The booklet under review makes sure that the wound will not be 
covered”.2 First and foremost, Brouwers purported that many priests no 
longer wholeheartedly accepted celibacy, and that the bishops should take a 
future lack of priests seriously. Furthermore, he held that history legitimised 
change: as the personal experience of celibacy varied over both time and 
place, celibacy law did not necessarily have to be rigid, and could be 
adapted to a new society. One of Brouwers’s recommendations to put an 
end to what he deemed as a ‘crisis’ was to carry out a polling project on the 
viability of priestly celibacy in contemporary society. 
Men entering the priestly office are bound not to marry and thus 
respect sexual abstinence. The principal determinations, anchored in canon 
law, are that priests are guilty of the charge of sacrilege if they marry, and 
face the risk of getting excommunicated.3 During the ordination ceremony, 
bishops make them aware of the gravity of these principal determinations 
by stating the following: “You ought anxiously to consider again and again 
what sort of a burden this is which you are taking upon you on own accord. 
Up to this, you are free. You may still, if you choose, turn to the aims and 
desires of the world. But if you receive this ordination, it will no longer be 
lawful to turn back from your purpose. You will be required to continue in 
                                                          
1  [BROUWERS], Celibaatscrisis, especially pp. 8–18. 
2  ‘Een crisis in het celibaat?’, in: Elsevier, 01-06-1963. 
3  Codex Iuris Canonici, 132.1, 985.3, 1072, and 2388.1. 
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the service of God, and with His assistance to observe chastity and to be 
bound forever in the ministrations of the Alter, to serve who is to reign”.4 It 
took hundreds of years before Church authorities transformed being 
unmarried from a clerical habit practiced in light of religious purity into a 
legal condition to enter the priestly office.5 This transformation accelerated 
by the end of the first millennium. During the Lateran Synod of 1059, 
which stood under command of Pope Nicholas II, the rules became stricter. 
Then, in 1123, the First Lateran Council passed an enactment declaring 
marriages contracted by clergymen themselves to be invalid. The Second 
Lateran Council (1139) further sharpened the regulations and the Council 
of Trent (1545–1563) once again underlined the necessity of celibacy.  
The answer to the question of how priestly celibacy became subject to 
public debate in the Dutch Church Province in the 1960s has not been 
systematically pursued before. What stands out historiographically is a brief 
historical overview compiled by psychologist Anke Hoenkamp-Bisschops by 
means of an introduction to a 1991 pilot study on the consequences of 
celibacy for the mental health of priests, and, later, into her 1993 doctoral 
thesis in which she elaborated on this pilot study.6 Hoenkamp-Bisschops 
placed emphasis on 1966 as a turning point. In October of this year, nine 
clergymen under the leadership of priest Ruud Bunnik sent a document to 
5,000 of their colleagues working in pastoral care. These petitioners were 
aware of the fact that an unmarried life could be a ‘blessing’ for both priests 
and laypeople. However, they simultaneously believed that the legal 
connection between the priestly office and celibacy ‘damaged’ the personal 
well-being of the priest as well as that of the Church as a whole. It 
‘discouraged’ many Catholic men to become a priest, often turned out to be 
an ‘obstacle’ rather than a ‘relief’, and forced some clergymen to ‘say 
farewell’ to their priestly lives. For these reasons, the petitioners declared 
that the disconnection of the priestly office and celibacy was an ‘urgent 
matter’. Hoenkamp-Bisschops also touched on the 1968 celibacy poll 
carried out by ITS and the voting outcomes of the Pastoral Council as 
constitutive forces in the rise of a celibacy question.  
Hoenkamp-Bisschops’s historical overview serves as the starting point 
when examining the links between sociological inquiry and ecclesiastical 
reform in this fourth chapter, with an emphasis on the 1968 celibacy poll. 
The first section is devoted to the origins of this poll. Goddijn initiated the 
inquiry after Bishop De Vet familiarised him with a concern about Bunnik’s 
1966 petition, upon which the PINK director took the lead. In the second 
                                                          
4  Quote taken from the Catholic Encyclopedia, which can be accessed on-line via: 
http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/. Visited on 31-10-2012.  
5  HOENKAMP-BISSCHOPS, Intimiteit en beschikbaarheid, pp. 80–90.  
6  Ibidem and HOENKAMP-BISSCHOPS, Celibaat: varianten van een beleving, pp. 18–30. 
See also: MAAS, Affektiviteit en celibaat, especially pp. 15–105, who leads the attention 
towards larger historical phenomena such as a transformation of images of mankind and God, 
secularisation, a change of ecclesiastical structures, democratisation, and a relative devaluation 
of celibacy in comparison to a marriage, but does not analyse the emerging discussions on 
priestly celibacy in the 1960s and their politisation in the second half of this decade. 
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section, I shall concentrate on the research design. The critique of 
psychologist Penders on the way in which the vocation poll was prepared, as 
explored in the previous chapter, did not have much effect. After contacting 
De Moor, Goddijn installed a supervisory committee consisting of a number 
of experts, and scripted vital preconditions of the inquiry. ITS became the 
enforcing research institute. The third section revolves around a discourse 
analysis of the polling text. It will be argued that, to a large degree, this text, 
too, echoed the negative convictions of its producers. Finally, in the final 
section, I shall analyse what happened after the poll was released from the 
walls of ITS. This poll fuelled controversy, and appeared in magazines, on 
the front pages of newspapers, and even on a popular television show 
viewed by millions of people.  
 
 
4.1. PRIESTLY CELIBACY ON THE AGENDA OF RESEARCH AND 
REFORM  
 
From Interview to Inquiry 
“Of course, priests also have an opinion about this issue [celibacy]; I believe 
that their opinion has never been examined in a systematic manner”, PINK 
director Goddijn said during a television interview aired on 11 November 
1963, on the occasion of the establishment of PINK. Goddijn emphasised 
that ordinary priests were not involved in the discussion of key questions in 
Rome during Vatican II. He stated that their points of view mattered. An 
investigation of these points of view would yield ‘a whole new insight’.  
A brief analysis of pastoral topics which had to be treated with 
priority—in December 1963, Goddijn requested 35 priests to send in their 
desires concerning Church reform—confirmed Goddijn’s conviction that 
celibacy was an issue that had more urgency than bishops were keen to 
admit.7 It took until October 1966 before he contacted KASKI director 
Kusters in order to explore the possibility of setting up a polling project. 
The reason for this lengthy interval could not be established. Perhaps 
Goddijn wanted to see the repercussions of an incident in 1964. On 1 
February of that year, young chaplains Jan Fraats and Mathieu Schlijper 
from the Diocese of Roermond publicly challenged statements in favour of 
celibacy made by Alfrink on several occasions in 1963. 8  Their critical 
remarks, which rested to a large extent on social scientific understandings 
                                                          
7  GODDIJN, De moed niet verliezen, p. 63. 
8  FRAATS and SCHLIJPER, ‘Het celibaat’, in: De Nieuwe Linie, 01-02-1964. For the 
resonance of this article in the media, see: ‘Dit blijkt tot de veranderlijke dingen te horen’, in: 
Limburgs Dagblad, 13-02-1964, ‘Maatregel tegen twee kapelaans na publicatie van artikel over 
het celibaat’, in: De Tijd, 20-02-1964, ‘Maatregel tegen twee kapelaans’, in: Limburgs 
Dagblad, 21-02-1964, ‘Inzage vooraf was niet beloofd’, in: De Tijd, 21-02-1964, ‘Kapelaans 
door bisschop onder censuur gesteld’, in: Het Vrije Volk, 22-02-1964, and ‘Bisschop stelt twee 
kapelaans onder censuur’, in: De Waarheid, 28-02-1964. 
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and attracted a great deal of media attention, incited Cardinal Alfrink and 
Bishop Moors to ban them from further writing.  
Another, and more likely, possibility is that Goddijn wanted to await 
the conclusions of PINK’s Priestly Experience of Faith Committee. Priest-
theologian Willem Grossouw chaired this committee. A specialist in the 
New Testament, he worked as a professor at the Haaren Seminary of the 
Diocese of Den Bosch between 1936 and 1953, and became a professor at 
the Catholic University of Nijmegen in 1947.9 Priest-theologians Haarsma, 
Van Rijen, and Ferdinand de Grijs, and psychologist Jan van Galen 
O.Carm., were other prominent committee members. De Grijs was a 
specialist in dogmatic theology who operated as an advisor of KRO, and 
would work as a professor at the Rijsenburg Seminary of the Archdiocese of 
Utrecht in 1966 and 1967, and as a professor at the Catholic School for 
Theology in Amsterdam from 1967 onwards.10 Van Galen was a professor 
at the educational centre of the Carmelite Order and assisted many 
congregations when it came to incorporating ‘renewal’ into day-to-day 
practices. 11  In a pastoral-theological memorandum completed in April 
1965, the PINK committee linked biblical passages to the sociologically 
informed notion of the priestly office as a profession and to the basic 
concepts of role theory. 12  With regard to priestly celibacy, its members 
strongly advised the bishops to stimulate in-depth inquiry. “It is 
understandable that the Church does not give up celibacy easily”, they 
wrote, “but that in itself does not legitimise a maintenance, for the moral 
dilemmas and social conflicts of thousands of priests will invariably continue 
to exist”. 
The petition drafted by Bunnik and eight other priests ultimately led 
to Goddijn’s enquiry at KASKI. As a letter written by Goddijn to Bishop 
De Vet on 31 October 1966 demonstrates, De Vet feared the public turmoil 
that this petition could cause.13 He summoned Goddijn to contact Bunnik 
in order to find out whether the results were to be published. Bunnik replied 
that the outcome of the petition would indeed be made public. He also 
appealed for a more reliable poll initiated or at least endorsed by the 
bishops, upon which Goddijn immediately got in touch with Kusters.  
How did Kusters respond to the idea to conduct an ‘objective’ 
investigation into the clergy’s opinions on obliged celibacy? Perhaps 
somewhat predictably, Kusters was supportive of this idea. Clear and 
nuanced research results would be of ‘great value’ and enable the bishops to 
adjust their policy more to ‘reality’, he noted. 14  By means of a written 
questionnaire, his employees at KASKI could swiftly ask all the priests in 
                                                          
9  SIMONS and WINKELER, Het verraad der clecken, p. 410. 
10  Ibidem. 
11  Van HEIJST, DERKS, and MONTEIRO, Ex Caritate, especially pp. 596–598. 
12  Paper Geloofsbeleving van de priester, April 1965, especially pp. 23–29: KDC, PINK, 837. 
13  Letter by Goddijn to De Vet, 31-10-1966: KDC, PINK, 241. 
14  The original letter has not been found. Yet, Kusters’s answer remains: letter from Kusters to 
the PINK Board, 04-11-1966: KDC, PINK, 213. 
 CHAPTER FOUR: A RISKY CHURCH?  
 
[133] 
the Netherlands whether they endorsed a disconnection of the priestly office 
and celibacy. According to Kusters, the sociocultural backgrounds of their 
opinions and the structural implications of a possible disconnection had to 
be included in the research. He envisaged a questionnaire consisting of 
three parts. In the first part, personal information such as age and education 
had to be collected, while celibacy itself needed to be explored in the second 
part. The last part should focus on priestly duties and tasks, “in particular to 
observe whether and to what extent the celibacy crisis is a derivative of a 
general crisis of the priestly office”. KASKI was able to start to prepare a 
poll in December 1966 and publish a report around Lent 1967. The project 
cost 14,200 Guilders excluding forwarding charges. Kusters requested a 
follow-up project with interviews. 
Goddijn reached out to De Moor in order to get a second opinion. He 
wanted him to take a closer look at ‘the first stage’ of the polling proposal 
and for the moment to ignore ‘the second stage’, the follow-up interviews. 
Goddijn urged De Moor to hurry, since he had planned to communicate 
with the bishops within that same week. 15  De Moor replied using the 
telephone in order not to lose any valuable time. He later reported on this 
call in a letter.16 A polling inquiry could be useful, De Moor wrote, but 
three matters had to be considered. To begin with, it was important to find 
out to what extent celibacy was ‘functional’ or ‘dysfunctional’ for the 
Church as a whole. Such ‘functionality’ or ‘dysfunctionality’, however, 
could only be weakly established by means of the opinions of individuals. 
Furthermore, a poll would strengthen the idea that individual opinions 
mattered in the Church, which, despite various democratic tendencies, 
remained a hierarchical institute. Finally, when a project would be 
commissioned or approved by the bishops, sociologists needed to eliminate 
as many interpretative problems as possible. De Moor concluded that a 
decent polling study could not be carried out in such a short period of time 
and with such a low budget. In the context of the Pastoral Council, he 
advised Goddijn to install a working group containing Church authorities as 
well as scholars. They had to determine what aspects were to be explored in 
the questionnaire and how. They should also write down a detailed research 
assignment and continue to function as a supervisory committee. Operating 
carefully was essential, De Moor stressed, “not only to obtain a maximum 
scientific profit, but also and especially to prevent poor research results from 
being used by public opinion to undermine episcopal policy”. 
As planned, Goddijn wrote a letter to De Vet in that same week. 
Goddijn asked him whether the Episcopacy approved the establishment of a 
supervisory committee and the preparation of a press statement, and 
prompted the bishops to quickly make a decision of principle.17 Goddijn 
must have been in such a hurry because he recognised that the momentum 
                                                          
15  Letter by Goddijn to De Moor, 29-11-1966: KDC, PINK, 213. 
16  Letter by De Moor to Goddijn, 02-12-1966: KDC, PINK, 213. 
17  Letter by Goddijn to De Vet, 05-12-1966: KDC, PINK, 241.  
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was there. In De Tijd newspaper published on 10 November 1966, Bishop 
Jansen from the Diocese of Rotterdam stated that it was ‘evident’ that a 
scientific polling project would be carried out in the wake of the October 
petition, since this petition had ‘little scientific value’.18 On 20 December 
1966, De Vet informed Goddijn that the matter had been discussed.19 The 
bishops decided to give the green light, but claimed the right to veto 
committee candidates and explicitly did not want an expert committee to be 
formed for the purpose of the Pastoral Council. De Vet instructed Goddijn 
to propose the committee candidates and draft a press communiqué.  
 
The Van Laarhoven Committee  
The bishops attempted to stay in control and keep the celibacy question off 
the conciliar agenda in December 1966. It was only a year prior to this 
point that Pope Paul VI reacted to the efforts of several Brazilian bishops to 
address celibacy at the Second Vatican Council by withholding this issue 
from being discussed by the Council Fathers.20 The Pope believed that such 
a discussion would be highly inappropriate. He declared that he intended to 
maintain and protect the ancient discipline of the Latin Church, thereby 
holding on to celibacy as a tradition belonging to the so-called ‘essentialia’: 
the fundamental matters in the Catholic Church which, by their very 
nature, could not be subject to change. For the Dutch bishops, to allow the 
celibacy question to be treated within the context of the Pastoral Council 
without further investigation meant to decrease their own negotiation 
margins in Rome. 
Goddijn was able to influence the composition of the supervisory 
committee to a considerable degree. Strikingly, he shortlisted Bunnik.21 The 
bishops did not agree on Bunnik’s membership, though, as they wished for 
candidates willing to consider “every solution of the problem”, including 
that of a full maintenance of celibacy law. 22  Other disapproved of 
candidates were theologian Haarsma and priest-psychologists Van Galen 
and Willem Berger, who worked at the Van der Hoeven Clinic in Utrecht 
and would become a lector at the Nijmegen University in 1968. 23  The 
bishops did not want many connections to exist between the group guiding 
the celibacy inquiry and PINK’s Priestly Experience of the Faith Committee 
Committee. They were convinced that this committee advocated a 
                                                          
18  ‘Bisschop van Rotterdam: Enquête celibaat onzuiver opgezet’, in: De Tijd, 10-11-1966 and 
‘Plan van bisschoppen: officiële enquête over celibaat’, in: de Volkskrant, 11-11-1966. See also: 
‘Kardinaal Alfrink: celibaatscrisis is vaak geloofscrisis’, in: Brabants Dagblad, 24-12-1966. In 
this interview, Alfrink pled for a more thorough inquiry. 
19  Letter by De Vet to Goddijn, 20-12-1966: KDC, PINK, 241. 
20  O’MALLEY, What happened at Vatican II, pp. 270–272. 
21  Letter by Goddijn to the bishops, 30-12-1966: KDC, PINK, 213. 
22  Minutes of the Episcopacy meeting on 10-01-1967: BARD, 312.1, BV. Emphasis in  
 original document. 
23  SIMONS and WINKELER, Het verraad der clecken, p. 403. 
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professionalisation of the office, and thereby, desacralised what essentially 
was a godly matter.24  
In a second round, Goddijn successfully proposed the names of Vicar-
general Jan van Laarhoven (chairman), Van Rijen, psychologist and lector 
at the Nijmegen University Jan Weima, and sociologists Van Kemenade 
(secretary), Kusters, and De Moor.25 Van Laarhoven had just succeeded 
Rooyackers as a vicar-general in the Diocese of Den Bosch, where he 
became responsible for matters related to pastoral care. As such, Van 
Laarhoven formed a direct link to the Episcopacy. Goddijn also formulated 
the committee’s task: “to examine to what extent a research on the 
functioning of celibacy in the Netherlands could soon be designed and form 
a working group able to guide this study”.26 In a previous version of this 
mandate, the word ‘examine’ had been followed by the words ‘if, and’.27 
The deletion of these words shows that it was suddenly no longer the 
question of if a polling inquiry could be conducted. This inquiry would be 
carried out regardless. 
 
 
4.2. THE CELIBACY POLL IN THE MAKING  
 
The Preparatory Study 
The first committee meeting took place on 13 April 1967.28 On the basis of 
De Moor’s lines of reasoning, Kusters’s suggestions were mainly rejected. 
The attendees, including the KASKI director himself, envisaged a more 
comprehensive project. Since the celibacy question had a complicated 
character, they concluded that an intensive preparation of the inquiry was 
crucial. ITS, not KASKI, would carry out a preparatory study costing 
18,400 Guilders. Additionally, two more experts would be asked to join the 
committee: Schreuder and Haarsma. They ‘secured’ a sociological and 
pastoral-theological contribution. The bishops approved both outcomes.29 
This acceptance implied that Haarsma entered the committee via the back 
door, and that sociology and theology were perceived as the key forms of 
expertise. 
Before ITS employees tested the questionnaire on 25 randomly 
selected priests, the Van Laarhoven Committee supervised the preparatory 
study. Its members discussed a refinement of the research problem, the 
selection of the respondents, the questionnaire, and the polling costs during 
                                                          
24  Letter by de Vet to Goddijn, 12-01-1967: KDC, PINK, 241 and minutes of the PINK Board 
meeting on 16-01-1967: KDC, PINK, 817. 
25  Letter by De Vet to Goddijn, 20-02-1967: KDC, PINK, 241. See also: letter by Goddijn to 
Van Laarhoven, Van Kemenade, Kusters, De Moor, Van Rijen, and Weima, 24-02-1967, 
including replies: KDC, PINK, 213 and minutes of the Episcopacy meeting on 14-02-1967: 
BARD, 312.1, BV. 
26  Letter by Goddijn to the bishops, 30-12-1966: KDC, PINK, 213. 
27  Letter by Goddijn to the bishops, 20-01-1967: KDC, PINK, 213. 
28  Minutes of the committee meeting on 13-04-1967: KDC, PINK, 213. 
29  Minutes of the Episcopacy meeting on 09-05-1967: BARD, 312.1, BV. 
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three sessions.30 In order to demonstrate how scientific facts and the image 
of a crisis were constructed, it is relevant to take a closer look at the 
deliberations about the exact wording of the list of questions and statements, 
as drafted by Van Kemenade and ITS employee Van Westerlaak. On 30 
August 1967, the committee made numerous corrections in the polling 
section on the personal experience of celibacy.31 The most radical changes 
concerned the insertion of an item about the perception of difficulties with 
celibacy as a possible enrichment of the priestly life and the insertion of two 
items about opinions prevailing in circles of acquaintance. Moreover, the 
committee decided that the ‘personal crisis of faith’ was not reflected 
enough in the section focusing on the individual orientation towards the 
Church. Its members therefore reworded various items in this section 
during the next meeting, which took place on 13 September 1967.32  
On 15 September 1967, Van Laarhoven informed Goddijn that the 
committee had successfully guided the preparations, which ITS would 
complete within a couple of days, and that the project would now benefit 
from the bishops taking a decision of principle as soon as possible.33 Goddijn 
quickly contacted these Church authorities, sending them the polling 
proposal.34 What kind of document did they receive? The first paragraph of 
the proposal focused on the content of the poll. 35  The project, Van 
Kemenade and Van Westerlaak claimed, centred around the priestly 
attitude towards celibacy. One of its main goals was to ‘measure’ the 
numbers of advocates and opponents of obliged celibacy. The following 
consequences would also be examined: that of celibacy for the psychological 
development of the priest, that of an unmarried life for his contacts with 
others, that of celibacy for his role as a priest, and that of celibacy for his 
spiritual life. Furthermore, Van Kemenade and Van Westerlaak proposed 
to scrutinise the opinions that priests had on the Catholic faith and the 
Church, their appreciation of priestly duties, and the extent to which they 
believed in certain religious values. The latter, in particular, would allow 
ITS employees to unveil a ‘crisis of faith’.  
What this paragraph shows is that Van Kemenade and Van 
Westerlaak highlighted an eventual lack of clerical support for the obligated 
nature of celibacy as well as other elements of crisis. The second paragraph 
directed attention towards the methodology. According to Van Kemenade 
and Van Westerlaak, a project about such a delicate religious matter ‘ideally 
lent’ itself to a written approach, since this guaranteed anonymity and thus 
                                                          
30  Minutes of the committee meetings on 15-05-1967, 30-08-1967, and 13-09-1967:  
 KDC, PINK, 213. 
31  Minutes of the committee meeting on 30-08-1967: KDC, PINK, 213. 
32  Minutes of the committee meeting on 13-09-1967: KDC, PINK, 213. 
33  Letter by Van Laarhoven to Goddijn, 15-09-1967: KDC, PINK, 213. 
34  Letter by Goddijn to the Episcopacy, 19-09-1967: KDC, PINK, 213. 
35  The following passages are based on the ITS proposal: Voorstel voor een schriftelijke enquête 
met betrekking tot de houding ten aanzien van het verplichte ambtscelibaat (Nijmegen 1967): 
KDC, PINK, 214. See also: letter by Van Kemenade to Goddijn, 22-09-1967:  
 KDC, PINK, 213. 
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a more honest response. The majority of the dimensions of attitude would 
be examined by means of standardised scaling items and the statistical 
method of factor analysis. Open questions would be raised in order to 
challenge multiple choice answers, touch on unexpected aspects, and 
provide priests with the opportunity to bring up matters in their own words. 
Van Kemenade and Van Westerlaak discerned four subpopulations: 
emeritus priests, missionaries spending their holidays in the Netherlands, 
priests ‘on duty’, and priestly candidates (deacons and subdeacons). It was 
preferable to send the questionnaire to the entire clergy. A random sample 
could lead to ‘needless and undeserved suspicion’ against the study.  
In other words, Van Kemenade and Van Westerlaak were seriously 
concerned about the public trustworthiness of the project. This 
trustworthiness needed to be prioritised, even if this led to substantial extra 
work and costs. The third paragraph addressed the time schedule. Van 
Kemenade and Van Westerlaak planned to bring the questionnaire into 
circulation between 16 and 23 October 1967. A week later, a reminder 
letter would be sent. From 25 October until 3 November 1967, the answers 
would be coded. In the meantime, the punching process had to begin, 
which would continue until 20 November 1967. Until 25 November 1967, 
the computer would process the data, and the analysis would take place 
until 12 February 1968. Between 22 January and 4 March 1968, the 
research report would be written. Van Kemenade would be able to submit 
a final version of this report to PINK around 8 April 1968.  
Before the fifth paragraph cast light on several more main issues such 
as the structure of the research report, the number of copies of this 
document, the contacts between ITS as the executing research institution 
and the Van Laarhoven Committee, and the necessity of two follow-up 
projects, the fourth paragraph gave insight into the expense. Canvassing the 
entire population of approximately 10,000 priests would cost 55,300 
Guilders. If half of all the priests were polled, this would demand an 
investment of approximately 42,000 Guilders.36  
 
Delay and Internal Opposition 
Up to October 1967, Goddijn had little reason to be unsatisfied with the 
progress of the polling project. A research blueprint was completed in a 
relatively short period of time and no major problems plagued the 
preparations. A letter sent to priest Nico Vendrik mirrors this satisfaction. 
Vendrik worked as a student pastor in Utrecht between 1945 and 1965, and 
moderated the National Union of Catholic Student Associations from 1956 
until 1965.37 In 1967, he became truly important to the bishops because 
they appointed him as the director of CAPER. Tension between theological 
                                                          
36  In the end, the polling project on celibacy costed significantly more as a result of an exceeding 
of nearly 25,000 Guilders: letter by Van Kemenade to the PINK Board, 29-06-1970:  
 KDC, PINK, 675. 
37  SIMONS and WINKELER, Het verraad der clecken, p. 428.  
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and social scientific forms of reasoning characterised the institute’s 
formative years.38 Whereas experts united in a KNBGG study group argued 
in favour of the professionalisation of the mental care of priests and religious 
in terms of the establishment of an external, independent institution, the 
bishops and religious superiors refused to give up control and responsibility. 
A compromise was reached by these three parties, meaning that KNBGG 
gained a significant share in determining the staffing policy. Vendrik 
profited from this development. Strategically, he was interesting for Goddijn 
precisely because he operated at the heart of the mental care scene as far as 
the priests and religious themselves were concerned. Between 1967 and 
1977, CAPER invested much time in guiding many of those struggling with 
celibacy, bidding farewell to their office, and leaving their convent. In his 
letter to Vendrik, Goddijn noted that the bishops had concluded to send the 
questionnaire to all the priests, deacons, and subdeacons in the 
Netherlands.39 The PINK director still expected some kind of resistance, 
however: “It might be the case that they’ll retreat a bit now that they’ve 
received the questions. We’ll see. As soon as the financial matters are 
settled, the questionnaire goes out”.  
Goddijn’s feeling did not prove him wrong. The bishops, so it 
appeared during a telephone call between Goddijn and Alfrink on 11 
October 1967, insisted on a thorough assessment of the questionnaire as 
well as of one of the two accompanying documents: an episcopal letter 
written by Van Laarhoven. 40  Effectively, this meant that the tight time 
schedule would be thwarted. A letter sent by Alfrink to Goddijn soon after 
the telephone conversation ended suggests that the latter tightened the 
screws, using time pressure as a weapon: “It occurs to me that it is really 
necessary that the bishops have the opportunity to discuss the matter. I 
mean both questionnaire and concept letter. This seems quite normal to 
me, by the way”.41 Clearly not amused about the delay, Goddijn informed 
Van Laarhoven straight away. Van Laarhoven subsequently urged the 
bishops not to examine the questionnaire down to the last detail. 42  He 
emphasised that a committee of experts had laboured intensively over the 
exact wording, while ITS took full responsibility for the technical aspects of 
the poll. Because everyone involved knew about the limitations of polling, 
and realised that the questionnaire would always leave something to be 
desired, a detailed criticism would be ‘unwelcome’. 
 Here, Van Laarhoven set out to minimise the influence of the 
bishops. Speaking on behalf of the Van Laarhoven Committee, he claimed 
expertise and implied that the Episcopacy should stick to its primary job: 
                                                          
38  MONTEIRO, ‘Discretie en deskundigheid’, pp. 70–72 and JACOBS, Werken in een 
dwarsverband, pp. 112–115. 
39  Letter by Goddijn to Vendrik, 06-10-1967: KDC, PINK, 213.  
40  Letter by Goddijn to the bishops, 12-10-1967: KDC, PINK, 213.  
41  Letter by Alfrink to Goddijn, 17-10-1967: KDC, PINK, 231. See also: minutes of the 
Episcopacy meeting on 22-09-1967: BARD, 312.1, BV. 
42  Letter by Van Laarhoven to Hendriksen, 13-10-1967: KDC, PINK, 213.  
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governing the Church. Yet another problem would soon loom on Van 
Laarhoven’s horizon. This time, Kusters strongly objected against the way 
in which the polling study took shape. He only attended the first meeting of 
the Van Laarhoven Committee on 13 April 1967, and instructed his 
employee Thoen to participate in the following three sessions. After 
receiving the polling blueprint, he sent a lengthy letter of complaint to Van 
Laarhoven.  
On a more general level, Kusters stated that the research activities of 
KASKI were reduced to the bare minimum without good reason. 43  In 
addition, he regretted the fact that the other committee members simply put 
aside Thoen’s critique. Kusters detailed four other complaints. Firstly, he 
believed that the committee did not respect its—limited—assignment. Its 
members scripted an entire research project and there seemed no way back. 
Worse than this, Kusters noted, was that a possible disconnection of 
celibacy and the priestly office played a predominant role in the 
questionnaire, which probably ran against the will of the bishops. Secondly, 
Kusters took a critical view against the methodology. This should be 
elaborated more extensively. He also believed that the committee members 
did not acknowledge that the polling results could be misused by certain 
individuals or pressure groups. Thirdly, Kusters questioned the time 
schedule: the polling project was meticulously staged, but little information 
about the two follow-up projects could be found. Besides, the planning of 
both the second study (an in-depth psychological and sociological inquiry 
with interviews which would complement the polling results and yield more 
insights into the links between and the structures of the numerous data) and 
the third research (a paper in which a number of experts would provide the 
bishops with well-founded policy advice) was ‘extremely vague’. Last came 
Kusters’s objections against the wording of the questionnaire. The negative 
perceptions that the committee members and ITS employees had of 
celibacy echoed much too strongly in the raised items. Various ‘one-
dimensional’ and ‘over-simplified’ questions would collide head-on with the 
sensitivity of the priest. According to Kusters, the only solution to counter 
this outpouring of negativity was to formulate items denoting a more refined 
and positive view on celibacy. 
Kusters had to wait for about two weeks before he received a reply. 
Remarkably, Van Laarhoven did not return to the argument that KASKI 
was more or less written out of the project.44 With respect to the activities of 
Thoen, Van Laarhoven commented that Kusters had never informed him 
about this replacement, and that every member of the committee always 
had ample opportunity to put forward criticism. Van Laarhoven also 
disagreed on Kusters’s first detailed objection. He believed that the bishops, 
too, perceived a possible disconnection of celibacy and the priestly office as 
one of the study’s main points of departure. Concerning the second, third, 
                                                          
43  Letter by Kusters to Van Laarhoven, 12-12-1967: KDC, PINK, 213. 
44  Letter by Van Laarhoven to Kusters, 27-12-1967: KDC, PINK, 213. 
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and fourth detailed complaints, Van Laarhoven reasoned that Kusters was 
mostly wrong and only sometimes partly right. During a plenary session that 
followed, the members of the Van Laarhoven Committee admitted that 
they needed to think over various matters such as the follow-up projects, yet 
unanimously characterised Kusters’s actions as ‘condemnable’. 45  The 
KASKI director was ‘wrong’ to raise objections without suggesting 
alternative options. When asked whether he still supported the project, 
Kusters answered affirmatively. It was only his primary aim, he explained, 
to prevent the polling results from becoming the ‘last and only normative 
verdict’ about a complex Church political issue.  
In the meantime, the bishops pored over the questionnaire as well as 
the accompanying letter, during a meeting on 14 November 1967.46 In a 
reaction to Van Laarhoven’s ‘advice’, they declared that they did not want 
to express their opinions on questions related to the research technique. In 
order to avoid misunderstanding, they did want to inform the Holy See 
about the polling project themselves. They argued that it should be stressed 
that the project was initiated a long time ago and that it served a clear 
pastoral goal: “How could the bishops handle the factual situation, which 
they would like to understand in great detail?”. The Episcopacy intervened 
quite heavily by instructing all parties involved to adjust the questions 
concerning the encyclical Sacerdotalis Caelibatus, so that they would 
become less suggestive, and not to place emphasis on celibacy. The poll had 
to be presented, not as an inquiry into that issue, but instead as a 
‘marshalling of information about various aspects of the priestly office in 
general and the daily life of the priest in particular’. This implied that both 
the questionnaire and the accompanying letter had to be restructured and 
reworded. Finally, the bishops noted that the opinions of the ‘People of 
God’ (‘Godsvolk’) must be integrated into the inquiry, for instance by 
referring to a poll recently conducted by Margriet magazine.  
These episcopal desiderata, which Bishop Jan Bluyssen from the 
Diocese of Den Bosch talked through with his vicar-general Van 
Laarhoven, indicate that the bishops found themselves between a rock and 
a hard place. They approved the polling project, but realised that the study 
could lead to trouble in Rome. In the end, they demanded a substantial 
reconfiguration of the questionnaire. It was only several months prior to this 
point that Pope Paul VI issued Sacerdotalis Caelibatus in order to call the 
global discussion on priestly celibacy to an end. 47  The value of priestly 
celibacy remained undiminished, the Pope explained, “even in our time 
when the outlook of men and the state of the world have undergone such 
profound changes”. The determination not to marry should support the 
office holders in their ‘total choice of the love of Christ’, uphold them in the 
                                                          
45  Minutes of the committee meeting on 18-01-1968: KDC, PINK, 213. 
46  Minutes of the Episcopacy meeting on 14-11-1967: BARD, 312.1, BV. 
47  Quotes taken from the official text, as it can be found on the Vatican’s website: 
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/paul_vi/encyclicals. Visited on 07-11-2012. 
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‘entire dedication’ of himself to the public worship of God and the service of 
the Church, and distinguish their state of life of both among the faithful and 
in the world at large. An increase in the number of abandonments of the 
priestly office and a decrease in the number of priestly candidates were 
important developments in the Dutch Church Province. These 
developments, painstakingly documented by KASKI at PINK’s request, 
contributed to the dissolution of the age-old Rijsenburg Seminary of the 
Archdiocese of Utrecht as well as of the other seminaries in the autumn of 
1967.48 In effect, this educational reform implied that priestly candidates 
had to make their way to the university, where they followed courses 
together with (married) lay Catholics who wanted to become pastoral 
workers. Contrary to priests, pastoral workers were not entitled to 
administering the Sacraments. Even though Cardinal Alfrink himself still 
believed in the power of celibacy, and would continue to do so in the future, 
he was well aware of the fact that a large number of Catholics and a 
younger generation of priests and priestly candidates did not.  
Goddijn, the members of the Van Laarhoven Committee, and the ITS 
researchers agreed on the strategy of the bishops, meaning that the 
questionnaire and the accompanying letter were adjusted to the episcopal 
desires.49 Just as Goddijn secured extra funding for the vocation project, 
moreover, he now contacted the trustees of the Nijmegen University. 50 
Goddijn informed them that the Episcopacy had commissioned polling 
research in order to yield objective insights into the priestly life. He went on 
by asking whether ITS employees could perhaps use the university 
computer for free. The bishops appreciated a ‘full continuation’ of the 
expensive project, Goddijn emphasised, since this project could provide 
them with ‘important information’. The trustees reciprocated on 15 March 
1968.51 The equipment in the university computer centre, they wrote, was 
purchased by means of government money. Consequently, they thought 
that is was incorrect to allow external parties to use this equipment for free. 
The contract signed with computer manufacturer IBM also declared that 
the IBM systems should be used for scientific purposes only. Nevertheless, 
the trustees believed in the value of the polling project for episcopal decision 
making, and therefore chose to apply the internal price. As a result, the 
costs of using the computer would be more or less halved.  
 
 
4.3. HOW TO CAPTURE A CELIBACY CRISIS 
 
 
 
                                                          
48  Van SCHAIK, Alfrink, pp. 382–383. 
49  In 2008, Van Kemenade denied the possibility of the Episcopacy having influenced  
 the questionnaire: interview by Dols with Van Kemenade, 03-12-2008. 
50  Letter by Goddijn to the university trustees, 09-02-1968: KDC, PINK, 213. 
51  Letter by the university trustees to Goddijn, 15-03-1968: KDC, PINK, 213. 
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An Analysis of the Questionnaire  
In February 1968, ITS sent a questionnaire containing 39 questions and 
statements to 8,879 priests, deacon, and subdeacons. They had to work 
through five sections. Some questions did not apply to the priestly 
candidates. The first section concerning personal data consisted of 
seventeen items.52 These items were raised in order to yield data on the 
sociocultural backgrounds of the respondents. After they had indicated how 
old they were (item 1), how they were educated (item 2), whether they were 
a regular or secular priest (item 3), or a deacon or subdeacon (item 4), and 
how large the Catholic community was in which they were active (item 6), 
the items 10 until 16 requested that they reflect upon their priestly duties. 
Similar to the parents questioned in the vocation project, the priests, 
deacons, and subdeacons were often prompted to think in general terms 
and encouraged to evaluate matters in a negative manner. The answering 
possibilities to item 10 (‘Do you regard all activities you currently undertake 
as meaningful for a priest, or are there also activities you do not regard as 
meaningful for a priest?’) were the following options: ‘all meaningful for a 
priest’, ‘some not meaningful for a priest’, ‘many unmeaningful for a priest’, 
‘all unmeaningful for a priest’, and ‘no opinion’. Hence, there were more 
possibilities to answer negatively (three) than positively (one). The same 
argument goes for the answering possibilities to the items 11 until 13a: 
‘sufficient’, ‘not totally sufficient’, ‘insufficient’, and ‘no opinion’. And only if 
the respondents answered negatively to the items 13a and 15a, which was 
thus probable because the negative answering possibilities again 
outnumbered the positive ones, were they asked to elaborate on their 
opinions. What they believed in, and why, did not seem to matter much.  
Item 17 marked the end of the first polling section.53 The respondents 
were incited ten times to take a closer look at two binary-opposed and 
sometimes suggestively worded statements concerning the ‘role’ of the 
priest, and then choose the one that appealed most to them. One statement 
mirrored a more classical, or traditional, conceptualisation of the priestly 
office (‘The main duties of the priest are related to worship, preaching, and 
administering the sacraments’), the other a more modern one (‘The main 
duties of the priest are related to the immediate care for the actual needs of 
his fellow men’). After the respondents picked a certain statement, they were 
expected to indicate to what extent they agreed with it: ‘yes!’, ‘yes.’, or 
‘yes?’. What is most striking about this polling item is that it, too, did not 
leave much space for a nuanced view, and that the communication 
structure was unbalanced in that the traditionally informed statements often 
came first.  
The second section of the poll regarding ‘the meaning of celibacy, 
generally speaking’ contained three items.54 Item 19 asked the respondents 
                                                          
52  Questionnaire, pp. 1–6: KDC, PINK, 214. 
53  Ibidem, p. 6. 
54  Ibidem, pp. 7–9. 
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to reveal whether they deemed celibacy really meaningful, practically 
desirable, not necessary, or disadvantageous for the priest, or whether they 
did not have an opinion. The next item requested them to link these five 
answering possibilities to specific categories of priests such as seculars, 
regulars, and bishops. The manner in which these two items would be 
answered was influenced by the extensive and crucial item 18. Here, the 
respondents were prompted to focus on 29 general statements. Did they 
totally or generally agree with these statements, or perhaps fairly or totally 
disagree? Or did they have no opinion? Opponents of celibacy were given 
more opportunity to articulate their opinion than advocates were. It 
consisted of theologically underpinned arguments (‘Celibacy makes the 
priest more highly valued by the people’, ‘For the people, celibacy is a 
visible sign of and a reference to the Kingdom of God’, and ‘Celibacy allows 
the priest to follow Christ better’) that were being portrayed as outdated in 
public discourse.55 These arguments, often with biblical references, could 
easily be rejected by opponents of celibacy. But they could not be confirmed 
easily by advocates. Furthermore, the respondents were not able to expand 
on more practical arguments in favour of celibacy. 
The third section of the poll, spanning through from item 21 until 25, 
focused on the attitude of the clergy towards an eventual liberalisation of 
obliged celibacy: four out of five items addressed this possibility and its 
repercussions exclusively. 56  Item 21 asked the priests, deacons, and 
subdeacons to agree, disagree, or give no opinion on two statements 
regarding obliged celibacy, two statements concerning dispensation 
possibilities, and two statements about a disconnection of celibacy and the 
priestly office. The reaction to the first statement (‘I believe that obliged 
celibacy has to be maintained for all priests’) set the tone immediately. Items 
22 and 23 urged the respondents to think about ‘practical problems’ which 
could arise if the priestly office and celibacy were disconnected, as well as 
about the consequences of such ‘problems’ for the pace of a possible 
disconnection. The most suggestive item of this section echoed the 
conviction of the ITS employees and committee members responsible for 
the questionnaire that there was already such a thing as a problematic 
situation. It incited the respondents to reflect upon the question of whether 
the ‘celibacy problem’ would be solved satisfactorily if priestly celibacy was 
maintained but a significant amount of priestly duties were given to the 
laity.  
After section four (the items from 26 until 28) explored the daily 
situation in which priests, deacons, and subdeacons lived, the last section of 
the poll examined the personal experience of celibacy and the orientation 
towards the Church. 57  This section not only contained the suggestively 
worded item 33 (‘Do you have the impression that the difficulties you have 
                                                          
55  See, for instance: BUNNIK, Gehuwde en ongehuwde priesters, especially pp. 82–125. 
56  Questionnaire, pp. 10–11: KDC, PINK, 214. 
57   Ibidem, pp. 12–18. 
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encountered in your experience of celibacy have enriched your life as a 
priest?’) and the binary-opposed item 34a (‘Do you accept celibacy because 
you really find it meaningful for the priestly office and the religious life, or 
do you only accept it ‘as part of the deal’?’), but also three larger items 
holding statements and articles of faith. Item 29 encouraged the 
respondents to assess 24 statements such as ‘I often feel lonely’ on the basis 
of a balanced five point scale. Item 35 consisted of 21 statements (ranging 
from ‘A good Catholic has to accept everything that the Church deems 
worthy of belief’ to ‘The Church needs to hold itself back from articulating 
hand down statements about methods of birth control’). Again, five 
balanced answering options were given per statement. And item 36 
provoked the respondents to appraise eleven articles of faith. These articles 
were primarily traditional ones such as the bodily resurrection of Christ, the 
divine inspiration of the Bible, the infallibility of the Pope, the miracles in 
the Gospel, and the bodily virginity of Mary. By listing these articles, it 
appears that the ITS employees and committee members were trying to 
prove the demise of traditional values and beliefs. The very item reworded 
at the bishops’ request, item 37, dealt with the encyclical Sacerdotalis 
Caelibatus. It first enquired about general knowledge of this encyclical, after 
which it asked the priests, deacons, and subdeacons to reflect in their own 
words upon the document’s conclusion, lines of argument, moment of 
publication, formulation, and eventual other aspects. The last question of 
the poll, which addressed the relationship between the Dutch Church 
Province and universal Church in general and the Pope in particular, held 
particular importance from the viewpoint of episcopal decision making: ‘Do 
you believe that the Dutch Church Province should pursue its own policy 
regarding celibacy?’. Here, the respondents were only asked to elaborate on 
their answer if they believed that a different Dutch policy was necessary. 
How they reacted to this specific question, as well as to other vital polling 
items, will be analysed below.  
 
 
4.4. CELIBACY LAW ABOUT TO DIE? 
 
Respondents Writing Letters: Approval and Rejection 
A series of—anonymised—letters written by respondents confirms historian 
Igo’s claim that surveys functioned as a kind of mirror on the personal level 
and contributed to processes of self-understanding.58 One respondent stated 
that he spent several hours thinking, ticking boxes, and comparing questions 
and statements. This was a ‘valuable meditation’.59 Someone else expressed 
his genuine admiration for the researchers.60 “Even if this poll has no or as 
                                                          
58  For Igo’s argument, see: IGO, The Averaged American, pp. 281–299. A 2008 interview with 
former priest Nico Kok, too, confirms this argument: DOLS, ‘Een holle spiegel’. 
59  Anonymised document of reactions (22), undated: KDC, KASKI, 3038.  
60  Anonymised document of reactions (24), undated: KDC, KASKI, 3038. 
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good as no value on the decision making level (which I, by the way, do not 
expect)”, he commented, “for me personally, it functioned as a cross-
examination in which one was repeatedly confronted with matters usually 
assessed and experienced in an implicit way”. Other respondents evaluated 
the poll positively for different reasons, mostly related to Church politics. 
One of them put it this way: “Praise to those responsible for this poll: 1. the 
bishops, who have had the courage to investigate this delicate religious 
matter by means of the new social sciences. This is important for the 
Church all over the world and I admire them greatly. 2. the experts, who 
have compiled this poll and are going to elaborate on the answers. As a 
non-expert, I would like to argue that they bring the Church and the world 
together. Applause and a big thanks!”.61  
In marked contrast with such praise stood the sometimes vigorous 
complaints which arrived at ITS in the immediate weeks following the 
distribution of the questionnaire. These complaints explain at least partly 
why 54 people decided not to participate in the project. Even though these 
persons were explicitly mentioned as a small minority of non-respondents in 
the final research report, the reasons for their refusal to cooperate have 
never been clarified.62 When categorising the discontent shining through in 
the complaints, four major objections can be identified.  
Firstly, some respondents revolted against the idea of being polled. “I 
don’t want to be coded, and I certainly don’t want to be put into a 
computer”, one of them reasoned.63 Someone else believed that the times in 
which complex matters were analysed by means of a fixed and one-way 
pattern of communication were definitely over.64 How were priests able to 
know what the researchers meant when they used certain words and 
statements without being allowed to raise counter-questions? Others refused 
to unveil their inner self to total strangers, and set clear limits with regard to 
their privacy. “What is confessed before God”, someone else noted, “does 
not have to be confessed before some sociologist-pollsters”.65 He continued 
as follows: “I accept informing every party entitled (a father superior, for 
example, or a bishop) about my conscience. However, in this specific case, 
the community and its serving sociologists do not in fact form such an 
entitled party—anonymous or not! The degree of distance between a 
sociologist-in-function and me as an individual is determined by myself 
rather than by him! Consequently, only one answer fits every question from 
29 until 33: ‘it is none of your business, utterly none!!’”. One respondent 
went so far as to remove the staples holding the forms together, and fill out 
the questionnaire on his typewriter.66 
                                                          
61  Anonymised document of reactions (6), undated: KDC, KASKI, 3038. 
62  Van KEMENADE and Van WESTERLAAK, Ambtscelibaat in een veranderende kerk, p. 22. 
63  Anonymised document of reactions (12), undated: KDC, KASKI, 3038.  
64  Anonymised document of reactions (3), undated: KDC, KASKI, 3038.  
65  Anonymised document of reactions (5), undated: KDC, KASKI, 3038. Emphasis in original 
document. 
66  Anonymised document of reactions (12), undated: KDC, KASKI, 3038.  
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Secondly, both bishops and sociologists were charged with engaging in 
the wrong Church politics. Item 39a—‘Do you think that the Dutch 
Church Province should pursue its own policy with regard to obliged 
celibacy?’—was disputed in particular. One respondent fully accepted a 
‘translation’ of the outcomes of Vatican II into national Church policies.67 
He deemed dissenting policy lines concerning priestly celibacy as 
unwelcome, however. Another respondent distanced himself from the 
‘somewhat-sultry-anti-Rome-mentality’ associated with those responsible for 
the celibacy poll.68 According to him, the inquiry was nothing more than an 
instrument by means of which the ‘Curia of the Dutch progressive 
Catholics’, which appeared to be even ‘a bit more tyrannical than Rome’s 
Curia’, disqualified Pope Paul VI. Instead of ‘lighting a candle in front of a 
saint’s figure in a church building’, members of this Dutch Curia wandered 
around in their ‘little private chapel of the Holy Impertinence’.  
Thirdly, some respondents protested against what they perceived as 
the negative and worldly nature of the poll. Someone noted that the spirit of 
the project was akin to an ‘enormous narrow-mindedness’ which conflicted 
with what he perceived as the charismatic atmosphere of Vatican II.69 The 
researchers made a ‘capital mistake’ by trying to capture the entire priestly 
life in ordinary data, hereby disregarding the visionary and mystical 
background of being a priest. In the questionnaire, the word ‘vocation’ was 
not used a single time. The same could be said concerning the phenomena 
of prayer, sacrifice, and self-purification. “If you find that such questions are 
located too much in the personal realm”, the respondent in question noted, 
“I would like to refer you to the sometimes impertinent questions about 
celibacy experience, which, by all means, have an intimate character”. 
Fourthly, as Kusters already predicted, by far the most objections 
encompassed what was deemed as a string of suggestive, unclear, and over-
simplified polling items. One respondent wrote the following: “From 
question 20 until 34, we are confronted with questions such as: ‘do you 
think?’, ‘do you consider useful?’, ‘really useful?’, ‘are you of the opinion’; 
and in question 21 and 29, answers are presented that already suggest a 
certain opinion or a certain ‘feeling’.70 Has putting words into a person’s 
mouth, too, become a part of polling? Is the intellectual capacity and 
understanding of the Dutch clergy valued that low already?”. 
All in all, the polling project on celibacy was challenged quite heavily 
behind closed doors. This critique is perhaps even more relevant than De 
Bont’s critical analysis of the vocation inquiry because it testifies to a larger 
extent of the significant cultural weight attributed to polling in the 
ecclesiastical domain after Vatican II. Ordinary respondents believed that 
the celibacy poll was truly worth mocking. Their complaints had a 
                                                          
67  Anonymised document of reactions (5), undated: KDC, KASKI, 3038. 
68  Anonymised document of reactions (1), undated: KDC, KASKI, 3038. 
69  Anonymised document of reactions (20), undated: KDC, KASKI, 3038.  
70  Anonymised document of reactions (5), undated: KDC, KASKI, 3038. 
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differentiated character. Whereas some of the respondents were opposed to 
the idea of being the subject of a polling inquiry and some were convinced 
that a polling project on celibacy was deplorable in light of Church politics, 
other respondents held that the questions and statements treated the ‘holy 
matter’ of celibacy in an ‘unholy fashion’, or doubted the exact wording of 
the questionnaire. This critique did not affect the time schedule. 4,600 
questionnaires were returned by 9 March 1968. 71  This number soon 
increased to 6,800.72  
  
Behind the Institutional Scenes  
In the spring of 1968, the ITS staff started to analyse the data. Following 
on, the Van Laarhoven Committee deliberated on the technical details and 
the content of the research report. 73  Its members decided that this 
document should consist of two parts. The first had to contain the research 
results and all scientific appendices. The second should present a pastoral-
theological analysis to be used in decision making processes. Since the 
committee members stated that they did not feel any responsibility for this 
pastoral-theological analysis, other experts appointed by the bishops had to 
be brought in. Van Laarhoven recommended Goddijn to contact the expert 
committee that had just started to prepare a study on the priestly office for 
the purpose of the Pastoral Council.74 
On 5 August 1968, the PINK director informed the bishops that the 
project was nearing completion as the members of the supervisory 
committee received various draft chapters. 75  Goddijn rejected Van 
Laarhoven’s advice by stating that it was not wise to fall back on the 
conciliar committee of experts. Its members had to deliver a report which 
would be discussed during a plenary session. They should ‘not be involved 
beforehand’ in evaluating the poll. The names that Goddijn did mention 
were those of priest-theologians Schillebeeckx, Jan Groot, and Ton Smits 
OFMCap., as well as those of priest-theologians De Grijs, René van 
Eynden, and Jan Stieger. These names indicate that Goddijn had in mind 
reform-oriented allies with the clerical state when envisaging a coalition 
between sociologists and theologians. Schillebeeckx, an expert in dogmatic 
theology, became a professor at the Nijmegen University in 1958 and a 
personal advisor to the Dutch Episcopacy during Vatican II. He was 
famous for his opposition to the obliged character of priestly celibacy in a 
1965 book, in which he reasoned that the ‘charisma’ of priestly celibacy 
could only have credibility and be valuable for one’s religiosity if it could be 
chosen in absolute freedom. 76  Van Eynden, a specialist in dogmatic 
                                                          
71  ‘Priesterambt en celibaat: enquête verloopt goed’, in: De Stem, 09-03-1968. 
72  ‘Priesterenquête verlengd’, in: De Gelderlander, 16-03-1968. 
73  Minutes of the committee meetings on 17-06-1968 and 19-06-1968: KDC, PINK, 213. 
74  Letter by Van Laarhoven to Goddijn, 18-07-1968: KDC, PINK, 213. The work of this 
conciliar committee will be further explored in the following chapter. 
75  Letter by Goddijn to the bishops, 05-08-1968: KDC, PINK, 213. 
76  SCHILLEBEECKX, Ambtscelibaat in de branding. 
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theology and scientific employee at the Catholic School of Theology in 
Amsterdam as of 1967, De Grijs, and Stieger, who was a vicar in the 
Diocese of Haarlem, had all signed a 1967 petition against Sacerdotalis 
Caelibatus.77 In this petition, which Goddijn also supported, they purported 
that the encyclical should not mean the end of the investigation into obliged 
celibacy in a post-conciliar ‘stage of dialogue’. They subsequently prompted 
the Episcopacy to encourage an open debate and not close its eyes to 
experimental pastoral policy. Groot, then, was specialised in dogmatic 
theology and governed the Catholic School of Theology in Amtserdam as a 
rector.78 Smits, too, was an expert in this theological strand. He worked as a 
professor at the Catholic University of Leuven as well as at the Tilburg 
Theological Faculty.79 
From August 1968 until May 1969, Van Kemenade, Van Westerlaak, 
and their colleagues at ITS elaborated on the completion of the research 
report. The high response, the extensive sociological analysis, and the time 
required to process all the data caused this slight delay. 80  The bishops, 
having discussed Goddijn’s proposal on 13 August 1968, determined that 
Groot, Schillebeeckx, and Stieger would be asked to set the quantitative 
data against a pastoral-theological background. 81  The Episcopacy thus 
endorsed a full continuation of the project. It allowed specialists in theology 
to formulate policy-related advice. Several months earlier, during a joint 
meeting on 11 June 1968, the bishops stated that the study could perhaps 
stimulate other Episcopacies to set up a similar investigation, despite the fact 
that “many believe that the matter of celibacy should, or even will, be dealt 
with through vote counting”.82  
Goddijn not only offered the polling outcomes to the conciliar expert 
committee on the priestly office, but also did his best to present the polling 
outcomes to a wide audience.83 These polling outcomes appeared in article 
form in PINK’s magazine, Pastorale Gids (Pastoral Guide), and in brochure 
form in the institute’s Tomorrow’s Church series. The brochure was 
tellingly titled Priestercelibaat: een probleem van de kerk (Priestly Celibacy: 
A Problem of the Church; figure 39).84 The document was translated into 
French by Schillebeeckx, into German by Schreuder and Menges, and into 
Italian by an unknown author.85 During a joint meeting on 8 April 1969, 
the bishops claimed the right to assess the text before it was published.86 
                                                          
77  ‘Laat discussie over het celibaat open blijven’, in: Maas- en Roerbode, 30-09-1967 and 
‘Katholieken sturen kardinaal adres over celibaat’, in: De Tijd, 29-09-1967. 
78  SIMONS and WINKELER, Het verraad der clecken, p. 410. 
79  Ibidem, p. 425. 
80  Letter by Van Kemenade to Goddijn, 23-12-1968: KDC, PINK, 213. 
81  Minutes on the Episcopacy meeting on 13-08-1968: BARD, 312.1, BV.  
82  Minutes on the Episcopacy meeting on 11-06-1968: BARD, 312.1, BV. 
83  Minutes of the committee meeting on 16-09-1968: KDC, PINK, 213. 
84  Priestercelibaat: een probleem van de kerk and ‘Priestercelibaat: een probleem van de kerk’,  
 in: Pastorale Gids, VI, 15-06-1969. 
85  SCHILLEBEECKX, Le célibat du prêtre, SCHREUDER and MENGES, Der alarmierende 
Trend, and Inchiesta ufficiale sul celibato in Olanda.  
86  Minutes on the Episcopacy meeting on 08-04-1969: BARD, 312.1, BV. 
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They knew that the Holy See was rather sensitive to the celibacy question. 
In a letter sent exclusively to the Dutch bishops on 4 November 1968, Pope 
Paul VI ordered them to stick to the existing legal determinations.87 The 
Pope warned that their voice would be heard by Catholics around the 
world, thereby expressing his concerns about international repercussions. In 
April 1969, Alfrink and his fellow bishops received another letter in which 
the Pope’s right-hand man, Cardinal Gabriel-Marie Garrone, wrote that 
the Holy See did not intend to alter celibacy law. 88  He instructed the 
bishops to release a pastoral letter or a statement saying that their priests 
should be loyal to the Pope. 
What main conclusions, then, had the investigation yielded? 
Concerning a possible disconnection of the priestly office and celibacy, the 
results were not revolutionary: there was not an overwhelming majority 
pleading for an immediate liberalisation of celibacy law for everyone. 89 
Only 21 percent of the 7,381 respondents were reported to do so, whereas 
five percent were in favour of an overall connection between celibacy and 
the priestly office, that is to say, a permanent link for everyone. An equal 
five percent endorsed a maintenance, but did not judge on possible 
restrictions. 17 percent applauded a maintenance including restrictions, 
whereas 16 percent promoted a restricted disconnection, and nine percent 
opted for a disconnection yet did not identify any restrictions. Most of the 
respondents, 27 percent, did not make a clear choice between absolute 
maintenance and full disconnection. Hence, 74 percent of the respondents 
adopted a rather nuanced stance. Furthermore, approximately 50 percent 
believed that obliged celibacy damaged the priest’s happiness (49 percent), 
rejected the conclusions of Sacerdotalis Caelibatus (48 percent), approved of 
the Dutch bishops pursuing their own policy (45 percent), and sometimes 
perceived obliged celibacy as a heavy burden (45 percent). 18 percent 
seriously considered stepping out of the priestly office as a result of a lack of 
affection and a sense of safety, whereas 77 percent did not regard celibacy 
as a hindrance to a proper contact with the faithful. 68 percent envisaged 
celibacy as important for their personal religiosity. 
Groot, Schillebeeckx, and Stieger couched this and other quantitative 
information in a pastoral-theological analysis, as requested by the 
Episcopacy via Goddijn.90 Schillebeeckx copy-edited the draft. Theologian 
Leo van Noort OSC, who took care of administrative services on the SNPR 
board and worked as a scientific officer at PINK, assisted the theological 
trio and shared in the scholarly responsibility. Giving a twist to a basic line 
of reasoning in the context of role theory, the authors reasoned that the 
figures revealed a situation known in the canonical tradition as a ‘non 
receptio legis’, or ‘non-acceptance of law’, meaning that the official 
                                                          
87  This letter is quoted here: BLUYSSEN, Gebroken wit, pp. 496–499.  
88  Minutes on the Episcopacy meeting on 08-04-1969: BARD, 312.1, BV. 
89  Van KEMENADE and Van WESTERLAAK, Ambtscelibaat in een veranderende kerk,  
 pp. 28–31 and 170–171. 
90  Ibidem, pp. 199–213. 
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regulations and the clergy’s opinions did not correspond. The fact that 
celibacy law did not serve the common good demanded the pastoral choice 
of a ‘risky Church’ (‘riskante kerk’). Polling results suggested that both the 
clergy and the faithful had a preference for the ‘inviting power’ of celibacy 
as a charisma rather than for the ‘dictating power’ of the ecclesiastical law.91 
Celibacy could only serve as an ‘authentic ideal’ if it could be chosen in 
freedom. This freedom implied at least a thorough reform in terms of a 
disconnection of celibacy and the priestly office for every future priestly 
candidate, and the development of a new way of preaching about celibacy. 
When it came to episcopal decision making, the authors did not envisage 
the well-being of the Church as a point of departure, but instead that of the 
faithful.  
Four prominent priest-theologians advised the bishops to question the 
official ecclesiastical regulations, as recently ratified by Pope Paul VI in the 
encyclical Sacerdotalis Caelibatus. Groot, Schillebeeckx, Stieger, and Van 
Noort not only used the solidified opinions of many priests as a legitimation 
for profound change. They also promoted risk as a modern form of belief in 
God, thereby adapting centuries-old episcopal policy on the celibacy 
question to the contemporary day and age, and put the traditional claim of 
top-down Church authority into perspective. In De Gelderlander 
newspaper, Schillebeeckx commented that the bishops, being the ultimate 
research commissioners, had no other choice besides publicly expressing 
their opinion on the polling outcomes.92  
 
A Media Spectacle  
The above statement made by Schillebeeckx in a regional newspaper begs 
the question of how journalists engaged with the celibacy inquiry. As it 
turned out, these journalists followed the project with enthusiasm. Tension 
was in the air. “It was a colossal operation in a period of religious 
upheaval”, Van Kemenade remembered.93 One journalist who wanted to 
enliven the public debate on celibacy even offered him a reward of up to 
100,000 Guilders in exchange for completed documents. Allegedly, this 
prompted Van Kemenade to hire security and protect his institute around 
the clock. ITS employees took all the forms out of the vault under a strict 
security regime. After they extracted the data on the basis of a code set, 
these forms were immediately destroyed. 
Telling on this score, too, is that the polling outcomes were circulated 
in popular culture before they were even published. This was caused by the 
talk show Mies en Scène, during which hostess Mies Bouwman, who 
received a Catholic upbringing, targeted ten questions at famous people. 
These questions mostly addressed ordinary life. On 14 February 1969, it 
                                                          
91  Here, Groot, Van Noort, Schillebeeckx, and Stieger also referred, albeit implicitly, to the 
outcomes of polling projects among the faithful.  
92  ‘Prof. Schillebeeckx meent: Episcopaat zal zich over enquête moeten uitspreken’, in: De 
Gelderlander, 22-05-1969. 
93  Interview by Dols with Van Kemenade, 03-12-2008.  
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was Schillebeeckx who made his way to the studio. Television ratings 
indicate that the show became one of the most watched programmes of the 
entire month.94 The audience came to know more about Schillebeeckx’s 
personal heroes, his favourite play, and the books he read. 95  Priestly 
celibacy—“something which is on the minds of all of us on a daily basis” 
according to Bouman—was addressed as well. Bouwman explained to the 
viewers that the bishops commissioned a polling study on this issue. She 
then asked whether the Dominican theologian could share something 
further about the project, and if possible, mention the most striking findings. 
Schillebeeckx confessed that the inquiry had led to intriguing conclusions. 
Just several minutes after he underlined that these conclusions were still 
confidential, he revealed that 68 percent of the respondents were of the 
opinion that the Church had to exempt many of the priests with a desire to 
marry from celibacy and permit them to carry out priestly duties. In 
addition, Schillebeeckx claimed that only 21 percent of the respondents 
believed that the Dutch Episcopacy should opt for short-term solutions, 
even if this could give rise to a conflict with the Holy See. “It only becomes 
more fascinating”, Bouwman replied, “to wait for the very surprising 
outcomes”. Those who did not watch the show but read the newspapers the 
next day could hardly miss Schillebeeckx’s ‘slip of the tongue’. ‘Most priests 
against celibacy’, de Volkskrant headlined.96 
This public resonance and the generous financial offer received by 
Van Kemenade from a journalist signalled that the research results would 
be big news. In order to streamline the expected publicity, Goddijn sent 
temporarily embargoed information throughout the country and organised 
a press conference due for 27 May 1969. All parties involved would be 
there: he himself on behalf of PINK, Van Kemenade and Van Westerlaak 
of ITS, Kusters and Poeisz of KASKI, and Van Laarhoven and Schreuder 
of the supervisory committee.97 The preparations took a surprising twist, 
however. On 21 May 1969, de Volkskrant printed the study’s key findings 
                                                          
94  The talk show had a viewing index of 72, meaning that averagely 72 percent of all the Dutch 
persons aged 15 and beyond with a television at home watched at least half of the programme. 
Approximately 90 percent of the Dutch population disposed of a television at home in 1969. 
These figures were established in the context of the so-called ‘Continu Programma 
Onderzoek’, or Continuous Programme Research, which started in 1965. The inquiry was 
mainly built on the diaries of a panel consisting of 1,500 people. See: Luisteren en kijken, 1969 
en 1970, pp. 2–3. The television ratings have been consulted in the archives of the Nederlandse 
Publieke Omroep, or Dutch Public Broadcasting Company, in Hilversum. These archives have 
no inventory.  
95  Mies en Scène, 14-02-1969: IBG, ACT, 160200. 
96  ‘Meeste priesters tegen celibaat’, in: de Volkskrant, 15-02-1969. See also: ‘Schillebeeckx: 
meerderheid priesters voor afschaffing van celibaat’, in: Het Vrije Volk, 15-02-1969, ‘Meeste 
priesters willen af van celibaat’, in: Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 15-02-1969, ‘Prof. 
Schillebeeckx bij Mies in de stoel’, in: Tubantia, 15-02-1969, ‘Schillebeeckx: celibaat als dwang 
immoreel’, in: Eindhovens Dagblad, 15-02-1969, and ‘Meeste priesters willen af van celibaat’, 
in: Algemeen Handelsblad, 15-02-1969. 
97  Announcement press conference PINK, 16-05-1969: KDC, PINK, 213. 
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on the front page.98 Goddijn had lost control. The press conference was 
cancelled, and the embargo lifted.  
De Volkskrant unleashed an avalanche of articles. Van Kemenade 
recalled a ‘media spectacle’.99 The following overview of headlines, which is 
not meant to be comprehensive, allows for an observation of the way in 
which journalists presented the opinions and desires of ‘the Dutch clergy’: 
‘Theologians Argue in Favour of an Abolition of Obliged Celibacy’ 
(Arnhemse Courant), ‘Local Church Should Implement Own Policy’ (Het 
Binnenhof)’, ‘Majority Priests Against Celibacy Law’ (Het Centrum), ‘Three 
Quarters of Dutch Priests Disclaim Celibacy Law’ (De Tijd), ‘Episcopal Poll 
Delivers Factual Evidence: Priests Appreciate Celibacy but Want to Get Rid 
of the Law’ (Brabants Dagblad), ‘Most Priests in Our Country Against 
Obliged Celibacy’ (De Nieuwe Limburger), ‘Majority Roman Catholic 
Priests In Favour of Abolition of Obliged Celibacy’ (Algemeen Dagblad), 
and ‘Only Five Percent of Priests in Favour of Preservation of Celibacy’ 
(Utrechts Nieuwsblad).100  
Opponents of celibacy law, too, expanded on the facts and figures. In 
De Nieuwe Linie (The New Line) magazine, Bunnik claimed that this 
ecclesiastical law was ‘about to die’ now the ‘hard facts’ were on the table.101 
The poll scientifically unveiled a ‘schism in mentality’ between The Holy 
See and the Dutch Church Province. According to Bunnik, the bishops had 
                                                          
98  ‘Meeste priesters tegen huidige celibaatwet’, in: de Volkskrant, 21-05-1969.  
99  Interview by Dols with Van Kemenade, 03-12-2008.  
100  This list is rather complete: ‘Theologen bepleiten opheffing celibaatsplicht’, in: Arnhemse 
Courant, 21-05-1969, ‘Groot deel van priesters wijst de huidige celibaatsverplichting af’, in: 
Het Binnenhof, 21-05-1969, ‘Meerderheid priesters tegen wet op celibaat’, in: Het Centrum, 
21-05-1969, ‘Meerderheid priesters tegen celibaatswet’, in: Haarlems Dagblad, 21-05-1969, 
‘Vragen door 84% ingevuld’, in: Nieuwe Haarlemse Courant, 21-05-1969, ‘Uit bisschoppelijke 
enquête blijkt: meeste priesters wijzen huidige celibaatswet af’, in: Noordhollands Dagblad, 21-
05-1969, ‘Uitslag van landelijke enquête: driekwart Nederlandse priesters wijst wet op het 
celibaat af’, in: De Tijd, 21-05-1969, ‘Celibaat’, in: Brabants Dagblad, 22-05-1969, ‘Oordeel 
van de celibaatswet afhankelijk van de visie op kerk en ambt’, in: Limburgs Dagblad, 22-05-
1969, ‘Meeste priesters in ons land tegen celibaatsplicht’, in: De Nieuwe Limburger, 22-05-
1969, ‘Bisschoppelijke enquête levert feitelijk bewijs: priesters waarderen het celibaat maar 
willen van de wet af’, in: Brabants Dagblad, 22-05-1969, ‘Meeste priesters zijn tegen de 
celibaatsplicht’, in: Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 22-05-1969, ‘Plaatselijke kerk moet haar 
eigen beleid kunnen voeren’, in: Noordhollands Dagblad, 22-05-1969, ‘Meeste priesters wijzen 
celibaatsverplichting af’, in: De Stem, 22-05-1969, ‘Meerderheid r.k.-priesters voor opheffing 
verplichte celibaat’, in: Algemeen Dagblad, 22-05-1969, ‘Pastorale nabeschouwing theologen: 
celibaat zinvol bij vrije keuze’, in: De Volkskrant, 24-05-1969, ‘Slechts 5 pct. priesters voor 
verplicht celibaat’, in: Arnhemse Courant, 22-05-1969, ‘Pleidooi voor pluriform priesterschap’, 
in: Brabants Nieuwsblad, 22-05-1969, ‘Bisschoppen staan sterk in Chur en Rome met 
resultaten van enquête’, in: Brabants Nieuwsblad, 22-05-1969, ‘Celibaat in huidige vorm door 
grote meerderheid afgewezen’, in: Brabants Nieuwsblad, 22-05-1969, ‘Veel priesters zouden 
wel willen trouwen’, in: Dagblad van Coevorden, 22-05-1969, ‘Meeste r.-k. priesters willen 
opheffing van verplicht celibaat’, in: Nieuwe Apeldoornse Courant, 22-05-1969, ‘Meeste r.k. 
priesters tegen celibaatswet’, in: Trouw, 22-05-1969, ‘Het celibaat in de kerk’, in: Twentsche 
Courant, 22-05-1969, ‘Slechts vijf procent priesters nog voor handhaving celibaat’, in: Utrechts 
Nieuwsblad, 22-05-1969, ‘Priester-enquête’, in: De Gelderlander, 23-05-1969, ‘Meeste priesters 
voor opheffing celibaat’, in: Nieuwsblad voor Zuid-Holland en Utrecht, 23-05-1969, and 
‘Grote verschillen in opvatting onder Nederlandse priesters’, in: De Waarheid, 30-05-1969. 
101  BUNNIK, ‘De priester-enquête in Nederland: celibaatwet ligt op sterven’.  
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three options: staying loyal to the Holy See and respecting the existing legal 
determinations, calling for a liberalisation of celibacy law in Rome and 
threatening to resign in cases of refusal, and effectuating the wish of the 
Dutch priests without deliberating with the Holy See. None of these options 
were desirable, Bunnik noted.  
The large amount of media coverage on the outcomes of the celibacy 
poll in May 1969, trickling downward from the national level to the regional 
level, elucidates the rather problematic situation that the Dutch Episcopacy 
had manoeuvred itself into. Despite the 1967 encyclical Sacerdotalis 
Caelibatus and two letters sent by the Holy See in 1968 in order to halt the 
Dutch bishops, these bishops continued their investigation into the opinions 
and desires of their priests. A considerable, media-led pressure to act 
decisively followed. This media-led pressure marked the zenith of a period 
in which journalists paid much biographical attention to men who had 
recently left the office but did not turn their back on the Church. As 
historian Marit Monteiro has shown, these men were no longer presented as 
ecclesiastical outcasts, as they had often been until way into the 1960s.102 
Instead, they were portrayed, both textually and visually, as role models of a 
modern priestly office which moved away from obliged celibacy and 
‘institutional harshness’, and centred around the notions of ‘authenticity’ 
and ‘honesty’. Their life stories gave meaning to the sometimes vague 
process of Church reform. At the same time, these stories underlined the 
necessity of thorough change. The opinions of ‘the Dutch clergy’ and ‘the 
Catholic community’, then, had something which biographical portraits of 
ex-priests lacked: the power of the collective. Precisely this power of the 
collective made the pastoral-theological essay and the underlying figures an 
attractive element of agenda-setting at a time when the Holy See attempted 
to prevent an international outbreak of the celibacy question.  
 
De Bont Strikes Again 
Van Kemenade and Van Westerlaak did not find it necessary to reply to the 
anonymised reactions analysed above. Possibly, they did not deem these 
comments as a threat to the scientific trustworthiness of the project because 
they were not articulated in the public sphere, or because they were put 
forward by a small number of non-experts. However, a defence of 
trustworthiness was required when De Bont, in analysing the ‘reports by 
means of which the ecclesiastical government wanted to control the destiny 
of the clergy’, castigated the celibacy poll in De Bazuin magazine.103  
Foremost, the questionnaire should have been tested more extensively, 
De Bont argued. The researchers would then have discovered that the 
‘wrong’ questions, statements, and answers were used. Referring to 
Matthew 7:27 (“The rain fell, the flood came, and the winds beat against 
that house, and it collapsed—it was utterly destroyed!”), De Bont 
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admonished that Aristotle and Jesus already knew that a building only 
remained standing if its foundation was laid properly. 104  Apart from 
charging the study with a cracked foundation, De Bont believed that the 
computer analysis was carried out in a ‘halfhearted fashion’. Consequently, 
the results looked like ‘kind of a hotchpotch’. Last came De Bont’s objection 
that various correlations were not calculated in the right manner, as the 
work of sociologist Robert Gordon was disregarded. This ‘miscalculation’ 
led to ‘unfounded claims’. De Bont’s overall conclusion read that the 
celibacy poll was of a better quality than its predecessor, the vocation poll. 
Still, it appeared a ‘questionably prepared meatball’. “We do not know all 
ingredients”, De Bont noted. More so, there was a lack of information on 
their quantity and functioning, in spite of the ‘assurance of the ITS-chefs’.  
Contrary to what is described in the previous chapter, where De 
Moor, Schreuder, Van Kemenade and Kusters took up the defense, Marian 
Albinski replied to De Bont’s accusations. Albinski worked as a professor of 
sociology at the Nijmegen University, acted as an advisor of ITS, and 
authored a companion into survey research.105 Could he have been asked 
because De Moor and the others were afraid to appear disagreeable in the 
public sphere, after all that happened one year earlier? Albinski’s main 
protest was that De Bont spread ‘false conceptions’.106 Albinski also wrote 
that methodological matters should not be discussed in a popular magazine 
such as De Bazuin: most of its readers did not read the scientific version of 
the report in its entirety and were not trained to understand whether De 
Bont’s arguments made sense. The editors of De Bazuin, however, stuck to 
their opinion that it must be possible to express critique on a scientific 
research project outside academia. Therefore, they allowed Albinski to 
counter the charges more extensively in another issue. 107  This decision 
might have been influenced by Goddijn, who held that De Bazuin had the 
‘evident right’ to publish criticism on an important study.108 ‘Disputable’, 
however, was that its editors did not balance the negative impression 
conveyed by De Bont. 
The PINK director sprang into action on the international level as 
well, after theologian Giuseppe de Rosa SJ published on the polling 
outcomes in the Italian newspaper of his Order, La Civiltà Cattolica (The 
Catholic Civilisation), and integrated De Bont’s criticism into his analysis.109 
Goddijn immediately addressed four complaints to Editor in Chief Roberto 
Tucci.110 Goddijn did not elaborate at all on De Bont’s arguments. Instead, 
                                                          
104  In this book, I have invariably consulted the New English Translation of the Bible in order to 
make sure that the translations of certain passages into English were correct as well as uniform: 
http://www.biblegateway.com/versions/New-English-Translation-NET-Bible/ 
Visited on 25-07-2013. 
105  ALBINSKI, Survey-Research. 
106  ALBINSKI, ‘De celibaatsenquête’. 
107  ALBINSKI, ‘Nogmaals de celibaatsenquête’. 
108  GODDIJN, ‘De celibaats-enquête’. 
109  ‘Inchiesta tra il clero olandese sul problema del celibato’, in: La Civiltà Cattolica, 18-10-1969. 
110  Letter by Goddijn to Tucci, 06-11-1969: KDC, PINK, 213. 
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he first stated that De Rosa did not study the scientific edition of the ITS 
report. Hence, De Rosa was ‘unable’ to judge the scientific value of the 
inquiry. In addition, Goddijn disqualified De Rosa as an expert. De Rosa 
copied De Bont’s remarks word for word, which was ‘not what a specialist 
in the field ought to do’. Furthermore, Goddijn questioned the scientific 
abilities of De Bont by arguing that he did not hold a job at a university and 
was not affiliated with a research institute. Finally, Tucci was told by 
Goddijn that De Rosa did not even mention the special committee which 
supervised the project. This committee consisted of ‘renowned scientists’ 
holding doctoral degrees.  
This attempt to influence what Goddijn perceived as distorted 
international news coverage was part and parcel of a larger media strategy. 
He repeatedly verified or corrected information addressed in foreign media, 
sent information on the Pastoral Council throughout Europe, and organised 
a special meeting on media between the Dutch bishops and their West-
German colleagues in Kevelaer on March 1970.111 While masterminding 
this media strategy, Goddijn could fall back on the knowledge of journalism 
that he gained through his study in Münster. As a 1969 paper suggests, he 
particularly feared mutually negative perceptions of ‘Utrecht’ and ‘Rome’—
the Dutch Church Province and the Holy See. 112  On the one hand, 
Goddijn noted, members of the Roman Curia sharply contrasted the 
traditional picture of a self-supporting and loyal Catholic community with 
the modern images spread by international media: that of a ‘national skid-
pan’ and a ‘laboratory for ecclesiastical renewal’. On the other hand, Dutch 
Catholics often portrayed the Holy See as the epiphany of Italian, top-
down, and never-changing Church governance. Since such ‘exaggerated 
perceptions’ could ‘suffocate’ the Church reform that had only just begun, a 
‘new dialogue’ revolving around a ‘systematic and balanced exchange of 
information’ had to be encouraged. 
 
 
CONCLUSION 
With thousands of priests, deacons, and subdeacons answering a list of 
questions and statements related to priestly celibacy in early 1968, the 
sociological research tradition revolving around the phenomenon of 
vocation evolved further. Other projects brought forth lists of statistical data 
on the ‘output’ of the priestly education, documented the social 
backgrounds of priestly candidates, and focused on the attractiveness of the 
‘religious office’ in comparison to other ‘jobs’, yet did not place much 
weight on celibacy. ITS director Van Kemenade and his employee Van 
Westerlaak bore the ultimate scientific responsibility for both the 
questionnaire used in the celibacy project and the research report. Similar 
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to the vocation questionnaire, the celibacy questionnaire highlighted 
elements of ‘crisis’. It lacked what could be regarded as ‘spiritual aspects’ 
and hardly provided the respondents with the opportunity to articulate the 
positive sides of an unmarried life. KASKI director Kusters, who served on 
the supervisory committee failed in turning his critique of this mode of 
surveying into a reformulation of polling items. The bishops, however, had 
the power to influence the wording of the celibacy questionnaire. They used 
this power in light of ecclesiastical diplomacy in the immediate wake of the 
1967 Sacerdotalis Caelibatus encyclical. Goddijn again found himself 
positioned between these Church authorities on the one hand and the 
researchers on the other. He opened the procedures, installed a supervisory 
committee chaired by Vicar-general Van Laarhoven, drafted an 
assignment, generated extra funding, and involved himself in the 
publication of the results. These results, carved out of highly personal 
information, shaped a community of clergymen. What made the media 
exposure on the opinions of ‘the majority’ so great was not so much the sex-
related character of the celibacy issue, but the appearance that the Dutch 
Church Province and the Holy See were heading towards an explosive 
conflict. Seen in this way, the celibacy poll contributed to both a 
politicisation and dynamisation of the celibacy question. Originally, a 
follow-up inquiry on the basis of in-depth interviews was planned to deepen 
the conclusions of the poll. But ironically, the existence alone of the poll 
meant that it soon became too late for that. Telling on this score is that an 
expert committee was put to work in the context of the Pastoral Council 
while the vocation and celibacy studies were still underway. In the final part 
of this book, I shall examine the committee’s establishment and activities in 
more detail, as well as the treatment of the priestly office at the Pastoral 
Council and its repercussions for episcopal decision making.  
════════════════════════════ 
 
Part Three  
 
PUSHING THE ENVELOPE:  
THE PRIESTLY OFFICE IN THE  
CONCILIAR SPOTLIGHT 
 
════════════════════════════ 
 
 
 
 
 
PERHAPS SOMEWHAT PREDICTABLY, Cardinal Alfrink had the final say at 
the Pastoral Council on 8 April 1970. During his closing address, he 
explained that the council had departed from a new understanding of the 
Catholic Church, as proclaimed by Vatican II.1 This new understanding, 
which replaced that of the Church as a ‘hierarchical’ and ‘static’ institution, 
taught that the Church was akin to a ‘People of God’ on the move among 
whom the bishops held an ‘own’ and ‘authentic’ position. The Pastoral 
Council had thus built on the Second Vatican Council. But Alfrink 
emphasised that the council had also moved on. Episcopal decision making 
was prepared by committees consisting of both priests and laypeople. Under 
the influence of theology and the social sciences, they elaborated on 
fundamental issues prevailing in the Dutch Church Province, ‘that of 
secularisation in particular’. Such a nationally oriented and interdisciplinary 
approach was rooted in “the new strands of theology and the social sciences 
making their way from France, West-Germany, and the Anglo-Saxon 
countries into the Netherlands” in aftermath of the Second World War. 
Alfrink’s recapitulation of what he regarded as the basic characteristics 
of the Pastoral Council serves as the starting point of an examination of the 
conciliar treatment of the priestly office. The Pastoral Council has received 
little exclusive attention in the historiography. This omission is puzzling 
because it was the first national follow-up of Vatican II in the world. The 
small amount of exclusive attention that has been directed to the Dutch 
initiative, then, is of a sociological and Church historical nature. 
Theologians Hans Wewerinke and Fons Mommers, and Goddijn, who 
at that point worked as a professor of sociology at the Tilburg University, 
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adopted the sociological stance. In 1986, they published the book Pastoraal 
Concilie (Pastoral Council).2 An exploration of the social backgrounds of the 
participants of the plenary sessions and of their conciliar experiences, 
mainly based on a questionnaire they produced, formed the analytical core. 
Goddijn, Wewerinke, and Mommers concluded that the respondents to this 
questionnaire evaluated the aspect of ‘reflection’ (‘bezinning’) as one of the 
most vital goals reached at the council. The respondents perceived such a 
reflection as a ‘joint search’ for what was religiously valuable to them. 
Exploring the content and nature of the so-called ‘draft reports’ which 
sought to streamline the plenary sessions, Goddijn, Wewerinke, and 
Mommers held that an impact of the social sciences was clearly recognisable 
in the texts which dealt with the matters of authority, marriage and family, 
experience of the faith, and the priestly office. They did not come to this 
conclusion through examples. Using the volumes on the plenary sessions co-
edited by Goddijn during the conciliar years as source material, Goddijn, 
Wewerinke, and Mommers also touched on the main course and outcomes 
of each plenary session, albeit briefly, and quantitatively analysed the role 
played by bishops during the sessions. The authors argued that during the 
fifth session, which partly focused on the priestly office, these Church 
authorities intervened quite often in a ‘controlling’ fashion. That is, they 
attempted to prevent the discussions from spiralling into a direction they 
disfavoured. Generally speaking, Cardinal Alfrink intervened 53 times, 
Bishop Bernard Möller from the Diocese of Groningen ten, Bishop Ernst 
from the Diocese of Breda nine, Bishop Bluyssen from the Diocese of Den 
Bosch eight, Bishop Moors from the Diocese of Roermond and Bishop 
Jansen from the Diocese of Rotterdam six, and Bishop Nierman from the 
Diocese of Groningen and Bishop Theo Zwartkruis from the Diocese of 
Haarlem practically none. Alfrink regularly expressed the opinion of the 
Episcopacy as a whole. 
In two articles, which rested on published primary sources, and 
respectively appeared in 1996 and 2008, historian Jan Jacobs looked at the 
Pastoral Council through the lens of Church history.3 He demonstrated 
that the council emerged from the Second Vatican Council, yet at the 
same time drifted off, foremost when it came to organisational structures. 
According to the Codex, the Pastoral Council was not a synod nor a 
conference of bishops. It was similar to a pastoral board described in the 
Vatican II Decree Christus Dominus. However, it was not the same, since 
such a pastoral board had a diocesan scope. In marked contrast with 
Vatican II, the laity had a rather unique opportunity to influence the 
outcome of a national ecclesiastical gathering. As a result of its exceptional 
organisational form, the Pastoral Council did not have the power to 
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legislate, but could only advice the Episcopacy. Significant differences with 
the Second Vatican Council come to the fore, too, when the way in which 
the discussions took place are taken into account. Jacobs’s analysis of the 
preparation and treatment of the draft report on ecumism De eenheid 
welke de heer maakt (The Unity shaped by the Lord), which a committee 
of experts wrote under the presidency of the aforementioned theologian 
Groot, revealed that these discussions revolved around the actual situation 
in the Netherlands, and were hardly devoted to the official documents of 
Vatican II.  
Engaging with recent historical literature on the Second Vatican 
Council, I envisage a more integral approach with a cultural historical 
character when elaborating on the coverage of the priestly office at the 
Pastoral Council. Effectively, this approach encompasses a study of the 
relationships between the council as an ‘event’ and ‘the letter’ of the 
council.4 A study of the documents produced by the Pastoral Council is the 
most straightforward way to find out more about what the council was and 
did. The Pastoral Council, however, cannot be fully understood by studying 
conciliar texts only. On the contrary, actions, encounters, and decisions are 
equally important because they influenced the conciliar outcomes. The 
Pastoral Council neither began nor ended with plenary sessions. Whereas 
meetings of all kinds preceded these plenary sessions, the conciliar 
deliberations also had repercussions for episcopal decision making. By 
approaching the Pastoral Council as an event, a stage in a larger series of 
circumstances, I shall situate this council in a wider historical context than 
previously been attempted.  
How will a study of the links between ‘the event’ and ‘the letter’ be 
structured in the following chapters? In the fifth chapter, I shall focus on 
the run-up to the fifth plenary session of the Pastoral Council. The chapter 
begins with the establishment of the expert committee on the priestly office 
in the spring of 1968 and ends with Second National Assembly of Priests in 
November 1969. Along the way, the role of this committee, the National 
Assembly of Priests and deliberations by the bishops will be scrutinised. As 
a result of the emphasis placed on the principle of ‘collegiality’, both during 
and in the wake of Vatican II, an exchange of arguments by the Dutch 
bishops for the purpose of arriving at a joint policy became increasingly 
relevant. SNPR often entered into an authoritative dialogue with the 
Episcopacy. In the sixth chapter, the attention will be directed to the 
plenary session in early January 1970, its impact on episcopal decision 
making, the increasing tension between the Episcopacy and the Holy See 
in the spring of 1970, and, in the end, a drastic reform of the episcopal 
administrative apparatus in 1972. The bishops sacrificed Goddijn in this 
reform.  
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Chapter Five  
 
THE EXPERT COMMITTEE ON THE 
PRIESTLY OFFICE IN ACTION 
 
════════════════════════════ 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
“THE ROAD OF gradualness is not only too long”, the conciliar expert 
committee on the priestly office boasted in its final report in late 1969, 
several months after the results of the celibacy inquiry became fully publicly 
known, “but also utterly unsuitable in order to arrive at a renewal that 
really purifies the inner Church”. The committee members believed that if 
the bishops rejected a certain ‘radicalness’, then they would inevitably be 
left with some ‘patch up work’: “a painful doctoring of something no longer 
reparable”.1  
Now that I have focused on the rise and development of an episcopal 
demand for sociology in the post-war decades in the first part of this book, 
and subsequently analysed the way in which two polling projects 
orchestrated by PINK director Goddijn justified an issue deemed worthy of 
reform and shaped crises, it is time to examine whether the results of these 
projects made their way into the decision making of the bishops. The 
conciliar expert committee on the priestly office was expected to contribute 
to this decision making. Its members carried out their job in the immediate 
wake of the tumultuous year of 1967, which saw the establishment of 
CAPER and the dissolution of the educational system of seminaries. Both 
this establishment and dissolution were part and parcel of a policy outlined 
by the Episcopacy on 23 January 1967 in their Pastorale beleidslijnen voor 
de ambtsvervulling van de priester in Nederland (Pastoral Policy Lines 
Regarding the Execution of the Priestly Office in the Netherlands). This 
document rested on the advice that PINK’s Priestly Experience of the Faith, 
Preparatory Seminaries, Higher Education (Hogere Studies), Continued 
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Pastoral Education (Voortgezette pastorale vorming), Pastoral Plan 
(Pastoraal Plan), and Appointment Policy (Benoemingenbeleid) committees 
formulated. After priest-theologian De Grijs and philosopher Hans van 
Munster OFM copyedited the advice, the bishops themselves drafted a final 
text.2 Apart from the priestly training, the key topics they addressed were 
that of the separation of the personal and professional spheres, and that of 
the creation of permanent structures of communication and deliberation.3 
Concerning priestly celibacy, the bishops noted that, even though they were 
convinced of its positive value, further research on its obligatory character 
needed to be conducted. Such inquiry had to take place in order to find 
‘adequate expressions of a renewed Church’ and explore the ‘special 
meaning’ of the unmarried status. The bishops also found it important to 
respond to the problems of individual priests and counter a possible future 
lack of priests. They drew on two statistical overviews which KASKI 
compiled by order of PINK: a report on the (preparatory) seminaries 
between 1958 and 1963, and a report on the number of priests on 1 
January 1965. Since these reports alone did not enable the bishops to fully 
gauge socio-religious developments, they argued in favour of follow-up 
research. On the one hand, they wrote, a quantitative and qualitative 
analysis of the structures of pastoral care should be carried out. Sociologists 
should establish the number of pastoral units, expand on a typology of 
parishes, and analyse the development of non-territorial pastoral care. On 
the other hand, the bishops wanted them to provide quantitative and 
qualitative insights into all the available issues and arrive at forecasts. 
Tellingly, a draft of these pastoral policy lines prompted SNPR figureheads 
to speak of ‘theological anaemia’ and a ‘too sociological, societal nature’ of 
the document.4 
The outcomes of the polling projects on religious vocation and priestly 
celibacy answered this episcopal demand for more sociological research on 
the priestly office. As we have seen, Goddijn offered the outcomes to the 
newly established conciliar expert committee. How, then, did this 
committee originate, and how did its members operate? What sort of draft 
report did they write? And how did the bishops assess this draft report? This 
fifth chapter starts with a description of the basic organisational features of 
the Pastoral Council. Such a description is necessary to understand the 
conciliar workings. In the following paragraphs of the first section, I shall 
explore the establishment of the expert committee in question. As the 
director of PINK, Goddijn paved the way for this establishment by 
organising a confidential expert seminar, and making sure that the priestly 
office received further attention from the Plenary Assembly of the Pastoral 
Council. In the second section, I shall analyse the activities of the committee 
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under the supervision of its chairman, priest-sociologist Schreuder. This 
committee placed much emphasis on empirically yielded data. The draft 
report itself will be highlighted as well. I shall argue that this document had 
a distinctive pastoral-theological character. Finally, in the third section, I 
shall investigate the efforts made by the bishops and two conciliar bodies to 
adjust the draft report. These efforts caused a deadlock. A public scandal 
could be prevented only at the very end. Goddijn, again in his capacity of 
PINK director, used the Second National Assembly of Priests to influence 
the pastoral recommendations offered by the expert committee to the 
Plenary Assembly.  
 
 
5.1. A NEW CONCILIAR EXPERT COMMITTEE  
 
The Pastoral Council Revisited  
Undoubtedly, Bishop De Vet from the Diocese of Breda should be seen as 
the key actor behind the Pastoral Council.5 During the Fourth Period of 
Vatican II (September–December 1965), when he and his fellow bishops 
attended the plenary sessions in Saint Peter’s Basilica, he launched several 
ideas about a Provincial Council. Similar to the 1865 Provincial Council of 
Den Bosch, such a synod had to take universal viewpoints and 
determinations as a starting point. De Vet’s ideas were discussed in Rome 
on 27 and 28 November 1965. KASKI’s co-founder and Franciscan 
theologian Van Leeuwen, who contributed to the writing process of the 
chapter of the Constitution on marriage and family Gaudium et Spes (Joy 
and Hope; 1965), and theologian and ‘peritus’ Piet Smulders SJ took part in 
the discussions along with De Vet himself. Goddijn also participated. This 
small group agreed that the plan for a Provincial Council made sense.6 In 
December 1965, when the bishops officially announced the synod to the 
public, they stated that the main insights of the Second Vatican Council 
should become the foundation of their policy.7 Special attention had to be 
given to the day-to-day life of priests and religious, as well as to the priestly 
education, pastoral plans concerning family, ecumenism, and the joint 
responsibility of Catholics for the world and the universal Church. It did not 
suffice to just implement decisions reached in Rome. Equally important was 
to keep ‘the spirit of the council’ alive.  
Historian O’Malley has examined what this rather vague but often 
articulated expression, the spirit of the council, actually meant. He argued 
that the official documents of Vatican II mirrored a Zeitgeist emerging in 
the 1960s, and therefore differed significantly from those of the Vatican 
Council (1869–1970) and all the other previous councils.8 These older texts 
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7  Letter by the bishops to the clergy and faithful, 08-12-1965: Herderlijke Brieven, Dutch 
Church Province, Alfrink, 1953–1975. 
8  O’MALLEY, What happened at Vatican II, pp. 43–52.  
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had a legislative-juridical character. They rested on the assumption of a 
council as both a juridical body that rendered judgement and a legislative 
body that issued ordinances. The Second Vatican Council issued no canons, 
anathemas, and verdicts. In O’Malley’s opinion, the language of Vatican II 
belonged to the genre of the panegyric, meaning that the council aimed at 
persuasion and excitement rather than at coercion. By holding up ideals 
and values, and inviting Catholics all over the world to achieve them, the 
conciliar documents did not draw firm lines of what was allowed and what 
was not. Instead, these texts contained horizontal-words or even equality-
words such as ‘people of God’, words of change such as ‘aggiornamento’ 
(‘updating’), reciprocity such as ‘partnership’, interiorly such as ‘charisma’, 
and humility such as ‘dialogue’.  
From its beginning to its end, the Pastoral Council moved into three 
partly overlapping phases.9 The first phase was dedicated to the conciliar 
preparations. It lasted from March 1966 until the official opening in 
November of that year. The second phase started in December 1966 with 
the formation of expert committees responsible for the draft reports and 
ended in November 1969 with the completion of the last draft texts. The 
third phase centred around the plenary sessions which took place between 
January 1968 and April 1970.  
As early as in the first phase, Bishop De Vet’s plan to organise a synod 
encountered fierce criticism. 10  Several conciliar advisors voiced their 
objections during a meeting in Doorn on 14 and 15 March 1966. A 
contemporary report on this meeting suggests that, contrary to what 
historian Jacobs has noted, priest-theologian Haarsma and priest-sociologist 
Schreuder—rather than Van Leeuwen, Smulders, and priest-theologian 
and ‘peritus’ Van Rijen—challenged De Vet’s conviction that the council 
should not go further than the Second Vatican Council.11 At Goddijn’s 
request, Haarsma and Schreuder turned the argument around, purporting 
that a Dutch initiative must be primarily built on Dutch needs: “Even 
though the investigation of the official documents of Vatican II is important 
and a review of the inner-ecclesiastical situation has great value, one could 
also take a factual description of the entire ecclesiastical situation as a 
starting point, and arrive at short-term and long-term decisions while 
referring to these official documents”. As it turned out, this opinion 
appealed to De Vet. After consulting Alfrink, Goddijn, Rooyackers, and 
theologian Frans van Waesberge OP on behalf of SNPR, De Vet changed 
the conciliar course. “Instead of taking Vatican II as a key point of 
departure of the council, one could also leave from the specific Dutch 
situation”, the bishop said at the end of the Doorn meeting.12 Empirical 
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studies might show that other subjects than those discussed at the Second 
Vatican Council demanded a solution in policy terms. 
Goddijn played a crucial role in what should be perceived as nothing 
less than a conciliar watershed. He encouraged critics to raise their points 
and convince De Vet to alter the principal approach of the Pastoral 
Council. The organisational contours of this council were as follows. 13 
There were fifteen ‘studiecommissies’, or ‘Committees of Experts’ (figure 
40). These committees consisted of both priests and laypeople. On the basis 
of already existing studies, they compiled draft reports for the purpose of the 
conciliar plenary sessions. The ‘Central Committee’ (‘Centrale Commissie’), 
formed by seven members, appointed the experts. The bishops, united in 
the ‘Presidium’, mandated this body to lead the Pastoral Council as an 
executive body. Alfrink acted as its chairman and Goddijn as its secretary. 
At the start of the council in March 1966, Bishop De Vet, SNPR chairman 
Van Waesberge, Vicar-general Rooyackers from the Diocese of Den Bosch, 
Father Superior of the Brothers of Maastricht Janssens, Grond-Grollenberg, 
Mother Superior of the Fransican Sisters of Etten Annette Verbeeten, 
Mayor of Helmond Jacques Geukers, H.J.M. van der Ven, and Joseph Tans 
acted as the other members. The latter found himself intrigued by the 
phenomenon of Catholic Church governance. 14  He was a professor of 
French literature at the Groningen University, and, in this capacity, proved 
to be a talented governor. As early as in 1949, he was an active member of 
PvdA (Partij van de Arbeid). Tans stayed loyal to this social democratic 
party despite the 1954 Mandatory Letter. 
Apart from installing expert committees, the tasks of the Central 
Committee were to assess the draft reports, keeping in mind their suitability 
as papers for the ‘Plenary Assembly’ (‘Plenaire Vergadering’), and forward 
documents approved by this assembly to the Episcopacy. The permanently 
changing ‘Concilieraad’, or ‘Board of Counsellors’, coordinated the work of 
the expert committees and also judged the draft reports. This institution 
consisted of eight experts chosen by the expert committees and the 
Organisations and Associations Working Group, one representative of the 
Discussion Platforms Working Group, one from the Post Boxes Working 
Group, and one of other Churches and religious communities. The 
‘General Secretariat’ (‘Algemeen Secretariaat’), led by Goddijn, managed 
the organisational preparations of the meetings of the Central Committee 
and the implementation of its decisions. Furthermore, the secretariat 
provided practical administrative services for the Board of Counsellors, 
arranged the production and distribution of the draft reports, and took 
responsibility for the general conciliar correspondence. The Plenary 
Assembly consisted of 120 members: seven bishops with two auxiliaries, 
seventy diocesan delegates (ten delegates from each of the seven dioceses, 
                                                          
13  GODDIJN et alii, Pastoraal Concilie van de Nederlandse Kerkprovincie, I, pp. 15–28.  
14  SCHMITZ DU MOULIN, ‘Joseph Anne Guillaume Tans’, on-line accessible via: 
 http://www.dbnl.org. Visited on 15-04-2014. 
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preferably three priests and seven laypeople) chosen by the various diocesan 
pastoral boards, ten delegates of the religious, the members of the Central 
Committee, and fifteen additional seats. The bishops assigned these seats to 
specific persons in order to give a voice to groups whose opinions were 
underrepresented or for different reasons.  
Between 1968 and 1970, six plenary sessions centred around publicly 
debated religious matters. The issues at stake pertained to authority (session 
I), missionary work (II), development work (II), ethics (III), marriage and 
family (III), the youth (III), experience and practices of faith (IV), the 
religious (V), the priestly office (V), preaching (VI), and ecumenism (VI). 
Voting procedures, often captured in photographs which journalists 
brought into circulation within and beyond the Dutch borders, made the 
Dutch Church Province look like a parliament. 15  
Accountants’ reports indicate that the six plenary sessions, which did 
not take place in a church building like Vatican II but instead at the 
Leeuwenhorst Prepatory Seminary in Noordwijkerhout, demanded an 
investment of approximately 112,000 Guilders. 16  In total, the Pastoral 
Council came at a cost of around 1,1 million Guilders. The staff expenses 
amounted to 321,000 Guilders. Expensive, too, were the various expert 
committees (258,000 Guilders) and administrative services (103,000 
Guilders). The bishops could hardly pay these substantial sums of money 
themselves. The ecclesiastical event in fact, hung on a very thin thread, 
Bishop Moors from the Diocese of Roermond stated in a draft television 
speech—the thread of financing.17 The Episcopacy found itself in the lucky 
circumstance that extra funding could be generated. The Amsterdam-based 
Benevolentia Fund granted 100,000 Guilders in 1968. 18  Moreover, two 
national collection campaigns known as ‘Pastoral Cash’ (‘Pastoraal 
Contant’) turned out to be successful, as 422,000 Guilders were raised in 
1968, and 268,000 Guilders in 1969 and 1970.  
On 27 November 1966, when the bishops officially opened the 
Pastoral Council, they had only a vague impression of what its financial 
burden would become. They did know that Pope Paul VI and his Curia 
were meticulously following proceedings. During two conversations 
between Alfrink and the Pope in early 1965, the latter expressed his 
concerns about the Church political situation in the Netherlands. 19 The 
Pope further elucidated these concerns in a letter he sent to the Dutch 
Episcopacy in March 1965.20 They were particularly related to a perceived 
decrease in respect for the Holy See. With regard to the Pastoral Council, 
Pope Paul VI wrote to the Dutch bishops on 23 November 1966 that he 
                                                          
15  See, for instance, the pictures published in: Pastoraal Concilie in de publiciteit. 
16  Accountants’ reports PINK, 1966–1970: KDC, PINK, 323–327. 
17  Concept television speech by Moors, undated: KDC, PINK, 364. 
18  Accountants’ reports PINK, 1966–1970: KDC, PINK, 323–327. 
19  BLUYSSEN, Gebroken wit, pp. 456–457. 
20  Ibidem. 
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deemed this as a ‘unique’ but also a ‘delicate’ undertaking.21 He instructed 
the Dutch bishops to respect the hierarchical nature of the Church, 
carefully evaluate all the information put forward by the laity, and make the 
appropriate decisions. Effectively, this meant that they had to keep the 
council under control, and separate the ‘good’ from the ‘immature’ opinions 
that had recently ‘darkened the purity of the faith’ in the Netherlands. The 
Pope wished for an inner connection of the Dutch Church Province to the 
universal Church and a joyful obedience to the Holy See. In this way, the 
tone was immediately set: Pope Paul VI stimulated Dutch Catholics in their 
efforts to effectuate Vatican II in their own Church, but at the same time 
told them explicitly that falling out of line should not be seen as an option. 
 
The Priestly Office (Re)Placed on the Conciliar Agenda 
The members of the Board of Counsellors met for the first time on 8 
December 1966 under the presidency of philosopher Andreas van Melsen. 
They designed a conciliar agenda upon which the priestly office figured 
prominently.22 The Central Committee, however, removed this topic from 
the priority schedule because the bishops were about to publish their 
pastoral policy lines concerning the priestly office. This deletion fuelled a 
politicisation of the Pastoral Council during a meeting of conciliar advisors 
in Rotterdam in January 1967. Jesuit priest Van Kilsdonk, Huub 
Oosterhuis SJ, journalist Daniël de Lange, and priest-lawyer Leo Meijers, 
whose desire to marry would make Bishop Bluyssen force him to leave the 
priestly office in December of that year, accused the bishops of sweeping the 
celibacy question under the carpet and of blocking an open discussion at the 
Pastoral Council.23 Alfrink strongly opposed these accusations. The bishops 
were the first to concern themselves with the matter of priestly celibacy, he 
explained, and that was exactly why they would soon issue a core 
document. The Cardinal continued that it might very well be possible that 
they would place the subject back on the conciliar agenda again if this was 
deemed necessary.  
On 4 September 1967, PINK director Goddijn anticipated these 
statements by launching the idea of convening a small-scale and confidential 
expert seminar on ‘the future of the priest’. The PINK board applauded this 
idea.24 Goddijn completed a preliminary programme as early as three days 
later.25 He planned to organise the expert seminar in Doorn on 2 and 3 
October 1967. Papers would be delivered by Haarsma, Vendrik, Capuchin 
theologian Smits, and sociologist Jan Ponsioen SCJ, who worked as a 
professor at the Institute for Social Studies in The Hague. They would all be 
requested to comment on an article titled ‘The Vanishing Clergyman’. 
                                                          
21  Ibidem, pp. 478–479. See also: GODDIJN et alii, Pastoraal Concilie van de Nederlandse 
Kerkprovincie, I, pp. 38–40. 
22  Letter by Toussaint to the conciliar advisors, 15-12-1966: KDC, PCNK, 540. 
23  Minutes of the meeting of conciliar advisors on 19-01-1967: KDC, PCNK, 540. 
24  Minutes of the PINK Board meeting on 15-09-1967: KDC, PINK, 817. 
25  Letter by Goddijn to the experts, 07-09-1967: KDC, PINK, 622. 
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Priest-philosopher Ivan Illich published this provocative article in The 
Critic in the summer of 1967, several years before he rose to international 
fame with his studies on deschooling.26 By 1967, most people knew him as 
founder of the Centre for Intercultural Documentation in Mexico in 1961, a 
research centre offering courses to missionaries. Highlighting the 
bureaucratic paradox of Church reform, Illich noticed that numerous 
intermeshing and overlapping organs were established in countries around 
the world: from committees, councils, and assemblies, to synods and 
consultative institutions.27 According to Illich, these bodies absorbed large 
numbers of trained grass roots personnel, implying that ‘restrictive’ and 
‘unimaginative’ central control replaced ‘creative’ and ‘fresh’ approaches in 
the dioceses and parishes. He called for a ‘renewal’ in terms of a total 
abandonment of the traditional ecclesiastical mindset. Adult laymen 
ordained to the ministry should play a leading part in the decades to come. 
Furthermore, Illich believed that Church service had to be turned from an 
‘impersonal attendance of a crowd around an altar’ into a ‘vivid face-to-face 
meeting of families around a table’.  
On behalf of the Episcopacy, Bishop Bluyssen and Bishop Ernst 
attended the expert seminar during which Haarsma, Ponsioen, Smits, and 
Vendrik reacted to Illich’s article.28 Bluyssen and Ernst participated in both 
the plenary sessions and the smaller discussion groups. These groups not 
only explored professional skills and the multiformity of the priestly office, 
but also focused on job descriptions and the acceptance of married men. A 
group led by priest-theologian De Grijs paid special attention to episcopal 
decision making. Its members pointed at the ageing of the priests, an 
immense pastoral potential among the laity, and the necessity of 
anatomising priestly functions. In addition, they wanted the bishops to 
defend experiments against the influence of the Holy See. Goddijn chaired 
the closing session. Underlining that the identification of a pastoral strategy 
was one of the main goals of the meeting, he presented a treatment of the 
office by the Plenary Assembly as a means to arriving at such a strategy. 
The attendees endorsed this standpoint, as well as Goddijn’s proposal to 
establish a new expert committee. So, too, did the PINK board and the key 
conciliar bodies.29  
Goddijn may have succeeded in placing the priestly office back on the 
conciliar agenda in a short period of time, supported by two bishops and a 
group of conciliar advisors, but the Episcopacy as a whole did not accept 
the conclusion related to the establishment of an expert committee. It 
believed that the subject of the priestly office was too complex to be treated 
by one committee.30 The committee’s formation accelerated during the first 
session of the Plenary Assembly in January 1968, however, when lay 
                                                          
26  ZALDÍVAR and UCEDA, ‘Ivan Ilich and the Conflict with the Vatican’, pp. 3–4. 
27  ILLICH, ‘The Vanishing Clergyman’, especially pp. 3–10. 
28  Report on the expert meeting on 2/3-10-1967: KDC, PINK, 622. 
29  Letter by Goddijn to the bishops, 31-10-1967: KDC, PINK, 622.  
30  SIMONS and WINKELER, Het verraad der clecken, p. 283. 
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Catholic Roosje Cappetti-Van de Belt from the Diocese of Groningen 
successfully tabled a motion. This motion stated that the assembly 
applauded the news that the issue of the priestly office, which was ‘decisive 
for renewing the Church’, would become an object of study.31 Since this 
issue should have the highest priority, the Plenary Assembly asserted, the 
Central Committee and bishops had to give way to a full conciliar 
treatment. According to the assembly members, this meant that a new 
expert committee should concentrate on the theological and human aspects 
of the issue on the one hand, and launch proposals which opened up 
perspectives on the future on the other. The experts ought to take into 
account at least five dimensions: a differentiation of the priestly office, the 
consequences of ecumenism, the meaning of celibacy, the possibility of 
married priests, and a possible acceptance of female office holders. 
The Board of Counsellors discussed this resolution on 17 January 
1968. Haarsma dominated the meeting. He proposed to install a modest 
expert committee which would compose a plan of work.32 Following on, 
several sub-committees could be put to work, after which a draft report 
could be written. The conciliar counsellors decided to present De Grijs, 
Schreuder, and Vendrik as candidate members to the Central Committee. 
This proposal was not surprising. Whereas De Grijs served on PINK’s 
Priestly Experience of Faith Committee, Schreuder published extensively on 
the priestly office and Vendrik encountered the difficulties priests struggled 
with on a daily basis as CAPER director. The names of psychiatrist and 
KNBGG chairman J.P. de Smet, and Tine Govaart-Halkes, a female 
specialist in the field of Dutch language and literature as well as the 
president of a national Catholic association for female students, who argued 
in favour of an emancipation of female Catholics in the Catholic Church, 
were also mentioned.33 What this list of names suggests is that Haarsma and 
the other counsellors tried to bring together a homogenous group: all 
candidates were part of a predominantly liberal inner circle of intellectuals 
repeatedly occupying advisory positions, be it in either the institutional 
context of PINK or that of the Pastoral Council.  
The members of the SNPR board argued that it was absolutely 
necessary that the new expert committee arrived at a thorough theological 
description of voluntarily chosen celibacy ‘for the sake of the Kingdom of 
Heaven’ (Matthew 19:12).34 Moreover, they suggested that the ‘crisis’ which 
many religious saw themselves confronted with was similar to the one with 
which secular clerics were struggling. Regular priests therefore had to serve 
on the committee as well. The bishops agreed on both of these desiderata. 
Alfrink actually promised to make sure that the remarks would not be 
overlooked. 
                                                          
31  Transcript (pp. 5–6 and 63–73) of the Plenary Session on 08-01-1968: KDC, PCNK, 35. 
32  Minutes of the Board of Counsellors meeting on 17-01-1968: KDC, PCNK, 4. 
33  For more biographical information on Govaart-Halkes, see: Van HEIJST, DERKS, and 
MONTEIRO, Ex Caritate, pp. 872–877. 
34  Note on the SNPR Board meeting on 22-01-1968, undated: KDC, PCNK, 197. 
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5.2. LOOKING OVER THE SHOULDER OF THE COMMITTEE 
MEMBERS  
 
A Plan of Work  
After having deliberated with Alfrink, conciliar secretary-general Goddijn 
requested Govaart-Halkes, De Grijs, Schreuder, De Smet, Vendrik, priest-
theologian, SNPR secretary, and co-author of the pastoral-theological 
reflection on celibacy Van Noort, and Ad Willems OP, a reasonably liberal 
specialist in dogmatic theology who worked at the Nijmegen University, to 
set out the course of the new expert committee. Everyone accepted the 
invitation.35 Priest Jan Levelt, one of Haarsma’s students at the Nijmegen 
University, became the secretary. The committee which came to bear 
responsibility for the draft report on the priestly office consisted of the 
following persons: Schreuder, Willems, Vendrik, Govaart-Halkes, Van 
Noort, Levelt, Dekkers, Protestant theologian Alexander Bronkhorst, female 
psychologist Marie Louise Frohn-De Winter, chairman of the Episcopal 
Working Group Pastoral Plan City Centre Amsterdam and pastoral 
assistant of the Amsterdam Deanery B.A.M Peters, H.G.P.F. de Bruyn, and 
L.P.M. Van Rijn-Marijnissen. 
The first committee meeting on 7 April 1968 started with Goddijn 
delivering an introductory speech.36 On behalf of the Central Committee, 
he explained that PINK had already concerned itself with the matter of the 
priestly office for many years. These endeavours had resulted in studies such 
as the polling project on celibacy and the 1967 pastoral policy lines. Now 
that even the Plenary Assembly insisted on an elaboration of the matter by a 
conciliar committee, Goddijn asserted, this elaboration could no longer 
wait. The first step the committee members should take was to compile a 
document holding a detailed duty description and a work scheme. Goddijn 
stressed that the final product, the draft report, had to have a clear pastoral 
character. It must be comprehensive for everyone.  
Thus, Goddijn first placed the priestly office back on the conciliar 
agenda as the director of PINK. He then switched to the role of secretary of 
the Central Committee, and used the work done under the flag of PINK as 
well as the conciliar motion as a justification for the establishment of the 
new expert committee. The members of this committee appointed 
Schreuder as their chairman.37 They knew what they could expect from 
him. Schreuder became a professor at the Nijmegen University in 1967. He 
increasingly linked the application of sociology in the Church to a lucid 
vision on Church reform. 38  The Church had to be released from its 
‘introvert character’, ‘artificial consciousness’, and ‘intensified system faults’. 
Only then, could this institute again be an instrument of the Gospel.  
                                                          
35  See the reactions to Goddijn’s invitation: KDC, PCNK, 196. 
36  Minutes of the committee meeting on 17-04-1968: KDC, PCNK, 196. 
37  Minutes of the committee meeting on 25-05-1968: KDC, PCNK, 196.  
38  SCHEUDER, Gedaanteverandering van de kerk, especially pp. 7–16, 29–30, and 115–119.  
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On the basis of a memorandum written by Willems, Schreuder 
structured the committee’s activities together with Govaart-Halkes, 
Vendrik, and Levelt. On 11 July 1968, the committee members accepted 
the procedure to establish six sub-committees.39 These committees, each 
chaired by a member of the ‘core committee’ and usually consisting of five 
members, would examine various specific aspects related to the office, and 
hand in a concise paper. The core committee would subsequently compose 
a draft report, based on the analyses put forward in each of the six papers. 
Schreuder, Govaart-Halkes, Vendrik, and Levelt explicitly instructed the 
members of the sub-committees not to examine theological features too 
deeply. ‘Theological chit-chat’ would not provide the bishops with ‘clear-
cut’ and ‘realistic’ insights into policy options.  
It was on 27 May 1968, during one of their monthly meetings, that the 
bishops had already expanded on the question of whether they should work 
towards a part-time ministry.40 They held that an increasing call for part-
time work rested on many motives: larger financial freedom, the perception 
of the office as a job rather than a calling, and a loss of tasks, to name a few. 
Even though there had always been some priests who worked part-time, 
simply because they were keen to carry out a variety of activities, or because 
this was in a person’s own interest, the Episcopacy decided that these priests 
had to remain an exception. The bishops were more optimistic about a 
specialisation of labour. 
 
The Actual Work  
The members of the conciliar sub-committees on the priestly office began 
their work in the second half of July 1968. Priest-theologian Dekkers chaired 
Sub-Committee I, or the ‘The Functions of the Ecclesiastical Office’ (‘De 
functies van het kerkelijk ambt’) Committee. ITS employee Sterk, author of 
the report on the vocation poll, and psychologist Jan van der Lans, who 
worked at the Nijmegen University, were the other prominent members. 
Schreuder, Govaart-Halkes, Vendrik, and Levelt told the sub-committee to 
arrive at a description of ‘manifest’ and ‘hidden’ needs on ‘the market’.41 
More specifically, feelings of discomfort and frustration had to be explored, 
important tasks of the priest defined, and trends concerning priestly activity 
investigated. Schreuder, Govaart-Halkes, Vendrik, and Levelt underscored 
that it was crucial to take into account ‘hard facts’. The sub-committee 
members wrote a paper in which they departed from the ‘crisis of the 
priestly office’.42 They stated that on the basis of oiling results, the priest saw 
himself confronted with a growing variety of expectations among the 
faithful. In addition, the priestly office more and more competed with other 
‘professions’, and the ‘staffing policy’ fell behind the contemporary norms of 
                                                          
39  Minutes of the committee meeting on 11-07-1968: KDC, PCNK, 196.  
40  Minutes of the Episcopacy meeting on 27-05-1968: BARD, 312.1, BV. 
41  Minutes of the committee meeting on 11-07-1968: KDC, PCNK, 196. 
42  Paper delivered by Sub-Committee I (especially pp. 1 and 9–10): KDC, PCNK, 201.  
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efficiency. This all gave rise to a decrease in the willingness to step into the 
priestly office, as well as to a relatively strong increase of the number of 
priests leaving the office. From the theological perspective, the sub-
committee members referred to the New Testament, Romans 12 and 
Corinthians 12 in particular. These passages indicated that forms of 
‘discipleship’ depended on the ‘demands’ of a specific day and age. 
Adopting anthropological lines of reasoning, the sub-committee members 
argued that the ‘divine force’ of God should be allowed to primarily express 
itself through the welfare of society and individuals. The Church and the 
priestly office, then, should always serve this welfare. The committee 
presented preaching and catechism, administering the sacraments and 
liturgy, establishing and maintaining religious communities, and practising 
pastoral care as the priest’s ‘core package’ of duties. In conclusion, it was 
underlined that traditional elements which could no longer be perceived as 
meaningful, such as the connection between the priestly office and celibacy, 
had to be identified and abolished. The priestly office should also be 
differentiated in that the possibilities of part-time work and an acceptance of 
women should be explored. Administrative duties ‘on the margins of the 
priestly role’ had to be minimized.  
Franciscan theologian Jan Braun acted as the chairman of Sub-
Committee II, better known as the ‘The Structure of the Ecclesiastical 
Office’ (‘De structuur van het kerkelijk ambt’) Committee. Peters, sociologist 
Bert Laeyendecker OSA, and theologian Sjoerd Bonting on behalf of the 
Anglican Church were the other eminent members. Schreuder, Govaart-
Halkes, Vendrik, and Levelt expected this sub-committee to cast light on 
priestly competencies, the desirability of either a full-time or part-time 
ministry, or both, and a professionalisation of the priestly office.43 The sub-
committee, however, directed most of its attention to the Catholic Church 
as a whole, since its members were convinced that the ‘actual problem’ 
should not be buried under an emphasis on the priestly office. 44  They 
purported that a rapidly changed society posed a series of questions for the 
Church. How should this Church cope with the value of democracy? How 
should the Gospel be presented, such that it would be experienced as a true 
service to mankind? And how could the Church be ‘present’ in urban areas, 
in which migration had turned the socio-religious status quo upside down in 
a short period of time? Many of the ecclesiastical structures, the sub-
committee members put forward, no longer corresponded with the 
evolution of society, and caused a great deal of frustration in the circles of 
priests. Church authorities therefore had to combine the ‘radical 
experiment’ with the ‘road of gradual renewal’. In effect, this meant that 
they must reform ecclesiastical structures and the priestly office in a bottom-
up manner on the one hand, and appoint ‘urban experts’ and ‘socio-
religious engineers’ who ameliorated pastoral planning on the other. The 
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sub-committee advised the Plenary Assembly not to engage in theological 
discussions on the desirability of an ordination of these urban experts and 
socio-religious engineers.  
There were no sociologists in Sub-Committee III, or the ‘The Office 
and Life of the Office Holders’ (‘Ambt en leven van de ambtsdragers’) 
Committee, which stood under the leadership of priest-theologian Van 
Noort, and particularly rested on the membership of Dominican theologian 
Willems and Carmelite psychologist Van Galen. Their assignment read to 
analyse the religious life and social status of office holders, the lack of a 
separation between the professional and personal spheres, and the meaning 
of celibacy and marriage. 45  Schreuder, Govaart-Halkes, Vendrik, and 
Levelt decidedly asked to work on policy lines concerning ‘breaking 
through’ obliged celibacy and on a possible maintenance of priests who 
were getting married. This sub-committee came up with the most refined 
paper. 46  It treated the celibacy question in an appendix, partly because 
celibacy was seldom mentioned during the interviews with priests which the 
sub-committee members relied on. These sub-committee members believed 
that the obliged character of celibacy should be undone. At the same time, 
they underscored the necessity of shaping the right conditions for 
voluntarily chosen celibacy. In the main text, the sub-committee argued in 
favour of an intensification of pastoral care for the priests themselves. 
Firstly, ‘pastoral working groups’ had to enable priests to reflect upon their 
duties and tasks under the supervision of experts. Secondly, experts should 
place an enrichment of the personal life of the priest centre stage in ‘pastoral 
study groups’. Thirdly, group gatherings during which priests discussed 
problems with each other (‘group pastorate’) had to be stimulated, as well as 
a personalised guidance of priests (‘individual pastorate’). The ‘crisis’ many 
clergymen struggled with justified an intensification of pastoral care. 
Reaching out to role theory and the sociologically informed 
conceptualisation of the priestly office as a profession, the members of the 
sub-committee stated that a ‘slide of roles’ made troubled priests experience 
a ‘landslide’. It was also asserted that professionals took over a considerable 
number priestly tasks, and thus certainties, and that a sharper separation 
between the professional and personal spheres would be beneficial to the 
priestly role. Concerning the priest’s attitude to life in ‘times of transition’, 
the sub-committee expanded on four ‘pastoral virtues’: an unwavering belief 
in God and Christ, servitude and collegiality, a poverty of the mind, and 
truth and veracity. 
Stimulating an emancipation of female Catholics in the Church, 
Govaart-Halkes led Sub-Committee IV, or the ‘The Division of Tasks 
within the Church’ (‘Taakverdeling binnen de kerkgemeenschap’) 
Committee. Bunnik and Van Eynden, also, figured prominently on this sub-
committee. Its members sought to scrutinise the possibility of opening up 
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the priestly office to lay women and married men, the job of pastoral 
workers, the relationships between the bishop and the priest, and the 
financial flexibility of the Church.47 The sub-committee highlighted the first 
two aspects in particular.48 Calling on the second chapter of the Dogmatic 
Constitution Lumen Gentium, it wrote that the People of God in its entirety 
had the duty to confront the world with the message of Christ. Hence, for 
instance, Church authorities should allow lay women and married men to 
participate in the administration of the sacraments. With special regard to 
lay women, the sub-committee members referred to Galatians 3:28 (“There 
is neither Jew not Gentile, neither slave nor free, nor is there male and 
female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus”) in order to demonstrate that 
men and women should be treated in a similar fashion in the ecclesiastical 
domain. Women could actually be called to ‘every form of ecclesiastical 
service’, dependent on the needs of the Church and the desired 
competencies. The sub-committee members noted that a growing lack of 
office holders licensed such change, as did the fact that the equal 
responsibilities of men and women were acknowledged throughout society. 
They called for inquiries into the theological arguments underpinning the 
key roles played by women in other Christian Churches, everyday 
experiences with a more active female involvement in Church service, and 
the possibility of accepting married men as office holders. The pastoral 
experiment should be interpreted as ‘indispensable’ for arriving at a 
‘renewal’ of the priestly office. 
The PINK staff formed Sub-Committee V, or the ‘Personnel 
Management’ (‘Personeelsvoorziening’) Committee. Schreuder, Govaart-
Halkes, Vendrik, and Levelt instructed this sub-committee to examine 
‘mechanisms of assignment’ such as selection, appointment, and promotion 
on the one hand, and ‘mechanisms of elimination’ such as retirement and 
socio-psychological problems on the other.49 In a paper known under the 
name of ‘P.I. 264’, the sub-committee members emphasised that proper 
‘personnel management’ had to constantly balance the needs prevailing in 
the pastoral field and the desires of the 5,400 priests (3,400 seculars and 
2,000 regulars) active in pastoral care. 50  A coordination of policy lines 
should encompass the entire Dutch Church Province, not only because a 
recent tendency to upscaling made the diocesan borders fade, but also 
because an overrepresentation of regular priests in certain areas needed to 
be prevented. The sub-committee members envisaged the establishment of 
a National Personnel Association as a means to arriving at such a 
coordination.51 This association had to streamline ‘personnel management’ 
by uniting bishops and religious superiors as far as matters such as 
                                                          
47  Minutes of the committee meeting on 11-07-1968: KDC, PCNK, 196. 
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recruitment, education, and payment were concerned, providing advice 
concerning positions with a national responsibility, and operating as a 
placement service. 
Vendrik chaired Sub-Committee VI, or the ‘Leaving the Office’ (‘Het 
neerleggen van het ambt’) Committee, which concentrated on the causes of 
priests leaving the office, personal and institutionalised help to be offered to 
them, and the financial consequences of office abandonment. 52  As co-
author of the celibacy report, ITS employee Van Westerlaak, too, was 
familiar with priests suffering from clerical life. The sub-committee 
members built their argumentation on an acceleration of abandonments of 
the priestly office: 30 in 1965, 60 in 1966, and 145 in 1967. They aimed at 
opening up perspectives to a ‘well-founded’, ‘positive’ and ‘pastorally 
responsible’ policy which was not hindered by ‘out-dated’ theological views 
on the priestly office. This policy had to be fine-tuned with the Dutch 
situation in mind, yet at the same time not lose sight of the policy pursued 
by the universal Church. The sub-committee members suggested to further 
investigate the priestly tasks and the possibility of a ‘multiform’ policy 
including the option of accepting married priests. The coordinating 
activities carried out by CAPER needed to be continued as well as refined. 
Concerning the causes underlying the figures, the sub-committee discerned 
between that ‘inherent to the priestly office’, such as a shift in the 
expectations of the laity and a connected ‘role uncertainty’, and that ‘related 
to individual priests’, such as a ‘wrong choice of profession’ or personal 
difficulties with celibacy.  
In sum, experts of various kinds populated the subcommittees. As a 
result of this diversity, the sub-committees articulated a wide variety of 
arguments. Whereas the first and third merged theological and social 
scientific lines of reasoning, the second, fourth, fifth, and sixth hardly fell 
back on theological modes of thought. In one way or another, most of them 
expanded on the ‘problematic’ consequences of obliged celibacy. While the 
six papers were drafted, the core committee deliberated about an essay on 
role theory composed by Schreuder.53 December 1968 saw the papers of 
the sub-committees being completed, meaning that the last phase, the 
compilation of a draft report, could start in January 1969. From this 
moment onwards, the core committee discussed texts written by Dekkers, 
based on a guideline that defined both the structure and the content of the 
report.54 Vendrik authored this guideline. 
Goddijn insisted on handing in the final version of the draft report on 
1 April 1969. Consequently, Schreuder and his team were under immense 
time pressure. PINK employee and theologian Otto ter Reegen SSS, who 
was the secretary of the Board of Counsellors, intensified this pressure after 
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the expert committee did not meet the deadline. On 6 May 1969, Ter 
Reegen let Levelt know that if the document was not handed in by 15 June 
1969, the subject of the priestly office would not be dealt with in 
Noordwijkerhout at all: the last meeting of the Plenary Assembly, which 
would take place in April 1970, was already filled with other issues to be 
discussed.55 Levelt replied that the committee would deliver on 13 June 
1969, even if the manuscript was unfinished. 56  This is exactly what 
happened despite Schreuder’s withdrawal as chairman. In a letter sent to 
Goddijn, Schreuder clarified that he was appointed as the president of the 
Nijmegen Faculty of Social Sciences, and decided to dispense other tasks 
that took up too much of his time.57 There is also evidence suggesting that 
Schreuder wanted to shortly marry, and that he could not defend the 
content of the report at a plenary session of the Pastoral Council for that 
reason. 58  Dominican theologian Willems succeeded Schreuder as the 
committee’s chairman. 
 
The National Assembly of Priests 
While the core committee and the sub-committees elaborated on the 
priestly office behind closed doors, the National Assembly of Priests took 
place in Noordwijkerhout on 27, 28, and 29 October 1968. Both the 
Episcopacy and the SNPR board attended the event, which Goddijn 
organised and Guus Winkeler SCJ moderated.59 They were accompanied 
by no less than 130 priests active in pastoral care and representing a 
deanery, the entire PINK staff, and 18 especially invited ‘experts’ such as 
priest-theologians De Grijs, Groot, and Haarsma, priest-sociologist 
Schreuder, and CAPER director Vendrik. The primary goal of the meeting 
was to establish a deliberation between the bishops and the priests about the 
most burning questions which they saw themselves confronted with.60 The 
assembly is important to focus on because it prompted the Episcopacy to 
publicly alter its policy regarding priestly celibacy. 
Prior to the meeting, PINK director Goddijn targeted a concise 
version of a sociological analysis by Kusters towards the attendees.61 On the 
basis of statistical ‘symptoms’, the KASKI director stated that the ‘crisis’ of 
the traditional Church became particularly visible when the priests, 
brothers, and sisters were taken into account. Not only were the numbers of 
vocations dropping quickly. The number of people leaving the office was 
also increasing. Nonetheless, Kusters reasoned that the Dutch Catholic 
Church Province could still be regarded as a firm institution, as the level of 
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Church attendance was 63.3 percent in January 1966 and 44 Holy 
Communions were received per churchgoer in 1966. This situation offered 
‘excellent chances’ for the pursuit of a ‘modern’ and ‘authentic’ way of 
believing and to get rid of the ‘hypocrisy’ which had prevailed in the 
Church in the immediate past. Goddijn asked the participants to examine 
this analysis and indicate whether it corresponded with the actual state of 
the Dutch Church Province.62 Out of 89 respondents, only seven rejected its 
bottom line.63 This broad support testifies to the persuasiveness of statistics 
as well as of the overarching interpretative framework of crisis and renewal. 
The mindsets of the attendees came to revolve around the sociologically 
informed notion of ‘crisis’. 
During the plenary sessions in Noordwijkerhout, sexuality was at the 
heart of attention. The participants focused on Humanae Vitae (Of The 
Human Life; 1968), the recently issued encyclical in which Pope Paul VI 
underlined traditional Catholic teaching concerning marriage, and 
condemned most forms of birth control.64 The discussions also addressed 
priestly celibacy. They led from a question raised by the Nijmegen dean 
Martin: should the bishops accept married ex-priests as deacons, thus 
allowing them to carry out basic pastoral duties? Martin commented that 
acceptance could be a first step in the direction of a disconnection of 
celibacy and the priestly office, while inciting his fellow priests not to ignore 
‘the facts’. As one of the ‘experts’, Vendrik supported Martin’s plea. He 
took the argument one step further, however, by underlining the necessity of 
an experimental episcopal policy adapted to the variety of priestly roles. It 
was better to end up with ‘half an egg’ than with an ‘empty cup’: before one 
started to work towards new ecclesiastical structures, the ‘living man in 
trouble’ needed to be provided with help. In a reaction to this discussion, 
Alfrink pointed out that he and the other bishops were rather unique in 
their care for the well-being of priests and ex-priests. He stressed that 
adopting a nuanced stance in the celibacy question was not at all easy. One 
could actually only do so if one had many sorts of information on the 
situation in the Church at one’s disposal. The Dutch bishops were acquiring 
bits and pieces at the moment of speaking, Alfrink noted, for example 
through the 1968 celibacy poll. The strategy that the Episcopacy always 
followed during recent years, was one of ‘testifying’ and in this way ‘doing 
justice’ to the Dutch Church Province as a whole. According to the 
Cardinal, the expression of ‘banging one’s fist on the table’ could be 
interpreted in multiple ways. The Dutch bishops should do so in Rome if 
they thought this was necessary, but neither in the literal sense, nor in the 
public sphere, as this could lead to a breakdown in communication: “It is all 
a matter of trying to find the right avenues and the right ways to bringing 
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certain things to the table and firmly leading the attention of one’s 
conversational partner towards these things”. 
Together with ‘experts’ Dellepoort, Stieger, and Vendrik, Martin 
formulated the most far-reaching motion put to the vote in 
Noordwijkerhout. It said that, next to holding on to the unmarried status 
chosen ‘on the basis of personal inspiration’, opening up the priestly office 
to married men would be ‘valuable’ to the Dutch Church Province.65 The 
text stimulated the bishops to turn this statement into reality to the best of 
their abilities, so that a ‘multiformity’ of the priestly office could be realised 
in the Netherlands as soon as possible. How did the attendees react to this 
motion? A large majority accepted it. Tens of priests even perceived its 
message as too weak. On behalf of the Episcopacy, Alfrink stated that the 
bishops were willing to address the assembly’s desire during encounters with 
foreign bishops and highly placed Church officials in Rome. In a dialogue 
with them and the Dutch Church Province, as represented by the Plenary 
Assembly, the Episcopacy would spare no effort in striving to achieve the 
multiformity the priests wished for. 
 
The Vrijburg Controversy 
As the 1960s passed by, a youth culture revolving around prosperity, the 
legacy of communism, and rock ‘n’ roll emerged in the larger cities 
throughout the Netherlands.66 Dance halls and youth centres formed the 
hot spots of this culture. Here, youngsters gathered and exchanged 
cigarettes for ideas about changing a political culture that they were averse 
to—a culture embodied by ‘the establishment’. University communities 
were also characterised by cultural unrest. The student revolts which took 
place in many European countries in 1968 started to echo in the 
Netherlands one year later. When the governors of the Tilburg School of 
Economics rejected a policy proposal to democratise education in April 
1969, students immediately occupied the main buildings, upon which the 
institution closed its doors. This was the first Dutch student occupation. 
More famously, students garrisoned the administrative headquarters of the 
University of Amsterdam two months later.  
For the bishops, also, student communities formed a reason for 
concern. In Amsterdam, Utrecht, Nijmegen, Maastricht, and The Hague, 
students experimented with new forms of liturgy.67 Against this backdrop of 
experimental liturgy, the bishops discussed the ‘Vrijburg Controversy’ at 
length during a joint meeting on 10 December 1968. Two months earlier, 
on 27 October 1968, Jos Vrijburg SJ made his engagement publicly 
known. 68  He encouraged the continuation of the celebration of the 
Eucharist in the Amsterdam Student Church (‘studentenecclesia’) by means 
                                                          
65  Ibidem, pp. 45–47. 
66  RIGHART, De eindeloze jaren zestig, especially pp. 166–172 and 258–262. 
67  GODDIJN, JACOBS, and Van TILLO, Tot vrijheid geroepen, pp. 214–215. 
68  ‘Wie beslist in de Zaak-Vrijburg?’, in: De Nieuwe Linie, 16-11-1968. 
 CHAPTER FIVE: THE EXPERT COMMITTEE ON THE PRIESTLY OFFICE IN ACTION  
 
[179] 
of experiment. Not only did he reason that the Lord never proclaimed 
celibacy law. He also believed that the general interest of the Church 
encompassed multiformity rather than uniformity. 69  Bishop Zwartkruis 
from the Diocese of Haarlem held on to the official regulations, however. 
He told Vrijburg that he could no longer conduct the celebration of the 
Eucharist. 70  Even though the other bishops supported Zwartkruis, the 
leaders of the Amsterdam Student Church kept insisting on a temporary 
exemption to the prohibition on preaching for Vrijburg, hoping that the 
celibacy question would be solved at the highest level of Church authority 
within a year or two. They submitted an official request to Zwartkruis. 
In order to structure decision making on the Vrijburg Controversy, 
Goddijn sent a memorandum titled ‘P.I.290’ to the bishops. The PINK 
director built his text on a letter he had just sent to Vrijburg by request of 
the Episcopacy.71 In the first part of his memorandum, Goddijn noted that 
the situation in the Netherlands was far from unique.72 Bishops all over 
Europe were encountering ‘the problem’, as were their colleagues in Africa 
and Latin-America. According to Goddijn, a significant difference with 
other countries was that the issue appeared more often in the newspapers in 
the Netherlands. As a result of wide media exposure, he underlined, much 
public awareness had occurred. Goddijn subsequently claimed that celibacy 
was actually nothing more than an ecclesiastical law, thereby indicating that 
its man-made character provided significant room for manoeuvre. He also 
stated that the Vatican II notion of multiformity implied that, if priests or 
future priests proved to be incapable of adhering to a life in celibacy, a 
Church Province had ‘the right’ to take measures on its own. To what 
extent, then, was the ‘centralistically operating Holy See’ willing to allow 
Church Provinces to implement dissenting policy lines? Goddijn firmly 
believed that one matter the Dutch bishops should emphasise again and 
again, was that of the decreasing amount of candidates for the priestly 
office.  
The second section of Goddijn’s memorandum dealt with the time 
frame of episcopal decision making. 73  Long-term solutions were not 
advisable in Goddijn’s opinion, since ‘policies delayed were policies denied’. 
In the short term, Goddijn envisaged two options. On the one hand, the 
Dutch bishops could of course follow the usual procedures and deliberate 
with the Holy See on a liberalisation of celibacy law. Any chance of success 
would be virtually absent, however, since not only Pope Paul VI but also 
Cardinal Garrone, his right-hand man, would not even consider a 
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liberalisation. On the other hand, the bishops could act on the basis of their 
own pastoral responsibility and only inform the Holy See. But this way of 
operating was likely to give rise to an open conflict, maybe even a collective 
resignation of the bishops and a rupture of the Dutch Church Province with 
the universal Church. Goddijn therefore proposed the middle-ground 
solution of actively seeking contact with European bishops and highlighting 
the issue during international events. He particularly had the Church 
authorities of Austria, Belgium, England, France, and West-Germany in 
mind as potential allies. International encounters such as the upcoming 
symposium of European bishops in Chur in July 1969 and the Episcopal 
Synod in Rome several months later formed excellent opportunities to form 
trans-alpine alliances. Goddijn branded October 1969 as the latest possible 
date for international consideration. If no solutions had been reached by 
this point, a strategic repositioning needed to take place. 
On 15 January 1969, the bishops talked through the request of the 
Amsterdam Student Church.74 They envisaged two options: to stick to the 
existing viewpoint, as clarified by Zwartkruis, or to allow Vrijburg (and 
other priests in similar circumstances) to preach, but on the condition, 
without the enforcement of time limits, that he (they) would not conduct the 
celebration of the Eucharist, and on the condition that dispensation from 
celibacy law would be requested. Zwartkruis and Bishop Nierman from the 
Diocese of Groningen feared that the latter solution would lead to a gradual 
erosion of priestly duties. Furthermore, they pointed at the difficulties which 
could arise if the bishops altered the decision that they had reached in 
November. The relationship of the Dutch Church Province with the Holy 
See and other Episcopacies would suffer, they stated, and large groups of 
Dutch Catholics would not endorse Vrijburg’s stance. Whereas Bishop 
Bluyssen from the Diocese of Den Bosch deemed this stance as ‘non-
ecclesiastical’, Bishop Ernst from the Diocese of Breda was of a different 
opinion. Ernst actually turned out to be the only one willing to perceive the 
administration of the sacraments, rather than the sermon, as a ‘breaking 
point’. Although, he respected the majority decision articulated in the 
gathering.  
The bishops also focused on Goddijn’s memorandum.75 They noticed 
that many priests had high hopes concerning the Chur meeting and the 
Episcopal Synod. During these encounters, it would become clear if 
Sacerdotalis Caelibatus should be seen as a definitive end to the discussions. 
For this reason, the bishops believed that a considerable number of priests 
had not yet decided whether to leave their office. The Church authorities 
agreed on Goddijn’s time schedule. If an actual perspective was not opened 
up by October 1969, ‘underground situations’ should be expected. What 
procedure had to be followed to create more awareness for the Dutch 
situation in the universal Church? The bishops favoured international 
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diplomacy over a trailblazing action of the Dutch Church Province. They 
named West-German Cardinal Julius Döpfner and Belgian Cardinal Leo 
Suenens as possible allies. During the Second Vatican Council, Alfrink and 
Suenens stood shoulder to shoulder in an attempt to carry through a 
diminishing of the traditional, sacral character of the priestly office.76 The 
Episcopacy also concluded that the communication between the Dutch 
Church Province and the Holy See left something to be desired. For this 
reason, the bishops planned to visit highly placed Church officials more 
often when staying in Rome. Under the influence of Goddijn, the Dutch 
Episcopacy thus did not take the ‘short road’ (‘korte weg’), as the two short-
term solutions highlighted by the PINK director were publicly known.77 Its 
policy mainly became manifest in three ways.  
Firstly, in the immediate aftermath of the January meeting, Zwartkruis 
let Vrijburg know that he could do little else besides abandoning the priestly 
office. As the bishop explained in a declaration, he saw it as his duty to keep 
an eye on his ‘flock’ in its entirety.78 Someone who did not respect the 
official regulations and the will of his bishop placed himself outside this 
flock. Zwartkruis referred to the Acts of the Apostles (20:28) in order to 
underpin his decision: “Watch out for yourselves and for all the flock of 
which the Holy Spirit has made you overseers, to shepherd the Church of 
God that he obtained with the blood of his own Son”. In February 1969, 
Zwartkruis gave way somewhere. Supported by the other bishops, he 
acknowledged the experimental character of the Amsterdam Student 
Church and permitted Vrijburg to preach, but only during special ‘word-
services’ which were not part and parcel of the celebration of the 
Eucharist.79 Yet, it did not take long before Superior General Pedro Arrupe 
SJ excluded Vrijburg and two fellows active in Amsterdam, Jesuit priest 
Oosterhuis and Ton van der Stap SJ, from their Order.80 
Secondly, in the longer term, the bishops lobbied for an examination 
of the celibacy question on an international level. Between January and 
October 1969, meetings with Cardinal Döpfner and his colleague Helmut 
Wittler took place, as well as with Cardinal Suenens and his fellow bishop 
Paul Constant Schoenmaecker.81 In addition, Goddijn went to Rome on 
behalf of the Dutch Episcopacy in May 1969 at the behest of Cardinal 
Alfrink.82 Goddijn offered KASKI statistics on the Dutch priests as well as 
the French translation of the celibacy report to Giovanni Benelli, the 
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Substitute for General Affairs to the Secretary of State who asked for this 
translation himself. 83  Goddijn also informed Benelli about the Pastoral 
Council, after which the PINK director briefly met the newly appointed 
Secretary of State Cardinal Jean-Marie Villot. Villot was the most powerful 
Church official in Rome after Pope Paul VI. Goddijn did not enter the 
Vatican on his own, but together with PINK employee and priest-
theologian Huysmans. As a former canon law student based in this city, 
Huysmans still had some vital connections there.84 For Roman officials, it 
was perhaps extraordinary at best and offensive at worst to shake hands 
with a Franciscan priest and one of his staff members rather than with 
Cardinal Alfrink. As Huysmans recalled in 2012, Alfrink, maintaining a 
biblical perspective, fully accepted the Pope as the successor of Saint 
Peter.85 But deep in his heart, Alfrink had difficulties with the existence of 
the Medieval invention of the Curia. Therefore, not only did he shelve 
Roman files in his Utrecht office, he also developed an aversion to engaging 
in face-to-face encounters with Curia members. Seen in this light, Goddijn’s 
visit suited the Cardinal well.  
Thirdly, the Dutch bishops supported a closing address delivered by 
Suenens during the symposium of European bishops in Chur.86 In May 
1969, Suenens had already stated in an interview that Pope Paul VI should 
be liberated from ‘the system’ that held the entire Holy See captive.87 In 
Chur, the Cardinal called for a thorough investigation of celibacy. In his 
opinion, it was necessary to deepen knowledge about the theological value 
of voluntarily chosen celibacy, the possibility of reforming the canonical 
regulations regarding dispensation, and the option of allowing married men 
to enter the priestly office in areas in which a pastoral need demanded 
such.88 The international lobby of the Dutch bishops and Goddijn appeared 
to start paying off. Alfrink himself touched on the celibacy issue during the 
Episcopal Synod in October 1969.89 He stated that even the most talented 
clergymen wrestled with moral dilemmas. Church officials therefore had to 
familiarise themselves with ‘the real problems’ their priests were 
experiencing.  
 
The Draft Report: “On the Office” 
On 24 June 1969, conciliar secretary-general Goddijn sent the draft report 
on the priestly office to the Episcopacy, the Board of Counsellors, and the 
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Central Committee. 90  The 64 page document without any notes or 
appendices, simply titled Over het ambt (On the Office) and consisting of 
seven chapters, can be seen as one of the most sociologically oriented draft 
reports. In order to understand how Dekkers worked the papers of the six 
sub-committees into one text and what kind of episcopal policy was 
suggested, each of the chapters will now be examined in more detail. Firstly, 
I shall focus on the global textual contours. Then, I shall arrive at a 
comparison of the overall document to the Vatican II Decree 
Presbyterorum Ordinis, mainly in an attempt to uncover possible 
similarities and differences with regard to analyses of the priestly office. 
The first chapter of the draft report was indebted to the work of the 
subcommittees chaired by priest-theologians Dekkers and Van Noort, and 
addressed a ‘crisis’ of the ‘profession’ of the priestly office.91 The conciliar 
expert committee highlighted feelings of unrest, unease, and fear. It claimed 
that these feelings increasingly posed younger and middle-aged priests with 
the difficult question of whether they were still able and willing to stay in the 
office. These priests often felt a ‘large emptiness’, sensing that they were far 
away from the Church they would like to represent and the faithful who 
they would like to serve. In addition, there were ‘problems’ concerning their 
daily activities and competencies. Were they well-trained enough to 
function properly in a rapidly changing society or should they receive extra 
training? And what did Catholics expect from them? Many office holders 
were reported to envy people holding secular positions such as that of a 
medical doctor, psychologist, and social worker, since societal expectations 
of them were much more ‘clear-cut’. In contrast with priests, these 
professionals had a ‘demarcated work area’ and ‘distinctive professional 
skills’.  
The second chapter was devoted to the ‘organisation’ at which priests 
worked, the Church, and its position in society.92 It particularly rested on 
the work of the subcommittees led by Dekkers and Braun. The expert 
committee argued that the office was bearable only if the Church at large 
seemed to be meaningful to the priests. The expert committee did not 
define the Church as an ‘institute hostile towards the Gospel’, but instead as 
a ‘group of followers of the Gospel of Jesus Christ, again and again 
searching for adaptation to the changing times’. They also promoted 
welfare as the cipher to a meaningful Church. Church formation, then, was 
all about developing and anchoring ‘a renewed vision of life’. A redefinition 
of conceptions and ideas needed to take place, based on ‘the best’ of 
contemporary society on the one hand and tradition in the form of the Old 
and New Testaments on the other. 
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The third chapter of the draft report for the greater part rooted in the 
paper of Dekkers and his team, examined the main features of the office.93 
The expert committee contended that, since exegetical inquiry revealed that 
the early churches did not employ a uniform model, and thus the ways in 
which the office was given an interpretation varied over both time and 
space, it determined these features while keeping in mind the specific needs 
of the contemporary day and age. A main feature was ‘modern leadership’ 
in the form of ‘servant leadership’.94 The expert committee pointed out that 
every community needed a leader serving its freedom, creativity, and 
inventiveness. When applied to Catholic communities, this meant that the 
traditional image of office holders as shepherds could be used, but only if it 
was realised that they had no other conscience than their sheep. A second 
main feature was a connectedness to the Gospel. This connectedness had 
two sides. The expert committee purported that priests should anticipate the 
ways in which a specific religious community interpreted the Gospel. Yet, if 
the values of the Gospel were ruled out by certain individuals or groups 
pursuing their own interests, priests should stand up and object as a 
‘prophet’. Appointment procedures formed a third main feature. According 
to the expert committee, the priestly office could not be compared to a 
profession free of obligations. Priests were ordained to ‘lead and inspire’, 
and were given specific tasks in service of the continuity of a Church 
Province. For this reason, the idea of other appointment procedures than 
the classic ordination needed further thought. The expert committee noted 
that a closer involvement of the laity should be considered as a serious 
option.  
The fourth chapter dealt with a systematic reorganisation of the 
priestly office, but only after a core package of priestly duties was 
described.95 Even though it built mostly on the paper of Sub-Committee I, 
again, traces of the work of the sub-committee chaired by Govaart-Halkes 
are also discernible. The expert committee discerned four kinds of key 
duties: preaching and catechism, administering the sacraments and liturgy, 
practising pastoral care, and establishing and maintaining religious 
communities. The expert committee stated that role theory demonstrated 
that priests themselves still regarded these duties as vital to their role. The 
primary duty, that of preaching and catechism, could only be satisfactorily 
brought into practice if priests ‘translated’ the message of the Gospel to the 
material world. An analysis of the core duties incited the expert committee 
to encourage ‘functional purification’: tasks related to organisational, 
administrative, and financial-economic matters needed to be simplified and 
delegated. In the opinion of the experts, a ‘differentiation’ and 
‘specialisation’ of the priestly office was necessary as well, as the time of all 
office holders carrying out the same broad array of tasks was ‘definitely 
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over’. Against the backdrop of an increasing lack of priests, the expert 
committee argued in favour of an intensified mobilisation of pastoral 
workers and put forward the possibility of setting up a part-time ministry.  
Avenues to modernising the ecclesiastical structures within which 
office holders had to function were indicated in the fifth chapter, which 
particularly engaged with the work of the committee chaired by Braun.96 
Even though these structures could be an ‘enemy of life’, pastoral care could 
not be properly brought into practice without them. ‘Renewal’ therefore 
had to take place rather than revolution. According to the expert 
committee, the traditional parishes in the larger cities were not being 
‘adapted’ enough to rapid social change. Since a considerable number of 
Catholics had widened their horizon, the expert committee advised to 
establish larger ‘pastoral units’ in which specialised teams of priests 
collaborated with each other. Permanent consideration, discussion, and 
correction were presented as vital ingredients for the success of these teams. 
In addition, the expert committee proposed to maximise the pastoral duties 
of the bishop by shifting responsibility to the deaneries and delegating policy 
matters to his vicars. Bishops would then be able to spend more time and 
effort carrying out what the expert committee defined as their primary 
assignment: that of being the ‘principal pastors’ of their diocese, men who 
inspired, encouraged, and listened. 
The sixth chapter merged the papers of the sub-committees supervised 
by Van Noort, Govaart, and PINK.97 It concerned the demands and rights 
of the office holders. On the one hand, the expert committee claimed that 
these office holders had to reflect upon their belief themselves in times of 
transition, prefer ‘true servitude’ to ‘clerical dirigism’, favour ‘collegiality’ 
instead of ‘clerical individualism’, and embrace ‘modern life’. On the other 
hand, parts of the ‘personnel system’ should be modernised. Priests had to 
receive the education that prepared them for working in pastoral care, 
meaning that more attention had to be directed towards actual fieldwork. 
Additionally, ‘praying for more workers in the vineyard of the Lord’ could 
turn out to be fruitless if there was no willingness to call upon all available 
resources. In other words, the office must be opened up to both women and 
married men. Furthermore, the expert committee urged to strive for more 
‘transparency’, ‘efficiency’, and ‘professionalism’. One of the key 
recommendations here was to establish a professional association with a 
disciplinary board focusing on evident violations of the ‘professional code’. 
The final chapter addressed matters of which the expert committee 
thought demanded a quick solution.98 By integrating this chapter into the 
report, the expert committee set the agenda of the Plenary Assembly. 
Celibacy was among the highlighted issues along with a combination of 
‘gradual renewal’ and the ‘radical experiment’, pastoral care for the priests 
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themselves, the female office holder, the married office holder, and office 
abandonment. Referring to the newly published results of the 1968 celibacy 
poll commissioned by Goddijn, as well as to the outcomes of a polling 
inquiry allocated by Elsevier magazine, the expert committee presented a 
legal separation between the priestly office and celibacy as both the most 
‘realistic’ and ‘fruitful’ policy. It wrote that this policy was ‘inevitable’, not in 
the least because there were no stringent reasons to typify celibacy as a 
jewel, as the Pope did in Sacerdotalis Caelibatus.  
The draft report on the priestly office merged theological and 
sociological lines of reasoning into an analysis which was meant to give a 
practical meaning to the priestly office. When comparing the document to 
the Decree Presbyterorum Ordinis, at least two striking similarities come to 
light. First and foremost, both the Vatican II decree and the draft report 
replaced the administration of the sacraments by preaching and catechism 
as the priest’s key duties. This replacement placed the Gospel centre stage in 
the lives of the faithful. Servitude towards Catholic communities was 
presented as a value to be embraced and conveyed by the priest. This 
presentation can be seen as an integration of the secular value of democracy 
into a centuries-old and hierarchical religious institute. At least three 
striking differences can be discerned. In accordance with the main course of 
the Pastoral Council, and similar to the draft report on ecumenism analysed 
by historian Jacobs, the draft report on the priestly office led from the 
specific Dutch situation rather than from a universal point of view. This 
implied that the expert committee focused intensively on a ‘crisis’ of the 
priestly office. Furthermore, and closely related to this first difference, the 
draft report differed from the decree in that it drew heavily on sociological 
concepts and findings in addition to holding onto theological lines of 
reasoning. Here, the ever-increasing domination of sociology in the 
ecclesiastical domain in the 1960s becomes visible. Finally, several 
recommendations of the draft office were incompatible with those unfolded 
in Presbyterorum Ordinis, especially the ones concerning celibacy and the 
acceptance of lay women in the priestly office.  
 
 
5.3. TOWARDS THE FIFTH PLENARY SESSION OF THE 
PASTORAL COUNCIL  
 
Turmoil behind the Conciliar Scenes 
How did the members of the sub-committees react to the draft report? Only 
one reaction, a written one, has been found: that of Bunnik. This reaction 
suggests that the sub-committee members were not given any chance to 
assert influence on the document. According to Bunnik, it was totally 
unacceptable that this text, which had to be an ‘expression of faith’, held 
only a very few biblical references.99 Moreover, no serious efforts were made 
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to refer to Vatican II, either in a positive way, or in a critical manner. As 
Bunnik wrote, he did not want the draft report to convey a kind of 
fundamentalist creed at all, but simply perceived its tone as ‘too social 
scientific’ and ‘too little religiously inspired’. What bothered him as well was 
the ‘injustice’ that happened to the paper submitted by himself and the 
other members of the subcommittee. They edited this paper ‘word by 
word’. Not only had important passages been deleted. ‘Senseless editorial 
changes’ had also been implemented. “I am eager to hear the opinion of the 
Board of Counsellors”, Bunnik sneered at the end of his letter.  
On 7 July 1969, this Board of Counsellors discussed the draft report. 
Priest-theologian Haarsma led the meeting because the actual chairman, 
theologian Joseph Lescrauwaet MSC, was unable to attend. 100  The 
counsellors unanimously assessed the report as ‘acceptable’ for the Pastoral 
Council. It was not only readable but also opened up perspectives on the 
future. After having offered ‘a sharp diagnosis of the crisis’ of the priestly 
office, it adopted a clear stance in all kinds of practical problems and 
proposed practical solutions. Such praise, however, did not hold back the 
counsellors from expressing fundamental criticism, particularly concerning 
the theological underpinnings of the document. They argued that the 
analysis for the greater part lacked these theological underpinnings. As a 
result, the document did not contain the ‘tension’ and ‘inspiration’ one 
should encounter in a pastoral report. Furthermore, the counsellors 
commented that the Gospel was often portrayed as something non-
committal. In this way, the committee members did not do justice to the 
Gospel as a gift from God: something preceding human need and 
transcending human expectation.  
Under the presidency of Cardinal Alfrink, both the members of the 
Central Committee and the bishops agreed on the underexposure of 
theological features. However, the bishops went much further in articulating 
their desires. Whereas the Central Committee changed the title of the 
report into Uitoefening van het ambt in de tijd van vandaag (The Execution 
of the Office in the Current Day and Age), the bishops wished for an 
explicit answer to the question of why the experts had not succeeded in 
writing a convincing theological section.101 A conversation between Alfrink 
and Lescrauwaet followed. Advised to do so by conciliar secretary-general 
Goddijn, they decided that Lescrauwaet, not the committee members, 
would take care of a preface which addressed the lack of theological 
perspectives.102  
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This intervention is relevant. It not only shows the influence of 
Goddijn in this specific situation. It also suggests that Alfrink feared the 
national and international repercussions of the draft report, and that he 
sidetracked the conciliar committee while trying to alter the document’s 
content. 103  On 20 August 1969, a preface written by Lescrauwaet and 
edited by Haarsma made its way directly to Alfrink. 104  In this—
anonymised—text, it was asserted that the draft report focused on the 
activity of the priestly office rather than on its nature. Deservedly, the 
preface continued, priests would be keen to read more about the meaning of 
their sacramental ordination, the extent to what biblical passages about 
shepherds, teachers, leaders, chairmen, and presbyters applied to them, and 
what documents Vatican II issued on the unique nature of being a high 
priest of Christ. Some of them would even question whether the report was 
about ‘the same priestly office they had attached their entire lives with’. For 
this reason, they should reflect upon the deeper questions of faith 
concerning the specific nature of being a priest themselves in the lead-up to 
the fifth session of the Plenary Assembly. 
Alfrink forwarded the preface to his fellow bishops, noting that it was 
‘a very good piece’ which met his wishes as well as that of the Board of 
Counsellors and the Central Committee.105 Dominican theologian Willems, 
the committee’s new chairman, was told by Lescrauwaet that he would only 
get access to the introductory passage and claimed the right to come back 
on the matter.106 In a telephone call with Goddijn, he criticised the followed 
procedure. 107  Willems felt as if the Board of Counsellors had ‘trampled 
upon’ the responsibility of the expert committee.  
During a meeting with the other committee members, Willems 
described Lescrauwaet’s text as a ‘preliminary note’ which directed the 
entire report into a false direction.108 The other committee members, too, 
protested against the intervention. According to psychologist Frohn-De 
Winter, the preface was ‘depressing’, as it did not invite readers to read any 
further. Additionally, it gave the impression of the Board of Counsellors 
distancing itself from the report. Dekkers spoke of a ‘nasty manoeuvre’ 
meant to bind the conservative faction in the Church. Vendrik, in turn, 
reasoned that this ‘fearful dirigisme’ should not result in general theological 
issues being raised at the council. The committee members envisaged two 
solutions. In the most favourable scenario, they would rewrite their own 
introduction while drawing on Lescrauwaet’s preface. The second option 
was to tolerate an epilogue from the Board of Counsellors, yet without a 
‘depressing tendency’. If both solutions were not accepted, the committee 
members would go so far as to seriously consider resignation.  
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In order to reduce the potential for collective embarrassment, a 
meeting between them and Lescrauwaet was called on 29 August 1969. The 
chairman of the Board of Counsellors elucidated that his text rested on a 
threefold episcopal concern.109 First of all, the bishops wanted to make clear 
to priests who were dissatisfied with laypeople determining their future that 
this participation was a good thing: the entire Catholic community had to 
be able to reflect upon the priestly office. The bishops also wanted to 
stimulate priests to think about the priestly office themselves, and give them 
the opportunity to come up with thoughts at the Second National Assembly 
of Priests, which would take place shortly. Finally, the Episcopacy foresaw 
that many of them would not find their problems being treated in the draft 
report. Lescrauwaet noted that these priests were much more interested in 
the question of what the meaning of being a priest was than in the question 
of whether they should start working in teams. Recalling that the committee 
members had strong objections against his text, he continued by inviting 
them to propose an alternative solution. This was the moment at which 
Willems suggested the option of the committee overhauling its own 
introduction on the basis of Lescrauwaet’s preface. Both Lescrauwaet and 
Alfrink reacted positively.110 They even came to prefer this option. At the 
beginning of September 1969, Levelt informed the other committee 
members that the matter was settled and no further thunderstorms were 
expected.111 This meant that Goddijn, now again in his capacity of PINK 
director, could finalise the preparations of the Second National Assembly of 
Priests.  
 
A Special Episcopal Meeting 
In order to adopt a stance on the celibacy question in time, and prepare 
themselves for the Second National Assembly of Priests, the bishops 
convened for a special meeting on 23 November 1969.112 The first part of 
this meeting was devoted to the question of what exactly they aspired to. 
The second focused on the best suited avenue to implementing their desires. 
The pastoral-theological paper drafted by Groot, Schillebeeckx, Stieger, 
and Van Noort on the basis of the outcomes of the 1968 celibacy poll 
formed their main starting point.  
The gathering began with the general remark that the bishops had 
already declared that they were willing to open up the office to married 
men.113 In other words, agreement was already reached on this option, the 
first out of three to be discussed. With respect to the second option, the 
possibility of a liberalisation of the legal determinations for future priestly 
candidates, Cardinal Alfrink stated that this was necessary against the 
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backdrop of recruitment strategies. Bishop Moors from the Diocese of 
Roermond reacted to Alfrink by challenging the overarching assumption 
that liberalisation was the only means to secure a sufficient number of 
priests, upon which Bishop Bluyssen from the Diocese of Den Bosch asked 
himself whether the attention should also be directed towards other basic 
aspects of the priestly office, such as religious inspiration. Bishop Ernst from 
the Diocese of Breda responded that a disconnection of celibacy and the 
priestly office would not entirely solve the policy issues. On the other hand, 
he argued that no new priestly candidates at worst and few at best would 
register if no legal alterations were made. A disconnection would make it 
‘much easier’ to enter the priestly office for those who regarded obliged 
celibacy as a significant obstacle, and pave the way for an unforced choice 
in favour of the unmarried status. Bishop Möller from the Diocese of 
Groningen moved away from statistics. He stressed that the members of the 
pastoral board of his diocese unanimously advocated an abolition of obliged 
celibacy. A changed perception of marriage from something which served 
the community of faithful to something beneficial to a development of the 
self justified such an abolishment, as did the psychic distortions of certain 
priests living a life of celibacy.  
Taking all these arguments into consideration, Bishop Bluyssen took 
the lead when it came to decision making. He believed that the bishops 
should aim at a transformation of the legal determinations, but build their 
ultimate decision on the opinions prevailing in the universal Church.114 
Bishop Jansen from the Diocese of Rotterdam noted that it was a new 
configuration of celibacy that they should strive for, meaning that the 
existing preference of the Church for an unmarried status could be 
preserved. This remark made Bishop Ernst indicate that he rejected the 
idea of tying down the choice of a specific way of living to the moment of 
ordination, which Alfrink did not find a good idea. The Cardinal did not 
want to offer priestly candidates the opportunity of marrying after their 
ordination. The ordination was when they had to make their definitive 
choice known. Alfrink held that such a policy would make sure that celibacy 
could survive, and that married priests could carry out their tasks without 
facing severe problems. This intervention concluded the discussion on the 
second option.  
The third option, which had already been food for thought in the 
immediate past, was that of an acceptance of priests who once embraced 
celibacy but married thereafter.115 Even though the bishops realised that 
such an acceptance could result in a maintenance of ‘many valuable forces’ 
in pastoral care, they agreed that this could only be tolerated in very specific 
circumstances. Every case had to be assessed individually. The following 
issues must be carefully considered: the reactions of the faithful, the 
psychological suitability of the priest in question, his faith, and the economic 
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consequences of his marriage for the Church. The bishops determined that 
they would not tolerate any priests posing them for a fait accompli as long 
as celibacy law remained unchanged. 
Reflecting upon an appropriate strategy, Ernst contended that the 
bishops must travel to Rome and highlight what they deemed necessary for 
their Church Province.116 If the Holy See disagreed with them, they could 
always reply that they could no longer prioritise the question of obliged 
celibacy in policy terms, and take responsibility for priests disregarding the 
official regulations. In terms of planning, the bishops concluded that they 
should first discuss the viability of obliged celibacy with both the clergy and 
the faithful at the fifth plenary session of the Pastoral Council. During the 
upcoming Second National Assembly of Priests, they would adopt the roles 
of ‘questioning’ and ‘listening’ in order not to anticipate or advance 
conclusions drawn after the conciliar session. When making their policy 
publicly known, the Episcopacy planned to be crystal clear, and emphasise 
that it placed much weight on pastoral-theological lines of reasoning.  
 
The Second National Assembly of Priests 
The Second National Assembly of Priests took place in Doorn on 24 and 25 
November 1969. PINK director Goddijn played a leading role during the 
event, namely that of chairman of the plenary sessions. Under his 
supervision, the assembly was able to submit various wishes regarding the 
pastoral recommendations attached to the draft report on the priestly office 
to the committee of experts.117 Contrary to the text of this draft report, these 
recommendations could still be subject to change. The attendees also had 
the ability to address the main conciliar bodies through letters, statements, 
and resolutions.  
The Second National Assembly of Priests set off with Alfrink 
tempering high hopes on change. 118  The bishops would make policy 
decisions only after the Plenary Assembly had examined the priestly office 
in January 1970. Furthermore, the Cardinal made clear that everyone had 
to take into account each other’s responsibilities during the debates. Being 
the heads of a diocese, the bishops should remain representative of 
everyone. Alfrink went on by arguing that this was not to say, however, that 
the attendees could not talk with each other about the office openly.  
The overwhelming domination of Goddijn as chairman of the plenary 
sessions is the most striking thing about the transcripts of the Second 
National Assembly of Priests. A quantitative analysis indicates that he nearly 
spoke 250 times. This number becomes significant if one realises that 
Vendrik spoke 33 times, Alfrink 25 times, and the rest of the priests less 
often. A qualitative analysis confirms the argument that Goddijn was 
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dominant. He determined what subjects were discussed by formulating the 
starting points of the discussions, based on the information that diocesan 
meetings and the morning session on 24 November yielded.119 He saw it as 
his overall duty to prevent the possibility of the Plenary Assembly 
influencing episcopal decision making from being blocked by an ongoing 
elaboration on theological questions. This assembly should not spiral into 
‘endless discussions’ on the theological aspects of the priestly office, Goddijn 
emphasised, but instead arrive at ‘practical ideas’ concerning episcopal 
policy. Rhetorical strategies that he used in order to reach this goal were 
chosen to prioritise certain matters (“Yes, that’s the third point I’ve thus 
formulated, those various operationalised policy moments I want to arrive 
at”), return to specific subjects (“I’d like to insist a bit on the question raised 
earlier by Father Willems”), and draw conclusions which he believed were 
supported by a majority of the attendees (“You yourself agree on it, so I 
suppose the assembly as a whole does too”). 
Illustrative for Goddijn’s acting as chairman of the Second National 
Assembly of Priests is a discussion on the establishment of a theological 
working group.120 This new body, or ecclesiastical ‘structure’, should keep 
up with the latest theological insights and the practical developments at the 
basis of the Church. It was meant to include experts and ‘field workers’ in 
terms of people with responsibilities in the field of pastoral care. The 
discussion commenced with Goddijn suggesting that the priests in Doorn 
reflect upon the idea of submitting an appeal in such a spirit directly to the 
Central Committee—on which he himself served. Jan Grieping, who 
directed the Diocesan Pastoral Centre of the Diocese of Groningen, 
immediately took the floor. He emphasised that the working group should 
not only study the priestly office from the theological perspective but also 
guide experiments in a critical manner. This twofold task ensured that 
recommendations concerning the priestly office met ‘actual commitment’. 
Goddijn reacted and contended that this was precisely what he envisaged, 
upon which Vendrik noted that the decisions of the Plenary Assembly 
should be implemented as much as possible. Who, then, guaranteed such an 
implementation? According to Goddijn, the Dutch bishops bore the 
ultimate responsibility for episcopal decision making. K. Linders 
subsequently reasoned that the expert committee on the priestly office had 
to have the right to propose the candidate members of the working group to 
the Central Committee. This intervention prompted Goddijn to underline 
that the Central Committee would discuss the matter with the Board of 
Counsellors and the expert committee on the priestly office, thereby 
implying that there was no reason for concern. Linders, who did not quite 
trust the Central Committee, stuck to his argument. Vendrik, too, did not 
applaud Goddijn’s latest move. The CAPER director asserted that both the 
Central Committee and the expert committee were regarded as suspect in 
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some circles. Everyone could be seen as suspect, Goddijn purported, 
depending on the perspective one looked from. He urged the priests to ask 
the Central Committee to take this all seriously and work closely together 
with the Board of Counsellors as well as with the expert committee. Alfrink 
intervened. In his capacity of chairman of the Central Committee, the 
Cardinal asked whether one was intending to request or summon this 
conciliar body to establish a theological working group. The latter would 
prevent the members of the Central Committee from making its own 
assessment about the desirability of this theological working group—a 
procedure which probably not all of them supported. In the opinion of 
Alfrink, moreover, it was vital to elaborate on the question of what had to 
happen with the working group after the Central Committee ceased to exist 
in 1970. Levelt, the secretary of the expert committee, replied to Alfrink by 
arguing in favour of a professional association. Griepink said that the priests 
could perhaps submit an appeal to the Central Committee via the Plenary 
Assembly. To Goddijn’s mind, this appeal should not be formulated as if it 
were an order. Finally, Alfrink warned against the danger of over-
institutionalisation: “We all live in a day and age in which we—truth be 
told—more or less kick against structures. On the other hand, we run a 
danger of building more structures; this is a real danger”. 
At the end of the day, the Second National Assembly of Priests in very 
general terms came to support the idea of asking the Plenary Assembly to 
encourage the establishment of a theological working group.121 It was stated 
that this theological working group had to fit into the existing ecclesiastical 
structures as much as possible and hold an episcopal representation so that 
it could execute decisions. Hence, Goddijn’s original suggestion made it 
through the event, albeit in a considerably amended way. The priests also 
offered the Plenary Assembly a ‘helping hand’ in terms of planning. 
Prioritising the celibacy question, they came to argue that ‘urgency’ rather 
than ‘feasibility’ had to be the leading policy principle of the bishops. They 
specifically encouraged these Church authorities to make their plans 
publicly known in the second half of January 1970, at the latest, and have 
the courage to opt for dissenting policy lines.  
The Episcopacy could now start to definitively work towards the fifth 
plenary session of the Pastoral Council. As Goddijn wrote on behalf of the 
Second National Assembly of Priests to the Plenary Assembly, the ‘crisis of 
the priestly office’ should be integrated into the decision making of an entire 
Church Province.122 Whether the efforts of this Second National Assembly 
of Priests to arrive at practical conciliar conclusions were successful, and 
what the impact of the fifth plenary session on episcopal policy actually was, 
will be analysed in the following chapter. 
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CONCLUSION 
As far as the priestly office was concerned, individuals of many intellectual 
natures and Church political colours were involved in the run-up to the 
Pastoral Council. Nevertheless, several key actors should be singled out: 
Goddijn, Vendrik, and, of course, the Dutch bishops. Goddijn combined 
the directorship of PINK with the position of conciliar secretary-general. 
This combination of advisory and executive tasks made him one of the most 
influential Catholics in the Dutch Church Province. What started with a 
plea in 1964 for a national sociological inquiry into the phenomenon of 
religious vocation and an orchestration of a polling project on priestly 
celibacy, ended with the establishment of a fully-fledged conciliar expert 
committee on the priestly office in 1968, advice related to episcopal decision 
making on the Vrijburg Contoversy, a controversial draft report, and 
motions issued by two priestly assemblies. Goddijn had a finger in almost 
every pie. Vendrik, too, played a crucial role before and behind the 
conciliar scenes. Not only was he dominant in the expert committee on the 
priestly office. He also delivered a paper at an expert seminar in 1968, co-
authored a motion accepted at the National Assembly of Priests, and often 
had the main say at the 1969 Second National Assembly of Priests. His 
directorship of CAPER made that he was generally regarded as a specialist 
in the ‘problematic’ aspects of the priestly office, and strengthened the man 
himself in a quest for an acknowledgement and humane treatment of 
troubled priests. He truly believed that the celibacy question was a burning 
issue which demanded a quick solution. The draft report on the priestly 
office co-authored by Vendrik did not quite meet the desires of the bishops. 
They voiced their objections along with the Board of Counsellors and the 
Central Committee. These objections did not lead to a fundamental 
transformation of the document, however. When setting out the general 
course of the Dutch Church Province, the bishops relied heavily on the 
pastoral-theological policy lines drafted by priest-theologians Groot, 
Schillebeeckx, Stieger, and Van Noort on the basis of the 1968 celibacy 
poll. Having an eye for the pastoral needs prevailing in this Church 
Province, and holding on to the principle of collegiality, Alfrink and his 
fellows sought to keep the celibacy question on the agenda. Differences of 
opinion were ironed out in the form of joint decisions. No major differences 
of opinion seem to have prevailed with regard to international diplomacy. 
The bishops invariably emphasised their connectedness to the universal 
Church. They discussed the celibacy issue during encounters with Church 
authorities abroad. 
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Chapter Six  
 
IN PURSUIT OF A LIBERALISATION  
OF CELIBACY LAW 
 
════════════════════════════ 
 
 
 
 
 
INTRODUCTION 
In late January 1970, after the fifth plenary session of the Pastoral Council 
ended and the Dutch bishops made their policy on priestly celibacy publicly 
known, Bishop Ernst from the Diocese of Breda reflected upon this policy in 
an interview article in the magazine of the Dutch Catholic Labour 
Association.1 “We [the Dutch bishops] refrained from setting a deadline in 
Rome”, he said. Ernst explained that the Dutch Episcopacy sought to work 
towards a liberalisation of celibacy law as soon as possible. Its viewpoint 
emanated from a lengthy preparation: “A poll circulated among the clergy, 
and, for over a period of about two years, an expert committee drafted a 
report on the priestly office”. However, Ernst did not have the slightest idea 
about the expected length of the deliberations with the Holy See. Also, there 
was always an ‘interval’ between the determination of a standpoint and the 
realisation of a certain conviction. “What has been an ecclesiastical law for 
centuries”, Ernst stressed, “cannot be undone overnight”. 
From this interview article we continue our exploration of the ‘letter’ 
and ‘event’ of the Pastoral Council in general and the conciliar treatment of 
the priestly office in particular, with an emphasis on the celibacy question. A 
general historical background against which this exploration should be set is 
that of an increasing tension between the Dutch Church Province and the 
Holy See. When seen from the ‘external’ perspective, the tension was 
particularly rooted in a controversy revolving around the 1966 Dutch New 
Catechism. This publication, which was characterised by a pedagogical style 
that no longer rested on the notion of the laity as mere recipients of ‘the 
truth’ as well as by a lack of technical theological vocabulary, became the 
                                                          
1 ‘Mgr. Ernst: de paus waardeert gehuwde priester’, in: Ruim Zicht 19 (1970), II, p. 1. 
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first post-Vatican II catechism in the world.2 Even though its origins can be 
traced back to the mid 1950s, the Dutch Episcopacy explicitly placed the 
text within the context of Vatican II. Warned by a group of 25 worried 
Dutch critics, who sent a review to the Holy See and bypassed the Dutch 
Episcopacy, Pope Paul VI installed a committee of prominent theologians in 
1967. He tasked these prominent theologians with assessing the New 
Catechism. This assessment led to a 1969 supplement written by Edouard 
Dhanis SJ and Jan Visser CssR. The Dutch bishops were not amused by 
this Roman intervention.  
When seen from the ‘internal’ perspective, grassroots activists 
embracing the code of protest contributed to the emergence of a religiously 
explosive climate. Laymen J. Asberg and P. den Ottolander established the 
action group Confrontatie (Confrontation) in 1964. Arguing that the 
Church reform carried through by the Episcopacy crossed the lines of 
acceptability, they set out to turn back to what they regarded as the essence 
of Catholicism: asceticism, subservience, and loyalty to God and the Holy 
See.3 Their repertoire of contention consisted of their own monthly 
magazine as well as of a sponsorship of local discussion groups organising 
gatherings for prayer and devotion. Counterparts of Confrontation were 
founded too, of which Septuagint is perhaps the most vivid example. Its 
members strived for a married clergy, freedom from ‘clericalism’, and an 
ongoing democratisation within the Church.4 They came to stand shoulder-
to-shoulder with other internationally operating groups in extra-
parliamentary actions soon after its foundation in 1968.5 In the second week 
of July 1969, for instance, when the European bishops met in Chur, a 
considerable number of Dutch priests attended a parallel conference 
initiated by the French protest organisation Échanges et Dialogue 
(Exchanges and Dialogue). These priests aimed at establishing a dialogue 
with the bishops, drawing public attention to what they deemed as failing 
Church leadership, and exchanging information and experiences. They did 
not manage to reach the first goal, as their request to send delegates to the 
episcopal symposium was denied. They did discuss papers, however, and 
attracted much attention in the national and international media. 
Somewhere in between these two groups stood the Aktiegroep Wereldkerk 
(Action Group Universal Church), which came into being in 1969 as a 
result of the endeavours of sociologists Kusters, De Moor, Dellepoort, and 
Van Leeuwen, among others. 6 Literally casting themselves as the ‘voice of 
the moderates’, they argued that the reform executed in the Dutch Church 
Province endangered the connection of this Church Province to the 
universal Church. They protested against the often presented dichotomy of 
                                                          
2  Van den BOS, Verlangen naar vernieuwing, pp. 166–171. 
3  DERKS, ‘“Die treue Majorität”, pp. 129–132. 
4  COLEMAN, The Evolution of Dutch Catholicism, pp. 239–247.  
5  DOLS and ZIEMANN, ‘Progressive Participation and Transnational Activism in the Catholic 
Church after Vatican II’. 
6 COLEMAN, The Evolution of Dutch Catholicism, pp. 238–239. 
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a return to ‘the old’ on the one hand and an embrace of ‘the new’ on the 
other. By 1970, they had received 25,000 signs of support.  
As the politicisation of Vatican II lingered on, Goddijn’s dominant 
position became controversial. Illustrative in this respect is a letter he 
received on 18 November 1969 from the much older Waddinxveen farmer 
S.C.J. van Tol. After reading about Goddijn’s latest activities for the 
‘Theatre of Puppets in Noordwijkerhout’ in the press, bitterness had 
overwhelmed Van Tol.7 How could it be that large amounts of money 
belonging to devout Catholics was wasted on progressive reports and 
committees of ‘so-called priests’, and that numerous believers were hurt 
time and again by some ‘trailblazers of a schism with Rome’? Van Tol 
advised Goddijn to have the courage to leave the Church instead of 
hollowing out the institute, or else, come to his senses. Mary would 
ultimately crush the ‘avant-garde of Modernism’. A further example of 
controversy caused by Goddijn is a collection of papers which NCSV 
(Nederlandse Christen Studenten Vereniging), an association of Christian 
students, offered to all the members of the Plenary Assembly on 4 January 
1970.8 The purple jacket of this collection showed an image of Goddijn as 
the ‘Pope of Holland’, the Dutch competitor of Pope Paul VI (figure 41). An 
angel played the guitar on the left-hand side of Goddijn’s mitre, which 
referred to the liberal nature of his influence on the Dutch Episcopacy. In a 
prominent contribution, aforementioned young marxist Dullaert contended 
that the fashion for an entirely new Church was designed in the 
ecclesiastical dressing rooms.9 For a long time, he analysed, Goddijn had 
been able to hide his ‘manager’s face’ behind the scenes of paperwork. The 
tide was changing, however, and Goddijn’s finest hour would come to an 
end when opposition increased even further. 
In the first section of this sixth chapter, I shall continue where we left 
off, in November 1969, and focus on an important channel of 
communication between the Dutch Church Province and the Holy See: 
PINK. Highly placed Church officials made clear to Goddijn and 
Huysmans that the pastoral-theological nature of the draft report on the 
priestly office gave rise to serious objections within the Vatican walls. In the 
second section, I shall lead the attention towards the plenary session itself. 
Laypeople, parish priests, and bishops open-heartedly discussed the legal 
connection between the priestly office and celibacy in the assembly hall in 
Noordwijkerhout. The debates led to voting ballots and a two-thirds 
majority vote in favour of a liberalisation of celibacy law, upon which 
Cardinal Alfrink went to Rome in order to deliberate with Pope Paul VI 
about the possibility of applying dissenting policy lines in the Netherlands. 
However, these efforts remained without success. As I shall argue in the 
third and final section, the Holy See, impressed by the stance adopted by 
                                                          
7  Letter by Van Tol to Goddijn, 14-11-1969: KDC, PCNK, 399. 
8  Paarsboek voor de Nederlandse rooms-katholieke kerk. 
9  DULLAERT, ‘Hoelang nog, meneer Goddijn?’.  
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the Dutch Episcopacy, started to restore the peace in what it regarded as a 
rebellious Church Province. Members of the Curia meticulously followed 
the international media, which cultivated this image. 
 
 
6.1. ON THE EVE OF THE FIFTH PLENARY SESSION  
 
PINK as a Channel of Communication between ‘Utrecht’ and ‘Rome’  
As we have seen, it was one of Goddijn’s overarching aims to maintain a 
regular contact with prominent Church officials abroad—mostly in order to 
seek support for the experimental policy of the Dutch bishops and adjust 
what he perceived as a negative image of the Dutch Church Province.10 In 
December 1969, a follow-up of the May 1969 meeting with Vatican 
representatives took place. The goals of this next visit were to continue the 
dialogue with authorities such as Cardinal John Wright from the 
Congregation of the Clergy, cautiously sound out Substitute for General 
Affairs to the Secretary of State Benelli about the Curia’s opinions on the 
Dutch Church Province, remove possible misconceptions, and defend 
policy choices made by the Dutch bishops.11 
During this second 1969 trip to Rome, Cardinal Wright told Goddijn 
and Huysmans that the matter of the priestly office figured high on the 
agenda of the Holy See.12 Yet, contrary to the approach of the Dutch 
bishops, the theological perspective prevailed over social scientific data and 
arguments. “Knowing the facts is not necessarily knowing the truth”, it was 
reported to have been said to Goddijn and Huysmans in Rome. Different 
theological interpretations of the notion of collegiality, too came to the 
surface. As Benelli clarified to Goddijn and Huysmans, this notion 
encompassed a ‘strong bond’ among the Church Provinces around the 
world.13 It meant that the freedom of movement of individual bishops was 
‘limited’: they were not supposed to handle matters independently, but only 
with permanent dependence on the universal Church with the Pope as the 
highest decision making authority. Goddijn and Huysmans turned the 
argument around, arguing that there would always be the inalienable and 
divinely given ‘own pastoral responsibility’ of a bishop. According to them, 
collegiality should be interpreted as an empowerment of the various Church 
Provinces. 
Goddijn and Huysmans gained several more insights during their trip, 
of which the following four can be seen as the most essential for the decision 
making of the Dutch bishops. Firstly, they found out that the international 
                                                          
10 See paragraph 4.4. for more details. See also: letter by Goddijn to Tenhumberg, 31-03-1970: 
KDC, PINK, 354. An overview of international PINK encounters, as composed by Goddijn  
in March 1970, can be found here: KDC, PINK, 791. 
11 Report ‘Bezoek aan Rome van Dr. W. Goddijn en Dr. R. Huysmans, 16–20 dec. 1969’:  
KDC, PCNK, 827. 
12 Ibidem. 
13 Ibidem.  
 CHAPTER SIX: IN PURSUIT OF A LIBERALISATION OF CELIBACY LAW  
 
[199] 
newspapers and magazines, as well as incoming letters from individuals and 
groups, still formed the Curia’s key source of information, despite all the 
endeavours of the PINK staff to improve the dissemination of knowledge.14 
Members of the Curia in fact feared that internationally renowned 
magazines such as Life and Time would continue to publish extensively on 
Dutch pastoral experiments.15 Delicate internal issues such as priestly 
celibacy could become too much exposed to public opinion, and, 
eventually, spiral out of the control of the Dutch bishops. Secondly, it was 
reasoned in Rome that the Dutch bishops governed their Church Province 
in a too democratic fashion. This undermined the hierarchical nature of the 
Church. Thirdly, Roman authorities were convinced that “ideas have legs”. 
The situation in the Netherlands had to be prevented from turning into a 
precedent that could be used as a legitimation of profound change in other 
countries. Finally, Goddijn and Huysmans discovered that the Curia hardly 
made any distinction between scientific polling research, improvised polls, 
public opinion, and pressure. With regard to the ‘celibacy crisis’ in 
particular, members of the Curia wondered whether the Dutch questions 
and needs were truly authentic, or a result of a pressure solidified in the 
public sphere. 
No clues have been found suggesting that Goddijn’s and Huysmans’s 
report was discussed during a joint meeting of the bishops. It is likely that 
these Church authorities received this report, however, as Goddijn also 
offered them an extensive account of the May visit.16 The conclusion of the 
diplomatic mission, then, might have underpinned some worries. On the 
one hand, Goddijn and Huysmans spoke with prominent Church officials 
and explained the course of the Dutch Church Province to them. On the 
other hand, they saw substantial differences in leading scientific angles and 
theological interpretations with their own eyes, and probably enabled the 
Dutch bishops to comprehend why Pope Paul VI stated during his weekly 
audience in Castel Gandolfo on 17 September 1969 that Catholics sought 
too much solace in publicity, opinion polls, and pastoral experiments.17 The 
Pope underscored that no single statistical account “proves how many 
understanding and quiet people pray, hope, and suffer together with their 
bishops and with us”. Nothing indicated that the gap in scientific angles and 
theological interpretations would be soon bridged. On the contrary, with 
the draft report on the priestly office lying on both the Dutch and Roman 
desks, and with the fifth plenary session of the Pastoral Council 
approaching, the tension was only mounting. 
                                                          
14 Report ‘Bezoek aan Rome van Dr. W. Goddijn en Dr. R. Huysmans, 16–20 dec. 1969’:  
KDC, PCNK, 827. 
15 The cover of the Christmas edition of Paris Match pictured a boy giving himself the 
Communion. Other typical photographs showed beat masses, experimental liturgy in a chapel 
in the town of Nijmegen, and masses held in private homes. See: DERKS, ‘The Gospel of the 
Old’, especially pp. 135–136. 
16 Minutes of the Episcopacy meeting on 10-06-1969: BARD, 312.1, BV. 
17 ‘Paus valt uit tegen celibaatsgesprekken’, in: Het Binnenhof, 18-09-1969 and ‘Er wordt te veel 
over het celibaat gepraat’, in: Brabants Dagblad, 19-09-1969.  
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6.2. HOLLANDIA DOCET? 
 
The Fifth Plenary Session 
The fifth plenary session of the Pastoral Council, presided by KVP 
politician Steenkamp, was held from 4 until 7 January 1970. It dealt with 
two subjects: the life of the religious and the priestly office. Gathered in the 
well-equipped press box, and assisted by a team of Dutch interpreters, tens 
of national and international journalists followed the large-scale gathering 
with great interest. They wrote extensively on the conciliar backgrounds. 
According to star reporter Richard Auwerda from de Volkskrant 
newspaper, the Plenary Assembly would consider celibacy law as 
‘outdated’.18 This could hardly come as a surprise for those who had 
followed the recent developments. Bolstered by ‘changes in the 
understanding of God’, an ‘altered vision on mankind’, and ‘new opinions 
on the Church and the priestly office’, public opinion increasingly wandered 
into the direction of a liberalisation. Such a growth of new ideas was 
accompanied by a series of ‘facts’: a rapidly increasing number of requests 
for a resignation from the priestly office and a dramatically dropping 
number of priestly candidates. 
As Protestant theologian Bronkhorst reported to the General Synod of 
the Dutch Reformed Church on 17 February 1970, the Plenary Assembly 
was of an exceptionally liberal nature.19 Dean Jan Joosten from the Diocese 
of Roermond did represent a conservative wing within the Dutch Church 
Province, but other conservative Catholics such as Andreas Maltha OP and 
Chaplain Ad Simonis were neither chosen nor invited, or chose themselves 
not to attend.20 West-German theologian Gerhard Fittkau, too, cancelled an 
invitation. Acting as the official observer of the five dioceses of Nordrhein-
Westfalen, he protested against a phenomenon which has been analysed in 
all previous chapters: an increasing dominance of socio-religious engineers 
in the ecclesiastical domain, most notably Goddijn. According to Fittkau, 
the Dutch council headed towards a ‘catastrophic zenith’.21 The draft report 
on the priestly office could be called ‘neither Catholic nor Christian’, since a 
social scientific model of reasoning formed its intellectual backbone. 
Comparing the Church reform promoted in the Netherlands to a lunatic 
rocket mission, Fittkau urged Goddijn not to ignore the instructions of the 
‘control centre on Earth’, that is to say, the Holy See. Otherwise, the 
consequences for Goddijn’s ‘spaceship’ could be disastrous. 
Worse than this, for both Goddijn’s image and that of the Dutch 
Church Province as a whole, was the absence of Apostolic Pronuncio 
Angelo Felici. Pope Paul VI instructed him not to attend, thereby publicly 
                                                          
18 ‘Volgende week in Noordwijkerhout: nog éénmaal het celibaat’, in: de Volkskrant, 02-01-1970. 
19 Report by Bronkhorst (p. 1), 17-02-1970: KDC, PCNK, 737. 
20 GODDIJN et alii, Pastoraal Concilie van de Nederlandse Kerkprovincie, VI, 207–210. 
21 Letter by Fittkau to Goddijn, 31-12-1969: KDC, CONF, 47. Twelve delegates of European 
episcopal conferences did attend: GODDIJN et alii, Pastoraal Concilie van de Nederlandse 
Kerkprovincie, VI, 207–210. 
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expressing feelings of displeasure.22 An emotional letter written by the Pope 
to Cardinal Alfrink on 24 December 1969 elucidates these feelings. It 
appears that various passages from the draft report on the priestly office 
astounded the Pope.23 He believed that these passages hardly corresponded 
with the understandings of Vatican II and recently published documents 
such as Sacerdotalis Caelibatus. More specifically, he argued that a 
predominantly sociological interpretation of the priestly office gave rise to a 
de-sacralisation, and that statements concerning the Papacy—the expert 
committee typified the figure of the Pope as a ‘secretary-general of separate 
Church Provinces’—denigrated the Papal Office. Being the ‘Godly 
appointed teachers of the Catholic doctrine’, the Dutch bishops were 
summoned by the Pope to avoid deviation and keep the Revelations 
unscathed. Even though the Pope claimed to understand the difficult 
situation which they saw themselves confronted with, he told them to 
protect the century-old practice of celibacy to the best of their abilities. 
Everyone should respect this ‘unforgettable treasure’, and realise that it was 
a source of joy and Holiness. In general terms, the Pope referred to 
objections raised in the press, especially those related to the council’s 
‘questionable representativeness’ of the entire Dutch Catholic community. 
Was the ‘ordinary Catholic’ present in Noordwijkerhout?  
Almost nobody present in Noordwijkerhout in January 1970 knew 
about the content of this letter. Marking the document as ‘personal 
correspondence’ between the Pope and himself, Alfrink did not reveal any 
details. The Cardinal only said that the Pope defended celibacy law.24 The 
Pope supported the plenary meeting with his ‘prayer’ and ‘intense 
sympathy’. According to Alfrink’s biographer Ton van Schaik, it is likely 
that Alfrink argued that it was now up to his Church Province to speak out 
and make the next move, or he feared an increase in already existing anti-
Rome sentiments in the Netherlands.25 Whatever the true reason may have 
been, the letter did enter the public sphere on 12 January 1970, after the 
fifth conciliar session ended. The Holy See, not Alfrink, released the text. In 
the following two paragraphs, it will become clear why Roman authorities 
found it necessary to act in this way.  
 
Noordwijkerhout V and the Celibacy Question 
The exact course of the conciliar deliberation on priestly celibacy has not 
been explored before, even though Van Schaik has obviously focused on the 
experience of Alfrink in Noordwijkerhout. Using a concise report co-edited 
by Goddijn, Van Schaik paid attention to Steenkamp’s opening address.26 
                                                          
22 See Felici’s letter to Goddijn, 20-11-1969 (KDC, PCNK, 113), in which the first decidedly and 
gladly accepted the invitation to attend the fifth plenary session of the Pastoral Council.  
23 ‘Integrale tekst pauselijke brief aan episcopaat’, in: De Gelderlander, 13-01-1970. 
24 Minutes of the fifth plenary session of the Pastoral Council (pp. 4 and 183–184): KDC, PCNK, 
564. 
25 Van SCHAIK, Alfrink, pp. 437–439. 
26 GODDIJN et alii, Pastoraal Concilie van de Nederlandse Kerkprovincie, VI, pp. 217–220. 
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Steenkamp underlined what he perceived as the uniqueness of the Pastoral 
Council and the trailblazing role of the Dutch Church Province in the 
international context: ‘Hollandia docet’, or ‘Holland teaches’. He even went 
so far as to link the council to the intellectual success of Renaissance priest-
theologian Desiderius Erasmus.27 But what string of events preceded the 
voting procedures? Who took part in the discussions? What were their 
positions? And what arguments did they articulate? In this paragraph, the 
answers to these questions will be pursued. Such an examination is relevant 
because it allows us to better understand an immediate context of episcopal 
decision making on priestly celibacy. 
Alfrink officially opened the plenary meeting on the evening of 4 
January 1970, highlighting two matters.28 He first brought to mind that the 
Pastoral Council was an ‘application’ of the Second Vatican Council, which 
meant that he and his fellow bishops had an ‘own responsibility’. Here, 
Alfrink explicitly referred to Christus Dominus and Lumen Gentium. Of 
course, such a responsibility could cause tension. But as Dutch Catholics 
needed to learn the ‘difficult game of dialogue’, so too did the universal 
Church. Alfrink therefore stated to aim at an international understanding of 
the position of the Church in the Netherlands. Simultaneously, he was 
intent on continuing on the ‘path of dialogue’, since the connection of the 
Dutch Catholics to the Pope was a ‘theological given’. Following on, the 
Cardinal admitted that the composition of the Plenary Assembly—“like that 
of every form of representation in society”—was imperfect, despite the fact 
that the Episcopacy assigned the fifteen additional seats to young priests and 
religious as well as to youngsters. Alfrink emphasised that not everything 
articulated during this session could be seen as a final verdict of the council 
at large, and that the draft reports were not documents of but in service of 
the Plenary Assembly: “They do mirror the opinion of the committee that 
determined its content, but do not necessarily reflect that of the council or 
the Dutch Church Province”. 
On the morning of 6 January 1970, Willems defended the draft report 
on the priestly office as the chairman of the expert committee. He noted 
that a dispute should be favoured over ‘apathetic harmony’, as discussion 
was a ‘clear sign of vitality’.29 Regarding the main objection against the 
draft report, which said that it had a too structural-functional character and 
seemed to deal with a sociologically well-designed company rather than 
with pastoral work, Willems stated that an in-depth theological analysis 
would have probably been laughed out of the assembly hall. He also 
claimed that the report did have theological underpinnings. These 
underpinnings, however, were not visualised using references for two 
reasons. Firstly, a large amount of notes would have obscured the 
                                                          
27 Van SCHAIK, Alfrink, p. 439. 
28 Minutes of the fifth plenary session of the Pastoral Council (pp. 1–5): KDC, PCNK, 564.  
See also: Van SCHAIK, Alfrink, p. 439. 
29 Minutes of the fifth plenary session of the Pastoral Council (pp. 102–105): KDC, PCNK, 564.  
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committee’s key goal, namely to ‘understand the Gospel and translate its 
message to the modern day and age’. According to Willems, genuine 
Christianity could not be measured through a number of references to the 
Gospel. Secondly, the committee members deemed it both unnecessary and 
impossible to duplicate the theological work of Schillebeeckx, Pierre Benoit, 
Josef Gewiess, Hans Küng, and Heinrich Schlier. What the committee 
members did instead was to take the findings of these theologians as points 
of departure. This implied that the expert committee assumed that the New 
Testament promoted numerous models of the priestly office. Following on, 
Willems commented on the emphasis placed on a ‘renewal’ of ecclesiastical 
structures. Even though these frameworks could not solve a ‘fundamental 
crisis of the priestly office’, they could contribute to the rise of a climate in 
which this ‘crisis’ could be gradually tempered. Many aspects of the 
problems relating to the priestly office did not originate from a lack of faith, 
but instead from “the variety of tasks which priests were expected to 
shoulder with as much expertise as inspiration”. 
Bishop Möller from the Diocese of Groningen reacted to this 
justification by declaring that the Episcopacy allowed the draft report to 
serve in the plenary discussions as a discussion paper because the document 
gave an insight into the way in which the priestly office was experienced on 
a day-to-day basis.30 The report also illustrated how the priestly office could 
be reformed, and it evoked questions by not touching on various features. A 
first series of questions was related to theology. According to the bishops, 
the report only addressed theology if an analysis of the role of the office 
demanded such. As a result, the ‘basic vision on faith’ (‘geloofsvisie’) was 
insufficiently elaborated. Nothing was written about the inner meaning of 
ordination, for instance, whereas Presbyterorum Ordinis clearly taught that 
an ordination equated priests with their fellow Christ-priests. A second 
series of questions had to do with the Second Vatican Council. The bishops 
described the link between the draft report and the council as ‘vague’, since 
Vatican II was mentioned almost nowhere. Moreover, several statements 
did evidently not correspond with the conciliar outcomes: “Someone not 
ordained in the classical sense can simply not celebrate the Eucharist in a 
valid manner”. At the end of his declaration, Möller said that the bishops 
approved an in-depth discussion on the pastoral recommendations attached 
to the report, as long as the debaters held in mind the theological 
implications of these recommendations. 
During the rest of the morning and the afternoon, laypeople and 
priests frankly took part in the debates. That the bishops also wanted to 
have their say was clear from the very outset, when a debate on New 
Theology arose. The discussion started with Bishop Mart Jansen from the 
Diocese of Rotterdam envisaging a great future for this theological strand.31 
Because it was still in its ‘infancy’ (‘kinderschoenen’), however, he 
                                                          
30 Ibidem, pp. 106–107.  
31 Ibidem, pp. 112–115.  
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questioned its durability. He did not believe that it was wise to only engage 
with old theology, but perceived an almost exclusive reliance on the insights 
of New Theology as risky. Schillebeeckx, who attended as a special guest, 
returned to ‘the children’s shoes of Monsignor Jansen’ straight away. New 
Theology was not new at all, the Dominican theologian contended. It 
actually stood in the ‘Biblical sandals’ and was ‘ancient-Christian’. The 
Plenary Assembly welcomed this intervention with applause, and at first 
glance, it appeared as if Jansen was silenced by Schillebeeckx’s argument. 
But after a while, the bishop reignited the debate. New Theology might be 
ancient, he stated, but this did not take away his concerns. Jansen therefore 
stuck to his point: the Catholic Church in its then state, in which an older 
form of theology was still dominant, was not completely ready for New 
Theology. 
The celibacy issue itself was not examined until the evening of 6 
January 1970, when Alfrink seized a suitable moment to make some 
preliminary remarks, hereby attempting to affect the discussions which 
would take up the whole of the day after. One of the first things the 
Cardinal said was that celibacy was a crucial part of the tradition of the 
Church, something which he thought was neglected all too often.32 Alfrink 
also found it important to emphasise that this ‘delicate matter’, which he 
wanted to be treated with diligence, was studied and debated abroad too, 
even within the walls of the Vatican. Dutch Catholics therefore had to take 
into account the existence of well-informed opinions in other countries. 
Furthermore, Alfrink urged the Plenary Assembly not to approach celibacy 
exclusively in the negative terms of ‘disconnection’ and ‘abolition’, and 
warned about the possibility of bold statements ending up in the press. 
Finally, he made clear that he and the other bishops were willing to 
participate in the debates. However, they would not draw any conclusions 
concerning policy before they had the possibility of reflecting upon the 
implications of the plenary session, and talking these implications over with 
the religious superiors united in SNPR. 
On the morning of 7 January 1970, the main debate commenced with 
Steenkamp reading out the following pastoral recommendation: ‘For the 
future priest, celibacy will not be a condition to hold the office anymore’. 
The expert committee on the priestly office finalised this and other 
recommendations in the wake of the Second National Assembly of Priests.33 
Haye van der Meer SJ, who represented SNPR, was the first to take the 
floor.34 Defending celibacy and its anchoring in canon law, and holding on 
to Sacerdotalis Caelibatus, he reasoned that celibacy was more sanctifying 
for priests than a marriage since it enabled them to connect themselves 
completely to Jesus Christ. According to Van der Meer, such a good thing 
ratified by an ecclesiastical law meant that this law could help people to 
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overcome serious doubts. Schillebeeckx immediately took up the issue. He 
asserted that it was the legal aspect of the matter that should be discussed, 
and not the theological one, as everyone present in the assembly hall was 
convinced of the positive value of celibacy. Steenkamp agreed on this 
intervention, which prompted Bishop Moors from the Diocese of 
Roermond to accentuate the major importance of a theological point of 
view. De Moor, who served on the Central Committee of the Pastoral 
Council, supported Moors, arguing that it would be intolerant to move on 
to the voting procedures without allowing ‘deeper reflections’ to come to the 
surface. De Moor strongly protested against a tendency to cut the ‘surface’ 
(‘oppervlakte’) of the issue from its ‘roots’ (‘wortels’). Conciliar expert 
committee member Vendrik responded that he did not understand De 
Moor’s argument, and claimed that a theological discussion had already 
taken place on the eve of the fifth plenary session. Applause followed, which 
is indicative of the atmosphere in Noordwijkerhout: many participants knew 
what power they had, and seem to have wanted to exert this power as soon 
as possible. Bishop Jansen then reduced the complexity of the conversations 
by comparing the priest to a pilot. When someone wanted to become a 
priest, he said, he could enter the office under several conditions. What 
worried the bishop about the deliberations was the often-heard argument 
that celibacy law violated a natural right to marry. Jansen did not agree on 
this argument. The logical consequence for someone opting for a marriage 
was that he could not enter the priestly office. It was as simple as that: “If 
you don’t have good eyesight, you can’t become a pilot”. At the end of the 
debate, priest-theologian and member of the Board of Counsellors Haarsma 
brought in a new and rather authoritative element, namely that of the 
decreasing number of office holders. In Church political terms, Haarsma 
emphasised, keeping this number high enough was a fundamental law 
which the bishops should live up to. Implicitly, he referred to Cicero’s De 
Legibus (On the Laws) III (“Salus populi supremo lex esto”, or “The health 
of the people should be the supreme law”) at this point.  
Alfrink was the last to speak before the coffee break.35 He did not find 
Vendrik’s argument very convincing: the bishops did not only want to know 
how the debaters thought about celibacy and celibacy law, but also why 
they did so. Moreover, Alfrink believed that the international image of the 
Dutch Church Province could be endangered. The Cardinal was convinced 
that people in other countries should be given as little opportunity as 
possible to reason that a decision was reached overnight without a thorough 
discussion. He also challenged Haarsma’s presumption that the number of 
priests would increase as a liberalisation of celibacy law took shape: “I do 
not quite believe that churches tolerating married office holders have an 
abundance of candidates at their disposal”.  
After the coffee break, Steenkamp put the pastoral recommendation to 
the vote. The Central Committee bore responsibility for the voting 
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protocol, which dictated that the 106 participants entitled to vote did not do 
so at the same time. Instead, the bishops, being the pastoral leaders of the 
Dutch Church Province, were allowed to vote first. Next came the members 
of the Central Committee, followed by the diocesan delegates from Utrecht, 
Roermond, Den Bosch, Haarlem, Rotterdam, Breda, and Groningen, and, 
finally, by the delegates of the religious. The voters did not use written 
ballots, but had to indicate their preference by raising their hand in the air. 
Perfectly visible to everyone, the bishops and the Central Committee thus 
set the tone.  
Because the bishops chose not to adopt any stance from the point of 
view of decision making during the council, they abstained from voting.36 
As planned, five of the seven members of the Central Committee did take 
part in the procedure—Cardinal Alfrink and Bishop Zwartkruis from the 
Diocese of Haarlem did not vote. Four of them voted positively. The 
delegates from the Archdiocese of Utrecht, the Diocese of Rotterdam, the 
Diocese of Breda, and the Diocese of Groningen unanimously voted in 
favour of a disconnection of the priestly office and celibacy. The end result 
was as follows: eight abstentions, ninety votes for, six votes against, and two 
‘blank votes’. Since acceptance required a two-thirds majority, the pastoral 
recommendation made it through the voting round.  
In a similar vein, the Plenary Assembly approved three more 
recommendations concerning obliged celibacy. ‘Under certain conditions, 
priests who want to marry or are already married will be given the 
opportunity to stay in the office or return to it’ led to nine abstentions, 86 
votes for, three votes against, and eight blank votes. ‘Married people will be 
given the opportunity to enter the office’ received nine abstentions, 94 votes 
for, one vote against, and two blank votes. The principle statement reading 
‘The obligation of celibacy as a condition for holding the office needs to be 
lifted’ was supported 93 times and evaluated negatively two times. There 
were eight abstentions and three blank votes. The afternoon of 7 January 
1970, or the ‘last round’ as Steenkamp called it, was particularly dedicated 
to the practical implications of the voting outcomes.37 Again backed by a 
two-thirds majority, the Plenary Assembly incited the bishops to act 
decisively and not put off urgent aspects of the celibacy question. The 
Plenary Assembly accepted the idea of establishing a theological working 
group on the priestly office without a vote.  
In a reaction to these outcomes, Alfrink told the members of the 
assembly that the Episcopacy had no other choice besides ‘doing something’ 
with the results, and that it was evident that it had to go further than just 
informing the Holy See. Yet, Alfrink said, setting an ultimatum in terms of a 
fixed and absolute decision was not an option since this would conflict with 
the idea of a dialogue. The Cardinal believed that Dutch bishops had to be 
ready to enter into a conversation with the Holy See being open to 
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opinions, to listen carefully to their conversational partners, and always 
remain open to potential changes of their own convictions. According to 
Goddijn who, as a member of the Central Committee, had so far hardly 
tried to impose himself on the course of the plenary meeting, the question of 
how far the Holy See permitted a national episcopate to go in the wake of 
Vatican II should be at the core of this dialogue. What were the exact rights 
of the Dutch bishops concerning decision making in their own Church 
Province? Bishop Bluyssen from the Diocese of Den Bosch responded to 
Goddijn’s question by touching on an ‘evident lack’ of priests, and 
admitting that many clergymen found themselves struggling with celibacy 
law. On the other hand, Bluyssen stressed, a large group of Catholics feared 
that their bishops would slowly but surely guide them towards a schism. The 
bishops might choose to play a very dangerous game with large risks 
involved. However, the Episcopacy would never risk a rupture. Or as 
Bishop Möller put it: the strategy of the bishops would aim at minimising 
the tension in the Netherlands, and keeping the unity with the Pope and the 
universal Church as strong as possible.  
As Wewerinke, Mommers, and Goddijn had already established in a 
quantitative way, the Episcopacy did not cling to a hands-off policy. 
Through Bishop Möller from the Diocese of Groningen, it critically 
reflected upon the draft report on the priestly office. Its natural leader, 
Cardinal Alfrink, had an ambivalent relationship with the Plenary 
Assembly. As a former Council Father, he sometimes encouraged an open 
discussion. But in his role of Archbishop, he attempted to slow down the 
conciliar dynamics, and pointed at the international image of the Dutch 
Church Province. Most of the other bishops, too, chose to participate in the 
debates. Whereas Bishop Jansen from the Diocese of Rotterdam challenged 
the legitimacy of an emphasis on New Theology, and presented a legal 
connection between the priestly office and celibacy as something logical, 
Bishop Moors from the Diocese of Roermond insisted on an in-depth 
theological debate. Implicitly referring to the pastoral-theological policy 
lines drafted by Groot, Schillebeeckx, Stieger, and Van Noort, Bishop 
Bluyssen from the Diocese of Den Bosch argued in favour of a ‘risky 
Church’ without losing sight of the general interest of the universal Church. 
These bishops regularly reacted to arguments put forward by the usual 
suspects. Schillebeeckx sought to focus on the obliged character of priestly 
celibacy, De Moor sided with Bishop Moors, Vendrik moved away from 
theology, Haarsma directed the attention to statistics and the personal well-
being of the priests, and Goddijn highlighted Church political planning. 
 
The ‘Majority’ as a New Policy Benchmark of the Bishops 
The Plenary Assembly had spoken. It is unknown how Goddijn reacted to 
the conciliar outcomes. He did incite Alfrink to strive for the greatest 
transparency: “The clearer the bishops’ point of view, the better”.38 It was 
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vital to ‘obey the Gospel’ rather than a ‘power-wielding institute’. A full 
maintenance of celibacy law could confirm the status of the Church as 
being such an institute, and result in a ‘silent downfall’ of the 
trustworthiness of the Dutch Episcopacy. Alfrink himself expressed feelings 
of discomfort about the startlingly high figures of around 90 percent. 
“There goes our Pastoral Council”, he said to Missionary Bishop Constans 
Kramer.39 Secretary Vic Zemann heard the following: “You just can’t sell 
these kinds of numbers”. Alfrink’s discomfort soon grew into anger. He 
became angry at the authors of the draft report on the priestly office, the 
troubled circumstances which brought this document into the assembly hall, 
the rather homogeneous composition of the Plenary Assembly, and even the 
persons who he expected would have voted differently.40  
As the Plenary Assembly insisted on profound action, and a long radio 
silence could have negative consequences for the international image of the 
Dutch Church Province, the Dutch bishops kept their promise. They 
definitively set out their policy lines during a joint meeting on 13 January 
1970.41 First and foremost, a press announcement would be released six 
days later. Alfrink was the main author of this announcement. The bishops 
rejected an unknown concept drafted by Goddijn and his staff. In addition, 
they agreed to highlight statistical data during a future encounter with the 
Pope, since these data ‘legitimated’ a transformation of celibacy law: the 
number of priestly candidates had almost fallen to zero, and the priestly 
population quickly decreased as a result of death, retirement, and 
abandonments of the office. They did not strive for an abolition of celibacy 
law, but instead aimed at a ‘new configuration’ of priestly celibacy. The 
international lobby would be continued, especially in the Belgium, West-
German, and French Church Provinces. 
The Dutch bishops released a statement on 19 January 1969 indeed, 
some hundred years after the dogma of papal infallibility was approved at 
the Vatican Council. The fifth plenary session of the Pastoral Council, they 
stated, showed what opinions prevailed in a substantial part of their Church 
Province. 42 Despite the fact that many Catholics thought otherwise, the 
Episcopacy, too, believed in change. Undoubtedly, the practice of celibacy 
chosen in absolute freedom must be maintained. At the same time, 
however, the married priest had to make his entrance into the ecclesiastical 
domain. The bishops envisaged the options of ordaining married men, and, 
in special cases and only under very specific preconditions, allowing married 
ex-priests to hold office again. According to the press announcement, 
Alfrink would contact Pope Paul VI in order to acquaint him with this 
episcopal viewpoint. In an explanatory memorandum which accompanied 
this announcement, one could read that a new phase in the dialogue 
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between the Dutch Province and the Holy See began: a public discussion 
was elevated to the ecclesiastical decision making level.  
In light of the overall thesis of this book, it is relevant to note how 
intensively polling results structured the minds of the Dutch bishops in 
addition to statistical data and theological forms of reasoning—something 
which could not be gleaned from the minutes of their joint meetings. The 
notion of a ‘majority’ appears to have had a normative impact on their 
policy formation. In May 1969, when the outcomes of the celibacy poll 
entered the public sphere, Bishop Bluyssen from the Diocese of Den Bosch 
reasoned that it was necessary to allow married men to become priests, and 
let young priestly candidates choose between a married life and a life in 
celibacy.43 The ‘clarifying’ data, which ‘proved’ that ‘the majority’ of priests 
did not perceive the celibacy law as valuable anymore, did not surprise him. 
Bishop Jansen from the Diocese of Rotterdam, in turn, declared during a 
meeting with the priests of his diocese in that same month that he was 
willing to act as an ‘interpreter’ on behalf of ‘a large majority of the clergy’, 
and, as such, promote a legal disconnection of the priestly office and 
celibacy.44 And as Bishop Ernst from the Diocese of Breda said in an 
interview on 26 January 1970, he and his fellow bishops based their 
decisions not only on the outcomes of the votes in Noordwijkerhout, but 
also and especially on the opinion of a ‘large majority of Catholics’, as 
yielded through various polling inquiries over the years.45  
The religious superiors united in SNPR determined not to back the 
bishops. During a deliberation with the Episcopacy on 19 January 1970, 
just before the press announcement would be released, they singled out two 
forms of celibacy.46 Whereas the ‘pastoral’ form built on the notions of 
servitude and availability, the ‘religious’ rested on a personal relationship 
with Christ or a direct encounter with God. On the basis of this difference, 
the religious superiors permitted their priests and brothers to pursue a legal 
disconnection between the secular priesthood and celibacy. On the other 
hand, they instructed them to keep respecting the unmarried status: not 
only did regular priests and brothers embrace free and unreserved devotion, 
it also ‘did not make sense’ to bring together two completely different ways 
of living. Since the religious superiors argued in favour of experimental 
episcopal policy lines, an option the bishops rejected, they did not endorse 
the press announcement. A remark made by Goddijn, who also attended 
the meeting as PINK director, and said the Episcopacy should count on a 
maximum of loyalty, did not change this situation. 
 
 
                                                          
43 ‘Vrije keuze acht ik noodzakelijk’, in: Brabants Dagblad, 25-05-1969. See also: letter by 
Bluyssen to the faithful in his diocese, 27-02-1970: KDC, PINK, 233. 
44 ‘Jubilerende bisschop voor ontkoppeling van het celibaat’, in: Nieuwe Rotterdamse Courant, 
23-05-1969. 
45 ‘“Grote meerderheid katholieken achter beleid episcopaat”’, in: De Stem, 26-01-1970.  
46 JACOBS, Werken in een dwarsverband, pp. 149–150. 
 CHAPTER SIX: IN PURSUIT OF A LIBERALISATION OF CELIBACY LAW  
 
[210] 
Towards Roman Interventions 
Sociologists figured prominently in the media upon the episcopal statement. 
On behalf of Action Group Universal Church, De Moor branded this 
announcement as a ‘wise determination of episcopal policy’.47 And on 13 
February 1970, Goddijn was invited onto KRO’s Riskante kerk (Risky 
Church) show to comment on the latest Church political developments. In 
the lead-up to the episcopal press announcement, KRO commissioned 
INTOMART to canvass public opinion. Employees of this market research 
institution arrived at the conclusions that 46 percent of ‘Dutch Catholics’ 
believed that the Pope was the highest decision making authority, 50 
percent approved the Dutch bishops taking action on their own, and four 
percent did not have an opinion on this matter.48 According to Goddijn, 
these figures presented a false contradiction: too much emphasis was placed 
on the ‘vertical line’ of Rome-Holland, whereas the ‘horizontal line’ of the 
World Episcopacy was neglected.49 In addition, the Pope was more or less 
isolated and dichotomised against the Dutch bishops. Goddijn believed that 
this was no longer acceptable in the wake of Vatican II. The World 
Episcopacy actually had to be perceived as the ‘successor of the ancient 
College of the Apostles’. Even though the Pope held a ‘special position’ 
within this college, he sought to make key decisions together with his peers. 
The ‘old’ ecclesiological notion of the Church as a centralistic and uniform 
institute was simply ‘wrong’.  
Pope Paul VI must have influenced Goddijn’s media appearance. On 
1 February 1970, during his weekly Angelus, the Pope touched on the 
celibacy question for the first time in the public sphere since the Dutch 
Episcopacy revealed its strategy.50 He stated that celibacy was a major law 
of the Latin Church which not only needed to be maintained but also 
protected. These words left the Dutch bishops in consternation. Did Pope 
Paul VI, over the heads of thousands of Catholics gathered on Saint Peter’s 
Square, condemn their policy stance? And did he speak as the Pope, the 
one leader of the universal Church, or perhaps as the Bishop of Rome? A 
press statement released on the same day read that Alfrink and the other 
bishops did not perceive the papal words as an answer to the worries they 
shared with him.51  
Far more explicit than this Angelus was a letter which the Pope sent to 
Secretary of State Cardinal Villot one day later, on 2 February 1970. In this 
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document, which appeared in newspapers and on television shows 
immediately after the Vatican published it, the Pope wrote that he saw it as 
his duty to confirm celibacy law in a lucid and powerful fashion.52 
Nonetheless, he was willing to reflect upon the question of whether the 
priestly office could be opened up to mature, married men in cases of a 
serious lack of priests. Whether these so-called ‘viri probati’ were a suitable 
solution to the celibacy question or not, together with the ‘shepherds of the 
Dutch dioceses’ means had to be found to solve their problems. But first, 
these Church authorities should absolutely reconsider the wishes they 
articulated. 
The Pope condemned the bishops’ January announcement but did his 
best to save their reputations. But the content of the papal letter, as well as 
the lack of direct contact between Alfrink and Pope Paul VI, prompted 
Goddijn’s brother Hans to publish an article in De Tijd newspaper on 7 
February 1970.53 He portrayed members of the Roman Curia as ‘slave 
drivers’ who eroded the Christian values of freedom. Goddijn argued that 
similarly to what had happened in the Second World War, when the Curia 
had forged alliances with Hitler, Franco, Mussolini, and Salazar, a ‘fatal 
treaty’ between the Curia, the Nunciatures, and right-wing Catholicism was 
about to block the blood circulation of the Church. Alfrink combined 
courage with competence, however, and showed that “we have not been 
liberated in Jesus Christ in order to fall prey to the slavery of the Curia and 
Nunciature”.  
Not long after these words made their way to a large audience, it 
became clear that Walter Goddijn’s plan to form a transalpine faction of 
bishops failed completely: not a single other European episcopacy sided 
with Cardinal Alfrink and the other Dutch bishops. An international 
isolation of their Church Province followed. Whereas English Cardinal John 
Heenan questioned the claim that a liberalisation of celibacy law would lead 
to an increase of priestly candidates, and Scottish Cardinal Gordon Gray 
incited Catholics in Scotland to pray for the Dutch Church Province in 
times of religious controversy, the Austrian Episcopacy testified to the 
official documents of Vatican II and the 1967 encyclical on celibacy.54 And 
whereas French Cardinal Jean Danielou called for a rediscovery of the 
spiritual value of celibacy for the Church, West German Cardinal Döpfner 
typified the Dutch developments as a ‘burden on the Churches in Western 
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Europe’.55 Even Belgian Cardinal Suenens turned his back on the Dutch 
Episcopacy.56  
It took until 8 July 1970 before Alfrink travelled to Rome. He not only 
discussed the celibacy issue with the Pope, but also engaged in a 
conversation with five cardinals and three bishops, among whom Villot and 
Benelli were prominent. Little detailed information about these encounters 
is known. According to Van Schaik, the option of allowing married ex-
priests to return to the priestly office was not even discussed.57 Furthermore, 
the Pope noted that the solution of ordaining ‘viri probati’ did not apply to 
the Dutch Church Province. He wanted Alfrink to publish a ‘mot 
d’adhesion’, a declaration of adhesion, to celibacy law. As the Dutch 
bishops noted in a press communiqué, Pope Paul VI listened with great 
interest and understanding to Alfrink’s analyses, and Alfrink was confronted 
with the responsibility of the Pope as the one leader of the universal 
Church. Probably in reaction to sociologically informed lines of reasoning, 
the Pope emphasised that the theological arguments in favour of celibacy 
law were still valid, maybe even more than ever before. In a separate letter 
to their priests, the Dutch bishops wrote that the priestly office was 
characterised by sociological aspects. The task of the priest could never be 
entirely defined within a context of sociological features, however. “We 
ought to proclaim God’s message”, the bishops stated, “and not ours”. Even 
though the interpretation of this message could vary over both time and 
space, every form of ‘corruption’ should be rejected. ‘Roma locuta causa 
finita’: Rome had spoken, once again, but now the case was closed in a 
conclusive way (figure 42). 
The bishops soon became aware of several other, and more far-
reaching, Church political repercussions of their decision making. As Bishop 
Jansen from the Diocese of Rotterdam would reach the age of 65 on 29 
August 1970, and would resign from his episcopal office, the search for a 
successor started in mid 1969. Dutch cathedral boards (‘kapittels’) from 
1958 onwards had the privilege of sending a list of three candidates to the 
Papal Nuncio—the so-called ‘terna’. The ultimate decision rested with the 
Pope. He was free to select anyone. In the Diocese of Rotterdam, the 
Diocesan Pastoral Board coordinated the search for a new bishop. Since the 
members of this pastoral board believed that the recent democratic 
tendencies in the Church had to be embraced, this search encompassed a 
large-scale opinion polling project guided by KASKI employee Poeisz. Via 
a questionnaire distributed among churchgoers, a series of questions 
targeted at approximately fifty groups, and a postal box, tens of thousands 
of Catholics responded to the main question of what ‘role’ the new bishop 
should play.58 When asked about the importance of certain tasks written 
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into an overloaded fictional diary, 82 percent of the 74,684 respondents to 
the questionnaire reasoned that the bishop’s participation in the monthly 
meetings of the Dutch Episcopacy should be maintained. Only 40 percent 
argued that a deliberation on financial affairs with a parish priest was 
important. With regard to professional competencies, being able to listen 
(94 percent), being open to cooperation (93 percent), and being willing to 
take advice (85 percent) came out on top. Concerning individual qualities, 
the ‘deeply believing’ category was up higher (77 percent) than that of 
‘organising’ (69 percent) and ‘being a pious priest’ (60 percent). On the basis 
of these and other polling outcomes, the cathedral board selected candidates 
for the vacant episcopal office. As it turned out, Pope Paul VI appointed 
Chaplain Simonis as the successor of Bishop Jansen on 30 December 1970, 
despite Simonis not holding any position on the list of candidates. Simonis 
was not a stranger to the public at all. On 13 February 1970, on KRO’s 
popular television show Brandpunt, he underlined how much he missed 
bishops prompting their priests to hold on to the obligation not to marry.59 
Celibacy was of invaluable importance ‘for the future of both mankind and 
society’.  
As historian Marjet Derks has suggested, it is probable that 
conservative Catholics influenced Simonis’s appointment to a considerable 
degree. They experienced Dutch Church reform as a serious threat to their 
most sacred values and therefore their identity.60 In sharp contrast with 
Goddijn, however, they did not mobilise the media in order to voice their 
concerns. Rather, they reached out to their extensive national contacts and 
Apostolic Pronuncio Felici, and tried to turn Dutch links with Church 
officials within the Vatican to their own benefit. 
Alfrink needed days to recover from Simonis’s entrance into the Dutch 
episcopal ranks.61 The Cardinal stated that a recurrence had to be 
prevented by all means, while anticipating the expected resignation of 
Bishop Moors from the Diocese of Roermond at the age of 65, in August 
1971. Interestingly, the cathedral board of Roermond adopted a similar 
bottom-up procedure as the one followed in Rotterdam. 12,748 Catholics 
took part in a polling inquiry.62 They expressed what qualities the new 
bishop should have. Sociologist Albert Felling, who worked at the Catholic 
University of Nijmegen, analysed the completed forms, of which 12,674 
were scientifically usable. But his efforts turned out to have little effect. Pope 
Paul VI again selected a candidate on his own: conservative Church 
historian Jo Gijsen succeeded Moors in January 1972. This Roman 
intervention made the PINK staff—Goddijn, Huysmans, and Ter 
Reegen—protest in the press against what it perceived as another ‘purely 
                                                          
59 Uitzendingen naar aanleiding van het communiqué van het episcopaat over ambts en celibaat, 
Brandpunt, 13-02-1970, p. 29. 
60 DERKS, ‘The Gospel of the Old’, especially pp. 146–150.  
61 Van SCHAIK, Alfrink, pp. 454–456. 
62 Paper ‘Profiel van een bisschop: samenvatting van een empirisch onderzoek in het diocees 
Roermond’ by A. Felling, 20-04-1971: ENK, CSSR, 18395. 
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political appointment’. The installation of Gijsen undermined the authority 
of the entire Dutch Church Province, as it was an expression of the 
‘incredibility of the Church as an institute’.63 The PINK staff proposed to 
establish an independent committee in order to investigate the mechanisms 
behind Gijsen’s assignment, and report on its findings during the upcoming 
National Pastoral Deliberation briefly known as LPO (Landelijk Pastoraal 
Overleg). In an interview in De Tijd newspaper, Goddijn explained that this 
form of contestation was meant as a ‘sign of hope in the midst of 
helplessness and sadness’.64 He incited eminent internationally minded 
Catholics to stand up and counterbalance the information which a small 
group of conservatives, who were perceived as trustworthy informants by 
Vatican officials, disseminated within their ‘invisible networks’. Goddijn did 
not deliberate about the protest with Alfrink. He was familiar enough with 
the written and unwritten rules prevailing in the ecclesiastical domain to 
know that the Cardinal would not have permitted him to publicly contest a 
papal decision under the PINK flag again.  
 
 
6.3. EPISCOPAL DECISION MAKING AFTER THE PASTORAL 
COUNCIL 
 
A Follow-Up of the Pastoral Council…  
The strategy of the Holy See to halt the Church reform in the Netherlands 
through episcopal appointments coincided with the Dutch episcopal plan to 
work towards a follow-up of the Pastoral Council. In the official closing 
address of this council on 8 April 1970, Alfrink hoped that both the content 
and form of this follow-up would take shape in the near future.65 What he 
and the other bishops particularly learned from the plenary sessions was to 
‘speak’ and ‘listen’ to one another. 
On 31 August 1971, the new project was considered refined enough to 
present to the outside world. Using the Vatican II documents of Lumen 
Gentium and Christus Dominus as a source of legitimacy, Alfrink expected 
a permanent Landelijke Pastorale Raad, or National Pastoral Council, to 
translate the ‘connectedness’ of all the Dutch Catholics into national 
policy.66 The bishops and 56 diocesan delegates would make up the core of 
its General Assembly, which would meet once or twice a year. Their impact 
on episcopal policy would be less noncommittal than that of the members of 
the Plenary Assembly: the General Assembly was explicitly stated by Alfrink 
to have ‘policy-forming’ (‘beleidsvormende’) power and become ‘co-
                                                          
63 ‘Dr. Walter Goddijn: enquête gevraagd naar benoeming’, in: De Tijd, 24-01-1972.  
64 ‘Staf PINK: Rome moet objectief worden geïnformeerd over situatie hier’, in: De Tijd,  
25-01-1972.  
65 GODDIJN et alii, Pastoraal Concilie van de Nederlandse Kerkprovincie, VII, pp. 270–273. 
66 Speech by Alfrink, 31-08-1971: KDC, PINK, 617. See also: Persdossier Landelijke Pastorale 
Raad & Centraal Bureau Kerkprovincie and Landelijke Pastorale Raad. 
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responsible’ (‘medeverantwoordelijk’) for this episcopal policy, even though 
the bishops would always have the ultimate say.  
The first plenary meeting of the new ecclesiastical institution took 
place on 26 January 1973.67 But as a result of yet another Roman 
intervention, the form of this ecclesiastical institution changed dramatically. 
The Roman Curia soon learned about the details of the Dutch plans via the 
international media, which in the recollection of Monsignor Ernst were 
informed by Goddijn without the bishops knowing and approving it.68 It 
appeared that the National Pastoral Council encountered strong opposition 
from the side of the Curia. Some Roman officials argued that a permanent 
pastoral council with a national character and a decisive influence on 
episcopal decision making threatened episcopal authority, and urged Alfrink 
to postpone its inauguration.69 It did not take long for the Cardinal and the 
other Dutch Church authorities to realise that their formula would never be 
accepted by the Holy See. They ultimately moulded the institution into the 
shape of a deliberation called LPO. This was a modest national forum for 
conversation in which the bishops and representatives of the faithful 
discussed matters such as justice.70 It had neither a statute nor a board. The 
Episcopacy determined if and when its members met, and what subjects 
were examined. No issues were subject to voting procedures. In this way, 
the Dutch bishops succeeded in neutralising the Curia’s reservation without 
cancelling the entire event. Goddijn and his staff at PINK became closely 
involved in the preparations for the project. He still pulled the strings and 
enjoyed the trust of the Episcopacy. At PINK, estimates were drafted, 
protocols designed, and all manner of practicalities arranged.71 By 1972, 
however, the Episcopacy sacrificed Goddijn and ‘his’ institute in a structural 
reorganisation of its advisory and administrative apparatus.  
 
…and a Reorganisation of the Episcopal Advisory and Administrative 
Apparatus 
Somewhat ironically, Goddijn himself kick-started this reorganisation as 
early as in the second half of the 1960s by sending letters of complaint to the 
PINK board.72 The first issue he complained about was the ‘top-heavy’ 
secretarial function in service of the Pastoral Council. He stated that friction 
between PINK and the Central Committee quickly came to prevail. The 
latter body ‘did not take on’ its responsibility. It often left the task of leading 
the council up to Goddijn and his employees. Goddijn also believed that 
PINK could not deliver quality services as a result of being understaffed, 
                                                          
67 Ontwerp-rapport De rechtvaardigheid in de wereld. 
68 Interview by Dols with Ernst, 02-03-2010. 
69 Van den BOS, Verlangen naar vernieuwing, p. 191. 
70 Van ANDEL, Landelijk Pastoraal Overleg van de Rooms-Katholieke Kerkprovincie in 
Nederland. 
71 Documents with regard to the National Pastoral Council, 1970–1972: KDC, PINK, 617–619 
and 790–795. 
72 Letters by Goddijn concerning the activities of himself as well as of PINK, 1967–1969:  
KDC, PINK, 790.  
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which gave rise to internal tension. The second aspect that worried him was 
a perceived lack of a long-term vision. What would happen to PINK and 
the existing ecclesiastical structures of participation after the Pastoral 
Council ended? A reflection upon this question could not start early 
enough. Finally, Goddijn felt like he was being saddled with numerous 
extra-statutory activities by the bishops, for instance the task to provide 
secretarial assistance in service of the monthly episcopal meetings. Such 
activities should be formalised, leading to a ‘better preparation’ of these 
meetings and a ‘higher ecclesiastical status’ when travelling abroad in the 
context of diplomacy.  
In order to examine the future position of PINK in the Dutch Church 
Province, as well as the relationship between this institute and a follow-up of 
the Pastoral Council, the bishops established a committee led by Steenkamp 
in October 1969.73 Jos Vollebergh, co-director of GITP and professor of 
organisational sociology at the Nijmegen University, was a prominent 
committee member. The Steenkamp Committee built its activities on a 
1968 research report on PINK published by GITP at Goddijn’s request. 
André Struik’s and Clemens Olthoff’s conclusions confirm what this and the 
previous chapters have shown, namely that that the operation of PINK was 
multi-faceted at best and vague at worst.74 The institute dealt with almost 
everything related to Church reform. A board existed on which Cardinal 
Alfrink served as chairman after De Vet’s passing away in 1967. But strictly 
speaking, Goddijn was not fully accountable to this board because most of 
the activities that he undertook were not directly ordered by its members. 
On the other hand, Goddijn was not fully accountable to the bishops either. 
The fact that most of his actions were commissioned or approved by these 
Church authorities did not mean that they could operate as his superiors, 
since there was a fully-fledged, active PINK board. Struik and Olthoff noted 
that this organisational disorder had to come to an end. They proposed a 
far-reaching reorganisation based on a ‘transparent management strategy’ 
and ‘clearly described job responsibilities’. 
The new advisory and administrative episcopal apparatus designed by 
the Steenkamp Committee with these suggestions in mind, which became 
active from 1 September 1972 onwards, centred around the Central 
Office.75 This Utrecht-based institution mainly sought to take care of 
secretarial activities for the Episcopacy and LPO, coordinate the pastoral 
activities of nationally operating institutes such as KASKI, direct research 
institutes or independent researchers to study certain issues, and provide the 
bishops with advice. The figure of the secretary-general became the most 
                                                          
73 Letter by Goddijn to Moors, Boom, Loeff, Steenkamp, Vollenbergh, and Wilbrink,  
17-10-1969: KDC, PINK, 793.  
74 STRUIK and OLTHOFF, Organisatorische doorlichting van het Pastoraal Instituut van de 
Nederlandse Kerkprovincie, pp. 7–10. 
75 Document on the structure and aim of the Central Office of the Dutch Church Province,  
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influential episcopal decision making official in the Netherlands after the 
bishops. His primary tasks were to supervise the performances of the 
Central Office, work as the secretary of the Episcopacy, and maintain 
contacts with the Holy See.  
Instead of offering this key position to Goddijn, who was still regarded 
by many as the top candidate, the bishops appointed Piet Vriens OFMCap., 
a specialist in missiology. For years, Vriens tried to coordinate the 
development of episcopal policy lines. He unexpectedly resigned in 1980. As 
Vriens explained in the press, the arrival of Simonis and Gijsen at the 
dawning of the 1970s marked the end of the relatively high levels of 
consensus and the large degree of cooperation which united the bishops up 
to that point.76 The religious polarisation visible at the ground level of the 
Church Province since 1964 made its way into the episcopal ranks. 
Consequently, the Episcopacy moderated or simply turned down many of 
his proposals. Cardinal Jo Willebrands, who became Alfrink’s successor in 
1975, decided to stay in touch with the Holy See himself. 
Why did the bishops give up on Goddijn, when, in saying goodbye to 
him as PINK Director in August 1972, Cardinal Alfrink stated that he had 
been so vital to the Dutch Church Province that his name would be written 
on nearly every page of future history books?77 A letter sent by Alfrink to 
Goddijn on 21 March 1972 suggests that the Episcopacy felt that the 
Franciscan sociologist had become too controversial.78 Recent interviews, 
too, point in that same direction. “Many people but also the bishops 
believed”, Monsignor Bluyssen recalled, “that he tried to play a role in the 
Church in a too monopolistic fashion, and that he was convinced of his own 
importance so much, that more and more Catholics appreciated him less 
and less”.79 According to Monsignor Ernst, “Goddijn came to embody the 
image of the Pastoral Council at large”.80 It appears that Alfrink was willing 
for quite some time to get Goddijn appointed to the job.81 However, several 
other bishops (probably Simonis and Gijsen) vetoed this decision. When 
asked about a possible influence from the Holy See, Bluyssen did not 
remember anything. Still, this possibility should not be ignored. In 
Goddijn’s own view, he claimed to have received inside information from 
the Rector of the Dutch Papal College in Rome Jo Damen, that Villot, in 
July 1970, increased the pressure on Alfrink to sideline him by presenting a 
French newspaper article which stated that he was about to marry his 
                                                          
76 ‘Kerkelijke topman dient ontslag in’, in: de Volkskrant, 04-04-1980, ‘Secretaris-generaal r.k. 
kerk dr. P. Vriens treedt af’, in: Trouw, 05-04-1980, ‘Vriens: kerkleiders zijn geen managers’, 
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77 GODDIJN, De moed niet verliezen, p. 251. 
78 Letter by Alfrink to Goddijn, 21-03-1972: KDC, PINK, 231. 
79 Interview by Dols with Bluyssen, 10-05-2010.  
80 Interview by Dols with Ernst, 02-03-2010. 
81 Letter by Goddijn to Böcker, 14-03-1973: KDC, BÖCK, 9. See also: GODDIJN, De moed 
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secretary.82 In addition, Goddijn alleged that Curia members were 
convinced that he was the ghost writer of the draft report on the priestly 
office. 
What, then, happened to Goddijn? Much to Alfrink’s relief, he 
became a professor of sociology in Tilburg in the summer of 1972. Goddijn 
was already slated to succeed Pieter Bouman as a professor of sociology at 
the Groningen University in 1967, but the Episcopacy convinced him to 
stay.83 Goddijn’s return to academia certainly did not imply that he began 
to neglect Church political trends. On the contrary, until a very late age, he 
played his role as loyal opponent with a great deal of verve. In 1982, he co-
founded the Mariënburg Society, which still exists today and aims to keep 
‘the spirit’ of Vatican II alive. Moreover, in numerous books, articles, 
interviews, columns, and lectures, he campaigned against what he perceived 
as an abuse of Church authority and autocratic parish governance.  
 
 
CONCLUSION 
The entanglement of ‘the event’ and ‘the letter’ of the Pastoral Council had 
far reaching consequences for episcopal decision making on the celibacy 
question. Relying on a theological conviction that celibacy chosen in 
absolute freedom gave meaning to the priestly role, newly accessible 
KASKI statistics on the priesthood, the 1968 celibacy poll, and the Plenary 
Assembly, the Dutch bishops pursued a liberalisation of celibacy law. In this 
way, they put their relationship with the Holy See under a 
disproportionately large amount of pressure. There were two issues-
beneath-the-issue of priestly celibacy, which began with the style issue, as 
influenced by emerging sociology.84 The Dutch follow-up of Vatican II was 
meant to be a pastoral council. The word ‘pastoral’ not only referred in a 
traditional sense to taking care of the souls of the faithful, but also and 
especially stood for a joint realisation of the Gospel using new ecclesiastical 
structures and forms of knowledge. Even though the bishops critically 
assessed the draft report on the priestly office, they did allow the document 
to serve as a discussion paper in the assembly hall in Noordwijkerhout. The 
style issue went hand in hand with the centre-periphery issue, with the 
notion of ‘collegiality’ at its analytical core. The Dutch bishops explained 
this notion in centrifugal terms, primarily saw themselves as the heads of a 
Church Province, and attempted to tone down the centralising tendencies 
in the universal Church. The Holy See, in turn, reasoned much more in a 
centripetal fashion, and felt as if the decision making of the Dutch 
Episcopacy undermined papal primacy. As a result of these two issues-
beneath-the-issue, a discursive breakdown occurred. Even though the 
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Dutch Episcopacy and the Holy See had more or less the same aim, namely 
implementing the legacy of the Second Vatican Council into actual policy, 
both parties no longer understood or wanted to understand each other. 
Pope Paul VI gained the upper hand in the summer of 1970, after having 
withheld celibacy from being discussed at Vatican II in 1965, having 
released an encyclical on priestly celibacy in 1967, and having addressed 
special letters to Alfrink and his fellow bishops in 1968 and 1969. Episcopal 
appointments formed the Pope’s ultimate weapon—a highly effective 
weapon which neither Alfrink nor Goddijn could equal. 
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════════════════════════════ 
 
Conclusion  
 
SOCIOLOGISTS OF RELIGION AS  
INSTIGATORS AND EXECUTIONERS OF 
EPISCOPAL POLICY IN TRANSFORMATION 
 
════════════════════════════ 
 
 
 
 
 
ON 2 MARCH 2010, Monsignor Ernst, responding to a series of questions, 
reflected upon the links between sociological expertise and episcopal 
decision making in the long 1960s.1 One of the first things Ernst emphasised 
was the fascination of his predecessor, Bishop De Vet, whom he served as a 
vicar-general between 1962 and 1967, with social scientific knowledge. 
Ernst said that De Vet particularly wanted to dispose of facts and figures for 
the purpose of developing an industrial pastorate. It was through De Vet 
that sociology increasingly made its way into the episcopal ranks: “Alfrink 
was a theologian specialised in exegesis, who then became a Church 
governor; he noticed the qualities of De Vet, who brought something to the 
table which the other bishops did not”. Concerning the possible value of the 
1968 celibacy poll for episcopal decision making, Ernst remembered that it 
functioned as an instrument of ‘dialogue’ as well as a fact-finding technique. 
This technique enabled the bishops to come to know the ‘sensus fidelium’, 
defined by Ernst as the ability to recognise the truth as provided to the 
faithful by the Holy Spirit. “In the early days”, Ernst recalled, “one had to 
assess the situation on the basis of logical reasoning, whereas one suddenly 
got a scientific access”. When asked about Goddijn’s contribution to 
Church reform, Ernst remembered that the preparations of the Pastoral 
Council overshadowed PINK’s eventual advisory task as the 1960s 
progressed. The pragmatic manner in which Goddijn worked made Ernst 
speak of him as a ‘man of the Church’—someone who truly cared about the 
future of the Church, used his sociological expertise in order to ‘renew’ this 
institute, and had a deep understanding of the workings of the ecclesiastical 
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bureaucracy. Even though Goddijn became Alfrink’s confidant, and, as 
such, influenced the episcopal course to a considerable degree, Ernst 
underlined that it is nearly impossible to measure this influence: “Alfrink 
always wanted to stay in control and make his own judgement”. Finally, 
with respect to the application of sociology in the ecclesiastical domain in 
general, Ernst pointed at a ‘link of confidence’ between the Episcopacy and 
KASKI. The bishops never arrived at plans for the systematic 
implementation of information offered by KASKI employees into their 
decision making because the institute represented a ‘profane strand of 
research’. 
Two months later, on 10 May 2010, it was Monsignor Bluyssen who 
reacted to questions targeted at him.2 “People throughout the Netherlands 
believed that Goddijn was the quintessential advisor operating behind the 
episcopal scenes, which he has certainly been”, Bluyssen recalled. Goddijn 
was aware of the role he himself played in the Dutch Church Province. He 
convincingly advised the bishops on all sorts of matters from the sociological 
perspective, and stood close to Alfrink. In fact, he was one of the very few 
licensed to call the Cardinal day and night. Goddijn used this privilege if he 
thought that this was necessary. Alfrink became fond of him, Bluyssen 
stated, not in the least because the Cardinal had a great deal of respect for 
everything Goddijn knew in a field of expertise which was not his own. Seen 
in this light, it was ‘logical’ that Goddijn, a prominent priest-sociologist, was 
tasked with ‘pulling the strings’ at the Pastoral Council from 1966 until 
1970. The draft report on the priestly office, as written in 1969 under the 
supervision of Franciscan priest-sociologist Schreuder, was a second theme 
of conversation. Bluyssen remembered Alfrink saying that the bishops had 
come to find themselves between two fires. They even went so far as to 
consider a veto of the document. “But in the end”, Bluyssen recalled, “we 
agreed on taking a leap of faith”. The final part of the conversation revolved 
around the supposed impact of public opinion on episcopal policy. In 
Bluyssen’s opinion, the influence of the celibacy poll should be evaluated in 
authoritative terms. The opinion that celibacy law was in need of alteration 
was articulated by priests, deacons, and subdeacons on such a large scale 
“that we, the bishops, had little other choice besides reasoning: ‘this is 
something we support’”. 
In the previous six chapters, I have focused on the historical setting of 
‘sociologisation’ against which these memories have to be assessed—a 
complex and multi-faceted historical setting by all means. In doing so, I 
have sought to join a growing group of scholars in an attempt to move 
beyond reductionist explanatory models, look further than the often-heard 
external causes of religious transformations, namely rapid social change, 
and highlight changes influenced by Catholics themselves. In the following, 
I shall return to the central research question of what roles sociologists of 
religion played in the decision making processes of the Dutch bishops 
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between 1946 and 1972, with an emphasis on intellectual and performative 
dimensions.  
 
 
SOCIOLOGICAL EXPERTISE AND EPISCOPAL DECISION 
MAKING 
 
(Dis)continuity 
The issue of continuity or discontinuity has been prominently raised in the 
historiography, often in relation to research questions on the ‘external’ and 
‘internal’ causes of religious change. Whereas Brown’s monograph has 
placed much weight on discontinuity, McLeod’s book has also emphasised 
forms of continuity. The studies of Coleman, Simons and Winkeler, and 
Van den Bos on episcopal policy in the Netherlands after 1945 have 
highlighted 1958 as a clear break in trend: the year in which the bishops 
became open to transformation. This openness was enhanced by Vatican II 
and implemented policy-wise in the Dutch Church Province after this 
council ended in late 1965. Van den Bos’s analysis also pointed at 1963, 
when Goddijn was appointed as the director of PINK, as the moment at 
which the prominence of sociologists started to increase. 
An examination of an episcopal demand for sociology—a total of 148 
publications, with peaks in 1957 and 1968 (graphs 10 & 11)—does not lead 
to the conclusion that the above chronology of episcopal decision making is 
in need of alteration. This is not to say, however, that the long 1960s have 
been serially overestimated as an era of profound change. True, 
discontinuity often came to the fore. A new generation of bishops under the 
leadership of Cardinal Alfrink attempted to come to terms with worldly 
values such as democracy, and searched for fundamentally new avenues to 
stimulate both the religiosity and active participation of Dutch Catholics. 
This search meant that large-scale opinion polling projects could be 
conducted which did not accurately reflect the unilateral style of governance 
that, for the most part, characterised the 1950s. However, as Ziemann has 
already underlined when analysing the development and application of 
sociology in the West-German Church Province in his 2007 monograph, 
the openness of Church authorities to reform in the 1960s was partly rooted 
in the sociological research tradition of the 1950s. KASKI stimulated a 
general ‘responsiveness’—to quote Ziemann—of bishops and vicars-general 
to socio-religious developments on both local and regional levels from 1951 
onwards, in this way nurturing their susceptibility to change. KASKI 
remained the leading sociological institute in the ecclesiastical domain after 
1958.  
In the Church political context of ‘renewal’, the scope of an already 
existing episcopal research agenda widened, with an increase of attention 
for the priestly office. Sociologists of religion also conducted more studies 
for the purpose of planning the spatial distribution of church buildings and 
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people throughout the Church Province. The mid 1960s saw a refinement 
of the gathering of ecclesiastical statistics, which was systematised by 
sociologists as early as in 1956. Much can be said, indeed, in favour of 
1966/1967 as a moment during which optimistic reform began to evolve 
into an apocalyptic atmosphere, as proposed by McLeod’s work. In 1966, 
the Dutch bishops officially opened the Pastoral Council. With regard to the 
priestly office, they in 1967, published a series of pastoral policy lines which 
opened up perspectives to ongoing change and underpinned unrealistically 
high hopes for transformation. This is also when the celibacy inquiry was 
staged and the diocesan seminaries ceased to exist. The apocalyptic 
atmosphere of 1968, 1969, and early 1970 disappeared rather suddenly in 
the summer of 1970. Pope Paul VI convinced the Dutch bishops that a 
liberalisation of celibacy law was not an option, no matter how many priests 
were in favour of such a liberalisation or how quickly the number of priests 
dropped. In the Dutch Church Province, the late 1960s ended in 1972, not 
in 1974. 
In sum, what started in the 1950s as a growing awareness of bishops 
and their vicars-general for socio-religious transformation, or ‘problems’, 
gradually evolved in the 1960s into the conviction that this transformation 
accelerated and demanded an intervention in terms of a rapprochement 
between the Church and the contemporary world. Under the influence of 
sociological analyses, their basic understanding of the Catholic Church 
changed: from a divinely constituted and governed ‘mystical body’ resting 
on God’s providence and a maintenance of tradition, to an institution with 
‘personnel’ and man-made bureaucratic structures which was dependent, 
also, on an interaction with its worldly surroundings.  
 
‘Crisis’ 
McLeod’s monograph has labelled accelerated socio-religious 
transformation as a ‘crisis’, and portrayed this crisis as something 
autonomous that was influenced by society and happened to Church 
authorities. Thereby, it unproblematically echoed a category of analysis 
coined by sociologists. Morris’s review article, in turn, has argued in favour 
of a genealogy of the secularisation narrative. Without going into detail, it 
pointed to the analyses of sociologists of religion as a constitutive force in the 
rise of this narrative.  
The religious crisis of the long 1960s primarily had an essentialist 
character in that this crisis, as scientifically constructed by sociologists of 
religion through the notions of ‘non-denomination’ and ‘seasonal 
conformity’ in particular, began to live a life of its own in the minds of the 
faithful and the bishops upon its publication in the media, and subsequently 
entered into the historiography. Hence, ‘crisis’ was a powerful category 
which helped to normalise the reshaping of ecclesiastical structures along 
the lines of sociological research. For this reason, a problematised 
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examination of crisis as an analytical category is imperative when exploring 
religious transformations in the long 1960s.  
The word ‘crisis’ was used by sociologists of religion, not only in order 
to denote what they perceived as a demise of religiosity, but also and 
especially to imply that ecclesiastical structures were malleable, open up 
sociological perspectives to episcopal decision making, and justify blueprints 
for reform. They built their analyses on categories mirroring measurable 
indicators of traditional believing and belonging, such as churchgoing and 
entering the priesthood. As the exact wording of questions and statements in 
questionnaires reveals, moreover, they were eagerly searching for aspects of 
crisis when it came to personal opinions and desires. Negative answering 
possibilities often outnumbered the positive ones. Items hardly addressed 
the positive sides of religiosity. Various questions forced presuppositions 
upon the respondents—laypeople, priests, and the religious whose opinions 
and desires were widely perceived as a legitimate benchmark for episcopal 
decision making. Since the script of their answers had already been written, 
they could do little else besides following suggested lines of reasoning.  
The presence of sociological analyses in the decision making realms of 
the Dutch bishops was pervasive. What provided these sociological analyses 
with their discursive power was the rhetoric of scientific empiricism as well 
as the amalgamation of narrative, numerical, and visual components. 
Sociological analyses not only described but also remade social ‘reality’. 
Whereas lists of statistical data captured the notion of a crisis in numbers, 
this notion was medicalised by the metaphors of ‘diagnosis’ and ‘prognosis’. 
Cartograms, which were striking to the eye, and mirrored the importance 
attached to orthopraxis through colours and categories, further nurtured the 
necessity of interventions in decision making as well as a general feeling of 
urgency. Journalists fostered public awareness of a religious crisis by 
working persuasive figures and the concomitant interpretative framework of 
a ‘crisis’ into articles and television shows. In this way, they increased the 
pressure on the Episcopacy to take thorough action.  
 
Agents of Change  
Who, then, should be perceived as agents of change in the Dutch Church 
Province? Agency of change agency proved to be a difficult phenomenon to 
grasp. It was fuelled by personal ideals and frustrations, as well as by 
professional convictions. It expressed itself through, and was constrained by, 
the power of institutional frameworks. In the historiography, the influence 
of sociologists of religion on episcopal policy had been often noticed. No 
one, however, had systematically analysed this influence. Not all sociologists 
of religion have been as famous as Goddijn. In fact, most of them did not 
come close, spending their days calculating behind their desks. But they 
were important.  
Firstly, they were bearers of a new form of expertise on religious 
matters. They successfully urged the Episcopacy to include this expertise 
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into their agenda of Church reform. Dellepoort’s 1955 monograph on 
priestly vocation and Goddijn’s 1968 expert seminar on the future of the 
priestly office may serve as a case in point. At first glance, the ‘community’ 
of historical actors formed by Catholic sociologists of religion might appear 
homogenous. However, differences concerning scientific convictions and 
religious viewpoints invariably were under the surface. Each and every one 
of the key players reacted differently to research trends in the field, and 
expressed in his own way the ‘aggiornamento’ which Pope John XXIII 
envisaged. 
Secondly, convinced of both the necessity and value of the principle of 
exerting authority in a dialogue between bishops, priests, and laypeople, 
bishops and their vicar-generals permitted sociologists of religion to operate 
as researchers and advisors. These Church authorities, who usually did not 
receive a training in sociology at the seminaries themselves, directly and 
indirectly tasked them with carrying out research projects, presenting 
statistical overviews and tables filled with percentages, and formulating 
recommendations. These recommendations served as a starting point for 
episcopal considerations. Significantly, four leading theologians, rather than 
the ITS staff, worked the outcomes of the 1968 celibacy poll into policy 
advice. The fundamental religious matter of priestly celibacy is where the 
absolute limits of the sociological ‘Deutungsmacht’, or power of 
interpretation, become visible. Whereas sociologists sought to provide the 
raw data on priestly celibacy, theologians interpreted the data, such that it 
could be used as a benchmark for episcopal decision making. Vicar-general 
Van Laarhoven and the other members of the supervisory committee 
determined this hierarchy of knowledge. Bishops and vicars-general 
perceived sociological advice on the exact location of a church building or a 
redefinition of parish borders as considerably less problematic since these 
matters did not belong to the ‘essentialia’ of the Catholic Church. 
Thirdly, the Episcopacy allowed sociologists of religion to act as 
executioners, or performers, of Church reform. De Moor and Goddijn both 
served on the Central Committee of the Pastoral Council, which 
determined the organisational contours of this national follow-up of Vatican 
II. Goddijn was also in charge of the General Secretariat. As conciliar 
secretary-general, he pushed the entire conciliar apparatus in the direction 
of concrete outcomes instead of that of ongoing theological reflection, 
thereby contributing to a politicisation of the Second Vatican Council.  
In the post-1960s historiography, Goddijn repeatedly claimed to have 
been the quintessential agent of change in the Dutch Church Province in 
the second half of the 1960s.3 As demonstrated in the previous chapters, he 
believed that the Dutch bishops should embrace ‘modernity’ in order to 
make the Church stand the test of time. By far the most beneficial pre-
                                                          
3   In addition to the co-authored books entitled Pastoraal Concilie and Tot vrijheid geroepen, 
as well as the monograph The Deferred Revolution, one could think of his two books Rode 
oktober (1983) and Kardinale kwesties in katholiek Nederland (2005). 
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condition for his change agency was his power to define transformative 
trajectories as the director of PINK, and then ‘engineer’ actual transition. 
This combination of advisory and executive tasks meant that Goddijn could 
do nearly everything he thought was ‘functional’ for Church reform in a 
legitimate manner. He was particularly successful in building, maintaining, 
and mobilising a dense social network consisting of ecclesiastical decision 
makers and reform-minded intellectuals. This success rested on his 
chameleonic ability to change colour as soon as he sensed that a specific 
social context demanded it. Self-assurance and people skills went hand in 
hand with sociological expertise and flair. Where others saw problems and 
retreated, Goddijn saw opportunities and pushed the envelope. Alfrink 
could happily allow him to travel to Rome to meet eminent Church officials 
such as Substitute for General Affairs to the Secretary of State Benelli and 
explain the policy course of the Dutch bishops with them. In a similar vein, 
the Cardinal could instruct him with organising low-key gatherings in the 
Netherlands.  
Goddijn eventually had to cope with the bounded nature of strategic 
choice, however, since the contra-agency of the Holy See could not be 
strategically managed. This highest decision making authority came to 
establish the ultimate boundaries of ‘renewal’ in the Netherlands, foremost 
by appointing Bishop Simonis and Bishop Gijsen in the early 1970s. To a 
much greater extent than has happened to date, historians should relate this 
Roman intervention to a collision between traditional modes of thought and 
modern scientific reasoning. The Pope perceived the pastoral-theological 
nature of the draft report on the priestly office, in which a liberalisation of 
celibacy law was advocated, as an emergency signal denoting that the 
Dutch Episcopacy was favouring sociological expertise too much.  
 
Understanding Post-War Episcopal Decision Making 
After having examined the impact of sociologists of religion on post-war 
episcopal decision making, one would be right in wondering about the 
benefit of unravelling a sociologisation when compared to analysing a 
psychologisation, as visible in the Westhoff’s monograph. It is critical not to 
downplay the influence of psychologists in the ecclesiastical domain in the 
decades after 1945. At times when personal struggles drove regular and 
secular priests to despair, these ‘mental liberators’ and their institutes came 
into play, and lightened the burden while relying on counselling techniques. 
Furthermore, men such as Fortmann and Vendrik were part of the reform 
coalitions consisting of bishops, theologians, and social scientists. They, too, 
underlined the necessity of a factual gaze on religious issues which had been 
either neglected or solely theologically interpreted.  
Still, I argue that sociologisation enables us to get closer to episcopal 
decision making than psychologisation, mainly because sociologists of 
religion studied the overarching interactions between Catholicism and 
society, and claimed to provide causal links between socio-religious 
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processes. This resulted in a privileged position for KASKI when it came to 
planning the pastorate, and an even more privileged position for Goddijn as 
far as drafting overall pastoral plans was concerned. Once the manager of a 
regional KASKI office, someone who worked in service of the Church for 
more than a decade, he in 1963 started to work at this institution as the 
head of PINK. There has not been a single psychologist who, similar to 
Goddijn, came to be involved in executing policy processes on a grand 
scale. Psychologists, rather, remained as experts in the outer dimensions of 
episcopal circles.  
Here, it is also worth noting the advantage of an actor-oriented focus, 
as adopted in the previous chapters, to network analysis, as applied in the 
work of Simons and Winkeler, and discourse analysis, as deployed in Van 
den Bos’s book. These two forms of analysis were used in order to uncover 
and evaluate the influence of intellectuals on the policy of the Episcopacy, 
yet intellectuals were scarcely caught in the act of exerting actual influence. 
True, networks and discourses were instrumental to understanding this act. 
Following sociologists of religion closely, however, has shown that actual 
influence was to be found behind the piles of paperwork, notably in day-to-
day contacts. Gatherings formed a milieu in which the leading sociologists 
of religion flourished.  
 
Understanding Socio-Religious Engineering 
Seen from the perspective of the Episcopacy, the last three chapters of this 
book have demonstrated the significant value of Ziemann’s 
conceptualisation of sociologisation in the ecclesiastical domain as a journey 
through a ‘dangerous modernity’, with the occurrence of unforeseeable 
side-effects. The draft report on the priestly office put the bishops’ ability to 
improvise to the test. The same can be said with respect to the preparations 
of the vocation poll and Goddijn’s controversial image. The entrance of 
sociological findings into the media mainstream meant that Church reform 
in the Netherlands took on a life on its own and became slightly 
uncontrollable.  
In light of a comprehension of the mechanisms behind such dynamics, 
Ziemann’s work could have paid more attention to the asymmetric power 
relations between priest-sociologists and sociologists with the lay state. Even 
though these relations did not affect research practices, they determined the 
position of sociologists of religion in the field. The fact that Zeegers was able 
to become the main protagonist of religious sociology in the immediate 
aftermath of the Second World War rested on the alliances he forged with 
the Franciscan Order. Without Versteeg, Staverman, and Van Leeuwen at 
his side, sociological inquiry in the ecclesiastical domain had been as good 
as predestined to fail. These Franciscan priests provided Zeegers with a 
loan, a cheap labour force, and work spaces throughout the country which 
could be used for next to nothing. More importantly, they reinforced 
KASKI’s overall trustworthiness. The asymmetry of power relations also 
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explains Zeegers’s fall and Goddijn’s rise. Goddijn may have spirited 
clericalism away on various occasions, but he used this clericalism in order 
to get Zeegers fired. So, too, did Koenraadt. Even though the Episcopacy 
formally had no say in KASKI’s management, Zeegers could be swiftly 
convinced to step down from his position by Archbishop Alfrink, precisely 
because he was a lay Catholic and by implication had little power in a 
research institute that relied on ecclesiastical (financial) goodwill. Goddijn 
exploited the vacuum of power that Zeegers’s leaving caused and that his 
successor, Damoiseaux, could not turn to his own benefit. Goddijn 
blueprinted the establishment of PINK: a ‘new’ and powerful institute 
affiliated with the Episcopacy and SNPR. 
Goddijn’s background as a prominent sociologist of religion and a 
priest who represented an influential Order was crucial in this respect. 
Holding a doctoral degree, he spoke and published about the role of the 
Church in society in an authoritative way. And as a priest more broadly and 
a Franciscan more specifically, the bishops knew that he was familiar with 
the written and unwritten rules prevailing in the ecclesiastical domain, as 
well as with the pastoral issues that had to be solved. It would be misleading 
not to note the increasing prominence of laymen such as De Moor in the 
ecclesiastical domain in the 1960s. In the end, however, it was always 
clergymen who had the final say. Nonetheless, it was relatively easy for 
Alfrink and his fellow bishops to turn aside even Goddijn.  
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Figures 1, 2, and 3. KASKI logos. Upper 
left: 1947. Upper right: 1948. Left: 1953.  
(KDC-KLiB Nijmegen)  
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Figure 4. Versteeg: Franciscan priest, amateur-sociologist,  
and co-founder of KSKSK and KASKI. Photograph taken  
on 30 September 1956. (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 5. The Dutch Church Province between 1853 and 1956, 
identified on the basis of diocese. (© Bart van de Camp) 
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Figure 6. The Dutch Church Province as of 1956, identified  
on the basis of diocese. (© Bart van de Camp) 
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Figure 7. The Dutch Episcopacy in 1953. Middle: Cardinal De Jong (Archdiocese of 
Utrecht). Below, from the left to the right: Archbishop-coadjutor Alfrink  
(Archdiocese of Utrecht) and Bishop Lemmens (Diocese of Roermond).  
Above, from the left to the right: Bishop Baeten (Diocese of Breda),  
Bishop Huibers (Diocese of Haarlem), Bishop Mutsaerts  
(Diocese of Den Bosch), and and Auxiliary Bishop  
Hanssen (Diocese of Roermond).  
(ENK Sint Agatha) 
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Figure 8. Grond: Franciscan priest, sociologist, director of the  
KASKI office in Amsterdam, and KASKI representative in  
the German speaking countries of West-Europe.  
Photograph taken on 30 September  
1956. (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 9. The oldest remaining photograph of early KASKI protagonists,  
taken on 14 July 1949. In the left corner, front row, stands Grond. The  
Franciscan priest right in the front is Versteeg. Zeegers, wearing a  
grey suit, can be found in between the front and  
the second row. (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 10. Versteeg (l), Koenraadt (m), and several Franciscan sisters of Breda striking 
a pose before embarking on a field trip to Africa along with Zeegers in order to  
explore the possibilities to practice missionary work. Photograph taken  
in May 1955. (ENK Sint Agatha) 
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Figure 11. Dellepoort: priest, sociologist, and KASKI employee.  
Photograph taken around 1965. (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 12. KASKI’s facts and figures making their way into popular culture.  
Cover of De Katholieke Illustratie, July 1955 issue.  
(KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 13. KASKI employees in Leeuwarden taking a break. From the left 
to the right: Goddijn, Keverkamp, Poeisz, and Nancy van Kerkoerle.  
Photograph taken in the mid 1950s. (Archive Diocese of  
Groningen-Leeuwarden)  
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Figure 14. Koenraadt (m), Zeegers (r), and several Franciscan sisters of Breda  
visiting the town of Bukoba, Uganda. Photograph taken in June 1955. 
(ENK Sint Agatha) 
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Figure 15. Jacket of KASKI’s anniversary brochure,  
published in 1956. (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen)  
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Figure 16. Cover of the very first issue (1953) of KASKI’s  
journal Social Compass. (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 17. Zeegers (second to the right) and other KASKI protagonists  
visiting Pope Pius XII in December 1955. (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 18. Zeegers shaking Alfrink’s hand on 30 September 1956,  
with Versteeg in the background. (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 19. Alfrink blessing a crucifix on the occasion of the opening  
of the KASKI office in Leeuwarden on 3 April 1952.  
(KDC-KLiB Nijmegen)  
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Figure 20. Alfrink and Goddijn discussing a KASKI cartogram on 3  
April 1952 in between Franciscan Father Superior Van Leeuwen (l) 
and Dean Theo Holtmann (r). Here, Alfrink and Goddijn actually   
met each other for the first time. (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 21. Alfrink delivering a special sermon in Saint Jacob’s Church  
in The Hague on 30 September 1956 on the occasion of  
KASKI’s first decennial. (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 22. RNP cartogram showing 
the number of inhabitants per square 
kilometre per province as well as towns 
with more than 25,000 inhabitants on 
31 December 1859. Published in 1947. 
(KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 23. KASKI cartogram showing 
the number of inhabitants per square 
kilometre per province as well as the 
municipalities with more than 25,000 
inhabitants on 1 January 1947. 
Published in 1947. (KDC-KLiB 
Nijmegen) 
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Figure 24. KASKI cartogram depicting the so-called  
‘diaspora areas’ in the Netherlands. Published in 1957. 
(KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 25. KASKI cartogram highlighting the number of Catholics 
above seven years old disregarding their religious duties at Easter  
around 1946. Published in 1949. (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 26. Van Kemenade: layman, sociologist, and ITS director. 
Photograph taken in the mid 1960s. (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 27. De Moor: layman, sociologist, and professor at the Tilburg  
School of Economics. Photograph taken around 1970.  
(KDC-KLiB Nijmegen/© Rien Siers) 
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Figure 28. Schreuder: Franciscan priest, sociologist, and professor  
at the Nijmegen University. Photograph taken in the mid 1960s.  
(KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 29. Zeegers leads the attention of his doctoral candidate  
towards a certain matter during the academic ceremony at the  
Catholic University of Nijmegen on 12 April 1957.  
(KDC-KLiB Nijmegen)  
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Figure 30. Scientific ‘novice’ and master talking to each other after the  
defence ended on 12 April 1957: Goddijn (l) and Zeegers (r).  
(KDC-KLiB Nijmegen)  
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Figure 31. Poeisz: layman, sociologist, and KASKI employee. 
Photograph taken around 1968. (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 32. The Dutch Episcopacy visiting the Pope on 27 October 1964. From the  
left to the right: Bishop Moors (Diocese of Roermond), Bishop Bekkers (Diocese of Den 
Bosch), Cardinal Alfrink (Archdiocese of Utrecht), Pope Paul VI, Bishop Jansen 
(Diocese of Rotterdam), Bishop Nierman (Diocese of Groningen), and Auxiliary  
Bishop Bluyssen (Diocese of Den Bosch). Bishop De Vet (Diocese of Breda)  
is absent. (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 33. A meeting of the PINK staff. From the left to the right: Huysmans, 
Keverkamp, Goddijn, IJsbrand Snabel, Driessen, and Ter Reegen.  
Photograph taken around 1969. (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 34. Goddijn and Alfrink deliberating during the  
Pastoral Council. Photograph taken around 1969.  
(KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 35. Two key agents of change in the Dutch Church Province:  
Goddijn (l) and Alfrink (r). Photograph taken in the mid 1960s.  
(KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 36. Goddijn’s student card. Issued on 28 October 1948. 
(KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 37. The 1960 companion into the sociology of  
Church and religion authored by Walter and  
Hans Goddijn. (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 38. Poster through which Dutch Catholics were  
urged in 1966 to send their opinions and desires to the  
Council Mailboxes. (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 39. Celibacy labelled as a ‘problem’ of the Church. 
1969 PINK brochure. (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 40. Contemporary organisational scheme of the  
Pastoral Council (1967). (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 41. Goddijn was not only nicknamed but also depicted  
as the ‘Pope of Holland’, here on the cover of the Paarsboek  
voor de Nederlandse Rooms-Katholieke Kerk volume  
in January 1970. (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Figure 42. Alfrink and Pope Paul VI in consideration of the future amidst  
a national and international elite, with a reference to a popular 1967  
song by The Beatles. Cartoon published by Elsevier magazine  
on 8 August 1970. (KDC-KLiB Nijmegen) 
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Graph 1. Number of KASKI publications commissioned by bishops and  
vicars-general in the period 1946–1957, identified on the basis of the  
diocese where the commissioner(s) came from. (Project Database) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Graph 2. Number of KASKI publications commissioned by bishops and  
vicars-general in the period 1946–1957, identified on the basis of the  
year of publication. (Project Database) 
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Graph 3. Percentage of KASKI publications commissioned by bishops and  
vicars-general in the period 1946–1957, identified on the basis of the  
research subject. (Project Database) 
 
 
 
 
Graph 4. Percentage of KASKI publications commissioned by bishops and  
vicars-general in the period 1946–1957, identified on the basis of the scope.  
(Project Database) 
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Graph 5. Number of KASKI and ITS publications commissioned by  
bishops and vicars-general in the period 1958–1972, identified on  
the basis of the diocese where the commissioner(s)  
came from. (Project Database) 
 
 
 
Graph 6. Percentage of publications commissioned at KASKI and ITS  
by bishops and vicars-general in the period 1958–1972, identified on  
the basis of research institution. (Project Database) 
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Graph 7. Number of KASKI and ITS publications commissioned by  
bishops and vicars-general in the period 1958–1972, identified on  
the basis of the year of publication. (Project Database) 
 
 
 
 
Graph 8. Percentage of publications commissioned at KASKI and ITS  
by bishops and vicars-general in the period 1958–1972, identified  
on the basis of scope. (Project Database) 
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Graph 9. Percentage of KASKI and ITS publications commissioned by  
bishops and vicars-general in the period 1958–1972, identified on  
the basis of research subject. (Project Database) 
 
 
 
 
Graph 10. Number of KASKI and ITS publications commissioned by bishops and 
vicars-general in the period 1946–1972, identified on the basis of the year of 
publication. (Project Database) 
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Graph 11. Number of KASKI and ITS publications commissioned by  
bishops and vicars-general in the period 1946–1972, identified on the  
basis of the diocese where the commissioner(s)  
came from. (Project Database) 
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Appendix I 
THE KEY PLAYERS  
Protagonist Main Activities Main Publications 
Dr. Dellepoort, Jan, pr. 
(1910–1979) 
Studied English Literature at the 
Catholic University of Nijmegen 
(1935–1946); successfully defended a 
sociological doctoral thesis on priestly 
vocations there, with George Zeegers 
as supervisor (1955); assisted in the 
expansion of KASKI by managing an 
office in Breda, conducting research 
projects, and promoting KASKI 
abroad (1957–1959). 
‘Sociografisch onderzoek over 
priesterroepingen in Nederland’, in: 
Social Compass 1 (1954) III, pp. 1–6; De 
priesterroepingen in Nederland: proeve 
van een statistisch-sociografische analyse 
(The Hague 1955); De priesterroepingen 
in Nederland: de ontwikkeling van 
1952–1957 (The Hague 1958). 
Prof. dr. Goddijn, Hans 
(1926–2013) 
Studied sociology at the University of 
Leiden (1950–1956); became a 
scientific employee there (1956); 
worked as an advisor at KASKI in the 
late 1950s and early 1960s; 
successfully defended a sociological 
doctoral thesis on functional sociology 
at the Leiden University, with 
Frederik van Heek as his supervisor 
(1963); was appointed as a lecturer 
there (1968); became a professor of 
sociology at the Catholic School for 
Theology in Amsterdam (1970). 
[together with Walter Goddijn] 
Godsdienstsociologie: het groepsleven 
van de Christenen (Utrecht 1960); 
[together with J.S. van 
Hessen]Wegwijzer in de sociologie 
(Amsterdam 1963); Het funktionalisme 
in de sociologie, met name in de 
Verenigde Staten (Assen 1963); 
[together with Walter Goddijn], 
Sociologie van kerk en godsdienst 
(Utrecht 1966); [together with Walter 
Goddijn, eds.] De kerk van morgen: een 
postconciliair toekomstbeeld van de 
katholieke kerk in Nederland 
(Roermond 1966); Anomie (Leiden 
1967); De sociologie van Emile 
Durkheim (Amsterdam 1969). 
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Dr. Goddijn, Walter, OFM 
(1921–2007) 
Studied political and social sciences at 
the Catholic University of Leuven 
(1948–1951); managed a KASKI 
office in Leeuwarden (1951–1959); 
successfully defended a sociological 
doctoral thesis on the relationships 
between Catholics and Protestants in 
the Province of Friesland at the 
Catholic University of Nijmegen, with 
George Zeegers as his supervisor 
(1957); was the manager of a KASKI 
office in Rotterdam (1959–1962) as 
well as the director of PINK (1962/3–
1972) and secretary-general of the 
Pastoral Council (1966–1970). 
Katholieke minderheid en protestantse 
dominant: sociologische nawerking van 
de historische relatie tussen katholieken 
en protestanten in Nederland en in het 
bijzonder in de provincie Friesland 
(Assen 1957); ‘Diaspora: proeve van een 
funktionele analyse’, in: Binnenlands 
Apostolaat 9 (1958) pp. 43–67; ‘Catholic 
Minorities and Social Integration’, in: 
Social Compass 7 (1960) pp. 161–176; 
[together with Hans Goddijn], 
Godsdienstsociologie: het groepsleven 
van de Christenen (Utrecht 1960); 
[together with Jacob Pieter Kruijt], 
‘Verzuiling en ontzuiling als sociologisch 
verschijnsel’, in: Arie den Hollander 
(ed.), Drift en koers: een halve eeuw 
sociale verandering in Nederland (Assen 
1961) pp. 227–263; [together with Hans 
Goddijn], Sociologie van kerk en 
godsdienst (Utrecht 1966); [together 
with Hans Goddijn, eds.) De kerk van 
morgen: een postconciliair 
toekomstbeeld van de katholieke kerk in 
Nederland (Roermond 1966). 
Drs. Grond, Linus, OFM 
(1918–2001) 
Studied political and social sciences at 
the Catholic University of Leuven; 
was the manager of a KASKI office in 
Amsterdam (1948–1952); was 
stationed in Vienna to promote 
KASKI abroad (from 1952 onwards). 
‘Nature et fonction du quartier d'une 
grande ville: quelques résultats d'une 
enquête sociologique sur la situation 
sociale et religieuse d'Amsterdam’, in: 
Lumen Vitae 6 (1951) pp. 245–254; 
‘Das Termometer der Kirche: Aufgaben 
einer kirchlichen Sozialforschung’, in: 
Wort und Wahrheit 8 (1953) pp. 85–94; 
[together with Jan Dellepoort] ‘Stand 
und Bedarf an Priestern in Österreich: 
die Kirche im Österreich am 
Scheidewege’, in: Social Compass 4 
(1957) III–IV, pp. 108–148. 
Dr. Kemenade, Jos van 
(1937) 
Studied sociology at the Catholic 
University of Nijmegen (1955–1960); 
worked as a scientific advisor at 
KASKI (1958–1965); became the first 
director of ITS (1964); successfully 
defended a sociological doctoral thesis 
on the education of Catholics at the 
Nijmegen University, with Ward 
Leemans as his supervisor (1968). 
De katholieken en hun onderwijs: een 
sociologisch onderzoek naar de 
betekenis van katholiek onderwijs onder 
ouders en docenten (Meppel 1968); 
‘Typen van religieus-kerkelijke binding’, 
in: Sociologische Gids 15 (1968) pp. 
222–230; [together with J. van 
Westerlaak], Ambtscelibaat in een 
veranderende kerk: resultaten van een 
onderzoek onder alle priesters, diakens, 
en subdiakens in Nederland (1969). 
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Dr. Koenraadt, Willem, pr. 
(1896–1973) 
Studied political and social sciences at 
the Catholic University of Leuven; 
successfully defended a sociological 
doctoral thesis on labour ethics there 
(1928); was appointed as vicar-general 
in the Diocese of Breda (1947); 
became the second chairman of 
KASKI (1950).  
Rechtvaardig arbeidsloon: een ethische 
studie (Leuven 1928); Corporatieve 
maatschappij, organissche staat 
(Hilversum 1934); Handboek der 
maatschappijleer, II: herstel der 
maatschappelijke orde (Hilversum 1938). 
Drs. Kusters, Wim 
(1923–1974) 
Studied economy at the Catholic 
School of Economics in Tilburg 
(1945–1949); worked at RNP and the 
Ministerie van Maatschappelijk Werk 
(Ministery of Social Work); became a 
fulltime KASKI employee in 1954; 
was appointed as the director of 
KASKI in 1962; co-founded the 
modedate Aktiegroep Wereldkerk 
(Action Group Universal Church) in 
1968. 
[together with George Zeegers and 
Antoine Oldendorff], Sociografische 
aspecten van de migratie (The Hague 
1951); Het nieuwe Westen (The Hague 
1959); Het stembusgedrag der 
katholieken van 1954–1959 (The Hague 
1960); Krisis en riskerend vertrouwen: 
situatieschets van het Nederlands 
katholicisme (The Hague 1968). 
Dr. Leeuwen, Bertulf  
van, OFM  
(1913–2008) 
Successfully defended a theological 
doctoral thesis on the theologian 
Abraham Kuyper (1946); was a 
member of KSKSK (1947); co-
founded KASKI (1947); assisted in the 
expansion of KASKI by managing an 
office in Alverna, serving on the 
institute’s board, and conducting 
sociological research on mixed-
marriage (1947–1957). 
 
‘Echtscheidingen van katholieken in 
Nederland’, in: Social Compass 1 (1953) 
I, pp. 19–24; [together with George 
Zeegers] ‘Entwurf eines 
Stützpunktplanes für die Norddeutsche 
Diaspora’, in: Social Compass 1 (1953) 
II, pp. 37–41; ‘Das Ansteigen und 
Absinken der Mischehen von 
Katholiken in den Niederlanden’, in: 
Social Compass 2 (1954) I, pp. 1–27; 
[together with W. Stoop] ‘Traditionele 
en moderne vormen van zielzorg en 
apostolaat’, in: Social Compass 4 (1957) 
III–IV, pp. 149–160. 
Prof. dr. Moor, Ruud de 
(1928–2001) 
Studied sociology at the Catholic 
School of Economics in Tilburg and 
graduated in 1952; held a position as 
researcher at PPD Noord-Holland 
(1954–1955); was the manager of IAV 
(1955–1962); successfully defended a 
sociological doctoral thesis on conflict 
sociology at the Catholic School of 
Economics in Tilburg, with Antoine 
Oldendorff as his supervisor (1961); 
became a professor of sociology there 
(1962); was a member of Aktiegroep 
Wereldkerk and the Central 
Committee of the Pastoral Council. 
De verklaring van het conflict: een 
onderzoek naar de uitgangspunten van 
de sociologische theorie (Assen 1961); 
Sociale werkelijkheid en sociale 
wetenschap (Tilburg 1962). 
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Dr. Poeisz, Jos 
(1935) 
Studied sociology at the University of 
Groningen (1953–1959); entered the 
KASKI office in Leeuwarden (1952); 
moved to the KASKI office in 
Rotterdam (1959) and finally to the 
KASKI headquarters in The Hague 
(1962); successfully defended a 
sociological doctoral thesis on 
tradition and reform in charitable 
organisations at the Groningen 
University, with Pieter Bouman as his 
supervisor (1968). 
[together with Walter Goddijn] 
Diaspora, zielzorg en apostolaat: een 
sociaal-religieuse typering van acht 
parochies in de provincie Groningen 
(The Hague 1958); 
‘Gruppenisolierung, Kirchlichkeit und 
Religiosität’, in: Internationales 
Jahrbuch für Religionssoziologe 
(Cologne 1965) pp. 69–112; ‘The 
Priests in the Dutch Church Province: 
Numbers and Functions’, in: Social 
Compass 14 (1967), III, pp. 233–253; 
‘Een kerk in overgang’, in: 
Sociologische Gids 15 (1968) pp. 218–
222; Traditie en vernieuwing in 
caritatieve organisaties (Meppel 1968).  
Prof. dr. Schreuder, Osmund, 
OFM 
(1925–2006) 
Studied sociology at the Catholic 
University of Nijmegen and the 
University of Frankfurt am Main 
(graduation in 1958); successfully 
defended a sociological doctoral thesis 
on parish sociology at the Nijmegen 
University, with Ward Leemans as his 
supervisor (1962); was appointed as a 
lecturer (1963) and as a professor 
(1967) of sociology there; acted as the 
first chairman of the committee that, 
for the purpose of the Pastoral 
Council, investigated the priestly office 
(1969–1970). 
‘The Parish Priest as a Subject of 
Criticism’, in: Social Compass 8 (1961), 
VI, pp. 111–126; Kirche im Vorort: 
soziologische Erkundigung einer Pfarrei 
(Freiburg 1962); ‘Church and 
Sociology’, in: Social Compass 11 
(1964), V, pp. 5–14; Het professioneel 
karakter van het geestelijk ambt 
(Nijmegen 1964); Gedaanteverandering 
van de kerk: aanbevelingen voor 
vernieuwing (Nijmegen 1969); 
Revolution in der Kirche?: Osmund 
Schreuder antwortet Eberhart Simons. 
Kritik der kirchlichen Amtsstruktur 
(Düsseldorf 1969). 
Dr. Staverman,  
Manfred, OFM  
(1915–1990) 
Studied theology at the Catholic 
University of Leuven; was a member 
of KSKSK (1947); co-founded 
KASKI (1947); established a KASKI 
office in Leeuwarden (1951); 
successfully defended a theological-
sociological doctoral thesis on 
nondenomination in the Province of 
Friesland (1954) at the Nijmegen 
University. 
Volk in Friesland buiten de kerk (Assen 
1954). 
Drs. Sterk, Johan 
(1934–2012) 
Studied sociology at the Catholic 
University of Nijmegen (graduation in 
1961); worked at the Hoogveld 
Institute (1961–1963); managed the 
KASKI office in Nijmegen (1963–
1965); worked at ITS (1965–1970).  
De betekenis van radio en televisie met 
name in het weekend (1965); De leek 
over het ambt: beeld en attraktiviteit van 
het ambt van priester, broeder en zuster 
(1967); ‘Priesterbeeld en godsdienstig-
kerkelijke oriëntatie’, in: Sociologische 
Gids 15 (1968) pp. 239–246.  
 APPENDICES  
 
[284] 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Versteeg, Montanus, OFM  
(1912–1991) 
Co-founded KSKSK (1947) and 
KASKI (1947); assisted in the 
expansion of KASKI by writing a 
research report, raising a considerable 
amount of money, holding 
propaganda-speeches, and serving on 
the institute’s board (1947–1950). 
Memorandum inzake stichting van 
tehuizen door daklozen in Maastricht 
(The Hague 1947); Toespraak, 
gehouden door pater Montanus 
Versteeg OFM, voorzitter van het 
Katholiek Sociaal-Kerkelijk Instituut, bij 
de installatie van de Raad van Bijstand 
van het Bureau Maastricht op zaterdag 
26 februari 1949 (The Hague 1949). 
Prof. drs. Zeegers, George 
(1911–1988) 
Studied economic geography at the 
School of Economics in Rotterdam 
and graduated in 1936; worked as the 
head of the socioeconomic 
department at RNP (1941–1949); was 
secretary and treasurer of ISONEVO 
(1945–1946); was secretary of the 
Dutch Association for Public Opinion 
Research (1946–1947); co-founded 
KSKSK (1947) and KASKI (1947); 
was secretary-director of KASKI 
(1947–1958); became professor of 
sociology at the Catholic University of 
Nijmegen (1950/1). 
Het uur van de leek: de katholieke 
lekenhulp aan de onderontwikkelde 
gebieden (The Hague 1955); De roeping 
van het westen (The Hague 1956); De 
verantwoordelijkheid van het christelijke 
westen voor de onderontwikkelde 
gebieden (The Hague 1956); ‘De sociale 
research als apostolisch instrument’, in: 
Social Compass 3 (1956), III, pp. 84-84; 
De kerk en Europa (The Hague 1957); 
De missionaire verantwoordelijkheid 
van de leek (The Hague 1957); Social 
Reconstruction of Europe (The Hague 
1957). 
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Appendix II 
THE BISHOPS  
 
 
 
Archdiocese of Utrecht 
 
Monsignor Jan de Jong (1885–1955): Archbishop of Utrecht from 1936 
until 1955, and Cardinal since 1946 
 
Monsignor Bernard Alfrink (1900–1987): Archbishop-coadjutor of Utrecht 
from 1951 until 1955, Archbishop of Utrecht from 1955 until 1975, and 
Cardinal since 1960 
 
 
Diocese of Haarlem 
 
Monsignor Jan Huibers (1875–1969): Bishop of Haarlem from 1935  
until 1960  
 
Monsignor Jan van Dodewaard (1913–1966): Bishop-coadjutor of Haarlem 
from 1958 until 1960, and Bishop of Haarlem from 1960 until 1966 
 
Monsignor Theo Zwartkruis (1909–1983): Bishop of Haarlem from 1966  
until 1983 
 
 
Diocese of Rotterdam 
 
Monsignor Mart Jansen (1905–1983): Bishop of Rotterdam from 1956  
until 1970 
 
Monsignor Ad Simonis (1931): Bishop of Rotterdam from 1970 until 1983, 
Archbishop-coadjutor of Utrecht in 1983, Archbishop of Utrecht from 
1983 until 2007, and Cardinal since 1985  
 
 
Diocese of Groningen 
 
Monsignor Pieter Nierman (1901–1976): Bishop of Groningen from 1956  
until 1969 
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Monsignor Benhard Möller (1923–1999): Bishop of Groningen from 1969  
until 1999 
 
 
Diocese of Breda 
 
Monsignor Peter Hopmans (1865–1951): Bishop of Breda from 1914  
until 1951 
 
Monsignor Joseph Baeten (1893–1964): Bishop-coadjutor of Breda from 
1945 until 1951, and Bishop of Breda from 1951 until 1961  
 
Monsignor Gerard De Vet (1917–1967): Bishop of Breda from 1962  
until 1967  
 
Monsignor Huub Ernst (1917): Bishop of Breda from 1967 until 1992  
 
 
Diocese of Den Bosch  
 
Monsignor Willem Mutsaerts (1889–1964): Bishop-coadjutor of Den Bosch 
in 1942 and 1943, and Bishop of Den Bosch from 1943 until 1960 
 
Monsignor Rinus Bekkers (1908–1966): Bishop-coadjutor of Den Bosch 
from 1956 until 1960, and Bishop of Den Bosch from 1960 until 1966 
 
Monsignor Jan Bluyssen (1926–2013): Auxiliary Bishop of Den Bosch from 
1961 until 1966, and Bishop of Den Bosch from 1966 until 1984 
 
 
Diocese of Roermond 
 
Monsignor Guillaume Lemmens (1884–1960): Bishop-coadjutor of 
Roermond in 1932, and Bishop of Roermond from 1932 until 1957 
 
Monsignor Toon Hanssen (1906–1958): Auxiliary Bishop of Roermond 
from 1946 until 1957, Bishop-coadjutor of Roermond in 1957, and Bishop 
of Roermond in 1957 and 1958 
 
Monsignor Peter Moors (1906–1980): Bishop of Roermond from 1958 until 
1970, and Diocesan Administrator of Roermond from 1970 until 1972 
 
Monsignor Jo Gijsen (1932–2013): Bishop of Roermond from 1972  
until 1993 
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Appendix III 
THE PUBLICATIONS, 1950–1957 
 
 
 
Interdiocesan Level (4) 
 
[Fr. Buskens], Memorandum inzake de rendabiliteit der bouwkosten van 
kerken en kerkelijke gebouwen van het RK Kerkgenootschap (1951)  
= KASKI R55 
 
Echtscheidingen van katholieken in Nederland (1952) = KASKI R88 
 
[George Zeegers], Het vraagstuk van de diocesane indeling der Nederlandse 
Kerkprovincie (1954) = KASKI R0 
 
Statistisch overzicht van de kerkelijke registratie der Nederlandsche bisdommen,  
1956 (1957) = KASKI M40* 
 
 
Diocese of Haarlem (35) 
 
Vervolg-rapport betreffende de vestiging van een nieuwe parochiekerk te  
Veur (1950) = KASKI R16 
 
Rapport betreffende de nieuw op te richten parochie te Lisse (1950)  
= KASKI R19 
 
Detail-plan voor de bouw van enige nieuwe parochiekerken en voor de 
parochiële indeling in Amsterdam Nieuw-Zuid {1950} = KASKI R22a 
 
Rapport betreffende de sociaal-kerkelijke en sociale structuur van de 
buurtschap Halfweg (1950) = KASKI R24 
 
Rapport betreffende de nieuw op te richten parochies te Vlaardingen 
(1950) = KASKI R25 
 
 
 
* Note that the 1977 bibliographical overview of KASKI publications 
separately lists the diocesan studies which addressed 1956 (KASKI M33-
M39), also 
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Detail-plan voor de nieuwe Christus Koningparochie in Amsterdam-
Watergraafsmeer {1950} = KASKI R30a 
 
Rapport betreffende de parochie O.L. Vrouw van Lourdes te Amsterdam 
(1951) = KASKI R36 
 
Rapport betreffende de vaststelling van de parochiegrens tussen de 
parochie van de H. Jeroen te Noordwijk-Binnen en de parochie Maria ter 
Zee te Noordwijk aan Zee (1951) = KASKI R45 
 
Interim-rapport binnenstad Rotterdam, in het bijzonder ten aanzien van 
de berekening van de grootte van de te bouwen kerk van de H. Antonius 
van Padua (1951) = KASKI R49 
 
Plan voor kerkenbouw en parochiële herindeling in ’s-Gravenshage, 
Rijswijk en Voorburg (1951) = KASKI R54 
 
Rapport inzake de eventuele vestiging van een tweede katholieke kerk in 
Alphen aan de Rijn (1951) = KASKI R56 
 
Eerste rapport betreffende de bouw van katholieke kerken in het gebied 
rond de IJmond {1951} = KASKI R57 
 
Rapport over de binnenstad Rotterdam (1952) = KASKI R50 
 
Rapport betreffende de eventuele oprichting van een parochie of een 
quasi-parochie rond de St. Hubertuskapel, Stadshouderskade te 
Amsterdam (1952) = KASKI R62 
 
Rapport betreffende de kerkelijke voorzieningen in het uitbreidingsplan 
Amsterdam-West buiten de Ringspoorbaan (1952) = KASKI R64 
 
Rapport inzake de onderwijsvoorzieningen in het plan Slotermeer (1952)  
= KASKI R68 
 
Rapport over de zg. Schipperskerk te Rotterdam (1952) = KASKI R71 
 
Aanvullend rapport betreffende de parochiële herindeling van Leiden en 
omgeving (1952) = KASKI R75 
 
Rapport betreffende een nieuwe parochie in Amstelveen (1952)  
= KASKI R83 
 
Rapport betreffende de parochiële herindeling van Delft (1952)  
= KASKI R91 
 APPENDICES  
 
[289] 
Rapport betreffende de te verwachten ontwikkeling van de parochie van de 
HH. Martelaren van Gorcum te Lier (1953) = KASKI R38 
 
Rapport betreffende een parochiële herindeling en bepaling van de 
omvang ener nieuwe parochie in Den Helder (1953) = KASKI R39 
 
Nota betreffende de noodzakelijkheid van de vestiging van een R.K. 
Hulpkerk in het Laakkwartier te ’s-Gravenshage (1953) = KASKI R40 
 
R.K. Bejaardentehuizen in het bisdom Haarlem (1953) = KASKI R94 
 
Rapport betreffende de demografische en stedebouwkundige ontwikkeling 
van de gemeente Noordwijkerhout, gezien tegen de achtergrond van een 
mogelijke en wenselijke parochiestructuur in de komende decennia (1953) 
= KASKI R96 
 
Rapport betreffende de noodzaak van een parochiële herindeling en de 
oprichting van een nieuwe parochie in Haarlem-Noord (1953)  
= KASKI R101 
 
Rapport naar aanleiding van de bestaande plannen tot het bouwen van 
een nieuwe kerk in de parochie St. Lucas-Evangelist te Venhuizen (1953)  
= KASKI R104 
 
Rapport inzake toekomstige kerkelijke voorzieningen in de gemeente 
Heiloo (1954) = KASKI R111 
 
Rapport betreffende de Rotterdamse linker-Maasoever beoosten de 
Waalhaven (1954) = KASKI R118 
 
Rapport inzake de toekomstige kerkelijke voorzieningen in de 
Alblasserwaard en Krimpenerwaard (1954) = KASKI R125 
 
Nota inzake R.K. schoolvoorziening te Goes (1955) = KASKI R131 
 
Rapport betreffende de kerkelijke voorzieningen in het zuid-oostelijk deel 
van de Haagse agglomeratie (1955) = KASKI R133 
 
Een structuurplan voor de kerkenbouw in het bisdom Haarlem (1955)  
= KASKI R134 
 
Rapport betreffende de kerkelijke voorzieningen in Alkmaar (1955)  
= KASKI R147 
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Rapport inzake de gewenste vestigingsplaats van een katholieke ULO-school in 
de Wieringermeer (1957) = KASKI R172 
 
 
Diocese of Breda (5) 
 
Enige aspecten van de katholieke samenleving in Zeeuws-Vlaanderen (1955)  
= KASKI R137 
 
Enige sociografische aspecten van de stad Breda. Voorstudie ten behoeve van het 
onderzoek naar de kerkelijke voorzieningen in de binnenstad van Breda (1957)  
= KASKI R169:1 
 
De misbezoektelling om de binnenstad van Breda op 9 december 1956 (1957)  
= KASKI R169:2 
 
De kerkelijke voorzieningen die nodig zijn geworden door de ontwikkeling van de 
stad Breda (1957) = KASKI R169:3 
 
[Jan Dellepoort], La Situation Religieuse et Ecclésiastisque du Diocèse de  
Breda (1957)*  
 
 
Archdiocese of Utrecht (1) 
 
Rapport betreffende de toekomstige parochiële structuur van Hengelo (1952)  
= KASKI R76 
 
 
Diocese of Rotterdam (1) 
 
Memorandum inzake het R.K. VHMO in de agglomeratie Rotterdam (1957)  
= KASKI M58 
 
 
 
* Note that the 1977 bibliographical overview of KASKI publications does 
not hold this study because it was published on a small scale only. 
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Appendix IV 
THE PUBLICATIONS, 1958–1972 
 
 
 
Interdiocesan Level (39) 
 
Statistisch overzicht van de kerkelijke registratie der Nederlandsche bisdommen,  
1957 (1958) = KASKI M40* 
 
Statistisch overzicht van de kerkelijke registratie der Nederlandsche 
bisdommen, 1958 (1959) = KASKI M40* 
 
Jan Dellepoort, Enkele aspekten van de kleinseminarieopleiding in 
Nederland (1959) = KASKI R207 
 
Statistisch overzicht van de kerkelijke registratie der Nederlandsche 
bisdommen, 1959 (1960) = KASKI M40* 
 
Statistisch overzicht van de kerkelijke registratie der Nederlandsche 
bisdommen, 1960 (1961) = KASKI M40* 
 
Werkwijze en organisatie van de kerkelijke van de kerkelijke registratie en 
statistiek, de katholieke bevolkingsbureaus en de parochiële kartotheken 
(1961) = KASKI R272 
 
Seminariestatistiek 1958–1959 (1961) = KASKI M126 
 
Seminariestatistiek 1959–1960 (1961) = KASKI M129 
 
Statistisch overzicht van de kerkelijke registratie der Nederlandsche 
bisdommen, 1961 (1962) = KASKI M40* 
 
Seminariestatistiek 1960–1961 (1963) = KASKI M145 
 
 
 
* Note that the 1977 bibliographical overview of KASKI publications 
groups together these studies under the header of one study, and separately 
lists the diocesan studies which addressed the period 1957–1963 (KASKI 
M33-M39), also 
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Statistisch overzicht van de kerkelijke registratie der Nederlandsche 
bisdommen, 1963 (1964) = KASKI M40* 
 
Jos Poeisz, Statistiek van de klein- en grootseminaries, 1958–1963  
(1964) = KASKI M154 
 
Osmund Schreuder, Het beeld van en de waarderingen voor het geestelijk 
beroep: probleemstelling voor een sociologisch onderzoek naar het 
roepingenvraagstuk in Nederland (1964) = KASKI M155 
 
Bernard Engbersen and Jos Poeisz, Toeristenzielzorg, zomer 1964: een 
inventarisatie van zielzorgelijke voorzieningen in de bisdommen Haarlem, 
Rotterdam en Breda (1965) = KASKI R303 
 
Zielzorgexperimenten: uitgangspunten en opzet van de 
zielzorgexperimenten, voorbereid in de bisdommen Rotterdam, Den 
Bosch en Haarlem (1965) = KASKI R304 
 
Jos Poeisz, Statistiek van de parochies op 31 december 1963 (1965)  
= KASKI M157 
 
Jos Poeisz, Statistiek van de klein- en grootseminaries. Studiejaar 1964–
1965 (1965) = KASKI M159 
 
Jos Poeisz, Statistiek van de priesters op 1 januari 1965 (1966)  
= KASKI M160 
 
Jos Poeisz, Statistiek van de klein- en grootseminaries. Studiejaar 1965–
1966 (1966) = KASKI M163 
 
Jos Poeisz, Statistiek van de parochies op 1 januari 1965 (1966)  
= KASKI M165 
 
Jos Poeisz, Parochies van Nederland, 1-1-1966 (1966) = KASKI M166 
 
Theo Steeman, De kerk van vandaag: een verkenning (1966)  
= KASKI M167 
 
 
 
* Note that the 1977 bibliographical overview of KASKI publications 
groups together these studies under the header of one study, and separately 
lists the diocesan studies which addressed the period 1957–1963 (KASKI 
M33-M39), also 
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G.W.M. van der Zee, Diaspora in beweging: een sociografische en 
sociologische verkenning van de katholieke diasporabevolking in 
Nederland (1967) = KASKI R309 
 
Johan Sterk, De leek over het ambt: beeld en attraktiviteit van het ambt 
van priester, broeder en zuster, onderzoek onder Nederlandse katholieken 
(1967) 
 
Jan Zuiker, Brieven aan het Pastoraal Concilie: analyse van 2000 brieven 
toegezonden aan de Concilie-postbussen (1968) 
 
Jan Hutjes, Interviewen over sexualiteit: een proefonderzoek in Arnhem ter 
voorbereiding van een landelijk onderzoek naar de sexuele beleving en 
omgang onder katholieke echtparen (1968) 
 
Jos Poeisz, Broeders- en zustersreligieuzen in Nederland op 1-1-1967  
(1968) = KASKI M171 
 
Jos Poeisz, Parochies in Nederland op 1 januari 1967 (1968)  
= KASKI M172 
 
Jos Poeisz, Survey van R.K. Kerkelijk Nederland, 1956–1968 (1968)  
= KASKI M177 
 
Jos Poeisz, Funkties en funktieveranderingen van priesters in Nederland,  
1965–1968 (1968) = KASKI M178 
 
Wim Kusters, Situatieschets van het Nederlands katholicisme (1968) 
 
Jos Poeisz, De ontwikkeling van het aantal priesters, broeders en zusters in 
de periode 1969–1989 (1969) = KASKI M180 
 
Jos Poeisz and F. de Mey van Streefkerk, Kerklidmaatschap, kerkelijke 
meelevendheid en territoriale organisatie van de rooms-katholieke kerk van 
Nederland op 1 januari 1969 naar regio (1969) = KASKI M181 
 
Jos van Kemenade and Jan van Westerlaak, Ambtscelibaat in een 
veranderende kerk: resultaten van een onderzoek onder alle priesters, 
diakens en subdiakens in Nederland (1969) 
 
Jos Poeisz, De rooms-katholieke kerk in Nederland landelijk en regionaal 
gezien (1971) = KASKI M183 
 
Jozef Tettero and J.F. Bruens, De rooms-katholieke bevolking van 
Nederland: territoriale organisatie en kerkbezoek (1971) = KASKI M184 
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De opbouw van de plaatselijke kerk: kerkopbouwzondag 1972 (1972)  
= KASKI M187 
 
Vijf jaar kerkontwikkeling in Nederland, 1967–1971 (1972)  
= KASKI R326 
 
 
Diocese of Haarlem (20) 
 
De toekomstige parochiële indeling van Slotervaart (1958) = KASKI M72 
 
Memorandum betreffende een aantal kerkelijke voorzieningen in 
Amstelveen (1958) = KASKI M79 
 
De toekomstige ontwikkeling van Amsterdam-Noord (1958)  
= KASKI R201 
 
Wim Kusters, De sociaal-ekonomische en sociaal-kulturele struktuur van 
de Zaanstreek (1958) = KASKI R203 
 
De mogelijkheid van het gewijzigd vaststellen der dekenaatsgrenzen in het 
bisdom Haarlem (1959) = KASKI R213 
 
Rapport betreffende de toekomstige parochiële indeling van Uithoorn 
(1959) = KASKI R222 
 
C.N.A. Leyten, De nieuwe parochies van het Diocees Haarlem: terugblik 
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DEZE STUDIE VORMT naast een serie artikelen het resultaat van een 
cultuurhistorisch onderzoeksproject met betrekking tot de verwevenheid 
van sociologische ‘expertise’ met bisschoppelijk beleid in Nederland tussen 
1946 en 1972. Hoewel de sociologie en de katholieke kerk niet op voorhand 
een voor de hand liggende combinatie lijken te vormen, vonden 
Nederlandse bisschoppen en hun vicarissen-generaal in de eerste decennia 
na de Tweede Wereldoorlog bij het uitstippelen van beleidslijnen dikwijls de 
weg naar godsdienstsociologen en hun ‘feitenfabrieken’.  
Dit boek, dat bestaat uit drie delen met elk twee hoofdstukken, biedt 
een gedetailleerde analyse van een historisch fenomeen dat zou kunnen 
worden aangeduid als een ‘sociologisering’ van de bisschoppelijke 
beleidssferen in Nederland. Drie debatten kaderen de studie historiografisch 
in: allereerst het debat over secularisering in de achttiende, negentiende en 
twintigste eeuw, waarin de anatomie van het seculariseringnarratief nogal 
centraal is komen te staan; vervolgens het debat over ‘kerkvernieuwing’ in 
de Nederlandse kerkprovincie in de lange jaren 1960 (1958–1972), dat 
lange tijd is gedomineerd door sociologische perspectieven; en tenslotte het 
debat over de rol die godsdienstsociologen hebben gespeeld in kerkelijke 
bestuursregionen tussen 1945 en 1975. De eerste twee debatten hebben met 
elkaar gemeen dat daarin het denken en handelen van godsdienstsociologen 
weliswaar is aangestipt, maar nog nauwelijks intensief bestudeerd. 
 
In het eerste deel gaat de aandacht uit naar de naoorlogse ontwikkeling van 
het ‘veld’ van de katholieke sociologie, toegespitst op de relaties tussen 
godsdienstsociologen, hun onderzoeksinstituten, vertogen en 
onderzoekstechnieken enerzijds, en bisschoppen en hun vicarissen-generaal 
anderzijds. Kernontwikkeling vormde de transformatie van theologisch 
gefundeerde analyses over kerk en maatschappij, die wortelden in de 
encyclieken Rerum Novarum (1891) en Quadragesimo Anno (1931), naar 
op ‘feiten’ gebaseerde analyses. De verkrijging van expertise loopt als een 
rode draad door dit eerste deel. Erkenning voortvloeiend uit een waardering 
van wetenschappelijke kwaliteit was essentieel voor de acceptatie van 
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godsdienstsociologen in het kerkelijk domein en de stimulering van een 
bisschoppelijke vraag naar sociologische studies. Zulke erkenning moest 
zorgvuldig worden gecultiveerd, bijvoorbeeld door middel van het 
oprichten en ontwikkelen van aan de universiteit verbonden instituten, het 
in het leven roepen van een internationaal georiënteerd wetenschappelijk 
tijdschrift en het halen van academische graden. In de katholieke kerk, een 
strikt hiërarchisch geordend instituut, was het sluiten van strategische 
bondgenootschappen met (andere) priesters minstens even cruciaal. 
Competitie is een volgende rode draad in het eerste deel. Vooral in het 
kielzog van de Tweede Wereldoorlog, jaren waarin de religiesociologie als 
sociaalwetenschappelijke sub-discipline in de kinderschoenen stond en 
disciplinaire grenzen nog moesten worden afgebakend, woedde er onder 
sociologen, psychologen en pedagogen niet zelden een strijd om 
onderzoeksopdrachten. Daarenboven vond er een twist plaats tussen 
vertegenwoordigers van verschillende generaties godsdienstsociologen over 
het antwoord op de vraag welke soorten onderzoek naar kerk en 
samenleving het meest waardevol waren, en daarmee over de bezetting van 
sleutelposities in het veld. 
Het eerste hoofdstuk staat in het teken van de jaren van 1946 tot 1958. 
De leek George Zeegers groeide in deze periode uit tot de absolute 
hoofdrolspeler. Nadat hij onder supervisie van Willem Boerman sociale 
geografie had gestudeerd aan de Economische Hogeschool te Rotterdam, 
en terwijl hij als hoofd van de afdeling onderzoek van de Rijksdienst voor 
het Nationale Plan (RNP) de integratie van sociologische analyses in 
overheidsbeleid stimuleerde, stond hij in 1946 samen met vooral pater 
Montanus Versteeg OFM aan de wieg van de Katholieke Sociaal-
Kerkelijke Studiekring (KSKSK). Een jaar later veranderde deze 
studiekring in een instituut, Katholiek Sociaal-Kerkelijk Instituut (KASKI), 
waarvan Zeegers directeur werd. Gedreven door een visionair gevoel voor 
ondernemen, een rotsvast geloof in God en een beroepsmatige drang naar 
invloed in de maatschappij, kende hij successen bij de ontplooiing van het 
KASKI binnen en ver buiten de Nederlandse landsgrenzen. Dit instituut 
verenigde katholieke godsdienstsociologen, de onderzoekstechnieken van de 
statistiek en de cartografie, en het vertoog van ‘de planning van 
Christianisering’ onder één vlag. Hoewel Zeegers met zijn KASKI de 
sleutelpositie in het veld bemachtigde en lange tijd behield, wist hij slechts 
een beperkte bisschoppelijke vraag naar KASKI-studies te genereren. 
Alleen in het Bisdom Haarlem gunden bisschop en vicaris-generaal een 
aanzienlijke hoeveelheid onderzoeksopdrachten aan het KASKI. Verder 
had Zeegers in dit bisdom zitting in de Diocesane Situeringscommissie en 
stuurde hij in die hoedanigheid bisschoppelijk bouwbeleid. Nu is het niet zo 
dat zojuist genoemd vertoog ineffectief bleek. Onder invloed van de 
narratieve, visuele en numerieke onderdelen van dit vertoog gingen de 
bisschoppen geloven in de belofte van een nieuwe vorm van expertise voor 
het nemen van beslissingen en het plannen van kerkelijk beleid in een snel 
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veranderende samenleving. Zoals de casus van het Bisdom Roermond 
aantoont, moet desondanks de beperkte bisschoppelijke vraag naar KASKI-
studies veeleer worden toegeschreven aan een welhaast onbegrensde 
expansiedrang van Zeegers. In de ogen van enkele kerkelijke gezagsdragers 
zorgde deze expansiedrang ervoor dat de traditionele, door God ingegeven 
scheidingslijn tussen onderzoeker en beleidsmaker zeer, en soms te zeer, 
vervaagde. 
In het tweede hoofdstuk komt de ontwikkeling van het veld tussen 
1958 en 1972 aan bod. Zoals representanten van een tweede generatie 
katholieke godsdienstsociologen dominant werden in de jaren direct na 
1945 en erin slaagden om hun kennis empirischer te funderen, zo kregen 
representanten van een derde generatie tijdens de lange jaren 1960 toegang 
tot belangrijke posities met definitiemacht. Het min of meer gedwongen 
afzwaaien van Zeegers als KASKI-directeur in 1958 en in 1963 de 
machtsgreep van pater Walter Goddijn OFM, gepromoveerd priester-
socioloog, zijn hoogst illustratief voor deze ontwikkeling. Het was Goddijn 
die met het door de bisschoppen en religieuze oversten opgerichte Pastoraal 
Instituut van de Nederlandse Kerkprovincie (PINK) de sleutelpositie ging 
bezetten en zich in veel opzichten spelverdeler mocht gaan noemen. Hij 
combineerde het directoraat van dit instituut met de functie van secretaris-
generaal van het Pastoraal Concilie (1966–1970)—het Nederlandse vervolg 
op het Tweede Vaticaans Concilie (1962–1965). Als gevolg van deze 
combinatie verenigde hij beleidsadviserende en -uitvoerende taken in zijn 
persoon, hetgeen hem de bijnaam ‘Paus van Holland’ opleverde. Goddijn 
wachtte niet lang met een wijziging in de interne velddynamiek, vooral door 
zijn denken en handelen te verankeren in de theorie van het structureel-
functionalisme. Concreet betekende deze verankering dat hij de katholieke 
kerk beschouwde als een organisatiestructuur gelijkend op een seculier 
bedrijf, waarvan de ‘functionele’ elementen moesten worden behouden en 
de ‘disfunctionele’ elementen dienden te worden geneutraliseerd. Verder 
deed Goddijn in tegenstelling tot Zeegers met genoegen een beroep op de 
techniek van het opiniepeilen, om zo zijn ideaal van een meer 
democratische kerk in de praktijk te brengen, en verspreidde hij het vertoog 
van de ‘planning van kerkvernieuwing’. In aanzienlijke mate dankzij het 
doen en laten van Goddijn vielen bisschoppen en hun vicarissen-generaal 
steeds meer voor de verleiding van de sociologie en kwamen zij in de ban 
van het maakbaarheidsideaal. Zij gingen de katholieke kerk beschouwen, 
niet meer zozeer als een onveranderlijk instituut waarvan elk element een 
door God geconfigureerde rol vervulde, maar eerder als een veranderlijk en 
bureaucratisch georganiseerd instituut waarvan het voortbestaan mede 
afhankelijk was van een interactie met maatschappelijke ontwikkelingen. 
Continuïteit en discontinuïteit karakteriseerden als gevolg van deze 
wisseling in visie de bisschoppelijke vraag naar ‘sprekende cijfers’. Enerzijds 
bleef deze vraag bestaan en was er nog altijd sprake van een 
vertrouwensband tussen kerkelijke gezagsdragers en medewerkers van het 
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KASKI. Anderzijds vond godsdienstsociologisch onderzoek dikwijls plaats 
in, en ten faveure van, een andere kerkpolitieke context met ‘vernieuwing’ 
als adagium. Bovendien gunden de bisschoppen prestigieuze 
onderzoeksopdrachten aan het in 1963 opgerichte Instituut voor 
Toegepaste Sociologie (ITS). Verder verbreedde (met het oog op schaal) en 
verdiepte (met het oog op onderwerp) hun onderzoeksagenda: projecten 
hadden frequenter betrekking op het ‘arbeidskrachten-vraagstuk’, werden in 
elk diocees ontwikkeld en uitbesteed, en namen steeds meer de nationale 
situatie in ogenschouw.  
 
In het tweede deel gaat de aandacht uit naar de dikwijls complexe en 
ambivalente relaties tussen godsdienstsociologisch onderzoek en kerkelijke 
hervorming, toegespitst op het beleidsterrein van het priesterambt. Tijdens 
de lange jaren 1960 ging godsdienstsociologisch onderzoek naar het ambt in 
toenemende mate gepaard met de wens van kerkelijke gezagsdragers om 
wervingsstrategieën te optimaliseren. Tegen deze achtergrond lieten zij in 
aanvulling op de statistische data van het KASKI onder meer twee 
grootschalige opinieonderzoeken uitvoeren. De vragenlijsten gebruikt in 
deze onderzoeksprojecten worden in deze studie niet geanalyseerd als 
objectieve producten van de wetenschap, maar als een vertoog waarmee 
een bepaalde visie op de werkelijkheid werd opgedrongen aan de 
respondenten. Terwijl het ene project betrekking had op het fenomeen 
roeping, en ons inzicht biedt in het optimistisch reformisme van medio 
jaren 1960, spitste het andere project zich toe op het celibaat, en maakt het 
een reconstructie mogelijk van de apocalyptische atmosfeer van de late 
jaren 1960. Beide projecten sproten voort uit de zogeheten rolsociologie. 
Aanhangers hiervan benaderden de priester als iemand die een beroep 
uitoefende en daarbij terugviel op een set van professionele rollen. Op 
macroniveau maakt dit deel inzichtelijk hoe bepaalde aannames en 
formuleringen van vragen in enquêtes resulteerden in beleidsadviezen die 
circuleerden voor en achter de schermen van de publieke sfeer. Op 
microniveau ontleedt dit deel het handelen van Goddijn als de PINK-
directeur die sociologische expertise belichaamde. Dit handelen was even 
divers als invloedrijk. Niet alleen prioriteerde Goddijn het onderwerp van 
het priesterambt op de bisschoppelijke onderzoeksagenda, en stimuleerde 
hij een sociologische visie op het ambt ten koste van theologische kennis en 
kunde. Ook installeerde hij begeleidingscommissies, droeg hij actief bij aan 
het doorbreken van een impasse, wierf hij extra financiële middelen, 
vormde hij de communicatieve schakel tussen bisschoppen enerzijds en 
onderzoekers anderzijds, en zette hij persconferenties op touw. Goddijn 
zocht relatief jonge journalisten, die zich kritischer dan voorheen opstelden 
tegenover kerkelijke gezagsdragers en religie normaliseerden als 
journalistiek onderwerp, evenzeer op als zij hem opzochten. De 
bisschoppen stelden in hem een groot vertrouwen en gaven hem in de 
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praktijk van alledag de nodige bewegingsvrijheid. Zo kon Goddijn zich 
ontpoppen tot een transitiemanager avant la lettre. 
In het derde hoofdstuk staat het ‘roepingenproject’ (1964–1968) 
centraal, een samenwerking tussen KASKI en ITS die voerde tot het 
rapport De leek over het ambt. Dit project was onderdeel van een 
betrekkelijk jonge onderzoekstraditie waarin priester-socioloog en KASKI-
medewerker Jan Dellepoort, die in 1955 aan de Katholieke Universiteit 
Nijmegen promoveerde op het proefschrift De priesterroepingen in 
Nederland, pionierswerk verzette. Hij nam voor het eerst op systematische 
wijze een toenmalige daling van het aantal priesterroepingen onder de loep. 
Zich baserend op grote hoeveelheden statistisch en cartografisch materiaal, 
legde hij de nadruk op de invloed van interne factoren zoals het 
seminarieleven. Osmund Schreuder OFM, gepromoveerd priester-
socioloog, tekende voor de intellectuele blauwdruk van het 
roepingenproject. In tegenstelling tot het werk van Dellepoort onderstreepte 
dit project de invloed van externe factoren, en wel op de aantrekkelijkheid 
van het priester-zijn, het broeder-zijn én het zuster-zijn. Het 
roepingenproject conceptualiseerde een roeping als een rationele 
beroepskeuze in plaats van een gave Gods en vergeleek het ‘religieuze ambt’ 
met seculiere beroepen. De vragenlijst in de vorm van een interview 
voorgelegd aan respondenten bood aan hen nauwelijks de mogelijkheid om 
uit te wijden over de positieve kanten van een leven in dienst van God. Op 
basis van hun antwoorden stelden onderzoekers een ‘crisis’ vast van zowel 
priesterambt als kloosterleven. Zij pleitten voor verregaande hervormingen 
in termen van religieuze ‘vernieuwing’ en professionalisering. Journalisten 
voedden een publiek bewustzijn voor de ‘crisis’ door de 
onderzoeksuitkomsten te verwerken in veel gelezen kranten en tijdschriften. 
Zo draaiden zij, voor zover het beleid omtrent seculiere priesters betrof, de 
duimschroeven van de bisschoppen stevig aan. Een crisis vroeg immers om 
een kordaat antwoord. 
In het vierde hoofdstuk komt het ‘celibaatsproject’ (1966–1969) ter 
sprake, waarbij godsdienstsociologen alle priesters, diakens en subdiakens in 
Nederland schriftelijk betrokken. Het rapport Ambtscelibaat in een 
veranderende kerk behandelde de onderzoeksresultaten. Ook deze enquête, 
ontworpen door ITS-medewerkers, vergrootte elementen van ‘crisis’ sterk 
uit. Respondenten die moeilijkheden ervoeren met de celibataire levensstaat 
of de kerkrechtelijke koppeling tussen ambt en celibaat principieel 
afkeurden, kregen ruimschoots baan om hun bedenkingen kenbaar te 
maken. Hoewel de bisschoppen de voortgang van het project toejuichten in 
het kielzog van de publicatie van de encycliek Sacertotalis Caelibatus door 
paus Paulus VI in 1967, drukten zij om strategische redenen een stempel op 
het vragenschema. Op hun verzoek verzorgden de vermaarde priester-
theologen Edward Schillebeeckx OP, Jan Stieger, Jan Groot en Leo van 
Noort OSC bovendien een pastoraal-theologische nabeschouwing. Dit 
viertal stelde risico voor als een moderne vorm van geloof in God en 
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relativeerde de traditionele claim op top-down kerkelijk leiderschap. De 
priester-theologen adviseerden de bisschoppen om aan te sturen op een 
wijzing in de celibaatswet. Een mediacircus barstte los nadat de Volkskrant 
het persembargo van het PINK doorbrak en de uitkomsten publiceerde op 
de voorpagina. Het was niet zozeer het seksgerelateerde karakter van het 
onderzoek dat de nieuwswaarde zo hoog maakte, maar veeleer de mythe 
dat de Nederlandse kerkprovincie en de Heilige Stoel rechtstreeks 
afstevenden op een explosieve conflictsituatie, wellicht met een 
kerkscheuring als gevolg. De celibaatsenquête zorgde in dat opzicht voor 
een politisering en dynamisering van een discussie die de paus onmiddellijk 
wenste af te sluiten. Oorspronkelijk was er een vervolgonderzoek door 
middel van diepte-interviews voorzien. Ironisch genoeg zorgde alleen het 
bestaan van de celibaatsenquête al dat het snel te laat werd voor een 
dergelijk vervolgonderzoek. De geest was uit de fles.  
 
In het derde deel gaat de aandacht uit naar de behandeling van het 
priesterambt door het Pastoraal Concilie en de repercussies hiervan voor 
het beleid van kardinaal Bernard Alfrink en zijn collega-bisschoppen. Als 
gevolg van de notie van ‘collegialiteit’ die het Tweede Vaticaans Concilie zo 
nadrukkelijk propageerde, groeide een reeds bestaande bereidwilligheid van 
de Nederlandse bisschoppen tot het voeren van gezamenlijk beleid. Tijdens 
haast elke gezamenlijke vergadering tussen 1966 en 1970 reflecteerden zij 
over het ambtsvraagstuk. Dit vraagstuk werkte voor hen als een lakmoestest 
in twee richtingen. Enerzijds drongen van alle kanten in de Nederlandse 
kerkprovincie leken en priesters aan op spoedige beleidsvorming. Daartoe 
zag een volwaardige studiecommissie van het Pastoraal Concilie het 
levenslicht. Anderzijds zagen de Nederlandse bisschoppen zich genoodzaakt 
om hun beleid te verhouden tot de visie van de Heilige Stoel, die vasthield 
aan het Tweede Vaticaans Concilie als de bandbreedte van hervorming, en 
tot de heersende opvattingen binnen de wereldkerk. Godsdienstsociologen 
hadden een niet te onderschatten impact op dit beleid. De bisschoppen 
stonden Goddijn in zijn dubbelrol als PINK-directeur en secretaris-generaal 
van het Pastoraal Concilie toe de conciliaire gang van zaken tot in detail te 
sturen. Priester-socioloog Schreuder beïnvloedde op zijn beurt als voorzitter 
van de conciliaire studiecommissie in grote mate inhoud en toonzetting van 
het ambtsrapport dat de discussies in de concilie-aula in Noordwijkerhout 
stroomlijnde. Betekenisvoller is dat de intellectuele funderingen van het 
bisschoppelijk beleid inzake het ambtscelibaat een danige transformatie 
ondergingen. Hoewel dit beleid nog altijd leunde op theologisch denken, 
kwam het op ongekend grote schaal te rusten op sociologische kennis, 
vooral statistische prognoses en enquêteresultaten. 
In het vijfde hoofdstuk staan het handelen van de ambtscommissie en 
de historische contexten van dit handelen centraal. Eind 1966 was het 
priesterambt nog geen onderdeel van het prioriteitenschema van het 
Pastoraal Concilie. Dit moet worden teruggevoerd op zowel de 
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opinieonderzoeken die destijds in volle gang waren als de publicatie van de 
Pastorale Beleidslijnen voor de ambtsvervulling van de priester in 
Nederland. Kardinaal Alfrink sloot niet uit dat het ambt alsnog zou worden 
geplaatst op het prioriteitenschema. Goddijn gaf een handige wending aan 
deze opmerking door een expert-seminar te organiseren in oktober 1967, 
hetgeen uiteindelijk leidde tot de oprichting van de ambtscommissie in de 
lente van 1968. Hij voorzag de leden van deze commissie al in een vroeg 
stadium van de conclusies van zowel het roepingen- als het celibaatsproject. 
Het ambtsrapport kreeg een sterk pastoraal-theologisch karakter. Mede op 
basis van sociologische onderzoeksresultaten legde het de nadruk op de 
‘crisis’ van het ambt. De tekst sloot af met voorstellen tot verregaande 
hervorming. Met betrekking tot het celibaat, dat de commissieleden 
bombardeerden tot een ‘brandende kwestie’, presenteerden zij de opheffing 
hiervan, één van de condities voor ambtstoetreding, als de meest vruchtbare 
en realistische beleidslijn. Het ambtsrapport bracht de nodige onrust 
teweeg. De Concilieraad en het Centrale Comité, beide organen van het 
Pastoraal Concilie, constateerden een gebrek aan theologische bezinning. 
De bisschoppen sloten zich bij dit oordeel aan. Ternauwernood kon een 
rechtstreekse botsing met de ambtscommissie worden voorkomen. Tijdens 
de gezamenlijke vergaderingen van de bisschoppen fungeerden adviezen 
van Goddijn en de pastoraal-theologische nabeschouwing op het 
celibaatsproject als hét vertrekpunt van de discussie over het priesterambt. 
In januari 1969 besloot het episcopaat om het ambtscelibaat te handhaven 
op de agenda, ondanks een niet mis te verstane terechtwijzing door de 
Heilige Stoel. Meer concreet kwamen Alfrink en zijn collega-bisschoppen 
met elkaar overeen om tijdens internationale bijeenkomsten zoals het 
tweede symposium van Europese bisschoppen te Chur aan te sturen op een 
trans-Alpijns bondgenootschap van kerkelijke gezagsdragers. Twee 
nationale priesterberaden, het ene gehouden in oktober 1968 en het andere 
in november 1969, maakten duidelijk dat de slotakkoorden van het 
celibaatsvraagstuk nog lang niet hadden geklonken in de Nederlandse 
kerkprovincie.  
In het zesde hoofdstuk komen een sleutelepisode van de vijfde plenaire 
zitting van het Pastoraal Concilie en de verdere beleidsbepaling door de 
Nederlandse bisschoppen ter sprake. De samenstelling van de plenaire 
vergadering, die zoveel mogelijk een natuurlijke afspiegeling van geheel de 
kerkprovincie diende te vormen, was verre van ideaal toen het priesterambt 
ter discussie stond. Meer behoudende katholieken ontvingen geen 
uitnodiging of kozen er zelf voor om weg te blijven. Deze 
onevenwichtigheid had directe consequenties voor het verloop van de 
debatten. De participanten wisten over welke macht zij beschikten, de 
macht van de meerderheid, en trachtten snel over te gaan tot 
stemmingsprocedures. De bisschoppen konden aangenomen resoluties 
immers niet zomaar naast zich neerleggen, aangezien deze een hoge 
symbolische waarde hadden. Met betrekking tot het ambtscelibaat stemden 
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overweldigende meerderheden van meer dan 90 procent voor een wijziging 
in de vigerende canonieke wetgeving. Op basis van deze 
stemmingsuitslagen, de theologische opvatting dat een celibatair leven 
gekozen in vrijheid zin geeft aan een priesterlijk leven, de uitslagen van de 
celibaatsenquête, en KASKI-statistieken concludeerden de bisschoppen dat 
een wetswijziging noodzakelijk was geworden. Gehuwden moesten tot 
priester kunnen worden gewijd. Daarnaast diende het mogelijk te zijn om in 
speciale gevallen priesters die in het huwelijk waren getreden onder 
bepaalde voorwaarden te herstellen in de ambtsbediening. Door deze 
beslissing stelden de Nederlandse bisschoppen hun relatie met de Heilige 
Stoel bloot aan onevenredig veel druk. Als duidelijk teken van toegenomen 
spanning manifesteerden zich de volgende twee zaken. Ten eerste was er de 
zaak van de pastorale conciliaire stijl, zoals beïnvloed door de oprukkende 
sociologie. Het woord ‘pastoraal’ stond in de Nederlandse kerkprovincie 
niet alleen in de klassieke zin voor een zorg om de zielenrust van de 
gelovigen, maar ook voor een gezamenlijke zoektocht naar kerk-zijn in 
tijden van geaccelereerde religieuze transformatie. Ten tweede speelde er 
het vraagstuk van de kern in verhouding tot de periferie, met de eerder 
genoemde notie van collegialiteit als conceptuele pijler. De Nederlandse 
bisschoppen vatten deze notie op in centrifugale termen. Zij beschouwden 
zichzelf primair als de hoofden van een ‘lokale kerk’ en trachtten 
centraliserende tendensen binnen de katholieke kerk af te zwakken. Paus 
Paulus VI en curieprelaten redeneerden letterlijk in de tegenovergestelde 
richting. In centripetale termen eisten zij loyaliteit van de Nederlandse 
bisschoppen en interpreteerden zij de ‘Hollandse’ beslissing als een serieuze 
ondermijning van het pauselijk primaat. Als gevolg van deze twee zaken 
trad er een divergerend effect. Hoewel ‘Utrecht’ en ‘Rome’ min of meer 
dezelfde centrale doelstelling nastreefden, namelijk het effectueren van 
Vaticanum II, verstonden beide partijen elkaar niet langer of wilden zij 
elkaar niet langer verstaan. De Heilige Stoel had het laatste woord. 
Bisschopsbenoemingen bleken een uiterst effectief wapen—een wapen 
waartegen geen Alfrink of Goddijn, beiden toch begiftigd met het nodige 
diplomatieke talent, was opgewassen. 
 
Deze studie analyseerde de wisselwerking tussen intellectuele en 
performatieve rollen van katholieke godsdienstsociologen in de beleidssferen 
van de Nederlandse bisschoppen na de Tweede Wereldoorlog. Op verzoek 
van bisschoppen en vicarissen-generaal verzorgden deze 
godsdienstsociologen tussen 1950 en 1972 148 ‘officiële’ publicaties. 
Mannen zoals Zeegers en Goddijn telden en turfden kerkgangers, 
berekenden het aantal gemengde huwelijken, bepaalden waar nieuwe 
kerkgebouwen moesten verrijzen, bevroegen duizenden gelovigen, hadden 
zitting in adviescommissies en waren actief in de organisatie van het 
Pastoraal Concilie. Daarmee beïnvloedden zij bestuurlijke routines en 
stelden zij niet zonder succes een kennisregime waarin de theologie de 
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boventoon voerde ter discussie. Hun waarheid stuurde zelfs de wijze waarop 
bisschoppen de hen omringende wereld waarnamen. Kern van deze 
waarheid vormde de vaststelling dat de kerk in Nederland werd geraakt 
door een aantal ‘crises’ zoals de roepingencrisis en de celibaatscrisis. ‘Crisis’ 
bleek een krachtige analytische categorie te zijn die een dramatiserend effect 
had op de bisschoppelijke werkelijksheidsperceptie en aldus de hervorming 
van kerkelijke structuren volgens sociologische plannen in de hand werkte. 
Godsdienstsociologen bedienden zich niet alleen van dit woord om de 
aandacht te vestigen op wat zij ervoeren als een achteruitgang van 
geloofsbeleving, maar ook en vooral om te onderstrepen dat kerkelijke 
structuren veranderlijk waren, om nieuwe perspectieven op bisschoppelijk 
beleid te openen en om hervormingsvoorstellen te legitimeren. Zoals zij 
keer op keer claimden dat hun analyses de werkelijkheid weerspiegelden, zo 
schiepen deze analyses in feite een nieuwe werkelijkheid. Terwijl lijsten met 
statistische data de notie van een ‘crisis’ uitdrukten in objectief lijkende 
cijfers, medicaliseerden de metaforen van ‘diagnose’ en ‘prognose’ deze 
notie. Cartogrammen cultiveerden de noodzakelijkheid van 
beleidsinterventie alsook een gevoel van urgentie. Zo gezien had de 
‘religieuze crisis van de jaren 1960’ vooral een essentialistisch karakter in die 
zin dat de crisis, zoals wetenschappelijk vormgegeven door 
godsdienstsociologen, een eigen leven begon te leiden in de percepties van 
gelovigen en kerkelijke gezagsdragers, en vervolgens onderdeel werd van 
een historiografie waarin sociologische kennis en kunde nog decennialang 
beeldbepalend zouden zijn. 
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